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UNIVERriTY  of  CALIFORNIA 

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LixJiviiiv  1 


THE   NEW    RATIONALISM 


THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  A  CONSTRUCTIVE  REALISM 

UPON  THE  BASIS  OF  MODERN  LOGIC  AND  SCIENCE, 

AND    THROUGH     THE     CRITICISM     OF     OPPOSED 

PHILOSOPHICAL    SYSTEMS 


BY 

EDWARD   GLEASON   SPAULDING 

Professor  of  Philosophy  in  Princetoo  Uciversity 


NEW  YORK 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

r*.  "-  (^  (\  O 

C^  D  V-''  *>•■>  ^ 


COPTKIQHT,    1918, 
BY 

HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 
PubliBhed  May,  1918 


THE    QUINN    «    BODCN    00.    Mill 
HAHWAY,    N.  J. 


i 


^3  3 

Cop,( 

PREFACE 

As  I  send  this  manuscript  to  the  publishers,  I  am  keenly 
aware  of  how  far  the  results  that  it  presents  fall  short  of 
attaining  that  ideal  both  of  method  and  of  accomplishment 
which  has  been  before  me  during  the  period  of  composition,  and 
which  I  have  explained  in  Chapters  I.  and  III.  Yet  coinci- 
dentally  with  the  closing  of  my  labors  I  find  that  I  am  con- 
vinced more  strongly  than  ever  that,  although  there  are  many 
other  ways,  of  undoubted  value,  in  which  to  study  philosophy, 
nevertheless  the  point  of  view  and  the  method  of  treating 
problems  which  this  book  presents  offer  one  way  or  mode  of 
approach  that  has  thus  far  been  of  much  too  infrequent  use  in 
philosophical  investigation.  For  it  has  been  my  experience, 
especially  during  a  number  of  years  of  teaching  at  Princeton 
University,  as  well  as  of  presenting  philosophical  problems  to 
the  scientific  workers  of  the  Marine  Biological  Laboratory  at 
Woods  Hole,  Mass.,  that  there  is,  at  present  at  least,  a  much 
deeper  interest  in  a  systematic  than  in  a  historical  treatment  of 
philosophy.  An  opportunity  to  satisfy  such  an  interest  would 
be  presented  to  a  far  greater  extent  than  it  now  is,  if  only  the 
effort  were  made  in  philosophy,  as  it  is  in  science,  not  to  em- 
phasize history,  but  to  investigate  problems  of  fact,  and  finally 
to  obtain  such  a  fairly  extensive  body  of  knowledge  as  will 
receive  general  acceptance  and  be  recognized  as  meaning  a  well- 
defined  advance  and  progress. 

The  present  tendency  in  philosophy,  at  least  in  our  educa- 
tional institutions,  is,  however,  directly  opposed  to  such  a  pro- 
cedure, for  it  is  to  the  almost  exclusive  study  of  the  history  of 
philosophy  that  both  student  and  general  reader  are  urged  and 
directed.  The  result  is  that  the  average  student  of  philosophy 
is  left  so  perplexed  through,  e.g.,  the  multiplicity  of  systems 
which  his  study  discloses  to  him,  that  his  dissatisfaction  usually 
far  exceeds  his  satisfaction  with  the  outcome  of  his  intellectual 
efforts.     But  even  if  this  is  not  true  of  the  student,  it  most 


vi  PREFACE 

certainly  is  the  case  with  the  scientist,  who  is  thereby  frequently 
moved  not  only  to  the  sharpest  criticism  of  all  philosophy  what- 
soever, but  also  to  the  total  neglect  of  philosophical  considera- 
tions where  these  cannot  well  be  neglected. 

This  book,  therefore,  represents  the  results  of  departing 
abruptly  from  the  historical  method,  and  of  endeavoring  to 
ascertain  both  what  those  postulates  are  from  which  each  philo- 
sophical system  is  logically  derivable,  and  also,  whether  there 
is,  finally,  one  body  of  principles  that  is  common  to  all  systems, 
and  logically  presupposed  by  them. 

It  is  my  conviction  both  that  there  is  such  a  single  "doc- 
trine," difficult  though  it  may  be  to  discover  what  it  is,  and 
also  that  this  doctrine  in  its  fundamentals  is  logically  present  in 
every  effort  to  philosophize  rationally. 

It  is  for  these  reasons,  therefore,  that  I  have  chosen  the  title, 
The  New  Rationalism,  for  a  position  which  also  becomes,  as  a 
developed  theory,  a  Neo-realism  of  ideals  that  are  discovered  by 
reason,  as  well  as  of  those  reals  that  are  disclosed  to  the  senses 
and  that  form  what  we  call  nature. 

A  further  constant  stimulus  to  my  efforts  has  been  the  con- 
viction, also,  that,  if  it  is  to  be  admitted  that  philosophy  is  of 
direct  and  far-reaching  effect  on  life — and  what  more  convincing 
demonstration  of  such  an  effect  could  there  be  than  the  origins 
of  the  present  world-crisis? — then  that  philosophy  which  the 
world  needs  to  accept  and  to  act  upon  at  the  present  time,  is 
one  that  holds  to  the  actuality  of  ideals,  discovered  by  reason, 
rather  than  one  that  justifies  our  living  only  in  accordance  with 
our  biological  nature.  For  it  is  such  a  naturalistic  philosophy 
and  ethics  that,  it  seems  to  me,  has  not  only  actuated  the  present 
attack  on  civilization,  but  is  also  persistently  used  to  justify  this 
attack. 

There  is  need,  therefore,  not  only  of  combating  by  physical 
force  those  physical  forces  to  the  use  of  which  such  a  naturalistic 
philosophy  has  led,  but  also  of  combating  and  refuting  by 
argument  and  by  philosophical  investigation  that  philosophy 
which  is  used  to  justify  such  a  physical  attack — if  only  such 
a  refutation  can  be  found.  For  if  such  a  refutation  cannot  be 
found,  then  intellectually  our  attitude  should  be  one  of  calm 
acceptance  of  the  outcome,  whatever  it  may  be. 


PREFACE  vii 

It  is  a  most  important  problem,  then,  to  ascertain  whether 
or  not  there  is  possible  a  philosophical  refutation  of  this  nat- 
uralism that  is  challenging  the  world  to  the  very  foundations 
of  its  civilization,  and,  if  there  is  such  a  refutation,  to  ascertain 
vJiat  it  is,  or  where  its  means  can  be  found.  » 

Such  means  are,  however,  surely  not  those  of  merely  dog- 
matically denying  the  truth  of  Naturalism,  nor  of  studying  its 
history  or  development  as  a  philosophy,  nor,  seemingly,  of 
appealing  to  the  opposed  system  of  Idealism,  which  in  the  face 
of  the  present  horrors  that  afflict  humanity  seems  to  have  suf- 
fered collapse  in  its  basic  doctrine  that  "all's  well  with  the 
A\orld."  But,  if  the  refutation  of  Naturalism  is  not  possible 
by  such  means,  then  it  would  seem  to  me  that  it  is  possible  only 
by  a  philosophy  which  can  demonstrate  that,  while  some 
"things"  evolve,  not  all  "things"  are  subject  to  the  principle 
of  evolution;  that,  while  a  ruthless  struggle  for  existence  may 
be  one  condition  for  progress,  cooperation  is  another  and,  per- 
haps, more  important  condition ;  that,  while  the  best  may  survive 
(and  may  not),  the  mere  fact  of  survival  is  itself  not  identical 
with  heing  the  best;  that,  while  justice  may  be  useful  to  him 
who  survives,  there  are,  nevertheless,  other  reasons  for  the 
practice  of  justice  than  its  usefulness;  and,  finally,  that,  al- 
though nature  is  undeniably  fact,  not  all  fact  is  identical  with 
ruthlessly  combating,  slowly  evolving,  strongest-surviving  na- 
ture, but  that  there  are  some  realities  which  are  beyond  nature, 
and  which,  though  they  cannot  be  seen  by  the  eye  of  the  body, 
are  nevertheless  revealed  to  reason. 

The  only  philosophy,  however,  which  can  demonstrate  these 
things, — i.e.,  which  can  refute  and  not  merely  deny  Naturalism 
— is  one  that,  in  fearlessly  submitting  all  "things"  to  reason's 
testings,  includes  among  these  "things"  the  very  means  either 
of  defense  or  of  refutation,  namely,  reason  itself.  And  the 
only  outcome  at  which  such  a  rational  "criticism"  of  reason 
itself  can  consistently  arrive  is  one  that  justifies  its  own  pro- 
cedure, and,  therefore,  any  rational  procedure  whatsoever,  as 
such.  But  such  an  outcome  means  the  frank  recognition  that 
there  are  not  only  facts  of  the  senses,  but  also  facts  of  the 
reason,  and  that  not  all  fact  is  part  of  nature  or  of  evolution. 
Such  a  philosophy  is,  however,  Rationalism. 


Viii  PREFACE 

It  is,  therefore,  both  for  the  student  and  for  the  general 
reader  who  are  interested,  first,  in  problems  that  concern  fact 
rather  than  history,  and,  secondly,  in  the  more  specijfic  prob- 
lem, What  is  the  correct  philosophy,  Naturalism,  or  some  other 
opposed  system?  that  this  book  is  written.  It  is,  also,  for  such 
readers,  in  case  they  are  not  familiar  with  psychology  and  logic, 
that  I  have  presented  certain  questions,  such  as  the  Problems 
of  Method  of  Part  I.,  Section  III.,  that  are  not  usually  offered  in 
an  ' '  Introduction. ' '  These  Chapters  may  be  omitted  by  one  who 
is  conversant  with  their  contents,  as  may  also  Chapters  II., 
XXII.,  XXIV.,  XLIII.,  vii.-x.,  if  they  are  found  too  difficult. 

In  conclusion  I  desire  to  express  my  appreciation  of  the  sym- 
pathy and  inspiration  that  I  have  received  from  my  friends, 
Professors  E.  B.  Holt,  W.  T.  Marvin,  W.  P.  Montague,  R.  B. 
Perry  and  W.  B.  Pitkin  in  the  development  of  a  point  of  view, 
a  method,  and,  finally,  a  positive  philosophy.  The  present 
volume  is  not  cooperative,  as  was  The  New  Realism  in  which 
my  five  friends  and  myself  collaborated,  but  it  is,  nevertheless, 
in  part  an  outgrowth  of  frequent  discussions  with  these  friends, 
and  of  definite  attempts  to  cooperate. 

My  thanks  are  also  due  my  friend,  Mr.  Henry  Lane  Eno, 
who,  in  thorough  sympathy  with  the  general  character  of  my 
endeavor,  has  kindly  read  the  greater  part  of  the  manuscript. 
I  also  desire  to  acknowledge  my  obligation  to  my  friend  and 
colleague,  Professor  H.  C.  Longwell,  for  his  careful  reading  of 
the  proofs. 

Finally,  I  should  explain,  that  the  bibliographical  references 
are  intended,  not  to  be  complete,  but  only  to  indicate  either  the 
more  important  literature  on  a  topic  under  discussion,  or  those 
places  where  the  correctness  of  my  assignment  of  certain  specific 
positions  to  certain  writers  may  be  confirmed. 

Princeton, 
October  10,  1917. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I 

PAQE 

Introduction xv 

SECTION  I 
THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

CHAPTER 

I    Postulates  and  Assumptions 3 

II    Realism  and  Logic 12 

III  The  Old  and  the  New  Logic 25 

I     Introductory 25 

II    The  Origins  of  the  Traditional  Logic       ...  29 
ni     The  Formulation  and  the  Criticism  of  the  Tradi- 
tional   Logic 35 

SECTION  II 
THE   HISTORICAL   PROBLEMS   OF   PHILOSOPHY 

IV  Introductory 44 

V    The  Ontological  Problem 51 

VI  The  Cosmological  Problem 64 

VII  The  Teleological  Problem   .......  57 

VIII  The  Theological  Problem 62 

IX  The  Problem  of  Values 66 

X  The   Epistemological   Problem 71 

XI  The  Psychological  Problem  and  the  Nature  op  Con- 
sciousness       .88 

SECTION  III 
METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

I      THINKING 

XII    Reasoning  by  Words  and  the  Psychology  of  Thinking  95 

I     Introductory 95 

n     The  Thinking  Situation 95 

m     The  Psychology  of  Thinking;  Symbols     ...  96 

IV    Grammar 99 


X  CONTENTS 

CHAPTEB  PAGE 

XIII  The  Logical  Aspects  of  Thinking:   Interpretations 

OF  the  Nature  of  Logic 99 

I     The  Realistic  View  of  Logic 100 

II     The    "  Psychologizing "    Tendency      ....  105 

III     The  Pragmatic  Tendency 109 

II    the  traditional  technical  methods  of  reasoning 

XIV  The  Categorical  Syllogism Ill 

XV    The  Truth  of  Premises 119 

I    The  Regress  of  Premises 119 

II     Common  Sense  and  the  Social  Tradition  .        .        .  120 

HI     Induction 121 

rv     How  Facts  Are  Given 122 

1  Sense  Experience 123 

2  Intuition,  Feeling,  and  Emotion     .        .        .  124 

3  Memory 126 

4  Imagination 126 

5  Self-Evidence 129 

6  The  Inconceivability  of  the  Opposite     .        ,  130 

7  Presupposition  by  Denial 132 

XVI     The  Nature  of  Contradiction 136 

XVII    The  Disjunctive  Syllogism 141 

XVIII    The  Hypothetical   Syllogism 144 

XIX    The  Dilemma 148 

XX    Analogy 152 

III    analysis  and  the  new  logic 

XXI    Further   Implicative   Situations   and   New   Methods 

of   Establishing   Premises 155 

XXII    Analysis 158 

XXIII  Analysis  by  Incorrect  Principles 160 

XXIV  Misinterpretations   of  Correct  Analysis      .       .       .  170 
XXV    The  Methods  of  the  New  Logic:  Summary  .       .       .  173 

IV    theories  of  relations 

XXVI    The  Theories  of  External  and  Internal  Relations  176 
I     The   Formulation   of  the  Theories      ....  176 
II     The  Proofs  or  Arguments  for  the  Theories  of  Re- 
lations      178 

1  The  Theory  of  External  Relations   .  .178 

2  The  "  Modification "  Theory  of  Relations       .  182 

3  The     Underlying     or     Transcendent     Reality 

Theory  of  Relations:  Criticism  of  the  Argu- 
ment   185 


CONTENTS 


XI 


CHAPTER 
XXVII 


PAGE 

Types  of  Relations,  of  Wholes,  and  of  Unities  .       .  190 

I     Types    of    Relations 190 

II     Types    of    Wholes 292 

ni    Types  of  Unity 197 

IV     Theories  of  Relations  and  Types  of  Logic     .        .  198 

V    Material  Principles  of  Proof 200 


PART  II 

SECTION  I 
INTRODUCTORY 

XXVIII    The  Problem  about  Problems 203 

I     The  Epistemological  Problem 203 

II     The  Value-Centric  Predicament 206 

ni    The  Solution  of  the  Ego-Centric  Predicament  ,       .  208 


SECTION  II 

CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

XXIX    Phenomenalism 216 

I     The  Logical   Derivation  of  Phenomenalism    .        .  216 

II    Phenomenalism's  Solution  of  Problems   .        .        .  224 

in     Criticism    of    Phenomenalism 230 

XXX    Subjective  Idealism 233 

I     Logical   Derivation 233 

n    Subjectivism's  Solution  of  Problems:   Criticism   .  237 

XXXI    Positivism 041 

I    Derivation 241 

II     Criticism 251 

XXXII    Naturalism 257 

I     Detailed    Naturalism 259 

II    Materialism,  Psychism  and  Dualism:  Materialism  262 
m     Universal   Dualism  or   Parallelism    .        .        .        .264 

IV    Psychism :  Criticism  of  Naturalistic  Theories  .       .  268 

XXXIII    Pragmatism 273 

I    Pragmatism's  Anti-Substance   Doctrine    .        .        .  273 

n    Pragmatism's  Anti-Intellectualism     ....  274 

m    Pragmatism's    Evolutionism 283 

1  Criticism:  Truth  and  Falsity  for  Pragmatism  288 

2  The  Degrees  of  Pragmatism's  Evolutionism    .  295 
IV    General  Criticism  of  Pragmatism     ....  299 

V    Conclusion 3q1 


xii 


CONTENTS 


SECTION  III 
SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES:  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

XXXIV      INTEODUCTORT 308 

I  Objective,  Subjective,  and  Platonic  Idealism  .        .  308 
II     The  Historical  Development  of  Objective  Idealism 

out  of  Phenomenalism 311 

XXXV    The  Logical  Derivation  of  Objective  Idealism:  Criti- 
cism    317 

XXXVI    Developments  of  Objective  Idealism       ....  328 

I     Theism   and   Pantheism 328 

II  Panlogism  and  Ethical  Idealism       ....  329 
XXXVII    Further  Developments  of  Objective  Idealism     .       .  335 

I     Voluntarism 335 

II     Vitalistic   and  Romantic   Idealism    ....  342 

XXXVIII    Conclusion 345 

I     Monism's    Solution    of     Philosophical     Problems: 

Criticism 345 

II     What  can  the  Absolute  One  be?        .        .        .        .  354 


SECTION  IV 

REALISM:    FUNCTION    PHILOSOPHIES 

I    the  central  doctrine  of  realism 

XXXIX    The  Solution  of  the  Eqo-Centric  and  Value-Centric 

Predicaments    .  364 

XL    Realism's   Hypotheses 372 

I    Knowing  and  Known  Object  may  be  Qualitatively 

Different 373 

II     Illusory  Objects  are  Objective 374 

in         1     Objects  may  be  Genuinely  Known  .        .        .     378 

2  They  may  Become  Known  and  Cease  to  be 

Known 378 

3  Not  All  Objects  are  Known   .        .        .        .378 
IV     Other  Instances  of  External  Relations.    The  Free- 
dom of  Reason 382 

V    Philosophical   Problems  not   Generated   by   their 

History 396 

VI  Truth  an  External  and  Non-causal  Relation  .       .     396 

VII  Analysis  does  not  Alter  the  "  Thing "  Analyzed     396 
Vin     Individualism  and  Skepticism  are  Logically  False 

Positions 402 

jx    Analysis  reveals  Facts,  and  Mysticism  is  False  .     402 


CONTENTS  l^iij 

C5APTEE  PAGE 

XLI    The  Principles  of  Realism 408 

I     There  are   Propositions ,  409 

II     There  are  Terms  aud  Relations     ....  409 

ni    There  is  the  Relation  of  Implication  .        .        .  412 

IV    There  is  the  Relation  of  Contradiction       .       .  414 

V    There  is  Consistency 418 

VI     There  is  a  System  of  Propositions       .        .        .421 
VII     There    are    Specific    Processes    called    Knowing, 

and  There  is  Knowledge 423 

VIII     There  is  Truth 423 

IX     Truth  is  Distinct  from  Certainty  ....  424 
X     The  Nature  of  Truth  is  not  the   Same  as  the 
Outcome  of  Knowledge,  i.e.,  of  its  Successful 

and  Satisfactory  Working 425 

XI    Truth  is  Independent  of  its  Proof  and  Tests       .  426 

XII    Analysis  is  Possible 426 

xni     Reason  is  Free  to  Follow  the  Implicative  Struc- 
ture  of   Reality 427 

XIV    An  Analysis  of  the  Knowing  Situation  is  Pos- 
sible    427 

XV    Truth  is  not  a  Completely  Implicative  System  of 

Truths 427 

XVI    There  is  a  System  of  Ideal  Truth  ....  428 
XVII    Knowing  and  Known  Object  may  be  Both  Quali- 
tatively and  Numerically  Distinct    .        .        .  428 
XVIII    Particular  Existent  Entities  are  not  the  Only 

Objects  that  can  be  Known        ....  429 
XIX     There  are  Two  Types  of  Knowing,  namely,   (a) 

by  Specification,    (b)    by  Type   ....  429 

XX     "  Unknown  "  is  not  the  Same  as  "  Unknowable  "  429 

XXI    Error  is  a  Fact  that  can  be  Explained       .        .  429 
XXII    There  are  Certain  Entities  that  are  Related  by 

Logical  Priority 429 

xxin    Relations  are  Themselves  not  Causally  Related  429 

n      CONSTRUCTIVE  AND   DETAILED    REALISM 

XLII    The  Ontological  Problem  as  Solved  by  Realism  .       .  430 

I     Introductory 430 

n     Realism's  Solution  of  the  Ontological  Problem  432 

XLIII    Realism's  Solution  of  the  Cosmological  Problem      .  437 
I    Normal  Objects,  ii    Error,  and  ill   The  Nature 

of  Consciousness 437 

IV    Complex    Entities;    v    Creative    Synthesis;    vi 

Freedom 444 

VII    and  VIII    Space  and  Time  as  Part  of  the  Cosmos : 

Infinity  and  Continuity 451 


XIV 


CONTENTS 


OHAPTEB  PAGE 

IX    Number 455 

X    Motion,  Qualitative  Change,  and  Evolution      .  464 

XI     Consciousness  as  a  Dimension  and  a  Variable  .  470 

XLIV    Epistemoloqy  and  Psychology  as  Pabt  of  Cosmoloqy    486 

XLV    The  Realistic  Doctrine  of  Values 496 

^LVI    Realism's  Teleology  and  Theology 607 


INTRODUCTION 

The  reader  familiar  with  philosophical  literature  will  find  in 
this  book  a  not  inconsiderable  departure  from  the  usual  presenta- 
tion and  treatment  of  the  problems,  methods,  and  systems  of 
philosophy.  Such  a  departure,  however,  has  been  deliberately 
adopted  by  the  author,  not  out  of  any  mere  desire  to  be  ex- 
ceptional, but  because  of  a  philosophical  and  scientific  point  of 
view  of  the  correctness  of  which  he  is  deeply  convinced.  Some 
of  the  most  notable  features  of  this  point  of  view  and  of  the 
departure  that  proceeds  from  it  are,  briefly,  as  follows: — 

I.  Genuine  philosophical  problems  are  regarded  as  being 
independent  of  their  historical  origin,  setting,  and  develop- 
ment. This,  of  course,  does  not  imply  that  these  problems  and 
the  systems  of  philosophy  which  are  sets  of  solutions  of  them, 
have  not  had  a  history.  But,  if  the  problems  are  real,  and  not 
false,  it  means  that,  while  the  consciousness  of  the  problems 
has  had  a  history,  the  problems  themselves  are  not  necessarily 
historical  in  character,  nor  conditioned  by  the  development  of 
the  consciousness  of  them.  Not  all  problems  can  be  admitted 
to  be  historical  or  genetic,  since,  if  history  itself  presents  real 
problems,  there  may  be  other  problems  of  fact  that,  as  such,  are 
not  conditioned  by  their  history  and  development. 

II.  Each  of  the  several  great  systems  of  philosophy  is  re- 
garded as  a  set  of  solutions  (of  philosophical  problems)  that  are 
obtained  by  the  use  of  certain  methods  and  presuppositions 
which  are  in  most  cases  otily  assumed,  either  tacitly  or  explicitly, 
but  not  established  and  proved.  These  methods  and  presup- 
positions, moreover,  have  been  regarded  and  employed  in  the 
past  as  absolute  and  self-evident,  chiefly  because  of  the  influence 
of  tradition  on  individual  philosophers.  They  now,  however, 
can  be  restated  in  a  purely  logical  and  disinterested  manner, 
and  subjected  to  examination  and  criticism  by  a  method  quite 
analogous  to  that  strictlj^  scientific  procedure  which  has  recently 


xvl  INTRODUCTION 

been  adopted  in  the  examination  of  the  several  geometrical  sys- 
tems, namely,  the  Euclidean,  Lobatchewskian,  and  Riemannian, 
not,  of  course,  in  reference  to  their  history,  but  to  their  self- 
consistency,  their  basic  postulates  or  so-called  axioms,  and  their 
logical  structure. 

III.  The  position  is  taken  and  developed  at  length,  that  most 
great  philosophical  systems  have  been  worked  out  under  the 
domination  of  a  logic  and  of  certain  philosophical  concepts  that 
have  come  down  in  the  tradition  whicli  emanated  from  Aris- 
totle. This  tradition  is  one  that  uecognizes  chiefly  only  a  lim- 
ited number  of  relations  between  rentities,  such  as  the  relations 
of  similarity  and  difference,  as  well  as  a  limited  number  of 
philosophical  concepts,  such  as  cause  and  substance,  so  that  it 
is  limited  as  an  organon,  or  method. 

IV.  Historical  study  reveals  the  domination  of  this  Aris- 
totelian tradition  in  its  several  phases,  but  does  not  so  readily 
disclose  its  origin.  However,  this  difficulty  is  to  be  expected 
if  the  character  of  the  tradition  is  due  to  the  unconscious  influ- 
ence of  certain  entities  on  its  initiators.  But  that  hypothesis 
which  accounts  both  for  the  specific  character  of  the  logic  and 
for  the  concepts  ivhich  have  dominated  most  traditional  phil- 
osophical thinking  is,  that  the  physical  thing,  conceived  as 
identical  ivith  a  substratum  in  which  qualities  inhere,  occupied 
the  attention  of  the  great  philosophical  pioneers  more  than  did 
relations  and  events.  This  being  the  case,  one  should  expect 
a  logic  of  a  specific  kind,  namely,  a  logic  that  is  modeled  after 
the  most  patent  relations  among  physical  things,  and  these 
are: —  (1)  independence  of  order,  or  mere  additiveness,  along 
with  (2)  resemblance  and  (3)  difference,  by  virtue  of  which 
there  are  classes,  and  (4)  the  inclusion  of  one  class  in  another, 
either  completely,  or  partially-,  or  negatively.  Furthermore,  one 
should  expect  philosophies  that  are  based  either  on  the  view 
that  all  entities  are  (5)  in  causal  interaction  with  one  another, 
or  on  the  view  that  entitii^  are  (6)  substances  or  substrata  in 
which  attributes  (7)  inhere,  or,  (8)  in  some  cases,  on  both 
views  combined.  } 

These  expectations  a  e  fully  confirmed  by  the  character  of 
the  greater  part  of  pft.losophical  development,  in  which  there 
have  appeared  a  seri28  both  of  causation-philosophies  and  of 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

substance-philosophies,  though  with  neither  of  these  fully  ex- 
cluding the  other  in  any  one  instance.  We  may  therefore  say, 
if  a  homely,  but  most  expressive  term  may  be  coined,  that 
philosophy  has  largely  been  "thingized"  throughout  its  entire 
history. 

V.  At  the  same  time  that  philosophy  has  been,  throughout 
most  of  its  history,  under  the  domination  of  the  Aristotelian 
tradition,  an  independ'^it  development  has  been  taking  place 
in  science,  especially  for  the  last  four  hundred  years.  In  this 
development  a  logic  has  Ix-^n  used  that  is  radically  different 
from  the  logic  of  the  traditic  i,  while  the  concepts  of  "relation" 
and  of  "event"  or  "happening"  have  played  the  dominant 
role  as  philosophical  principles  of  thinking,  rather  than  the 
concepts  of  substance  and  cause.  This  "new"  logic  and  these 
principles  have  only  recently  come  to  full  consciousness  and 
received  careful  and  accurate  formulation.  The  logic  is  not 
limited  to  the  logic  of  classes  and,  therefore,  to  such  relations 
as  similarity  and  inclusion,  but  is  essentially  the  "science  of 
order" — a  principle  which,  as  identical  with  the  non-additive 
relationship  of  parts  to  form  a  whole,  allows  of  the  appearance 
and  subsistence  in  the  whole  of  qualities  that  are  lacking  to  the 
parts.  It  fully  recognizes  also  (1)  the  functional  relation- 
ship as  opposed  to  the  causal,  and  (2)  those  asymmetrical  and 
transitive  relations  that  are  present  in  series,  such  as  the  series 
of  positive  integers  in  order  of  magnitude.  A  pivotal  point,  also, 
in  this  new  logic  is  the  discovery  (3)  of  the  complete  com- 
patihility  of  relatedness  and  independence,  as  instanced  in  a 
number  of  respects  in  the  functional  relation. 

VI.  From  the  point  of  view  and  by  the  method  which  this 
new  and  non-Aristotelian  logic  furnishes,  a  number  of  im- 
portant philosophical  positions  ai  i  found  both  to  be  logically- 
justified  and  to  receive  empirical  confirmation. 

One  of  the  most  important  of  these  positions  is,  that  the 
relationship  between  knowing  and  T  -t  which  is  known,  what- 
ever that  object  may  be,  is  but  anothe  ■  instance  of  entities  that 
are  related  and  yet  independent,  whic^i  means,  of  course,  that 
knowing  does  not  create  nor  even  affect  that  which  is  (to  be) 
known,  in  contradistinction  from  the  ri  lit  which  is  obtained 
if  the  problem  of  knowing  is  "solved"  by  the  Aristotelian  logic 


xvi'ii  INTRODUCTION 

and  by  the  principles  of  cause  and  substance.  This  episte- 
mological  position  is  both  Rationalism  and  Realism. 

Another  position  or  result  is,  that  the  entities  which  can  be 
known  {in  this  way)  are  not  limited  to  those  of  the  physical 
and  mental  "worlds,"  but  include,  as  well,  universals  and  such 
ideals  as  perfect  justice,  which,  though  they  may  never  "exist," 
are  nevertheless  facts. 

It  is  also  found  that  recent  attacks  on  intellectual  analysis 
are  really  baseless  because  arbitrarily  and  unjustifiably  they 
limit  intellect  to  the  use  of  a  logic  and  of  methods  that  are 
Aristotelian,  and  so  seem  to  be  able  to  demonstrate  its  failure; 
whereas,  if  in  place  of  this  traditional  logic  and  method,  the 
principles  of  the  new  logic  be  granted  to  intellect,  it  can  be 
shown  as  inevitably  to  succeed. 


PART  I 
PROBLEMS  AND  METHODS 


SECTION  I 

THE   PROBLEM   OF   THE   POINT   OF   VIEW 

CHAPTER  I 

POSTULATES  AND  ASSUMPTIONS 

In  presenting  an  examination  and  analysis  of  the  several  great 
philosophical  systems,  not  historically,  but  according  to  their 
success  or  failure  in  the  solution  of  philosophical  problems,  and 
their  logical  dependence  upon  one  or  another  set  of  initial 
assumptions,  the  writer  has  no  intention  to  minimize  the  interest 
and  importance  of  that  study  of  philosophy  which  concerns  its 
development.  The  literature  of  philosophy,  however,  is  already 
full  of  both  books  and  articles  that  are  historical.  There  is 
opportunity,  then,  for  a  volume  which  has  resulted  from  the 
conviction  that,  although  philosophical  problems  and  their  mani- 
fold solutions  have  both  had  a  history,  nevertheless  these  prob- 
lems are  not  in  every  instance  generated  by  their  history,  any 
more  than  are  the  problems  of  the  science  of  history  itself. 

This  statement  requires,  perhaps,  some  elucidation,  since  the 
term  history  is  somewhat  ambiguous.  It  may  be  used  to  desig- 
nate the  actual  development,  throughout  one  time  period  or 
another,  of  human  thought,  ideas,  and  institutions,  or  of  the 
structure  and  functions  of  living  organisms,  or  the  evolution 
of  chemical  elements,  or  planets  and  suns.  For  the  modem 
view  is  that  all  these  evolve  and  have  a  history.  The  term  may 
also  be  used  to  mean  the  scientific,  or  at  least  the  systematic 
study  of  this  development  and  evolution  in  any  specific  instance. 
Sometimes,  however,  the  term  is  so  employed  that  it  seems  to 
have  both  meanings  at  once,  whereupon  confusion  arises.  In 
this  volume,  however,  it  is  the  first  meaning  that  concerns  us 
most.     Therefore,  unless  otherwise  indicated,  the  term  will  be 

3 


4  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

used  to  identify  history  with  development  and  evolution.  When 
used  in  the  second  sense  we  shall  refer  specifically  to  history 
as  a  science. 

With  these  distinctions  made,  the  statement  is  clear,  that 
history  as  a  science  has  itself  had  a  history  or  development. 
When  this  specific  development  is  studied,  as  it  is,  e.g.,  in 
investigating  the  progress  in  historical  methods  and  canons,  we 
have  the  history  of  history.  We  may  conclude,  then,  that  history 
as  development,  history  as  a  science,  and  the  history  of  history 
itself  are  three  different  "things,"  and  that  the  distinction 
between  them  is  essential. 

It  is  important  next  to  note  that  history  as  a  science  does 
not  generate  its  own  problems — at  least,  not  all  of  them.  The 
most  it  can  do  is  to  focus  the  attention  of  historians  upon  one 
kind  of  problem  rather  than  upon  another,  as,  e.g.,  upon  that 
branch  of  history  which  concerns  itself  with  the  rule  of  kings 
rather  than  with  the  aspirations  and  deeds  of  the  people  ruled. 
As  a  science  history  is  selective,  not  generative  of  its  own  prob- 
lems, unless  these  problems  be  false  ones, — which  is  not  beyond 
the  range  of  possibilities. 

That  history  as  a  science  must  always  be  rewritten  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  present,  is  a  dictum  both  frequently  re- 
peated and  widely  accepted.  But  the  reinvestigation  of  that 
which  is  past  fails  of  its  purpose,  unless  there  are  7iew  methods 
and  points  of  view  which  themselves  reveal  facts  and  truths 
that  are  not  historical.  Indeed  it  may  be  that  it  is  only  by 
such  truths  and  facts,  and  by  such  methods  and  points  of  view, 
now  to  be  regarded  as  correct,  that  the  real  character  of  the 
past,  oftentimes  in  its  falsity  of  hypothesis  and  of  problem,  can 
ever  become  known. 

In  other  fields,  e.g.,  in  biology,  the  situation  is  quite  similar. 
There  has  been  a  development  of  biological  science,  and  there 
is  a  history  of  this  development ;  but  biology  as  a  science  is  little 
concerned  with  the  study  of  this  specific  development,  and  is 
certainly  not  identical  with  the  history  of  itself. 

A  similar  condition  holds  of  many  other  sciences,  such  as 
logic,  mathematics,  mechanics,  physics,  chemistry,  and  astron- 
omy. Indeed  one  can  say  of  these  sciences  that  they  themselves 
would  not  have  had  a  development  and  a  history,  had  there  not 


POSTULATES  AND  ASSUMPTIONS  5 

been  problems  which  are  themselves  not  developmental  or  his- 
torical. 

Philosophy  presents  no  exception  to  these  principles.  It  is 
admittedly  a  fact  of  compelling  interest  and  importance  that 
there  has  been  a  long  and  extensive  development  of  human 
thought  and  knowledge,  especially  among  European  peoples, 
which  because  of  its  character  and  influence  is  called  philo- 
sophical. For  philosophy  means  love  of  knowledge.  It  is  to 
be  admitted,  too,  that  this  great  ''stream  of  thought"  has 
touched,  or  included  in  itself,  to  some  degree  at  least,  perhaps 
every  phase  of  human  activity,  more  especially  religion,  science, 
art,  and  politics.  But  the  great  vis  a  tergo  in  the  onward  sweep 
of  its  currents  has  been  the  conviction  that  there  are  problems 
of  fact  which  have  not  been  conditioned  by  their  own  develop- 
ment. Indeed,  the  consciousness  that  there  are  problems  of 
development  has  itself  been  almost  entirely  absent  throughout 
the  greater  part  of  history,  as  is  witnessed  by  the  comparatively 
recent  origin  of  history,  and  especially  evolution  as  sciences. 

It  is  the  writer's  intention,  therefore,  to  present  in  this  non- 
historical  way  the  several  great  philosophical  systems  of  the 
past  in  respect  to  their  problems,  their  methods  and  their  solu- 
tions of  problems  (whether  these  be  true  or  false),  and  thus  to 
review  the  comparative  anatomy  and  morphology,  as  it  were, 
of  these  systems,  not  as  they  have  grown  up  in  a  maze  of 
surroundings  and  of  antecedent  historical  causes,  but  as  each 
may  be  regarded  today  as  a  set  of  possibly  genuine  solutions 
of  problems.  As  systems  that  have  this  character,  they  are 
open  to  examination  and  analysis  as  to  their  logical  structure, 
their  presuppositions,  their  self-consistency,  their  implications, 
and  their  agreement  with  facts,  quite  as  much  as  they  are  in 
respect  to  their  historical  setting.  And  an  investigation  of  this 
character  also  serves  the  purpose  of  presenting  to  the  reader, 
whether  he  has  a  knowledge  of  the  history  of  philosophy  or 
not,  the  various  systems  of  philosophy  as  they  may  solve  or  fail 
to  solve  problems  that  concern  facts. 

Such  a  program,  moreover,  is  not  different  from  that  of  the 
scientist,  e.g.,  of  the  student  of  geometry,  who  elucidates  the 
older  geometries  in  the  light  of  present  geometrical  science,  and 
who   examines   and  develops   in   a   purely   logical   manner  the 


0  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

possible  geometrical  systems,  of  which  it  is  now  well  known 
there  are  several. 

Indeed,  the  character  and  purpose  of  this  volume  may  be 
further  made  clear  by  the  statement,  that  the  writer  has  long 
been  convinced  of  the  close  resemblance  between  the  situations 
in  geometrical  science  a7id  in  philosophy.  This  resemblance, 
while  it  is  important,  is,  however,  not  complete.  The  several 
geometries,  e.g.,  the  Euclidian,  the  Lobatchewskian,  and  the 
Eiemannian,  are  each  self-consistent  and  free  from  internal 
contradiction,^  This,  however,  cannot  be  said  of  the  several 
philosophical  systems,  some  of  which  are  very  evidently  self- 
contradictory  and  self-refuting  at  critical  points.  Of  this, 
Phenomenalism  is  a  good  example  in  its  denial,  on  the  one  hand, 
of  the  possibility  of  knowing  "things-in-themselves"  {i.e., 
things  as  they  really  are),  and  in  its  assertion,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  this  is  the  real  "state  of  affairs"  concerning  know- 
ing.^ But  geometrical  and  philosophical  systems  both  seem  to 
agree  in  this,  that  there  issues  from  them  that  which  is  put  into 
them  by  way  of  initial  postidation  or  assumption,  be  this  taciti 
or  explicit.  In  geometry  it  is  usually  explicit  or  conscious, 
while  in  philosophy  it  is,  more  frequently  than  not,  almost 
entirely  tacit  or  unconscious.  The  study  of  the  psychological 
influences  on  the  philosopher,  both  past  and  present,  demon- 
strates this  quite  convincingly. 

The  procedure  of  explicit  postulation  is  commonly  recognized 
to  be  the  correct  one  in  geometrical  science  today,  though  the 
history  of  geometry  shows  that  it  has  not  always  been  so.  For 
not  until  Bolyai,  in  1832,  and  Lobatchewsky,  in  1835,  inde- 
pendently found  it  possible  to  develop  a  consistent  system  of 
geometry  by  denying  the  Euclidean  axiom  of  parallels,  was 
there  known  a  non-Euclidean  system.  This  denial  was  made  by 
postulating  what  amounted  to  the  proposition,  that  through  a 
given  point  not  on  a  given  line  there  are  an  infinite  number  of 
lines  parallel  to  this  given  line.  The  non-Euclidean  system  that 
results  is  self-consistent  and  quite  as  applicable  to  our  space  as 
the  traditional  Euclidean  geometry,  as  far  as  empirical  measure- 
ment can  determine. 

'  See  the  bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  chapter. 
"See  Chap.  XXIX. 


POSTULATES  AND  ASSUMPTIONS  7 

Today,  however,  still  other  geometrical  systems  are  known, 
of  which  the  same  assertion  can  also  be  made  as  regards  their 
internal  consistency  and  their  application  to  the  space  in  which 
we  measure  angles,  distances,  and  the  like.  Among  these  sys- 
tems there  is  the  Riemannian,  which  is  based  on  the  postulate, 
among  others,  that  through  a  given  point  not  on  a  given  line 
no  lines  pass  that  are  parallel  to  this  line. 

Each  of  these  geometries  is  a  consistent  body  of  propositions 
that  are  implied  or  generated  by  the  original  propositions  which, 
as  not  derived  from  other  propositions  still  "further  back," 
are  freely  postulated  or  assumed.  The  process  of  discovering 
or  deriving  these  later  propositions  chat  are  implied  by  these 
initial  ones  is  deduction.  This  process,  so  far  as  it  is  correct, 
follows,  as  it  were,  the  thread-like  network  of  implications  that 
already  subsist  or  are  facts.  Each  system  is  said  to  apply  to 
a  manifold  of  such  entities,  whether  these  be  points,  lines,  sur- 
faces, or  spheres,  or  something  else,  as  can  be  "exhibited"  to 
be  in  "consistent  standing"  with  the  propositions  asserted  about 
them.  Thus  a  line,  or  a  space  of  one  dimension  is  found  to 
be  the  field  of  entities,  called  "points,"  that  are  related  in  a 
very  definite  and  specific  manner,  namely,  by  an  asymmetrical 
and  transitive  relation.^  But  emphasis  is  placed  upon  the  rela- 
tions rather  than  upon  the  specific  character  of  the  entities 
that  are  related.  In  this  way  the  necessity  of  making  a  defini- 
tion, e.g.,  of  a  point,  is  avoided,  other  than  to  assert  that,  e.g., 
a  point  is  such  an  entity  as  is  "consistent  with  what  is  said 
about  it."  The  test  of  the  consistency  of  a  system  of  initial 
postulates  and  implied  propositions  is  the  "exhibition"  of  a 
class  of  entities  of  which  the  system  holds. 

It  is  to  be  emphasized,  however,  that  the  geometer  discovers 
a  certain  freedom  to  postulate  *  one  set  of  initial  propositions 
(axioms?)  or  another,  so  that,  by  taking  advantage  of  this 
freedom,  the  several  extant  systems  of  geometry  are  developed. 
But  it  is  further  discovered  that,  although  the  Euclidean  geom- 
etry historically  preceded  the  other  systems,  nevertheless  all 
the    geometries    are    open    to    an    examination    and    criticism 

•  See  Chap.  XXVII. 

*Cf.  articles  by  H.  C.  Brown  and  Karl  Schmidt  in  the  general  bibli- 
ography at  the  end  of  the  chapter. 


8  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

that    is    quite   independent   of    the    temporal    order   of    their 
appearance. 

The  writer  of  this  book  is  convinced  that  a  situation  very 
similar  to  that  which  exists  among  the  various  geometries  is 
to  be  found  among  the  several  great  philosophical  systems,  not- 
withstanding certain  obvious  points  of  difference.  In  phi- 
losophy, as  in  geometry,  there  are  fundamental  divergences 
between  the  respective  sets  of  propositions  which  constitute  the 
different  systems,  and  also  between  the  respective  manifolds  of 
entities  to  which  these  propositions  apply.  Also,  these  differ- 
ences result  from  initial  postulates.  However,  unlike  the  results 
in  geometry,  in  philosophy  not  all  systems  are  found  by  em- 
pirical tests  to  apply  equally  well  to  the  universe.  Further, 
not  all  systems  are  self-consistent  and  free  from  self-contradic- 
tion, and  finally,  the  right  or  the  freedom  to  postulate  is  not 
recognized.  Rather,  in  philosophy  the  making  of  postulates  that 
condition  the  remaining  whole  structure  of  a  system,  is  found, 
in  many  instances  to  have  been  determined  either  by  the  emo- 
tional disposition  of  the  individual  philosopher,  or,  very  fre- 
quently, by  tradition,  or  by  both  together.  Because  of  either 
of  these  two  influences,  or  of  both  combined,  fundamental  philo- 
sophical assumptions  are  made  unconsciously,  or  uncritically, 
and  quite  tacitly,  and  oftentimes  with  the  support  of  the  con- 
viction that  they  are  necessarily  true,  either  because  they  are 
self-evident,  or  because  their  opposite  is  inconceivahle,  or  both.^ 
However,  tests  or  evidence  of  this  kind  are  found,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  be  generated  by  the  influence  of  tradition  and  author- 
ity, and,  on  the  other  hand, — which  is  not  surprising — to  be 
thoroughly  unreliable  as  criteria  of  that  which  they  are  held  to 
reveal,  namely,  absolute  truth.  That  which  is  self-evident  or 
inconceivable  to  one  person,  or  to  one  generation,  is  not  to 
another;  and  it  is  certainly  not  self-evident,  that  that  which  is 
self-evident,  or  whose  opposite  is  inconceivable,  must  be  true, 
and  could  not  be  false.  That  it  might  be  false,  is  itself  not 
inconceivable. 

But  to  become  thus  aware  that  it  has  been,  not  the  unbiased 
investigation  of  facts,  but  rather  the  influence  of  tradition  and 
authority  that  has  led  many  of  the  great  philosophers  to  develop 

°  Cf.  the  examination  of  these  tests  in  Chap.  XV. 


POSTULATES  AND  ASSUMPTIONS  9 

their  specific  systems,  is  itself  one  of  the  first  steps  in  freeing 
oneself  from  this  very  influence,  and  in  establishing  a  firm 
foundation  for  further  examination  and  criticism.  On  this 
basis  one  not  only  can  discover  that  there  have  been  great 
historical  tendencies  or  postulates  in  philosophy,  but  also  can 
critically  restate  these  postulates,  much  as  this  is  done  in 
geometry,  i.e.,  both  the  postulates  themselves  and  the  philo- 
sophical systems  that  result  from  them  can  be  restated  logically 
and  quite  apart  from  their  historical  setting,  and  both  postulates 
and  systems  can  be  examined  for  their  self -consistency  and  com- 
pared with  one  another. 

As  a  result  it  is  found,  not  only  that  not  all  systems  are 
self-consistent,  but  that  some  of  them,  and  indeed  perhaps  all 
of  them,  presuppose  one  system.  This  system,  since  it  is  0710 
among  systems,  must,  then,  presuppose  itself,  and  in  this  respect 
be  self -consistent. 

This  self-consistent  and  basic  system,  in  the  form  in  which  it 
appears  to  the  writer  in  respect  to  both  its  fundamental  princi- 
ples and  its  detailed  structure,  is  philosophical  Kealism,  the 
exposition  and  defense  of  which  is  here  conducted  by  examining 
other,  opposed  systems  as  to  their  logical  structure  of  primary 
postulates  and  derivative  propositions,  and  not  in  their  his- 
torical setting  and  development. 

The  opposed  systems,  of  which  this  system  is  critical,  and 
which  are  found  to  presuppose  it,  and,  possibly,  also  to  be  self- 
contradictory,  are  classified,  contrary  to  the  usual  more  elaborate 
classifications,  as  fundamentally  only  two,  and  even  these  two 
can  be  shown  to  arise  from  a  common  source  and  tradition. 
These  two  systems  are  a  causation-philosophy,  represented  by 
Phenomenalism,  and  a  "substance"  and  monistic  philosophy, 
which  usually  takes  the  form  of  Objective  Idealism.  The 
common  source  is  the  Aristotelian  tradition,  with  its  logic  of 
classes,  and  its  dominant  concepts  of  cause  and  substance. 

Other  systems  of  philosophy,  as  they  are  usually  classified, 
e.g.,  as  Subjective  Idealism,  Positivism,  Naturalism,  and  Prag- 
matism, and  as  Voluntarism,  Pan-logism,®  and  the  like,  are  but 

•  See  Wm.  James,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  for  the  types  of  phil- 
osophical systems;  also  L.  Stein,  Philosophische  Stromungen  der  Gegen- 
tcart. 


10  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

specific  modifications  of  these  two  more  fundamental  phi- 
losophies. 

These  more  specific  systems  thus  fall  together  under  two 
great  heads  because  each  is  a  product  of  one  or  the  other  of 
two  great  tendencies,  which,  on  the  one  hand,  have  produced 
a  rather  definite  historical  succession  of  systems,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  are  each  identical  logically  with  the  tacit  presup- 
position of  a  very  definite  set  of  metaphysical  presuppositions. 
Thus,  Subjective  Idealism,  Positivism,  Naturalism,  and  Prag- 
matism (Naturalism  up-to-date)  present  an  historical  sequence 
of  systems  which  have  resulted  from  the  metaphysical  assump- 
tion that  all  things  causally  affect  one  another^  On  the  other 
hand,  the  monistic  systems  of  such  philosophers  as  Spinoza, 
Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel,  Bradley  and  others  have  resulted  from 
the  assumption  that  a  numerically  single,  suh stance-like,  under- 
lying entity  is  necessary  in  order  to  mediate  the  relationships^ 
which  are  universal  among  all  "things."  ^  In  the  last  analysis, 
however,  even  these  two  basic  logical  and  metaphysical  doctrines 
are  traceable  to  a  common  source,  namely,  the  Aristotelian  phi- 
losophy and  logic,  especially  as  each  of  these  has  come  down  in 
the  tradition.  It  is  because  of  the  influence  of  this  tradition, 
not  only  that  these  metaphysical  principles  have  been  postulated 
unconsciously  and  uncritically,  but  that  they  have  been  in  many 
instances  accepted  as  self-evident  and  their  opposite  regarded 
as  inconceivable.  The  metaphysics  of  cause  and  substratum 
(substance)  and  the  logic  of  classes,  since  these  together  form 
the  core  of  the  Aristotelian  tradition,  constitute,  then,  that 
philosophy  from  which  later  systems  have  diverged  as  branch- 
ing genera  and  species  from  an  ancestral  tree.^ 

The  Realism  which  is  accepted,  defended,  and  explained  in 
this  book  is  one  that  is  based  on  logical  and  metaphysical  doc- 
trines that  are  directly  opposed  to  the  logic  and  metaphysics 
of  the  Aristotelian  tradition.  The  logic  is  one  that  has  long 
been  used  in  the  development  of  modern  science,  but  that  has 
only  recently  been  formulated  as  the  logic  of  series,  or  as  the 

^  See  Chap.  XXVI.  on  the  modification  theory  of  relations,  and  Chaps. 
XXIX.-XXXIII.  on  the  systems  that  are  developed  from  this. 

"  See  Chap.  XXVI.  on  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations,  and 
Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII.  on  the  systems  that  are  developed  from  this. 

"  Bee  Chap.  III.  for  the  expansion  of  this  hypothesis. 


POSTULATES  AND  ASSUMPTIONS  n 

science  of  order,  and  that  can  be  designated  broadly  as  non- 
Aristotelian.^o  The  metaphysics  is  one  that  denies  the  uni- 
versality of  causation  and  of  substance,  and  that  emphasizes 
relations.  On  this  basis  it  is  found  that  the  knowing  situation 
is  of  such  a  character  that  the  knowing  process  neither  causally 
affects,  modifies,  or  creates  that  which  is  known,  nor  demands 
an  underlying  entity  to  mediate  the  relationship  between  know- 
ing and  its  object.  For  this  reason  the  position  is  called  Realism. 
It  is  that  position  which  results  from  discovering  such  empirical 
evidence,  including  non-Aristotelian  logical  principles,  as  allows 
for  a  knowledge  of  all  entities  in  their  genuine  character.  One 
of  these  entities  is  that  very  ''state  of  affairs"  which  the  position 
itself  asserts  to  be  true  concerning  the  knowing  situation.  Cer- 
tain other  systems  are  not  thus  self -consistent. 

This  Realism  is,  however,  not  one  that  limits  the  realm  of 
entities  that  are  knowable  in  their  true  character  to  the  objects 
and  relations  of  the  physical  universe,  and  to  conscious  proc- 
esses. Bather,  it  is  a  Realism  which  insists  also  on  the  factuality 
and  knowableness  of  entities  that  are  neither  physical  nor 
mental,  nor  "individual"  in  the  usual  sense  of  this  term  as 
meaning  spatially  and  temporally  particularized.  All  such 
entities  may  be  called  " subsistents"  to  distinguish  them  from 
the  temporally  and  perhaps  also  spatially  particularized  ex- 
istents.  They  include  what  are  frequently  called  "  universals, " 
and  also  "ideals"  such  as  justice,  and  still  other  entities,  such 
as  numbers,  and  the  ideal  systems  of  mechanics.  This  Realism 
is  one  which  holds  that  the  realm  of  such  subsistents,  as  entities 
that  are  both  knowaUe  and  yet  independent  of  being  known, 
is  even  more  varied  and  extensive  than  the  realm  of  existential 
entities."  Indeed,  as  an  important  demonstration  in  the  closing 
chapters  of  this  book,  it  is  shown  that  such  worths  and  values, 
typified  by  justice  and  beauty,  although  they  are  ideals  which 
are  never  completely  attained,  are,  nevertheless,  realities, 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Concerning  the  actual   development  of  non-Euclidean  svBtems,  aa  well 
aa  the  use  of  the  method  of  postulation  in  other  fields,  see  H.  C.  Brown  in 
li^asays  Philosophical  and  Psychological  in  Honor  of  William  James,  1908. 

"Bee  Char'xSv'^^^"  ^^^^'  ''  ^°^  "'  ^'  ^°^  ^^^P'  ^^"- 


12  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

pp.  425-459,  and  Karl  Schmidt,  Studies  in  the  Structure  of  Systems,  4, 
"  The  Generating  I'roblem,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  X.,  pp.  64-75,  especially  p.  73  on  the  freedom  to  postulate,  etc.;  also 
"  Critique  of  Cognition  and  its  Principles,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych,  and 
Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  VI.,  p.  281  ff. 

Concerning  (1)  the  method  of  postulation  in  geometry,  or  (2)  the 
actual  systems  that  result,  see  J.  Bolyai,  The  Science  Absolute  of  Space, 
trans,  by  G.  G.  Halsted,  1896;  original  edition  in  Latin,  Editio  Nova, 
by  the  Hungarian  Academy  of  Science,  Teubner,  1903;  K.  Bonola,  Non- 
Euclidean  Geometry,  trans,  by  H.  S.  Carslaw,  1912;  B.  Erdmann,  Die 
Axiome  der  Geometric;  D.  Hilbert,  Foundations  of  Geometry,  trans,  by 
E.  J.  Townsend;  E.  Husserl,  Logische  Untersuchungen;  E.  V.  Huntington, 
Sets  of  Independent  Postulates  for  the  Algebra  of  Logic,  trans,  of  the 
American  Math.  Society,  1904,  Vol.  V.;  Wm.  James,  A  Pluralistic  Uni- 
verse, Lecture  I.;  Lobatschewsky,  Geometrical  Researches  on  the  Theory 
of  Parallels,  trans,  by  G.  B.  Halsted;  R.  H.  Nunn,  Aims  and  Achievements 
of  Scientific  Method,  Chap.  V.;  H.  Poincare,  Science  and  Hypothesis,  1905, 
Chap.  Ill,  on  Non-Euclidean  Geometries;  B.  Russell,  Foundations^  of 
Geometry,  1897,  and  Principles  of  Mathematics,  1903;  B.  Riemann,  f/fter 
die  Uypothesen  welche  die  Geometric  zu  Grunde  liegen,  1868,  Abh.  Ges. 
Gottingen,  1868;  also  in  Gesam.  Werke,  1892;  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  Axioms 
as  Postulates,  in  Personal  Idealism;  O.  Veblen,  A  System  of  Axioms  for 
Geometry,  trans.  Am.  Math.  Soc,  1904,  Vol.  V.;  J.  W.  Withers,  Euclid's 
Parallel  Postulate,  1908;  F.  S.  Woods,  Non-Euclidean  Geometry,  in 
Monographs  on  Topics  of  Modern  Mathematics,  ed.  by  J.  W.  A.  Young, 
1911;  A.  N.  Whitehead  and  B.  Russell,  Principia  Mathematica,  3  vole.. 
Vol.  I.,  Introduction;  A.  N.  Whitehead,  Axioms  of  Projective  Geometry, 
1906,  and  Axioms  of  Descriptive  Geometry,  1907;  J.  W.  Young,  Ftmda- 
mental  Concepts  of  Algebra  and  Geometry,  1911. 


CHAPTER  II 
REALISM  AND  LOGIC  ^ 

That  ultimately  a  realistic  position  is  taken  in  philosophy, 
even  when  one  attempts  the  opposite,'  and  that  this  Realism  is 
not  limited  to  the  acceptance  alone  of  an  existential  world  of 
physical  and  mental  entities,  has  been,  in  the  author's  opinion, 
exceedingly  well  shown  by  Professor  Josiah  Royce  in  his  Essay, 
"The  Principles  of  Logic,"  in  the  volume  entitled.  The  En- 
cyclopedia  of  the  Philosophical  Sciences,  Logic,   1913.     Pro- 

*  This  chapter  was  originally  published  under  the  title  of  "  Realistic  As- 
pects of  Royce's  Philosophy,"  in  the  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XXV., 
No.  3,  in  the  number  in  honor  of  Professor  Royce. 

'  Uf.  the  criticism,  throughout  Fart  II.,  of  systems  opposed  to  realism. 


REALISM  AND  LOGIC  13 

fessor  Royce  probably  would  not  have  accepted  this  judgment  as 
to  the  outcome  of  his  demonstrations,  but  that  the  judgment  is 
correct  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  by  quoting^  and  discussing 
certain  paragraphs  of  the  essay.  Professor  Royce 's  essay  will 
be  examined  in  this  way,  both  because  it  is  a  most  timely  and 
excellent  presentation  of  recent  results  in  the  field  of  modern 
logic,  and  because  of  what  seems  to  be  its  bearing  on  philo- 
sophical problems  and  their  solution. 

The  essay  is  divided  into  three  sections.  The  last  two,  making 
up  its  greater  part,  are  (p.  67)  "devoted  to  indicating,  very 
summarily,  the  nature  of  a  doctrine  of  which  the  traditional 
General  or  Formal  Logic  is  but  a  part,  and,  in  fact,  a  very 
subordinate  part.  To  this  doctrine  the  name  'The  Science  of 
Order'  may  be  given.  It  is  a  science  which  is  indeed  inci- 
dentally concerned  with  the  norms  of  the  thinking  process. 
But  its  character  as  a  normative  doctrine  is  wholly  subordinate 
to  other  features  which  make  it  of  the  mos*t  fundamental  im- 
portance for  philosophy.  It  is  today  in  a  very  progressive  con- 
dition. It  is  in  some  notable  respects  new.  It  offers  inex- 
haustible opportunities  for  future  progress.' 

Defining  Applied  Logic,  or  Methodology,  as  that  "special 
and  very  extended"  part  of  "Logic  as  a  Normative  Science" 
"which  deals  with  the  norms  of  thought  in  their  application  to 
the  methods  used  in  various  special  sciences,"  Professor  Royce 
says  (p.  69)  :  "Methodology,  taken  in  its  usual  sense  as  a  study 
of  the  norms  and  methods  of  thought  used  in  the  various  arts 
and  sciences,  is  the  mother  of  Logic  taken  in  the  other  sense 
hereafter  to  be  expounded.  For  the  undertakings  of  Methodo- 
logy lead  to  certain  special  problems,  such  as  Plato  and  Aristotle 
already  began  to  study,  and  such  as  recent  inquiry  makes  more 
and  more  manifold  and  important."  "They  are  problems 
regarding,  7iot  the  methods  by  which  the  thinker  succeeds,  nor 
yet  the  norms  of  correct  thinking  viewed  as  norms,  but  rather 
the  Forms,  the  Categories,  the  Types  of  Order,  which  characterize 
any  realm  of  objects  which  a  thinker  has  actually  succeeded  in 
mastering,  or  can  possibly  succeed  in  mastering,  by  his  methods." 

•  The  meaning  of  the  passages  quoted  is  not  altered  by  removal  from 
their  context. 


14  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

Discussing  some  of  the  solutions  of  the  problems  of  method 
as  they  have  occurred  in  the  development  of  philosophy,  he 
cites  (p.  71)  the  view  of  Plato,  that  (1)  "The  realm  of  the 
Universals  or  'Ideas'  is  essentially  a  System,  whose  unity  and, 
order  are  of  the  first  importance  for  the  philosopher;  (2)  /n- 
ference  is  possible  because  truths  have  momentous  objective  Rela- 
tions, definable  precisely  in  so  far  as  the  process  of  inference  is 
definable;  (3)  The  'Order  and  Connection'  of  our  rational  proc- 
esses, when  we  follow  right  methods,  is  a  sort  of  copy  of  an  order 
and  connectio^i  which  the  individual  thinker  finds,  but  does  not 
make.  One  thus  sets  out  to  formulate  the  right  method.  One 
discovers,  through  this  very  effort,  a  new  realm — a  realm  of 
types,  of  forms,  of  relations.  All  these  appear  to  be  at  least  as 
real  as  the  facts  of  the  physical  world.  And  in  Plato's  indi- 
vidual opinion  they  are  far  more  real  than  the  latter." 

Professor  Royce  then  says  (p.  72)  :  "We  are  not  in  the  least 
concerned  to  estimate  in  this  discussion  the  correctness  or  even 
the  historical  significance  of  the  Platonic  Metaphysic, — a  doc- 
trine thus  merely  suggested.  It  is  enough  to  note,  however,  that 
even  if  one  sets  aside  as  false  or  as  irrelevant  all  the  principal 
metaphysical  conclusions  of  Plato,  one  sees  that  in  any  case  the 
Methodology  of  the  logician,  even  in  this  early  stage  of  the 
doctrine,  inevitably  gives  rise  to  the  problem  as  to  the  relatively 
objective  order  and  system  of  those  objects  of  thought  to  which 
the  methodologist  appeals  when  he  formulates  his  procedure. 
The  Platonic  theory  of  Ideas,  Aristotle's  later  theory  of  Forms, 
the  innumerable  variations  of  the  Platonic  tradition  which  the 
subsequent  history  of  thought  contains — all  these  may  or  may 
not  be  of  use  in  formulating  a  sound  metaphysic.  But  in  any 
case  this  comes  to  light :  If  a  logician  can  indeed  formulate  any 
sound  method  at  all,  in  any  generally  valid  way,  he  can  do  so 
only  because  certain  objects  which  he  considers  when  he  thinks, 
— be  these  objects  definitions,  classes,  types,  relations,  proposi- 
tions, inferences,  numbers,  or  other  'principles,' — form  a  more 
or  less  orderly  system,  or  group  of  systems,  whose  constitution 
predetermines  the  methods  that  he  must  use  when  he  thinks.* 
This  system,  or  these  systems,  and  their  constitution,  are  in  some 
sense  more  or  less  objective.    That  is:  What  constitutes  order, 

*  Italics  mine. 


REALISM  AND  LOGIC  15 

and  what  makes  orderly  method  possible,  is  not  the  product  of 
the  thinker's  personal  and  private  caprice.  Nor  can  he  'by- 
taking  thought'  wilfully  alter  the  most  essential  facts  and  rela- 
tions upon  which  his  methods  depend.  If  any  orderly  classifica- 
tion of  a  general  class  of  objects  is  possible,  then,  however  sub- 
jective the  choice  of  one's  principles  of  classification  may  be, 
there  is  something  about  the  general  nature  of  any  such  order 
and  system  of  genera  and  of  species, — something  which  is  the 
same  for  all  thinkers,  and  which  outlasts  private  caprices  and 
changing  selections  of  objects  and  of  modes  of  classification." 

And  again  Professor  Royce  says  to  the  same  point  (p.  73), 
"Order  is  order.  System  is  system.  Amidst  all  the  variations 
of  systems  and  of  orders,  certain  general  types  and  character- 
istic relations  can  be  traced.  If,  then,  the  methodologist  attempts 
to  conduct  thinking  processes  in  an  orderly  way,  he  inevitably 
depends  upon  finding  in  the  objects  about  which  he  thinks  those 
features,  relations,  orderly  characters,  upon  which  the  very 
possibility  of  definite  methods  depends.  Whatever  one's  meta- 
physic  may  be,  one  must  therefore  recognize  that  there  is  some- 
thing objective  about  the  order  both  of  our  thoughts  and  of  the 
things  concerning  which  we  think;  and  one  must  admit  that 
every  successful  methodologist  depends  upon  grasping  and  fol- 
lowing some  of  the  traits  of  this  orderly  constitution  of  a  realm 
that  is  certainly  a  realm  of  facts." 

In  all  th^se  quoted  statements  Professor  Royce  seems  to 
accept  very  directly  and  unconditionally  the  objectivity  not  only 
of  entities  that  are  ideal  and  general  and  abstract,  but  also  of 
those  that  are  logical.  Thus  he  opposes  the  dominant  and  tradi- 
tional view  that  logic  is  "subjective,"  and  is,  in  this  sense,  the 
"art  of  thinking,"  and  that  the  "laws  of  thought"  are  laws  of 
a  psychical  process.* 

From  the  quotations  given  it  would  appear  that  all  logic, 
including  the  traditional,  narrow  logic  of  classes  and  of  the 
syllogism,  is  objective,  and  is  only  one  of  the  several  types  of 
order. 

There  follows,  in  Professor  Royce 's  essay,  an  exposition  of 
some  of  the  most  important  features  of  The  New  Logic,  espe- 
cially as  this  includes  "Order-types."     In  these  sections  such 

«  Of.  Chap.  XUI. 


16  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW  ' 

subjects  as  Relations  and  their  "logical  properties,"  Classes, 
Series,  the  Correlation  of  Series,  Functions,  and,  finally,  "The 
Logical  Genesis  of  the  Types  of  Order,"  are  presented  in  con- 
siderable detail,  and  the  following  interesting  statements,  bear- 
ing upon  specific  points,  are  made  (p.  97)  :  "Relations  are  of 
such  importance  as  they  are  for  the  theory  of  order,  mainly 
because,  in  certain  cases,  they  are  subject  to  exact  laws  which 
permit  of  a  wide  range  of  deductive  inference.  To  some  of 
these  laws  attention  must  be  at  once  directed.  They  enable  us 
to  classify  relations  according  to  various  logical  properties. 
Upon  such  properties  of  relations  all  deductive  science  depends. 
The  doctrine  of  the  Norms  of  deductive  reasoning  is  simply  the 
doctrine  of  these  relational  properties  when  they  are  viewed  as 
lawful  characteristics  of  relations  which  can  guide  us  in  making 
inferences,  and  thus  Logic  as  the  'Normative  Science'  of  the 
deductive  inference  is  merely  an  incidental  part  of  the  Theory 
of  Order."  Thus  the  implicative  relation,  the  progressive  dis- 
covery or  guidance  of  which  is  identical  with  or  accompanies 
our  correct  reasoning  processes,  is  held  to  be  objective.  Rea- 
soning, as  defined  in  this  manner,  has  its  conditions.  Did  these 
conditions  not  subsist,  there  might  still  be  a  "world,"  and  this 
"world"  might  be  knowable,  but  we  could  not  reason  about  it. 
For,  says  Professor  Royce  (p.  107),  "Without  objects  con- 
ceived as  unique  individuals,  we  can  have  no  Classes.  Without 
classes  we  can,  as  we  have  seen,  define  wo  Relations,  without 
relations  we  can  have  no  Order.  But  to  he  reasonable  is  to  con- 
ceive of  order-systems,  real  or  ideal.  Therefore,  we  have  an 
absolute  logical  need  to  conceive  of  individual  objects  as  the 
elements  of  our  ideal  order-systems." 

With  all  this,  excepting  only  a  seemingly  implied  dependence 
of  the  individuality  of  "individuals"  upon  their  being  conceived 
as  such,  one  can  agree.  But  at  this  point,  as  in  other  places, 
Professor  Royce  seems  to  retract  his  earlier  introductory  asser- 
tions of  the  objectivity  of  the  logical  situation,  and  to  color 
these  now  with  an  idealistic  tinge.  He  introduces  the  thin  edge 
of  a  wedge  for  his  idealism  even  more  noticeably,  but  quite  as 
unnecessarily,  in  the  statement  (p.  108),  that  "Apart  from  some 
classifying  will,  our  world  contains  no  classes."  One  may  very 
well  ask.  then:  How  about  the  class  of  ivilh  that  classify?    Is 


REALISM  AND  LOGIC  17 

this,  as  a  class  of  individual  wills  or  ^vill-ads  that  are  related 
and  so  ordered  in  a  certain  way,  itself  dependent  upon  a  classi- 
fying will?  And,  if  not,  may  not  other  classes,  and  the  indi- 
viduals, the  relations,  and  the  order,  by  virtue  of  which  they 
subsist  as  classes,  be  equally  independent  of  a  classifying  will, 
although  related  to  it  ? 

Professor  Royee's  "proof"  or  demonstration  that  Individual, 
Relation,  and  Class  are  "the  Forms,"  or  "Categories"  that 
"characterize  any  realm  of  objects  which  a  thinker  has  actually 
succeeded  in  mastering,  or  can  possibly  succeed  in  mastering," 
is  contained  in  the  Section  on  "The  Logical  Genesis  of  the 
Types  of  Order."  His  proof  is  the  familiar  one  of  finding  cer- 
tain propositions  that  are  "presupposed  by  their  own  denial."  ° 
But  in  applying  this  test  or  criterion  he  again  seems  to  pass 
from  the  earlier  acknowledged  objectivity  of  logical  entities  to 
a  somewhat  surreptitious  introduction  of  an  idealism  that  does 
away  with  this.  Professor  Royce's  demonstration  and  the  prin- 
ciple on  the  basis  of  which  he  makes  it  can  be  granted  in  the 
specific  instance  chosen.  But  one  cannot  allow  either  the 
limitation  of  the  principle  to  this  instance,  or  the  conclusions 
which  he  draws  from  this  specific  demonstration.  Some  of  the 
main  points  of  his  demonstration  are  as  follows  (p.  131)  : — 

"(1)  To  any  'mode  of  action,'  such  as  'to  sing'  or  'singing' 
(expressed  in  English  either  by  the  infinitive  or  by  the  present 
participle  of  the  verb)  there  corresponds  a  mode  of  action, 
which  is  the  contradictory  of  the  first,  for  example  'not  to 
sing'  or  'not  singing.'  Thus,  in  this  realm,  to  every  x  there 
corresponds  one,  and  essentially  only  one,  x." 

"(2)  Any  pair  of  modes  of  action,  such  for  instance  as 
'singing'  and  'dancing,'  have  their  'logical  product,'  precisely 
as  classes  have  a  product,  and  their  'logical  sum,'  again,  pre- 
cisely as  the  classes  possess  a  sum.  Thus  the  'mode  of  action' 
expressed  by  the  phrase:  'To  sing  and  to  dance'  is  the  logical 
product  of  the  'modes  of  action'  'to  sing'  and  'to  dance.'  The 
mode  of  action  expressed  by  the  phrase,  'Either  to  sing  or  to 
dance,*  is  the  logical  sum  of  'to  sing'  and  'to  dance.'  These 
logical  operations  of  addition  and  multiplication  depend  upon 
triadic  relations  of  modes  of  action,  precisely  analogous  to  the 
•  See  Chap.  XV.,  rv, 


18  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

triadic  relation  of  classes.  So  then,  to  any  x  and  y,  in  this 
realm,  there  correspond  xy  and  x  +  y." 

"(3)  Between  any  two  modes  of  action  a  certain  dyadic, 
transitive  and  not  totally  non-symmetrical  relation  may  either 
obtain  or  not  obtain.  This  relation  may  be  expressed  by  the 
verb  'implies.'  It  has  precisely  the  same  relational  properties 
as  the  relation  — -<  of  one  class  or  proposition  to  another. 
Thus  the  mode  of  action  expressed  by  the  phrase,  'to  sing  and 
to  dance,'  implies  the  mode  of  action  expressed  by  the  phrase 
'to  sing.'  In  other  words  'singing  and  dancing'  implies 
'singing.'  " 

"  (4)  There  is  a  mode  of  action  which  may  be  symbolized  by 
a  0.  This  mode  of  action  may  be  expressed  in  language  by  the 
phrase,  'to  do  nothing,'  or  'doing  nothing.'  There  is  another 
mode  of  action  which  may  be  symbolized  by  1.  This  is  the  mode 
of  action  expressed  in  language  by  the  phrase  'to  do  some- 
thing,' that  is,  to  act  positively  in  any  way  whatever  which 
involves  'not  doing  nothing.'  The  modes  of  action  0  and  1  are 
contradictories  each  of  the  other." 

Professor  Royce  finds  further  (p.  134)  : — 

"  (1)  That  the  members,  elements,  or  'modes  of  action'  which 
constitute  this  logically  necessary  system  2  exist  in  sets  both 
finite  and  infinite  in  number,  and  both  in  'dense'  series,  in  'con- 
tinuous' series,  and  in  fact  in  all  possible  serial  types." 

"  (2)  That  such  systems  as  the  whole  number  series,  the  series 
of  the  rational  numbers,  the  real  numbers,  etc.,  consequently 
enter  into  the  constitution  of  this  system.  The  arithmetical 
continuum,  for  instance,  is  a  part  of  the  system  ^."  " 

"(3)  That  this  system  also  includes  in  its  complexities  all 
the  types  of  order  which  appear  to  be  required  by  the  at  present 
recognized  geometrical  theories,  projective  and  metrical." 

In  conclusion.  Professor  Royce  arrives  at  a  position  which, 
he  calls  Absolute  Pragmatism,  and  which  he  holds  "differs  from 
that  of  the  pragmatists  now  most  in  vogue."  He  says  (p.  121), 
"There  are  some  truths  that  are  known  to  us  not  by  virtue  of 
the  special  successes  which  this  or  that  hypothesis  obtains  in 
particular  instances,  but  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  there  are 
certain  modes  of  activity,  certain  laws  of  the  rational  world, 

'  Uf.  for  (1)  and  (2)  Chaps.  XXI.-XXV.  and  XLIII.,  vu.,  vni.,  ix.,  x. 


REALISM  AND  LOGIC  19 

which  we  reinstate  and  verify,  through  the  very  act  of  attempt- 
ing to  presuppose  that  these  modes  of  activity  do  not  exist,  or 
that  these  laivs  are  not  valid.  Thus,  whoever  says  that  there 
are  no  classes  whatever  in  his  world,  inevitably  classifies.  Who- 
ever asserts  that  for  him  there  are  no  real  relations,  and  that, 
in  particular,  the  logical  relation  between  affirmation  and  denial 
does  not  exist,  so  that  for  him  yes  means  the  same  as  no, — on 
the  one  hand  himself  asserts  and  denies,  and  so  makes  the 
difference  between  yes  and  no,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  asserts 
the  existence  of  a  relational  sameness  even  in  denying  the  dif- 
ference between  yes  and  no." 

"In  brief,  whatever  actions  are  such,  whatever  types  of 
actions  are  such,  whatever  residts  of  activity,  whatever  con- 
ceptual constructions  are  such,  that  the  very  act  of  getting  rid 
of  them,  or  of  thinking  them  away,  logically  implies  their  pres- 
ence, are  known  to  us  indeed  both  empirically  and  prag- 
matically; hut  they  are  also  absolute.  And  any  account 
which  succeeds  in  telling  what  they  are  has  absolute  truth  J 
Such  truth  is  a  'construction'  or  'creation,'  for  activity 
determines  its  nature.  It  is  'found'  for  ive  observe  it  when  we 
act." 

With  the  general  tenor  of  Professor  Royce's  essay  I  am  in 
closest  sympathy,  and  it  is  only  to  certain  restrictions  and  con- 
clusions that  exception  must  be  taken.  One  can  accept  even 
the  specific  instance  which  the  application  of  "proof  by  denial" 
furnishes,  namely,  that  the  "modes  of  action,"  "to  assert"  and 
"to  deny,"  are  themselves  instances  which  conform  to  and  pre- 
suppose the  logic  of  classes,  of  relatio7is,  of  logical  products, 
and  of  series.  However,  this  is  not  proof  for  the  idealistically 
tinged  conclusion,  that  this  logic  is  in  some  way  created  by 
"will,"  e.g.,  by  the  "will  to  assert"  and  "to  deny,"  or  that 
individuals,  classes,  relations,  order,  and  the  like  are  in  some 
way  dependent  on  "will."  This  idealistic  tendency  is  exhibited 
in  the  statement,  previously  quoted,  that  "Apart  from  some 
classifying  will,  our  world  contains  no  classes." 

Modes  of  action  such  as  those  of  willing,  of  affirming  and 
denying, — and  especially  of  finding  that  denial  presupposes  the 
very  thing  denied,  may  indeed  present  a  specific  existential  case 

'  Cf.  the  criticisms  of  systems  opposed  to  realism  all  through  Part  II. 


20  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

of  entities  that  are  individual,  are  similar,  form  classes  with 
sub-classes,  have  logical  products,  and  form  series  that  are 
infinite,  and,  also,  either  discontinuous,  dense,  or  continuous. 
But  this  does  not  imply  that  any  of  these  generic  entities  as 
such,  or  that  any  instance  of  them,  such  as,  e.g.,  the  real  num- 
bers, points,  and  physical  objects,  is  created  hy  ''will,"  or 
dependent  on  it. 

The  ground  for  this  assertion  is  the  generally  recognized 
principle,  accepted  by  Professor  Royce  himself,  that,  if  there  is 
one  "instance,"  it  is  always  a  permissible  hypothesis  that  there 
are  others.  Perhaps,  indeed,  "instance"  means  or  implies  just 
this  possibility.  It  follows,  that,  if  there  is  one  "instance," 
namely,  of  acts  of  ''will"  which  form  classes,  series,  etc.,  the 
possibilities  cannot  be  denied  (1)  that  there  are  other  instances 
of  these  generic  entities,  class,  series,  etc.,  and  (2)  that  these 
generic  entities  themselves  also  are,  i.e.,  have  being.  However, 
if  there  are  these  possibilities,  there  are  also  the  further  ones, 
(3)  not  only  that  these  other  instances  of  individuals,  classes, 
and  series  may  be  independent  of  that  particular  series  which 
is  identical  with  acts  of  will,  but  also  (4)  that  the  generic  en- 
tities, class,  series,  and  the  like,  may  be  similarly  independent.^ 
In  fact,  this  independence  of  "other  instances"  is  itself  identical 
with  that  of  these  generic  entities.  But  in  any  case,  even  with 
only  the  possibility  implied,  that  there  are  other  instances  of 
series  than  the  will-series,  it  is  logically  prohibited  to  infer  the 
dependence,  either  of  these  other  instances,  or  of  the  generic 
entities,  on  the  will-series  itself.  The  opportunity  for  their  inde- 
pendence is  quite  as  good  as  for  the  opposite.  Such  an  inde- 
pendence is  quite  compatible  with  a  relatedness  of  both  the 
specific  and  the  generic  entities  to  will,  to  reasoning,  or  to  know- 
ing, and  means  the  objectivity  both  of  the  generic  logical 
entities,  class,  individual,  series,  and  of  all  instances  of  these 
entities. 

However  not  only  can  one  thus  find  that  this  hypothesis  of 
the  objectivity  of  logical  entities  and  principles  is  permissible, 
and  that  it  is  confirmed  by  empirical  investigation,"  but  also 
one  can  show  that  Professor  Royce  himself  really  presents  no 
obstacles  to  its  acceptance  as  confirmed.     For  the  very  logical 

»  Cf.  Cliap.  XLIV.  '  Cf.  Chap.  XXVI.,  ii.,  1. 


REALISM  AND  LOGIC  21 

principles  which  our  author  himself  elucidates  and  accepts,  if 
they  are  applied  to  the  specific  situation  under  discussion,  them- 
selves demand  this  conclusion.  This  can  be  demonstrated  as 
follows : — 

Professor  Royce  makes  a  number  of  statements  to  the  effect 
that  "rational  will,"  ''modes  of  action,"  "reasoning,"  "the 
making  of  conceptual  constructions,"  and  "the  getting  rid  of 
them,"  and  the  like,  each  "presupposes"  or  "logically"  implies 
that  logic  which  is  identical  with  classes  of  individuals  that 
stand  in  one  or  another,  or  in  many,  of  several  relationships, 
and  that  form  one  of  the  several  kinds  of  series. 

Although  neither  "presuppose"  nor  "imply"  is  defined  by 
Professor  Royce,  each  of  these  "entities"  is  by  his  own  logic 
(at  least)  a  relation.  This  is  the  case,  first,  because  the  distinc- 
tion is  made  between  the  act  of  "rational  activity"  (the  \n\l 
to  reason)  and  that  which  this  activity  presupposes  or  logically 
implies,  namely,  individuals,  classes,  and  series.  "Presupposer" 
and  "presupposed"  are,  therefore,  at  least  two.  But,  secondly, 
a  relation  is  defined  (p.  96)  as  "a  character  that  an  object  pos- 
sesses as  a  member  of  a  collection  (a  pair,  a  triad,  etc.),  and 
that  would  not  belong  to  that  object,  were  it  not  such  a  mem- 
ber." We  must  conclude  that,  since  "presupposer"  and  "pre- 
supposed" are  two,  they  are  related,  and  that  "presuppose," 
or  "imply,"  is  the  relation  present  between  them. 

The  next  important  question  is,  Can  that  which  is  presup- 
posed or  implied  be  related  to,  and  yet  be  independent  of  the 
"presupposer"  or  "implier"?  And  again  Professor  Royce 
gives  us  the  materials  for  an  answer.  In  his  presentation  of 
the  several  classes  of  relations  as  dyadic,  triadic,  symmetrical 
and  non-symmetrical,  transitive  and  intransitive,^"  he  says  (p. 
99),  ''Transitivity  and  symmetry  are  mutually  independent  rela- 
tional characters."  This  independence  is  then  exhibited  by 
finding  instances  of  the  one  character  without  the  other.  Thus 
the  relation  of  "greater  than,"  symbolized  by  >,  is  transitive, 
since,  il  A  >  B  and  B  >  C,  A  >  C;  but  it  is  totally  non- 
symmetrical, since,  ii  A>B,  this  precludes  B  >  A.  Likewise 
the  relation  "father  of"  {A  is  "father  of*  B)  is  also  non- 
symmetrical, yet  it  is  non-transitive,  since,  if  A  is  father  of  B, 
"  See  Chap.  XXVIl. 


22  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

and  B  is  father  of  C,  A  is  precluded  from  being  father  of  C: 
the  relation  '' father  of"  does  not  "go"  from  A  to  C.  "An- 
cestor of"  is,  however,  both  non-symmetrical  and  transitive. 
Thus  are  symmetry  and  transitivity  demonstrated  to  be,  in 
Professor  Royee's  own  words,  '^ independent  relational  char- 
acters." But,  in  any  case,  by  the  principles  previously  stated, 
since  these  characters  are  two,  i.e.,  a  pair,  they  are  related. 
Therefore  it  follows,  in  at  least  one  case,  that  relatedness  and 
independence  are  quite  consistent,  and  'cosuhsist.'  '^^ 

Here  again  it  must  be  said,  that,  if  there  is  one  instance  of 
such  compatibility,  there  may  be  others,  and,  further,  that  in 
no  case  does  relatedness  merely  of  itself  imply,  necessitate,  or 
carry  with  it,  dependence;  nor  independence,  non-r elatedness. 
Just  such  another  instance,  however,  may  be  the  important 
relation,  just  discussed,  of  "presupposition"  or  "implication." 
That  which  is  presupposed  or  implied,  namely,  the  logic  of  order, 
may  be  related  to  and  yet  be  independent  of  that  which  pre- 
supposes (or  implies)  it,  namely,  that  very  rational  activity 
which  Professor  Royce  emphasizes  so  much. 

With  this  the  case,  one  certainly  cannot  justifiably  assert 
that  (p.  109)  "our  world  contains  classes"  only  because 
there  is  the  will  to  classify.  One  cannot  in  this  manner 
logically  maintain  a  "synthetic  union"  of  "creation"  and 
"discovery." 

However,  in  order  to  confirm  empirically  this  hypothesis,  that 
independence  and  relatedness  are  quite  compatible.  Professor 
Royce  himself  need  only  have  found,  if  possible,  another  class 
and  series  of  individuals  that  bear  the  same  relation  (that  of 
being  "reviewed")  to  his  own  investigating  mind  as  do  his  own 
rational  modes  of  action.  He  discovers  among  or  in  these  last, 
quite  as  Descartes  found  that  either  to  deny  or  to  assert  con- 
sciousness is  to  presuppose  it,  a  relation  that  generates  a  series. 
Thus  he  finds  that  to  review  a  mode  of  action  is  itself  a  mode  of 
action  that  implies  its  own  possible  reviewal  in  another  mode 
of  action,  and  so  on,  in  an  infinite  series.  Further,  this  series 
is  found  to  be  generated  by  an  asymmetrical  transitive  relation, 
and  is  either  discontinuous,  dense,  or  continuous.^-  However, 
each  member  of  the  series  is,  as  Professor  Royce  himself  admits 

"  See  Chap.  XXVI.,  n.,  1.  ^=  Cf.  Chap.  XLIII.,  vn.-x. 


REALISM  AND  LOGIC  S8 

(p.  153),  "distinct,"  and  sooner  or  later  there  is  that  member 
of  the  series  which  discovers,  or  is  identical  with  ihe  discovery 
of,  the  serial  character  of  the  whole.  It  is  shown  by  the  subse- 
quent study  of  this  series,  that,  if  any  specific  member  drop  out, 
especially  any  so-called  first  or  last  member,  the  series  is  no 
less  serial  or  ordered.  The  series  is,  therefore,  both  related  to, 
and  yet  independent  of  any  member  that  can  thus  "drop  out." 
Thus  that  very  serial  character  of  the  "modes  of  action," 
which  Professor  Royce,  in  order  to  support  his  Idealism, 
would  show  is  created  by  and  depends  upon  the  "will 
to  act,"  is  implied  by  his  own  logic  to  be  independent  of  that 
individual  act  or  member  in  which  it  is  discovered.  This  is 
Realism. 

But  further,  that  there  are  other  series  than  the  series  of  the 
modes  of  action  called  "reviewing,"  "noting,"  and  the  like,  is 
also  admitted,  at  least  tacitly.  For  our  author  accepts  and 
explains  at  some  length  the  correlation  of  series  and  the  func-/ 
tional  relationship.^^  Then,  at  least,  there  must  be  series  (at 
least  two)  to  be  correlated,  say,  by  a  one-one  relation,^*  and  each 
series  is  distinct  from  the  other.  But,  though  thus  related, 
they  are  also  in  their  distinctness,  or  bare  "twoness,"  inde- 
pendent. For.  if  there  must  be  at  least  two  entities  as  the  con- 
dition for  a  relation,  then  this  relation  cannot  in  turn  generate 
or  condition  this  minimum  of  diversity. 

We  thus  reach,  finally,  an  important  conclusion  of  direct 
bearing  on  the  problem  of  the  character  of  the  relationship 
between  "knowing  process"  and  "entity  known,"  whether  this 
be  existential  or  subsistential,  generic  or  specific,  physical  or 
mental.  First,  there  are  other  manifolds  than  that  of  the  series 
of  rational  will-acts.  This  is  implied  by  the  possibility  of  series 
being  correlated,  for  correlation  demands  at  least  two  series. 
But  the  manifold  of  will-acts  is  a  series.  Then  there  must  be 
other  series  with  which  this  is  in  correlation.  Accordingly  we 
must  include  (1)  that  other  manifolds  are,  or  have  being; 
(2)  that  these  other  manifolds  involve  one,  some,  or  all  of  the 
logical  principles  that  the  series  of  rational  will-acts  itself 
involves;  (3)  that,  as  "other  than"  and  numerically  distinct 
from  this  series,  these  other  series  are  both  independent  of  and 

"  Cf.  Chap.  XLIII.,  VU.-X.  "  See  Chap.  XXVII. 


24  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

yet  related  to  it,  just  as  the  series  of  one's  own  rational  "modes 
of  action"  (e.g.,  Professor  Eoyce's)  are  both  related  to  and 
independent  of  that  specific  mode  which  is  the  act  of  discovery;  ^^ 
and  (4)  that  there  is  at  least  the  possibility  that  all  of 
these  ordered  manifolds  should  be  related  to,  and  yet  be 
distinct  from,  not  indentieal  with,  and  independent  of  one 
another. 

This  four-fold  conclusion  presents  one  of  the  most  important 
parts  of  that  modern  logical  doctrine  which  is  called  Logical 
Pluralism.  It  is  the  direct  opposite  of  that  tendency  which 
Professor  Royce  supports,  at  least  towards  the  close  of  his 
essay,  namely.  Logical  Monism.  These  two  positions  together 
center  on  what  is  perhaps  the  most  important  prohlem  in  philo- 
sophical methodology,  that,  namely,  of  the  compatibility  of 
independence  and  r elatedness. ^^  The  one  answer  to  this  problem, 
Logical  Monism,  has,  whether  it  be  true  or  false,  conditioned 
logically  the  majority  of  the  great  orthodox  philosophical  sys- 
tems down  to  the  present.  It  is  an  answer  that  is  itself  con- 
ditioned historically  and  psychologically  in  the  Aristotelian 
tradition.  The  other  answer,  Logical  Pluralism,  has  also  had  its 
foreshadowings  now  and  then  throughout  philosophical  devel- 
opment, but  its  roots  strike  deepest  into  that  fertile  soil  for 
logical  research  which  is  furnished  by  the  relatively  recent  de- 
velopment of  the  empirical  sciences,  including  mathematics. 
Only  of  late  has  this  tradition  and  tendency  come,  as  it  were, 
to  self-consciousness,  and  its  logic  been  formulated.  Professor 
Royce 's  essay  forms  a  notable  contribution  to  the  formulation 
and  emphasis  of  the  importance  of  this  new  logic  or  "science 
of  order,"  as  it  may  be  called.  Indeed  this  long  discussion  of 
the  essay  has  been  undertaken  because  of  its  recognition  of  "the 
inexhaustible  opportunities  for  future  progress,"  both  in 
philosophy  and  in  science,  through  investigations  in  this  new 
field.  Not  so  much  along  the  line  of  continuing  to  use  the 
traditional  logic  as  in  philosophizing  in  accordance  with  the 
new  logic,  is  there  the  possibility  of  philosophical  advance  in 
the  future;  not  so  much  by  studying  substance  and  causation, 
mere  classes,  and  the  relations  of  exclusion  and  inclusion,  will 
real  problems  be  solved,  as  by  examinmg  the  various  types  and 

"  See  Chap.  XXVI.,  ii.,  1.  "  Ihid. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  25 

the  properties  of  relations  and  series  {as  well  as  mere  classes), 
the  correlations  of  series  {e.g.,  functions),  and  the  nature  of 
implication  and  presupposition.  The  one  procedure  would  seem 
to  have  exhausted  its  possibilities :  the  other  is  full  of  promise. 


CHAPTER  III 
THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC 

I.   INTRODUCTORY 

A  SURVEY  of  the  general  situation  in  modern  philosophy  dis- 
closes three  dominant  features.  One  of  these  features  is  the 
ascendancy  of  the  epistemological  problem  over  all  other  prob- 
lems. Thus  from  the  time  of  Descartes  (1596-1G50),  of  Locke 
(1632-1704),  and  of  Kant  (1724-1804)  to  the  present,  there  has 
been  sought  either  an  absolutely  certain  basis  for  (absolute) 
knowledge,  or  a  knowledge  of  how  we  know,  or  both,  before 
philosophers  have  gone  ahead  and  known,  as,  in  contrast,  the 
scientists  have  gone  ahead.  Secondly,  there  has  been  the  almost 
exclusive  influence  both  of  a  method  or  logic  and  of  a  set  of 
fundamental  premises,  often  called  necessary  truths,  that  may 
be  grouped  together  under  the  caption  of  Aristotelian  logic. 
The  third  dominant  feature  is  one  of  omission,  but  it  is  the 
correlative  of  the  other  two.  Philosophers  have  proceeded 
largely  in  ignorance  of  the  actual  practice  of,  and,  in  many 
cases,  of  the  results  obtained  by  the  scientists,  who  have  in- 
creased human  knowledge  without  prior  investigation  of  the 
problem  of  knowing.  Thus,  e.g.,  philosophy  has  largely  been 
ignorant,  until  rather  recently,  of  a  logic  that  is  radically  dif- 
ferent from  the  Aristotelian. 

Now,  as  has  been  suggested  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the 
demonstration  that  there  is  one  philosophical  position  tvhich  is 
presupposed  by  others,  and  that  this  position  is  Realism,  is 
obtained  by  examining  the  "knowing  situation"  in  the  light  of 


^6  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

the  principles  of  this  neiv  logic.  The  general  epistemological 
problem  includes  a  number  of  more  specific  problems,  such,  e.g., 
as  those  of  the  origin  of  knowing,  the  nature  of  truth  and  its 
tests,  the  limits  of  knowledge,  and  the  like.  But  ivhatever  posi- 
tion is  taken  in  the  solution  of  these  problems,  and  whether  this 
position  be  Skepticism,  Individualism,  Pragmatism,  Naturalism, 
Positivism,  Idealism,  or  Phenomenalism,  it  is  presupposed  that 
the  knowing  process  and  the  ''state  of  affairs"'^  known  and 
asserted  in  the  position  taken,  are  both  independent  and  related. 
This  presupposition,  however,  is  the  very  essence  of  Epistemo- 
logical Realism.  In  other  words,  whoever  asserts  or  advances  as 
true  a  position  that  is  opposed  to  Realism,  of  necessity  takes  a 
realistic  position  toward  that  very  ''state  of  affairs"  which  this 
opposed  position  describes.  For,  if  one  arrive  at  any  conclusion  at 
all  in  solution  of  the  epistemological  problem,  then  some  position 
is  asserted,  as  true  in  some  sense,  and  this  position  is  descriptive 
of  that  "state  of  affairs,"  regarding  the  knowing  situation, 
which  includes  the  relation  of  knowing  to  the  entities  known,, 
whether  these  entities  be  simple  or  complex.  But  it  is  there- 
with presupposed,  that,  although  this  (true)  "state  of  affairs" 
is  known  by  him  who  asserts  it  as  true,  and  is  therefore  related 
to  this  specific  knowing,  nevertheless  it  is,  as  a  genuine  "state 
of  affairs,"  not  created,  altered,  or  ynodified  by  virtue  of  this 
relation.  This,  however,  is  a  clear  case  of  asserting  and  of  pre- 
supposing, at  least  tacitly,  that  rclatedness  and  independence 
are,  in  one  instance  at  least,  quite  compatible.  From  this  it 
follows,  in  this  specific  instance,  that  one,  at  least,  of  the  two 
entities,  knowing  and  entity  known,  could  be  without  the  other. 
But  that  this  is  the  fact,  is,  again,  one  of  the  basic  contentions 
of  Realism. 

This  discovery  of  the  compatibility  of  relatedness  and  inde- 
pendence in  the  instance  of  the  knowing  situation,  and  in  other 
cases  as  well,  has  extremely  important  consequences.  Indeed 
this  compatibility  is  a  fundamental  logical  principle  that  leads 
to  the  development  both  of  more  specific  logical  doctrines  and 
of  a  detailed  Realism. 

One  of  the  most  important  implications  of  the  principle  is, 

'  E.  L.  Thorndike,  Elements  of  Psychology,  p.  71  et  passim,  also  uses 
this  phrase. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  27 

e.g.,  that  it  permits  of  the  validity  of  analysis.  For,  iy  it,  the 
"thing"  analyzed,  though  related  to  the  act  of  analysis,  can  be 
independent  of  this.  But,  if  it  is  thus  independent,  then  the 
analyzed  entity  is  not  created,  altered,  or  modified  by  the 
analysis.  This  principle  of  the  consistency  of  relatedness  and 
independence  that  is  itself  discovered  by  analysis,  thus  logically 
supports  the  validity  of  the  very  method  of  its  own  discovery. 

But,  further,  the  principle  implies  that  those  constituent 
parts  of  which  analysis  discloses  certain  wholes  to  be  made  up, 
are  to  be  accepted  as  entities  that  are  not  thereby  created,  but 
that  are  discovered.  For,  if  entities  can  be  both  related  and 
independent,  then  such  constituent  entities  do  not  of  necessity 
causally  affect,  modify,  alter,  or  create  one  another.  They  can, 
therefore,  either  be  removed  experimentally  without  being 
changed,  or,  if  an  experimental  removal  is  impossible,  they,  or 
at  least  certain  classes  of  them,  can  be  selected  and  isolated  in 
the  attention  field,  while  others  are  ignored.  This  is  analysis 
in  situ  - — a  method  that  has  been  most  productive,  all  through 
the  history  of  modern  science,  of  the  discovery  of  the  details  of 
those  complex  entities  that  cannot  be  experimentally  rent 
asunder.  It  is  also  a  method  of  virtual  ^  elimination,  since,  if 
one  class  of  entities  is  independent,  in  the  sense  defined,  of 
another  class,  then  the  one  can  he  studied  as  if  the  other  were 
not  present. 

In  the  results  and  methods  of  the  more  exact  sciences,  espe- 
cially mathematics,  and  the  new  logic,  which  is  largely  the 
formulation  of  such  methods,  any  number  of  instances  of  re- 
latedness and  independence,  of  analysis  in  situ,  and  of  virtual 
elimination  are  present.  These  are  found,  e.g.,  among  func- 
tional relations,  which  subsist  between  variables;  among  abso- 
lutely simple  entities,  such  as  points  and  instants,  both  in  the 
case  of  the  relations  of  the  individuals  of  each  of  these  classes 
among  themselves  and  to  those  of  the  other  class;  and  among 

*  Analysis  situs  is  the  term  that  is  used  in  mathematics.  But  the  phrase 
here  used  also  has  recognition;  e.g.,  see  Cajori,  History  of  Mathematics, 
p.  226.  Cf.  Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  pp  141,  466.  It  is  here 
used  with  a  broader  meaning  than  it  has  in  the  technical  analysis  situs. 

*  Cf .  the  definition  of  "  virtual  "  as  "  existing  in  effect,  but  not  actually," 
given  by  Mach,  Science  of  Mechanics,  p.  49,  in  his  footnote  concerning 
The  Principle  of  Virtual  Velocities. 


28  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

relations,  such  as  'cosubsisting'  asymmetrical  and  transitive  rela- 
tions, as  we  found  in  the  preceding  chapter.* 

If,  now,  it  were  not  possible  to  discover  in  a  direct  manner, 
that  the  knowing  situation  demands  the  compatibility  of  re- 
latedness  and  independence  and  the  possibility  of  an  analysis 
which  always  leaves  the  knowing  in  situ  in  any  situation  where 
something  is  known,  this  might  he  discovered  by  first  forming 
our  hypothesis  in  accordance  with  those  principles  that  are 
recognized  in  the  new  logic.  Conversely,  if  these  principles  had 
not  been  already  obtained  from  other  sources,  then  the  first  sug- 
gestion of  them  as  well  as  direct  evidence  for  them  could  well 
come  from  an  analysis  of  the  knowing  situation  itself.  Either 
order  of  procedure  is  thoroughly  empirical,  and  the  outcome  in 
the  two  cases  is  the  same.  On  the  one  hand  it  is,  that  the  * '  state 
of  affairs"  in  the  "knowing  situation"  is  one  that  demands, 
if  no  other  instance  does,  those  principles  which  are  recognized 
in  the  new  logic,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is,  that  for  these 
principles  there  is  one  more  opportunity  for  "application"  in 
the  particular  instance  of  the  knowing  situation. 

An  analogous  statement  with  reference  to  the  traditional,  old 
logic,  especially  those  doctrines  which  concern  the  concepts  of 
substance  and  of  cause,  meets,  however,  with  a  different  fate. 
First,  the  result  of  the  empirical  study  of  the  knowing  situation 
directly  invalidates  at  least  the  universality  of  these  two  con- 
cepts. For  it  is  found  that  the  knowing  situation  is  one  that 
makes  it  impossible  for  the  knowing  or  the  ego  to  be  a  sub- 
stance, or  to  have  a  modifying,  causal  effect  on  the  entity  known, 
on  pain  of  the  attempt  genuinely  to  know  defeating  itself.  Or, 
secondly,  if  one  endeavor,  conversely,  as  it  were,  to  "apply" 
these  concepts  of  substance  and  cause,  then  they  fail  to  account 
for  the  facts  of  the  knowing  situation,  namely,  that  there  is 
always  something  that  is  genuinely  known.  And  yet  it  is  just 
these  traditional  principles  and  concepts  that  have  been  applied, 
in  one  form  or  another,  again  and  again,  in  the  orthodox  en- 
deavors to  solve  the  epistemological  problem,  until,  with  per- 
haps every  variation  tried  and  a  philosophical  impasse  reached, 
one  must  seek  success  by  a  radically  different  procedure. 

The  necessity  of  thus  adopting  a  new  and  radical  point  o^ 

*  Pp.  21-22. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  29 

vietv  may  indeed  be  forced  upon  us  even  by  the  mere  manifold- 
ness  of  systems  that  result  from  the  application  of  the  tradi- 
tional doctrines.  But,  even  if  this  were  not  so,  the  discovery 
of  the  self-contradictory  character  of  at  least  some  of  these 
systems,  and  of  the  presupposition  by  all  of  them  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  new  logic,  would  compel  our  recognition. 

II.    THE   ORIGINS   OF   THE   TRxiDITIONAL   LOGIC 

The  modern  view  is  that  logic  is  an  empirical  science.  One 
accepts  various  types  of  relations,  of  classes,  of  series,  and  of 
functions  because  one  finds  that  there  are  these  entities.  One 
proceeds  here  much  as  he  does  in  physics,  chemistry,  and 
biology,  namely,  by  induction.  In  induction  one  generalizes 
from  those  cases  that  are  regarded  as  typical  and  are  taken  at 
random.  The  inductive  procedure,  further,  may  be  used  either 
quite  unconsciously  and  uncritically,  as  it  often  is,  indeed,  in 
common  sense  affairs,  or  with  full  knowledge  and  control  of  it 
as  a  method,  as  it  is  in  science. 

This  modern  view,  although  one  not  held  by  all  logicians,  as 
to  what  logic  is,  and  as  to  what  constitutes  logic,  results  from 
the  use  of  the  general  inductive  method  as  it  is  used  in  science, 
namely,  consciously.  But  the  use  of  induction  in  the  historical 
development  of  logic  has  7iot  been  of  this  kind.  For,  if  we 
investigate  the  heginnings  of  logic  among  the  Greeks,  we  find 
much  evidence  for  the  conclusion,  that  these  founders  of  logic 
were  unconsciously  dominated,  in  respect  to  the  typical  cases 
which  they  selected  for  inductive  examination,  by  physical 
things.  However,  that  this  should  have  been  the  case,  is,  per- 
haps, not  surprising.  For  psychology  shows  that,  out  of  all 
the  variety  of  the  realm  of  entities  with  which  we  are  acquainted, 
it  is  physical  things  that  most  extensively  and  intensively  attract 
the  attention  of  both  the  individual  and  the  nation  that  is  im- 
mature. But  both  psychology  and  the  history  of  human  thought 
show,  also,  that  the  physical  thing,  when  this  thus  becomes  the 
model  for  thinking,  is  itself  conceived  of  as  a  complex  of  quali- 
ties that  inhere  in  a  suhstance-like  substratum  or  core,  the  thing, 
i.e.,  the  qualities  and  the  substratum  together,  being  "particu- 
larized" as  here  or  there  in  space,  and  as  now  or  then  in  time. 

It  is  the  physical  thing,  therefore,  as  defined  in  this  way,  that 


30  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

was  the  model  after  which  the  Greek  philosophers,  though  uncon- 
sciously, perhaps,  patterned  their  thinking  and  formulated  the 
"laws  of  thought,"  ^  these  laws  being  called  logic.    Accordingly, 

"  In  the  very  nature  of  the  case  it  is  difficult  to  get  certain  evidence 
that  Aristotle  and  his  predecessors  in  Greek  thought  were  predominantly 
influenced  by  the  particular  physical  thing  as  the  model  after  which  they 
patterned  their  thinking,  i.e.,  both  their  logic  and  philosophy.  For  such 
an  influence  would,  in  the  circumstances,  be  exercised  without  at  least  the 
full  awareness,  criticism,  and  consciousness  of  those  whom  it  affected. 
Therefore  we  must  not  expect  to  find  an  explicit  recognition  and  formula- 
tion of  this  influence  in  the  philosophical  writings  of  the  Greeks,  but  we 
must,  rather,  look  for  such  an  influence  "  between  the  lines,"  and  beneath 
the  surface. 

If,  e.g.,  Aristotle's  Metaphysics  is  examined  in  this  way,  it  will  be 
found  that,  by  and  large,  the  whole  work,  and  especially  Book  V.,  is 
couched  in  terms  of  the  particular  thing.  That  to  which  Aristotle  directs 
his  thought,  and  from  which  he  derives  the  rest  of  his  philosophy  is  a 
concrete  somewhat  (  rdde  ri ) ,  an  individual  thing.  This  concrete  somewhat 
is  a  subject  {v^roKeifievov)  with  qualities,  quantities,  and  relations.  These 
latter  are  the  predicates  of  the  former  (vnoKelfievov  ) ,  while  the  former,  the 
subject,  does  not  stand  in  the  relation  of  predicate  to  the  latter  or  to 
anything  else. 

As  examples  of  statements  that  confirm  this  whole  view  one  finds  in 
the  Metaphysics  the  following  definitions:  Book  V.  (A),  Chap.  I.,  "'Be- 
ginning '  means  that  from  which  a  thing  arises,  e.g.,  as  the  foundation  of 
a  house."  Chap.  IV.,  "  '  Nature  '  means  the  genesis  of  growing  things." 
Chap,  v.,  "'The  necessary'  means  that  without  which,  as  a  condition, 
o  thing  cannot  live,  e.g.,  breathing  and  food  are  necessary  for  an  animal." 
Chap.  VI.,  b,  "  Things  are  called  one — because  the  substratum  does  not 
difl'er  in  kind."  Chap.  VIII.,  "  '  Substance '  means  the  simple  bodies,  i.e., 
the  earth  and  fire  and  water  and  everything  of  the  sort,  and,  in  general, 
bodies  and  the  things  composed  of  them,  both  animals  and  divine  beings 
and  the  parts  of  these.  All  these  are  called  substances  because  they  are 
not  predicate  of  a  subject,  but  everything  else  is  a  predicate  of  them." 

In  agreement  with  the  view  of  the  writer,  that  the  particular  physical 
thing  was  the  point  of  departure  for  Aristotle,  we  have  also  the  statement 
of  Grote,  Aristotle,  2nd  ed.,  1880,  p.  97,  that  Aristotle  "  was,  as  far  as  we 
can  see,  original  in  taking  as  the  point  of  departure  for  his  theory  the 
individual  man,  horse,  or  other  perceivable  object;  in  laying  down  this 
concrete  particular  with  all  its  outfit  of  details,  as  the  type  of  Ens  proper, 
complete  and  primary;  and  in  arranging  into  classes  the  various  secondary 
modes  of  Ens  according  to  their  different  relations  to  the  primary  type 
and  the  mode  in  which  they  contribute  to  make  up  its  completeness." 
Also,  ibid.,  pp.  69  and  79. 

A.  W.  Benn  in  his  Greek  Philosophers,  1914,  and  R.  Adamson,  in  hia 
Development  of  Oreek  Philosophy,  1008,  also  agree  with  my  view.  See 
the  latter  author,  op  cit.,  pp.  153-154  and  180-182.  Also  E.  Cassirer, 
Substanzbegriff  und  Funktionsbe griff,  1910,  Chap.  IV.,  v.,  concurs  in  my 
views,  not  only  as  to  the  origin,  but  also  as  to  the  character  of  the 
Aristotelian  tradition. 

On  the  Aristotelian  tradition  see  de  Wulf,  History  of  Mediceval  Phi- 
losophy, 1900,  trans,  by  Coffee,  and  Scholasticism,  Old  and  Neiv ;  H.  O. 
Taylor,  The  Classical  Heritage  of  the  Middle  A  (jes,  and  The  Media  vol 
Mind;  and  Adams,  Civilization  during  the  Middle  Ages,  Cambridge 
Mediaeval  History.  A  good  systematic  account  of  the  general  character 
of  this  development  in  its  divergencies,  with  names,  dates,  bibliographies. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  31 

it  is  not  surprising  that  not  only  in  the  logic  and  thinking  of 
these  Greek  philosophers,  but  also  in  the  whole  long  tradition 
which  has  developed  from  them,  one  should  find  philosophy  to 
be  dominated  by  the  * ^ thing-concept,' ^  and  by  those  further  con- 
cepts that  are  derivable  from  this,  namely,  the  concepts  of  sub- 
stance and  of  cause.^ 

etc.,  will  be  found  in  F.  H.  Thilly'a  History  of  Philosophy,  1914,  pp.  120- 
227.  Cf.  with  this,  Boutroux,  Historical  Studies  in  Philosophy,  trans,  by 
F.  Rothwell,  pp.  74-169,  especially  pp.  156-162.  For  the  continuation  of 
the  tradition  in  modern  philosophy  see  The  Life  of  Ren6  Descartes,  by 
E.  S    Haldane,  1905. 

Evidence  that  the  concrete  particular  thing  was  the  model  for  earlier 
thinkers  as  well  as  for  Aristotle,  is  found  in  Plato  in  the  Cratyhis,  the 
Vhcexlo,  and  the  Parmenides.  Plato's  logic  is  presented  in  the  Cratylus, 
the  Phcedo,  and  the  Thecetetus. 

*  As  illustrating  the  character  of  the  tradition,  and  also  as  confirmatory 
of  my  main  hypothesis,  I  may  quote  a  modern  scholastic,  P.  Coffee, 
Ontology,  pp.  216-217. 

"  First,  as  regards  our  knowledge  of  the  existence  of  substances,  and 
the  manner  in  which  we  obtain  our  concept  of  substance.  We  get  this 
concept  from  corporeal  substances,  and  afterwards  apply  it  to  spiritual 
substances;  so  that  our  knowledge  of  the  former  is  'immediate'  only  in 
the  relative  sense  of  being  prior  to  the  latter,  not  in  the  sense  that  it  is 
a  direct  intuition  of  the  natures  of  corporeal  substances.  We  have  no 
such  direct  insight  into  their  natures.  But  our  concept  of  them  as  actually 
existing  is  also  immediate  in  the  sense  that  at  first  we  spontaneously 
conceive  every  object  which  comes  before  our  consciousness  as  something 
existing  in  itself.  The  child  apprehends  each  separate  stimulant  of  its 
sense  perception — resistance,  color,  sound,  etc., — as  a  '  this '  or  a  '  that,' 
i.e.,  as  a  separate  stimulant  in  itself;  in  other  words,  it  apprehends  all 
realities  as  substances:  not,  of  course,  that  the  child  has  yet  any  reflective 
knowledge  of  what  a  substance  is,  but  unknowingly  it  applies  to  all 
realities  at  first  the  concept  which  it  undoubtedly  possesses  of  '  something 
existing  in  itself.'  It  likewise  apprehends  each  such  reality  as  '  one ' 
or  '  undivided  in  itself,'  and  as  '  distinct  from  other  things.'  Such  is 
the  child's  immediate,  direct,  and  implicit  idea  of  substance.  But  if  we 
are  to  believe  Hume,  what  is  true  of  the  child  remains  true  of  the  man: 
for  the  latter,  too,  '  every  perception  is  a  substance,  and  every  distinct 
part  of  a  perception  a  distinct  substance.'  Nothing,  however,  could  bo 
more  manifestly  at  variance  with  the  facts.  For  as  reason  is  developed 
and  reflective  analysis  proceeds,  the  child  most  undoubtedly  realizes  that 
not  everything  that  falls  within  its  experience  has  the  character  of  '  a 
something  existing  in  itself  and  distinct  from  other  things.'  '  Walking,' 
'  talking,'  and  '  actions '  generally,  it  apprehends  as  realities, — as  reali- 
ties which,  however,  do  not  '  exist  in  themselves,'  but  in  other  beings,  in 
the  beings  that  '  walk  '  and  '  talk  '  and  '  act.'  And  these  latter  beings 
it  still  apprehends  as  '  existing  in  themselves,'  and  as  thus  differing  from 
the  former,  which  '  exist  not  in  themselves  but  in  other  things.'  Thus 
the  child  comes  into  possession  of  the  notion  of  '  accident,'  and  of  the 
further  notion  of  '  substance '  as  something  which  not  only  exists  in 
itself  (bvaia,]  ens  in  se  subsistens)  but  which  is  also  a  support  or  subject 
of  accidents  {vnoKeifjevov,  suhstans,  suhstare) .  Nor,  indeed,  need  the 
child's  reason  be  very  highly  developed  in  order  to  realize  that  if  experi- 
ence furniBhes  it  with  'beings  that  do  not  exist  in  themselves';  that  if 


32  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

Such  is  the  conclusion  to  which  the  study  of  the  history  of 
philosophy  brings  us,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  dominant 
concepts  in  philosophy  throughout  the  middle  ages  and,  indeed, 
in  the  greater  part  of  modern  philosophy,  e.g.,  in  the  systems  of 
Descartes,  Spinoza,  Berkeley,  Kant,  and  Hegel,  have  been: 
(1)  substance,  in  the  sense  of  a  substratum  in  which  (2)  quali- 
ties seem  to  inhere'' — as  in  a  physical  thing;  (3)  causation,  in 
the  sense  in  which  one  physical  thing  seems  to  affect  another 
physical  thing,  namely,  by  producing  an  effect  which  is  a  new 
quality  that  inheres  in  the  substance  of  the  thing  affected ;  (4) 
the  relations  of  similarity  and  dissimilarity,  by  virtue  of  which 
"things"  form  classes;  (5)  the  fact  of  class  and  the  relation  of 
inclusion  by  virtue  of  which  an  individual  "thing"  is  included 
in  a  class,  or  one  class  is  included  in  another  class,^  completely, 
partially,  or  negatively;  (6)  and  finally,  the  additive  relation 
by  virtue  of  which,  whether  it  exists  alone  or  together  with 
similarity,  parts  form  a  whole  that  is  not  ordered  or  serial 
in  character,  and  that  has  only  the  same  characteristics  that  the 
parts  have. 

That  philosophy  and  even  science,  somewhat,  should  have  been 
dominated  by  these  concepts,  is,  however,  readily  understood,  if 
one  inquires,  What  would  most  probably  be  the  derivative  con- 
cepts if  the  particular  physical  thing  were  unconsciously  made 
the  model  not  only  for  the  formulation  of  logic  but  for  "actual" 
thinking  and  reasoning?    "Would  it  not  then  have  seemed  to  the 

'  accidents '  exist  at  all,  it  would  be  unintelligible  and  self -contradictory 
to  deny  the  existence  of  '  substances.' 

"  Hence,  in  tlie  order  of  our  experience  the  first,  implicit  notion  of  sub- 
stance is  that  of  '  something  existing  in  itself  '  ( Svoia )  ;  the  first  explicit 
notion  of  it,  however,  is  that  by  which  it  is  apprehended  as  '  a  subject 
or  support  of  accidents'  (vTroKeifjnov,  suhstare,  substantia)  ;  then  by  reflec- 
tion we  go  back  to  the  explicit  notion  of  it  as  '  something  existing  in 
itself.'  In  the  real  or  ontological  order  the  perfection  of  '  existing  in 
itself '  is  manifestly  more  fundamental  than  that  of  '  supporting 
accidents.' " 

'Aristotle  distinguished  four  causes.  Tims  he  says:  "The  same  thing 
may  have  all  the  kinds  of  causes,  e.g.,  the  moving  cause  of  a  house  is  the 
art  or  the  builder,  the  final  cause  is  the  function  it  fulfils,  the  matter  is 
earth  and  stones,  and  the  form  is  the  definitory  formula." — Metaphysics, 
translated  by  \V.  D.  Ross,  Bk.  III.,  Chap.  II.,  p.  990''.  These  four  causes 
are  usually  called  the  efficient,  the  final,  the  material,  and  the  foi'mal, 
respectively.  They  are  in  turn  "  reduced "  to  two,  the  material  and  the 
formal. 

*  Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the  syllogism,  contained  in  the  Prior  Analytics, 
the  Posterior  Analytics,  and  the  Topics. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  33 

uncritical  mind,  even  as  it  does  today,  that  a  thing  is  not  the 
mere  aggregate  of  its  qualities,  but  that  it  includes  a  suhstratum 
in  which  these  attributes  inhere?  For,  if  there  are  qualities, 
are  they  not  qualities  of  something,  and  so  dependent?  And 
do  they  not,  therefore,  imply  something  that,  ultimately,  is  not 
dependent  on  anything  else,  on  pain  of  this  again  being  a  quality 
and  so  in  turn  demanding  a  substratum?  With  this  the  case, 
would  it  be  surprising  if,  further,  the  concept  of  a  substance- 
like unitary  ego"  had  resulted  from  "thinking"  a  human  being 
after  the  analogy  of  a  physical  thing,  with  only  the  difference 
that  the  substratum  here  is  regarded  as  spiritual  instead  of  as 
"material"?  And  would  it  be  a  step  far  removed  from  this 
also  to  conceive  of  the  manifold  parts  of  the  universe  as  inhering 
in  one  universal  substratum,  be  this  spiritual  or  material  or  even 
"unknowable"?  To  these  inquiries  the  history  of  philosophy 
gives  innumerable  affirmative  answers  in,  e.g.,  the  doctrines  of 
rational  psychology  and  the  modern  ontological  monistic  systems 
of  materialism  and  spiritualism. 

But  further,  with  the  physical  thing  made,  unconsci'^asly, 
perhaps,  the  model  for  thinking,  would  it  not  also  seem  to  the 
uncritical  and  naive  mind  that  things  woidd  affect  one  another, 
so  as  to  produce  either  modifications  in  old  qualities,  or  quite 
new  ones,  yet  in  both  cases  without  prejudice  to  the  self-ideyitity 
of  the  substance-like  substratum  that  is  the  "core"  of  each? 
And  also,  if  all  the  entities  of  the  universe  were  conceived  of 
as  "things"  of  this  kind,  and  so  in  causal  interaction,  would  not 
each  "thing,"  in  respect  to  its  qualities,  be  infinitely  complex 
by  virtue  of  being  affected  by  everything  else?  Indeed,  would 
not  each  complex  of  qualities  depend  on  all  other  "things'*  to 
a  greater  or  less  degree,  so  that  the  universe  would  be  like  an 
organism?  And  finally,  would  not  the  soul,  or  the  knowing 
ego,  or  whatever  it  may  be  called,  be  in  interaction  with  other 
"things,"  both  material  and  spiritual,  so  as  loth  to  affect  and 

*  The  Platonic  doctrine  of  the  unity  of  the  soul,  presented  in  the  Phcedo, 
the  Thewtetus,  and  the  Parmenides  is  an  excellent  example  of  the  trans- 
ference, to  the  human  personality,  of  the  model  of  the  concrete  particular 
thing  defined  as  a  unitary  substratum  with  a  manifold  of  qualities. 

Further  references:  C.  M.  Bakewell,  Source  Book  in  Ancient  PhUosophij, 
1909;  Burnett,  Greek  Philosophy,  Part  I.,  Thales  to  Plato;  Gomperz, 
Greek  Thinkers,  trans,  by  G.  G.  Berry,  1912;  Lutoslawski,  The  Origin  and 
Growth  of  Plato's  Logic,  1905, 


34  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

he  affected  hy  themf  Then  would  not  the  very  act  of  knowing, 
as  the  act  of  a  thing-like-ego,  causally  affect  the  object  {to  be) 
known,  with  the  result  that  all  genuine  knowing  would  h^ 
rendered  impossible?  ^'^ 

Again  do  our  inquiries  receive  affirmative  answer  in  some  of 
the  great  systems  of  philosophical  history.  Thus  there  is  phe- 
nomenalism, holding  that  things-in-themselves  are  unknowable, 
and  not  merely  unknown,  because  the  "structure"  of  the  know- 
ing ego  in  its  inherent  qualities  affects  the  "thing"  known,  thus 
to  condition  the  character  of  all  that  filters  through.  Thus  it 
conditions  the  tvorld  that  we  live  in  as  the  only  world  that  we 
know.  Of  necessity  it  follows  from  this  that,  ivere  knowing 
eliminable,  it  could  not  be  removed  without  altering  "things" 
as  we  know  them.  But  there  are  also  panzoism,  maintaining  that 
the  universe  is  a  living  being  and  has  a  soul,  and  anti-intellectu- 
alism,  holding  that  genuine  intellectual  analysis  is  impossible, 
both  because  each  thing  is  infinitely  complex  and  because  the 
removal  of  a  part  alters  its  causal  context." 

Finally,  we  may  complete  our  inquiries  by  asking:  If  the 
physical  thing  is  the  model  after  which  the  naive  mind  strongly 
tends  both  to  conceive  the  entities  that  it  thinks  about  and  also 
to  formulate  its  logic,  then  what  kind  of  a  logic  will  this  bef 
Will  it  not  be  one  that  rests  on  the  most  patent  relations  among 
*' things,"  in  addition  to  that  of  causation?  And  are  not  these 
the  relations  of  similarity  and  of  difference,  and  of  mere  "to- 
getherness" or  additiveness  ? 

But  "things''  in  that  they  are  merely  additively  related  form 
only  a  plurality  or  manifold  or  collection  that  is  quite  inde- 
pendent of  order,  while,  as  both  similar  and  dissimilar,  they  form 
distinct  classes.  Patterned  on  the  physical  thing  as  a  model, 
logic  thus  becomes  essentially  a  system  of  classes  that  are  either 
included  in  or  excluded  from  each  other,  partially  or  com- 
pletely. But,  if  this  is  the  logic  of  the  naive  mind,  Greek  or 
other,  then,  with  a  tradition  based  upon  it,  would  there  not 
develop  philosophies  which,  because  of  the  lack  of  the  proper 
methods  of  analysis,  become  involved  in  unsuccessful  struggles 
to  solve  such  problems  as  those  of  infinity  and  continuity,  calling 

•'Kant's  phenomenalistic  position:  Bee  Chap.  XXIX. 
"    See  Chap.  XXXIII. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  35 

the  results  of  these  vain  attempts  "antinomies,""  as  Kant 
does?  Would  there  not  also  be  systems  which,  because  they 
insist  that  parts  can  be  only  additively  related  to  form  a  whole, 
can  conceive  of  7iotliing  new  appearing  in  this  world-process? 
Would  they  not  thus  be  forced  to  deny  all  genuine  evolution? 
And  finally,  would  there  not  be  systems  that  would  be  con- 
spicuous for  their  ignorance  of  those  entities  and  relations  which 
science  discovers,  such  as  (1)  limits,  (2)  relations  that  generate 
series  and  correlations  hetiveen  these  (some  of  which  are  called 
functions) ,  and,  lastly,  many  other  wholes  that  have  properties 
which  are  very  different  from  those  of  their  parts  f 

Historical  inquiry  shows  that  nearly  all  of  the  great  philo- 
sophical systems,  especially  those  of  the  last  three  hundred  years, 
have  one  or  more  of  the  characteristics  above  mentioned.  Yet 
that  this  should  be  the  case  is  not  surprising  to  him  who  looks 
sufficiently  beneath  the  surface  to  discover  the  influences  that 
have  determined  both  problems  and  methods  and  solutions.  One 
may  conclude,  indeed,  that  throughout  its  entire  history  phi- 
losophy has  been  for  the  most  part  "thingized,"  if  the  term 
is  allowable.  The  one  great  postulate  from  which  deductions 
as  to  both  problems  and  methods  and  solutions  have  been  made, 
is,  that  entities  are  "things"  which  (1)  consist  of  a  suhstance- 
like  substratum  in  which  qualities  inhere,  and  (2)  are  related 
causally,  additively,  and  by  similarity  and  difference. 

in.    THE  FORMULATION   AND   THE   CRITICISM   OP    THE   TRADITIONAL 

LOGIC 

At  the  present  time,  however,  in  both  philosophical  and  sci- 
entific circles  there  is  a  fairly  general  recognition  of  the  necessity 
of  some  criticism  of  the  Aristotelian  traditional  logic  and  of  what 
it  has  produced.  This  criticism,  however,  is  participated  in  by 
two  schools.  The  one,  attempting  to  criticize,  is  nevertheless, 
with  the  irony  of  fate,  itself  caught  up  in  the  onward  sweep  of 
the  tradition.  Even  now  it  can  discern  no  other  methods  and 
concepts  for  intellect  to  use  than  the  Aristotelian.  And  since 
it  discovers  that,  with  these,  intellect  fails  to  solve  certain  prob- 
lems, this  school  takes  refuge  in  a  philosophy  of  emotionalism, 

"  See  Chaps.  XXIII.,  XXIV.,  and  XXIX. 


36         THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

of  intuition,  and  of  direct  experience.  A  much  discussed  repre- 
sentative of  this  anti-intellectualism,  emotionalism,  and  prag- 
matism, is  the  French  philosopher,  Bergson.  In  criticism  of  this 
school  it  is  perhaps  but  fair  to  admit  that  it  is  guilty  only  of 
an  unconscious  ignoring  of  those  other  methods  and  principles 
to  which  intellect  may  turn  if  it  does  not  succeed  by  the  use  of 
the  Aristotelian  methods  and  principles. 

The  other  school  of  criticism  frankly  recognizes  these  other 
methods  and  principles,  and,  in  the  knowledge  and  use  of  them, 
not  only  discovers  the  reason  for  the  failures  of  the  past,  but 
also  solves  problems  and  gains  the  promise  of  future  advance. 
Those  who  thus  criticize  are,  many  of  them,  scientists,  but, 
mostly,  philosophers  who  keep  their  weather-eye  on  the  methods, 
the  results,  and  the  logic  of  modern  analysis. 

It  is  in  the  light  of  these  methods  and  results  that  it  is  possible 
to  reformulate,  in  terms  of  logical  theory,  the  major  postulates 
of  the  great  historical  systems  of  philosophy.  The  new  logic, 
especially  through  its  principle  of  the  consistency  of  relatedness 
and  independence,  and  its  denial  of  universal  causation,  itself 
logically  justifies  the  presentation  of  the  "comparative  anat- 
omy" of  systems  independently  of  their  historical  environment 
and  causes.  Even  the  Aristotelian  logic  in  its  several  aspects 
receives  reformulation  and  proper  placing  in  a  broader  realm. 

Thus  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  of  the  syllogism  is  found  to 
be  but  a  special  instance  of  the  "science  of  order."  An  ordered 
series  is  generated  by  some  asymmetrical  and  transitive  relation, 
such  as  "precedes"  or  "less  than"  or  "ancestor  of,"  and  the 
relationship  of  inclusion  is  only  one  of  a  number  of  such  specific 
relations.  Any  asymmetrical  transitive  relation,  e.g.,  "less 
than,"  supposing  it  to  be  symbolized  by  the  sign  <,  is  of  such 
a  character,  that,  if  x  <C  y,  and  y  <.  z,  then  x  <i  z.  Substituting 
for  these  variables  the  less  general  ones  of  three  classes,  standing 
as  subject,  or  minor  term,  predicate,  or  major  term,  and  middle 
term,  and  symbolized  by  8,  P,  and  M,  respectively,  we  have,  if 
S  <  M,  and  M  <  P,  then  S  <  P;  i.e.,  the  conclusion  S  <  P  is 
"mediated"  by  a  middle  term,  and  in  this  conclusion  this  term 
"falls  out."  This  is  all  illustrated  by  the  syllogism,  that  (1)  if 
knowing  is  an  entity,  and  all  entities  are  causes,  then  (2)  know- 
ing is  a  cause. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  87 

But  more  important  for  our  purposes  is  the  restatement  and 
logical  formulation  of  the  traditional  Aristotelian  doctrine  of 
suhsiance  and  of  cause.  This  doctrine  is  now  called  the  theory 
of  "internal  relations,"  and,  in  accordance  with  what  has  been 
said  of  the  dominant  influence  of  the  Aristotelian  tradition,  it 
is  evident  that  it  is  that  theory  which  conditions  logically  most 
systems  of  philosophy.  The  theory  may  be  formulated  in  two 
ways,  according  as  emphasis  is  placed  on  one  or  the  other  of 
the  two  doctrines  that  are  involved  in  it. 

The  one  formulation  is,  that  terms,  by  virtue  of  being  related, 
causally  affect  one  another  and  are  complex,  indeed  infinitely 
so;  or,  merely,  that  related  terms  are  infinitely  complex}^  How- 
ever, this  second  statement  is  not  so  satisfactory  as  the  first, 
since  it  leaves  the  reason  for  the  complexity  unassigned.  This 
reason  is,  that  terms  are  initially  conceived  of  after  the  analogy 
of  interacting  physical  things.  Then  it  follows  that  they  are 
infinitely  complex  not  only  because  of  the  causal  effect  on  them 
of  the  infinite  number  of  other  "things"  to  which  they  are 
related,  but  also  because  the  effects  thereby  produced  in  turn 
affect  or  causally  modify  one  another,  since  they  are  related. 
Phenomenalism,  Subjective  Idealism,  Naturalism,  Pragmatism, 
and  Anti-Intellectualism  are  systems  that  are  logically  derivable 
from  the  postulation  of  this  theory  for  one  situation  or  another, 
but  especially  in  interpretation  of  the  specific  relational  com- 
plex, "knowing"  and  "object  known." 

A  symbolism  that  may  be  used  advantageously  to  express  this 
theory  of  internal  relations  in  brief  form  is : — 


xBy    or     a^y®^^-  R  2/^  etc. 


<r 


The  former  symbolism  is  preferable,  since  it  is  the  sim- 
pler. B  symbolizes  the  relation,  x  and  y  the  related  terms, 
and  the  arrow  that  causal  action  of  each  term  on  the  other, 
by  virtue  of  ivhich  each  becomes  infinitely  complex.  This 
specific  theory  of  relations  may  be  called  the  "  modification 
theory." 

''B.  Russell,  "The  Basis  of  Realism,"  .Jovr.  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and 
Scientific  Methods,  1911,  Vol.  Vlll.,  p.  158;  also  see  the  references  in 
Chap.  XXVI. 

Q  ^  P  n  o 
*J  t)  iJ  \j  kj 


!38  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

The  other  formulation  of  the  theory  of  internal  relations  is 
the  proposition,  that  tiie  relatedness  of  two  terms  demands  an- 
other, third  entity,  of  a  different  order  of  reality,  to  mediate 
the  relationship,  i.e.,  to  make  the  relation  "really"  relate.  This 
may  be  called  the  "underlying,"  or  the  "transcendent  reality" 
theory.  This  theory  is  derived,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
from  the  analogy  of  the  supposed  holding  together  of  the  several 
related  attributes  of  a  physical  thing  hy  the  substance-like  sub- 
stratum in  which  they  inhere,  and  of  which  they  are  attributes. 
It   receives   an   advantageous,   brief   formulation   in   the   sym- 

X  R  y 

holism  > — . — ',  the  meaning  of  which  is  evident.     X,  y,  and  R 

symbolize  respectively  the  two  related  terms  and  the  relation, 
and  U  the  numerically  single,  metaphysical  reality  that  medi- 
ates this.  Objective  Idealism  is  an  example  of  a  system  that  is 
logically  derivable  from  the  postulation  of  this  theory  as  applied 
to  all  entities,  i.e.,  to  the  universe.^^ 

The  logical  arguments  for  both  of  these  aspects  of  the  theory 
of  internal  relations  will  be  given  in  a  later  chapter.^'^ 

In  direct  opposition  to  this  twofold  theory  of  internal  rela- 
tions stands  the  theory  of  external  relations.  A  convenient  sym- 
bolism for  this  is  x\R\y,  or  merely  xRy.  By  this  it  is  in- 
tended to  express  (1)  the  fact  of  the  mere  relatedness  of  the 
terms  by  virtue  of  the  relation;  (2)  the  absence  of  any  causal 
action  of  either  term  on  the  other;  (3)  the  absence  of  any  com- 
plexity as  produced  by  causal  action;  (4)  the  possible  absolute, 
numerical  simplicity  of  either  term;  (5)  the  absence  of  any 
entity  to  mediate  the  relationship,  or  to  relate  the  relation  to 
the  terms;  (6)  the  independence  of  the  terms  side  by  side  with 
the  fact  of  their  relatedness. 

The  central  question  for  which  each  of  these  theories  of  rela- 
tions is  asserted  by  its  advocates  to  be  an  answer,  is,  How  does 
a  relation  relate?  The  answer  of  one  party  is,  that  a  relation 
relates  by  carrying  with  it,  or  by  transmitting,  a  ca^isal  effect 
from  one  entity  to  another ;  of  another  party  it  is,  that  a  relation 
relates  through  the  agency  of  another,  a  third  and  underlying 
entity.    Each  of  these  answers  is  conditioned,  at  least  psycho- 

"  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII.  "  Chap.  XXVI. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  39 

logically,  by  the  influence  of  the  physical  thing  as  the  model 
for  all  thinking.  The  answer  of  a  third  party  is  that  a  relation 
just  relates,  with  no  causal  effect,  no  dependence,  no  "under- 
lying entity." 

For  the  third  theory,  that  of  external  relations,  direct  and 
convincing  evidence  is  found  throughout  a  broad  field  of  scien- 
tific, logical,  and  philosophical  investigation.^®  A  most  impor- 
tant instance  is  the  functional  relationship — between  variables, 
particularly  in  the  case  of  "one-valued"  functions,  in  which 
there  is  a  one-one  correspondence  between  two  series.  Each 
series  is,  of  course,  a  manifold  and  a  complex,  but  it  is  also 
an  ordered  whole;  and,  in  the  case  of  one-valued  functions,  each 
individual  of  the  one  series  is  related  in  a  one-one  manner  to, 
or  is  in  one-one  correspondence  with,  one  and  only  one  specific 
individual  of  the  other  series.  A  simple  illustration  of  such 
one-valued  functions  is  presented  in  the  case  of  the  uniform 
motion  of  a  body.  Here  the  distance  traveled  is  a  function  of 
the  time  required ;  i.e.,  each  point  of  the  path  or  space-series  is 
related  in  a  one-one  manner  to  one,  and  only  one,  specific  instant 
of  the  time-series ;  each  of  these  correlatioyis  is,  therefore,  itself 
a  complex,  but  its  constituent  parts,  namely,  a  point  and  an 
instant,  are,  not  complex,  hut  simple;  they  are,  therefore,  hoth 
related  and  independent,  since  each  would  be  "the  same  entity," 
if  it  were  out  of  the  relation,  that  it  is  in  the  relation.  The 
motion  itself  is  the  series  of  these  complexes,  as  these  are  related 
asymmetrically  and  transitively." 

Another  instance  of  one-valued  functions  is  the  relation  be- 
tween the  uniform  acceleration  of  a  falling  body,  and  the  specific 
time-period  required  for  this  change.  Acceleration  is  not  mo- 
tion, but  it  is  change  of  velocity.  It  is,  therefore,  a  series  of 
velocities  that  are  correlated  with  the  instants  of  the  specific 
time  series  of  which  it  is  the  function.  Each  specific  velocity 
is  a  complex  that  is  correlated  in  a  one-one  manner  with  one 
and  only  one  instant  of  this  time-series,  and  this  correlation  is 
in  turn  another  complex.    But  no  individual  velocity  is  complex 

"  See  G.  A.  Bliss,  "The  Function  Concept  and  the  Fundamental  Notions 
of  the  Calculus,"  in  Monographs  ov  Topics  of  Modern  Mathematics,  ed.  by 
J.  W.  A.  Youno:;  also  A.  N.  Whitehead,  Introduction  to  Mathematics, 
1911,  Chaps.  1.,  II.,  v.,  and  VI. 

"See  Chap.  XLIII.,  x. 


40  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

by  virtue  of  this  particular  one-one  correlation,  since,  were  there 
no  accelerated  motion,  there  could  still  be  (motion  of  uniform) 
velocity.  In  other  words,  there  could  still  be  that  complex, 
point-correlated-with-instant,  which  is  the  constituent  term  of 
uniform  motion,  even  if  there  were  not  that  further  correlation 
of  this  complex  with  an  instant,  which  further  relational  com- 
plex is  the  constituent  term  of  acceleration. 

The  brief  analysis  of  these  two  examples  shows  that  at  least 
certain  types  of  the  functional  relationship  present  a  number  of 
instances  of  entities,  both  simple  and  complex,  that  are  related 
externally,  as  this  term  has  been  previously  defined.  Such  in- 
stances are  (1)  an  ordered  series  of  points,  and  (2)  of  instants; 
(3)  in  the  case  of  motion,  the  correlation  of  a  point  with  an 
instant,  and  (4)  the  ordered  series  of  these  complexes  as  "form- 
ing" motion.  Indeed  it  may  be  said,  in  general,  of  the  func- 
tional complexes  in  their  several  aspects  of  simple  and  complex 
individuals  that  form  series  through  asymmetrical  and  transitive 
relations,  and  of  complexes  that  are  formed  by  one-one  relations, 
and  the  like,  that  a  consistent  explanation  of  them  is  possible 
only  on  the  basis  of  the  theory  of  external  relations. 

Further  evidence  for  the  theory  of  external  relations  from 
the  fields  of  both  science  and  logic  will  be  presented  in  the  later 
chapters  of  this  volume.  At  this  point,  however,  we  may  note 
the  important  fact,  that,  while  philosophy  has  remained  for  the 
most  part  under  the  influence  of  the  Aristotelian  tradition, 
scientific  development  has  been,  from  the  time  of  Galileo  (1564- 
1641),  especially  in  the  mathematical  sciences,  largely  identical 
with  the  discovery  of  functional  relationships  and  of  what  is 
involved  in  them.  The  expression  of  these  relationships  in  brief 
formulae  is  indeed  the  symbolic  form  that  is  taken  by  the  ma- 
jority of  precise  scientific  laws.  That  which  these  laws  express 
is,  in  a  large  number  of  instances,  the  correlation  of  variables, 
and  this  correlation  is  the  functional  relation.^  ^  Science  at  the 
present  time  distinguishes  a  number  of  different  kinds  of  func- 
tions, and  it  is  remotely  possible  that  some  of  these  do  not  allow 
of  the  "cosubsistence"  of  independence  and  relatedness.  But 
the  majority  of  them  do,  and  indeed,  in  some  such  manner  as 

•'Whitehead,  op.  cit.;  Eoyce,  Essay  on  "The  Principles  of  Logic"  in 
the  Encyclopedia  of  the  Philosophical  Sciences. 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  41 

our  specific  examples  show.  The  functional  relation  at  any  rate, 
therefore,  involves  in  a  number  of  ways  relations  that  are 
external. 

For  this  reason,  but  also  to  employ  a  term  which  will  perhaps 
be  more  familiar  to  the  reader  than  "external  relation,"  and 
which  will  suggest  the  sources  of  the  evidence  from  which  this 
theory  is  obtained,  I  shall  frequently  use  "functional"  as  inter- 
changeable with  "external."  This  can  be  done  advantageously 
except  in  cases  where  more  precise  distinctions  are  necessary. 
As  concerns  the  relation  between  the  two,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  theory  of  external  relations  is  the  formulation  of  that  con- 
sistency of  independence  and  relatedness  of  which  the  functional 
relationship  is,  in  its  several  aspects,  a  most  important  example. 

As  other  systems  result  logically  from  postulating  one  or  the 
other  aspect  of  the  theory  of  internal  relations  for  certain  situa- 
tions, so  Realism  is  that  theory  ivhich  is,  in  general,  consisten 
with  the  theory  of  external  relations,  particularly  as  "holding 
for  the  knowing  situation.  But  there  is  a  radical  difference  in 
the  two  cases.  In  the  one  case  there  may  be  said  to  have  been 
a  genuine  application  that  was  forced  on  philosophers  ty  his- 
torical causes.  The  systems  that  result  are  not  only  self-refuting, 
but  lack  empirical  confirmation.  In  the  other  ease,  that  of 
Realism,  the  specific  theory  of  external  relations  is  found  to  be 
applicable.  In  other  words,  the  investigation  of  the  conditions 
under  which  genuine  knowing  is  alone  possible  discloses  these 
to  be  of  such  a  character  as  to  demand  the  "external"  or  "func- 
tional" theory.  They  are  shown  to  be  but  another  instance  of 
the  generic  theory  of  two  entities  being  both  related  and  inde- 
pendent. For  example.  Phenomenalism,  Subjectivism,  Natural- 
ism and  Pragmatism,  and  Objective  Idealism,  whatever  else 
they  may  be,  are  asserted  to  be,  if  not  explanatory,  then  at  least 
descriptive  of  a  "state  of  affairs"  that  is  known,  and  that  is 
true.  Yet  the  sole  condition  on  which,  in  each  instance,  this 
specific  knowing  can  really  be  what  it  is  at  least  tacitly  assumed 
to  be,  namely,  genuine  knowing,  is  that  of  the  cosuhsistent 
relatedness  and  independence  of  the  knowing  process  and  the 
state  of  affairs  known.  But  this  condition,  as  a  proposition,  is 
precisely  what  these  systems  explicitly  deny.  Therein  lies  one 
aspect  of  their  inconsistent  and  self-contradictory  character. 


i- 


42  THE  PROBLEM  OF  THE  POINT  OF  VIEW 

Genuine  knowing,  and  a  cosubsistent  relatedness  and  inde- 
pendence between  the  object  known  and  the  knowing,  are  erc- 
cluded,  if  the  knowing  is  in  any  sense  a  substance  after  the 
analogy  of  a  physical  thing.  For,  if  it  is  this,  then  the  knowing 
process  affects  the  object,  and  is  self-defeating.  From  this  the 
conclusion  is  clear,  that,  if  genuine  knowing  is  to  be  accounted 
for,  and  if  knowing  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  typical  conscious 
process,  one  hypothesis  as  to  its  nature,  and  that  the  great  his- 
torical one,  is  to  be  excluded.  This  hrjpothesis  is,  that  knounng 
and  consciousness  are  substances.  Whatever  else  these  entities 
may  be,  they  cannot  be  this.  They  may  be  specific  relations,  or 
specific  events,  one  or  both,  or  even  specific  disembodied  qualities 
that  do  not  inhere  in  any  substance.  All  of  these  classes  of 
entities  are  shown  by  modern  logical  analysis  to  be  quite  con- 
sistent; for  an  event  is  a  relational  whole,  and  one  specific  event 
is  qualitatively  different  from  others.  All  of  these  classes  of 
entities  allow  also  for  a  cosubsistent  relatedness  and  inde- 
pendence. 

But  further,  if  the  "substance  view"  is  found  impossible  of 
acceptance  in  explanation  of  the  nature  of  knowing  and  of  con- 
sciousness in  general,  the  suggestion  lies  near,  that  it  must  also 
be  given  up  as  a  means  of  explaining  the  physical  thing.  This 
suggestion  is  confirmed  by  physical  science.  A  physical  thing 
is  now  regarded  in  physics,  not  as  a  substratum  in  which  quali- 
ties inhere,  but  as  a  complex  of  mere  qualities  that  are  related  in 
various  specific  ways.  It  is  a  whole  that  is  the  7ion-additive 
result  of  its  constituent  parts,  these  parts  seeming  to  be  identical 
with  different  energy-forms.  But  even  energy,  although  it  is 
conserved,  is  not  a  substratum-like  substance.  Rather,  it  is  at 
once  a  relational  whole,  a  process,  and  a  specifically  distinct 
qualitative  constituent  of  the  universe. 

The  "relational  view  of  consciousness"  is,  then,  that  one 
which  the  writer  finds  himself  compelled  to  support.  Somewhat 
paradoxical  though  this  view  is  in  the  light  of  tradition,  and 
incomplete  though  it  now  is  in  many  details,  it  is,  nevertheless, 
that  view  which  seems  to  be  forced  upon  us  by  the  logic  of  facts. 
It  appears,  however,  as  only  one  part  of  a  much  more  extensive 
position  that  may  be  well  called  the  relational  view  of  the  uni- 
verse, and  that  stands  in  strong  opposition  to  the  substance  and 


THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC  4>S 

the  causal  views.  This  position  may,  however,  receive  other 
names.  It  may  be  called  Ontological  Pluralism  from  the  fact 
that  there  are  found  any  number  of  instances  of  entities,  both 
simple  and  complex,  that  are  related  externally  and  functionally. 
No  empirical  evidence  is  discovered  either  for  the  universality 
of  causation,  or  for  one  suhstratum,  whether  this  be  mind, 
matter,  or  an  "unknowable,"  The  position  may  also  be  called 
Realism,  since,  among  the  entities  that  are  related  externally 
to  other  entities,  are  knowing  and  consciousness.  Objects  known 
are  neither  modified  nor  created  by  the  act  of  knowing,  and  no 
underlying  reality  is  required  to  mediate  the  knowing.  Finally 
the  position  may  be  called  The  New  Rationalism  to  indicate  that 
there  are  new  methods  of  rational  analysis  which  make  it  possible 
to  solve  problems  where  old  methods  fail.  One  is  not  justified 
in  betaking  himself  to  an  anti-intellectualism  and  emotionalism 
on  the  ground  that  intellect  fails,  unless  he  has  first  granted 
to  intellect  the  freedom  to  use  all  possible  methods.  Recent 
attacks  on  analysis  '^^  have  ignored  those  new  logical  methods 
and  principles  that  come  from  science,  and  have  assigned  to 
intellect  only  those  methods  that  are  imbedded  in  the  Aristotelian 
tradition.  Intellect,  if  limited  to  these,  does  fail  to  solve  many 
problems.  But  such  attacks  on  intellect  can  have  only  a  seeming 
success,  for  there  are  other  methods,  as  we  have  seen.  These 
new  methods  lead  both  to  Logical  Pluralism  and  to  Realism. 
For  this  reason  the  name  The  New  Rationalism  is  perhaps  the 
most  suitable  for  a  volume  that  is  a  defense  and  an  exposition  of 
a  position  the  character  of  which  is  well  indicated  by  any  of  the 
three  titles  suggested. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

For  a  discussion  of  the  problems  of  philosophy  and  the  types  of 
philosophical  thinking  see  J.  G.  Hibben,  The  Problems  of  Philosophy ; 
W'm.  James,  A  Pluralistic  Universe;  H.  Hoffding,  Problems  of  Philosophy ; 
A.  Key,  La  Philosophie  Moderne;  R.  Eucken,  Main  Currents  of  Modern 
Thought;  VV.  Windelband,  Philosophische  Richtungen  der  Oegenwart. 

^^  E.g.  by  Bergson  in  Creative  Evolution. 


SECTION  II 
THE  HISTORICAL  PEOBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  IV 

INTRODUCTORY 

Having  outlined,  in  some  detail,  the  point  of  view  and  also 
the  departure  from  the  more  usual  methods  tvhich  that  point  of 
view  represents,  we  may  now  undertake  the  task  of  examining 
in  further  detail  philosophical  problems,  methods,  and  solutions 
of  problems.  The  problems  of  philosophy  will  be  considered 
first,  since  so  to  proceed  is  to  follow  a  certain  natural  order  of 
relationship,  whether  this  be  logical,  psychological,  or  historical, 
or  all  of  these  together.  For  it  is  clear,  that,  if  there  were  no 
philosophical  problems,  there  would  be  no  occasion  to  apply 
methods  of  solution,  even  if  these  were  ready  at  hand,  and  also, 
that,  if  there  were  no  problems  to  be  solved,  there  would  be  no 
solutions.  To  present,  first,  problems,  then  methods,  and  finally 
solutions,  is,  therefore,  to  follow  a  specific  order  of  relationship 
between  the  three  main  divisions  of  all  philosophical  thought 
and  development. 

However,  in  carrying  out  this  program,  the  attempt  will  not 
be  made  to  discover  a  definition  of  philosophy  that  will  separate 
its  problems  from  those  of  science,  art,  and  religion.  Rather, 
without  any  such  definition,  reliance  will  be  placed  upon  the 
designation,  both  in  the  past  and  at  present,  of  certain  problems 
as  philosophical.  Thus  to  recognize  the  historical  point  of  view 
is  quite  in  agreement  with  the  position,  accepted  in  Chapter  I., 
that,  while  history  is  not  the  only  source  of  facts  and  of  prob- 
lems, it  is  nevertheless  one  source,  and  that  although  many  of 
the  historical  problems  of  philosophy  may  be  genuine,  many 
also  may  be  false.    But  problems  that  are  false  logically  may 

44 


INTRODUCTORY  45 

psychologically  be  very  serious  and  real,  and  should,  therefore, 
in  a  general  list  of  philosophical  problems  be  included  with 
those  problems  that  are  logically  and  factually  genuine. 

Although  the  problems  of  philosophy  will,  then,  be  presented 
in  this  very  general  sense,  nevertheless  they  will  be  limited  very 
largely  to  that  philosophy  which  has  appeared  in  European 
intellectual  development.  This  limitation  is  made  with  the  ex- 
plicit recognition  that  very  distinctive  and  interesting  phi- 
losophies have  developed  in  other  civilizations,  notably  in  those 
of  India,  of  China,  and  perhaps  of  Japan.^  Indeed,  for  these, 
especially  for  the  first,  much  preeminence  in  both  insight  and 
liberality  is  claimed  by  their  occasional  occidental  adherents. 
It  may  also  be  found  that  these  philosophies  are  adapted  to  their 
environment  as  beliefs  to  live  hy,  and  that  they  are  poetic  in 
form  and  suggestive  of  realities  which  are  mysterious  and 
strange  to  the  European  mind;  but,  since  it  is  also  the  fact 
that  they  have  developed  in  a  social  environment  from  which 
there  is  absent  much  both  of  the  knowledge  of  science  and  of  the 
logic  that  is  involved  in  science,  we  are  relieved  of  the  necessity 
of  examining  these  systems  in  our  present  endeavor. 

With  our  program  thus  limited,  it  is  advantageous  to  remind 
ourselves  of  that  environment  in  which  the  problems,  the  meth- 
ods, and  the  systems  of  European  philosophy  have  arisen.  This 
environment  consists  of  the  realms  of  common  sense,  of  conduct, 
of  religion,  of  politics,  of  science,  and  of  creative  art  and 
literature,  each  in  a  greater  or  lesser  degree  of  development. 
Each  of  these  realms  influences  the  others  and  is  influenced  by 
them,  and  each  contains  certain  elements  which  come  to  be 
recognized  and  formulated  as  philosophical.  It  is  thus  that 
philosophy  arises  and  develops.  Philosophy  in  turn  is  re- 
absorbed into  each  of  these  realms,  to  influence  them,  and  again 
to  help  form  a  new  environment,  out  of  which,  together  with 
its  own  tradition,  there  develop  new  problems,  new  methods, 
and  new  solutions.  However,  of  the  parts  played  by  these 
several  realms  in  containing,  in  influencing  and  in  being  influ- 
enced by  philosophy,  it  is  the  parts  of  religion  and  science  that 
are  most  important.    Each  of  these  realms  has  furnished  prob- 

'  See,  e.g.,  P.  Deussen,  The  Philosophy  of  the  Upanishads,  trana.  by 
Geden,  1906;  and  lloyce,   World  aiul  Individual,  Chiijis.  II.  and  IV. 


46         HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

lems,  methods,  and  solutions  to  philosophy,  and  each  has,  during 
certain  periods  of  history,  been  the  dominant  motive  and  source 
for  all  philosophizing. 

Religion  played  this  role,  especially  from  the  second  and  third 
centuries  A.D.,  down  to  the  seventeenth  century,  and  has  recur- 
rently done  so  ever  sinee.^  But  for  the  last  four  hundred  years, 
while  the  problems  that  come  from  religion  have  not  been 
excluded,  it  is  science  or  at  least  the  scientific  impulse  that  has 
been  the  most  active  stimulus  for  philosophy.^  Also  in  the 
period  of  the  bloom  of  the  Greek  civilization  it  was  the  scientific 
and  not  the  religious  impulse  that  was  in  most  intimate  inter- 
action with  philosophy.  Indeed  it  is  important  to  note  that  in 
their  beginnings  in  that  period  both  science  and  philosophy  arose 
from  a  common  source,  which  was  the  conviction  not  only  that 
there  is  absolute  truth,  but  also  that  the  attainment  of  truth  is 
worth  while  both  for  itself  and  as  a  means  to  practical  ends. 

However,  since  at  the  present  time  it  is  not  religion,  nor  art, 
nor  common  sense,  but  science  that  is  most  intimately  related  to 
philosophy  and  that  furnishes  it  with  most  of  its  problems  and 
also  with  its  methods,  it  is  interesting  to  note  hoiv  this  relation- 
ship has  been  interpreted  in  certain  specific  historical  instances. 

First  we  may  note  the  historical  fact,  that  many  hypotheses, 
theories,  and  laws  that  now  are  scientific  in  the  strict  sense  of 
this  term,  e.g.,  the  atomic  theory,  have  had  their  origin  in  the 
tendency  of  men  to  reflect,  to  speculate,  and  to  seek  for  con- 
sistent descriptions  and  explanations  of  the  "things"  that  sur- 
round them.  This  specific  relationship  between  science  and 
philosophy,  this  origin  of  problems  and  solutions,  is  in  large 
part  identical  with  the  development  of  thought  among  the 
Greeks,  from  its  beginnings  in  the  sixth  century  B.C.  to  its 
climax  in  Plato  and  Aristotle. 

A  second  and  more  sophisticated  view  is,  that  philosophy  is 
the  queen  that  reigns  over  the  sciences,  possibly  in  all  justice 
and  kindness,  yet  nevertheless  to  say  them  "nay"  and  to  say 
them  "aye,"  prohibiting  and  permitting,  and  passing  judgment 
on  the  validity  of  their  efforts.    In  this  relationship  philosophy 

"  Much  philosophy  has  been  and  still  is  apologetics. 

"  iJ.g.,  with  Descartes,  Locke,  tSpinoza,  Comte,  ISpencer,  Mill,  Mach, 
Avenarius,  the  Neo-Realists,  and  probably  with  the  Pragmatists. 


INTRODUCTORY  47 

would  assume  for  herself  the  role  of  a  science,  yet  one  in  which 
she  would  be  not  only  distinct  from  other  sciences  in  respect 
both  of  subject-matter  and  of  method,  hut  also  supreme  over 
them.  Her  oivn  distinct  method  would  be  that  of  criticism;  her 
subject-matter,  the  methods  and  the  results  of  the  other  sciences. 
Such  an  interpretation  of  the  relationship  between  philosophy 
and  science  is  the  position  of  Kant  and  of  the  Kantian  tradition, 
and  persists  even  to  the  present. 

Thirdly,  and  in  distinction  from  the  relationship  just  pre- 
sented, it  is  also  an  historical  fact,  that,  while  to  philosophy 
there  has  been  assigned  both  a  method  and  a  subject-matter  that 
are  special,  yet  to  her  the  right  and  the  possibility  of  criticizing 
has  been  denied.  By  this  view  philosophy  is  a  constructive 
science,  along  with  other  sciences,  with  her  function  neither  that 
of  destructive  criticism  nor  of  sitting  in  judgment  over  other 
sciences.  This  is  a  position  of  ancient  lineage,  since  it  is  found 
among  the  Greeks.  It  also  precedes  Kant  in  the  philosophy  of 
Spinoza  and  of  Leibniz,  and  follows  Kant  in  Hegel  and  in  the 
Hegelian  school. 

Fourthly,  still  another  interpretation  and  development,  both 
historical  and  recent,  denies  to  philosophy  not  only  all  right  to 
criticize,  both  also  all  specific  problems  and  methods.  In  this 
view  philosophy  is  held  to  be  but  the  sum  total,  or,  perhaps, 
the  organized  and  consistent  unity  of  the  whole  group  of  the 
special  sciences.  But  the  special  sciences  selected  and  em- 
phasized are  the  group  of  so-called  "natural  sciences."  Nothing 
is  admitted  to  be  fact  except  what  is  recognized  by  these  sciences, 
and  some  sciences,  such  as  mathematics,  are  denied  their  purity, 
and  wholly  identified  with  their  application  to  natural  "things." 
The  whole  realm  of  fact  is  thus  held  to  be  included  in,  and  ex- 
hausted by  Physics,  Chemistry,  Physiology,  Biology,  Astronomy, 
Psychology,  and  Sociology.  This  view  has  become  especially 
prominent  during  the  last  hundred  years,  because  of  the  great 
expansion  of  the  natural  sciences,  and  especially  through  the 
influence  of  such  great  empirical  generalizations  as  Evolution 
and  the  Conservation  of  Energy.  It  is  identical  with  Positivism 
and  Naturalism,  and  is  the  position  held  by  such  philosophers 
as  Comte,  Spencer,  and  Ostwald,  and  by  the  majority  of  natural 
scientists.    Pragmatism  is  in  large  part  its  latest  phase. 


48  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Fifthly, — though  perhaps  this  does  not  exhaust  the  list  of 
possibilities — there  is  the  tendency  of  interpretation  which 
grants  to  philosophy  a  special  field  of  research,  but  assigns  to 
her  only  those  methods  that  have  appeared  and  been  tested  in 
the  development  of  science.  But  in  this  case,  as  concerns  results, 
much,  if  not  all,  depends  upon  the  view  that  is  taken  as  to  what 
these  scientific  methods  are.  If  these  are  selected  as  being 
limited  to  the  formal  principles  of  the  Aristotelian  logic  and 
the  concepts  of  substance  and  cause,  as  is  more  frequently  the 
case  than  not,  then  philosophical  systems  of  a  very  limited  type 
result.*  On  the  other  hand,  if  recognition  and  use  are  made  of 
the  modern  scientific  methods  of  the  *' science  of  order"  in  its 
several  branches  of  analysis  in  situ,  and  of  discovering  func- 
tional relations,  series  and  their  limits,  and  the  various  types  of 
non-additive  relations,  and  the  like,  then  there  result  radically 
different,  new,  and  satisfactory  solutions  of  those  problems  that 
are  left  for  philosophical  investigation  only  because  the  special 
sciences  omit  to  consider  them.  Aside  from  this,  these  problems 
are  quite  as  scientific  as  they  are  philosophical,  and  whether 
they  are  referred  to  by  the  one  name  or  the  other  is  a  matter 
of  complete  indifference.  That  philosophy  which  results  from 
these  liberal  scientific  methods  as  applied  to  the  solution  of 
specific  problems,  may  be  called  Rationalism,  or  Intellectualism, 
or  Neo-Realism. 

The  general  question  as  to  the  character  of  the  problems  of 
philosophy  in  their  relation  to  science  may  perhaps  be  still  more 
sharply  focused  by  the  question :  Are  the  methods  and  the  results 
of  the  individual  sciences  open  to  rcinterpr elation  and  trans- 
formation, and,  if  so,  to  what  extent  and  in  what  manner  ?  This 
question  is  answered  positively  and  definitely  by  the  majority 
of  philosophical  systems,  most  notably  by  Phenomenalism,  by 
Idealism,  and  by  Naturalism. 

As  an  excellent  example  of  the  complete  reinterpretation  and 
transformation  of  the  results  of  science,  we  may  cite  that  philo- 
sophical position — of  great  influence  in  recent  thought — which 
holds  that  all  the  entities  of  the  enormous  quantitative  and. 
qualitative  midtiplicity  and  diversity  of  this  universe,  are  but 

*  See  Part  II.,  Section  1,  for  the  systematic  and  logical  derivation  of 
BUch  systems. 


INTRODUCTORY  49 

the  manifestation  of,  and  are  held  together  in  relation  and 
made  a  universe  by,  a  numerically  single,  unitary  spiritual 
being.  Such  a  being  is  frequently  identified  with  the  Deity, 
while  the  philosophy  which  holds  to  its  existence,  assign- 
ing to  it  such  "manifesting"  and  "uniting"  functions, 
is  variously  called  Pantheism,  and  Transcendental  or  Objective 
Idealism. 

Another  example  of  reinterpretation  is  the  position  which 
holds  that  all  the  entities  of  our  immense  and  yet  minutely  de- 
tailed universe  are,  not  the  manifestations  of  a  single  universal 
entity,  but  the  partial  creations  of  finite  knowing  minds.  This 
position  is  Phenomenalism. 

Still  another  position  maintains,  that  this  creation  is  not  par- 
tial, hid  complete,  so  that  the  whole  universe  (of  time)  and  of 
space,  and  of  all  other  entities,  is  reinterpreted  to  be  only  the 
sensations  and  ideas  of  finite  knowing  minds.  This  position  is 
Subjective  Idealism.  If  this  view  be  developed  consistently, 
then  clearly  everything,  both  great  and  small,  must  finally  be 
"brought  within"  one  finite  mind,  as  only  its  conscious  states. 
This  position  is  Solipsism. 

If,  now,  these  positions  are  illustrative  of  some  of  the  more 
important  ways  in  which  the  results  of  the  individual  sciences 
are  reinterpreted  and  transformed,  it  is  of  interest  to  contrast 
this  universe  of  the  sciences  in  respect  to  its  immensities  and 
minutenesses,  its  multiplicities  and  diversities,  with  e.g.,  that 
numerical  unity  to  which  these  characteristics  are  reduced  in 
some  systems. 

It  does  not  in  the  least,  however,  lie  within  our  province  to 
endeavor  to  reproduce  that  account  which  the  sciences  give  of 
the  various  aspects  of  this  universe,  but  it  suffices  our  purpose 
merely  to  mention  some  of  the  most  conspicuous  of  these  scien- 
tific facts.  Thus,  if  we  take  the  results  of  even  one  science, 
namely.  Physics,  we  find  that  it  reveals  not  only  the  most  striking 
contrasts  between  the  minuteness  and  the  immensity  of  things, 
but  also  the  almost  inconceivable  numerical  manifol'dness.  For, 
on  the  one  hand.  Physics  holds  to  the  existence  of  minute  enti- 
ties, called  electrons,  that  are  of  the  diameter  of  l/100,000th  of 
that  of  an  average  molecule,  and  that  move  at  the  rate  of  37,000 
miles  per  second ;  on  the  other  hand,  there  are  other  entities  that; 


50  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

are  quite  as  surprisingly  large,  and  that,  nevertheless,  are  made 
up  of  such  extremely  minute  parts.  For  example,  as  regards 
the  spatial  size  of  "things,"  there  are  stars  or  suns  which  are 
many  hundreds  of  times  as  large  as  our  sun  (this  being  864,000 
miles  in  diameter)  and  from  which  light  reaches  us  only  in 
100,000  "light-years,"  a  light-year  being  the  total  distance  that 
light  travels  in  one  year  at  the  rate  of  186,000  miles  a  second. 
If  these  "scientific  facts"  are  suggestive  of  the  greatness  and 
smallness  of  things,  one  can  get  an  inkling  of  the  numerical 
multiplicity  of  the  physical  universe  by  first  contrasting,  e.g., 
the  size  of  a  sun  with  that  of  an  electron  or  even  an  atom,  and 
then  by  realizing  that  these  minutenesses  are  the  components  of 
those  immensities. 

But  nothing  has  been  said  thus  far  of  the  qualitative  diversity 
of  things,  in  regard  to  which  science  is  not  less  startling.  It 
may  be  doubted,  if  any  two  individual  entities  are  ever  exactly 
similar,  but,  whether  they  are  or  not,  there  are  kinds  or  classes, 
and  the  multiplicity  of  these  is  here  again  almost  overpowering. 
Thus,  e.g.,  Biology  recognizes  that  there  are  500,000  different 
species  of  plants  and  animals,  and  Chemistry,  that  there  are 
:iillions  of  qualitatively  different  compound  substances. 

These  few  examples  must  serve  the  purpose  of  suggesting, 
though  most  inadequately,  how  very  complex  and  manifold  this 
universe  is.  But  they  may  suffice  also  to  show  hoiv  very  extensive 
is  the  "material"  that  is  to  be  manifested  by  a  single  unitary 
being,  or  held  together  in  relationship  or  perhaps  in  an  organic 
unity  by  such  a  being,  or  created  in  whole  or  in  part  by  finite 
minds,  if  the  fact  of  such  activities  is  the  conclusion  that  we 
accept  as  the  result  of  our  philosophizing,  thus  to  maintain  that 
the  entities  of  science  must  be  transformed. 

However,  whether  it  is  one  of  these  positions  or  some  other 
that  is  the  conclusion  with  which  we  issue,  in  any  case,  the  scien- 
tific account  of  things  forms,  together  with  the  religious,  the 
political,  the  aesthetic,  and  the  common-sense  realms,  that  en- 
vironment to  which  our  philosophy  must  adapt  itself  as  well  as 
contribute  its  part,  and  of  which  it  must  be  interpretative.  But 
this  is,  indeed,  now  as  it  always  has  been,  even  when  it  was  not 
science,  but  other  influences  that  were  paramount.  For,  from 
the  time  of  the  Greeks  to  the  present  philosophical  problems 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  51 

have  arisen  because  they  have  been  presented  by  that  varied 
and  complex  universe  in  which  men  have  found  themselves  as 
reflecting  beings. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROBLEM 

This  problem  is  examined  first  because  of  a  certain  precedence 
over  the  other  problems  of  philosophy.  This  precedence  is  in 
part  historical,  in  part  psychological,  and  in  part  methodological. 

Historically  the  ontological  problem  antedated  the  other  prob- 
lems of  philosophy  in  the  form  of  the  question  as  to  ivhat  is  the 
fundamental  "stuff"  or  "stuffs,"  the  "material"  or  "ma- 
terials," out  of  which  other  "things"  are  "made,"  or  which 
play  the  role  of  ultimate  reality  to  other  "things"  as  manifesta- 
tions and  appeara7ices.  This  is  shown  by  the  well-known  an- 
swers which  were  given  to  the  problem,  e.g.,  by  Thales 
(624-548  B.C.),  that  all  was  water,  by  Anaximenes  (about  588- 
534  B.C.),  that  all  was  air,  and  by  Empedocles  (495-435  B.C.), 
that  there  were  many  fundamental  materials,  namely,  fire,  water, 
earth,  and  air.  Quite  analogous  answers  to  the  problem  are, 
however,  offered  at  the  present  day  in  both  those  monistic  phi- 
losophies which  maintain  either  that  all  things  are  ultimately 
psychical  or  spiritual,  or  that  they  are  all  material,  and  in  those 
pluralistic  systems  which  hold  that  not  one,  but  many  irreducible 
"stuffs"  are  in  the  universe. 

These  answers  indicate,  however,  that  there  are  other  phases 
of  the  ontological  problem  that  strike  deeper  than  does  the 
problem  as  to  what  is  the  fundamental  stuff,  material,  or  sub- 
stance of  the  universe.  Logically  antecedent  to  this  problem 
are  the  questions  (1)  whether  the  universe  is  made  up  of  stuff 
or  substance  at  all,  rather  than  of  events,  or  relations,  or  even 
disembodied  qualities,  or  neutral  entities;  and  (2),  if  there  is 
anything  ultimate,  whether  it  is  07ie  or  many? 

The  ontological  problem  may  have  come  first  historically  be- 
cause of  its  psychological  preeminence  in  the  intellectual  interest 


52  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  Greek  race,  and  this  priority  it  still  possesses,  since  for 
many  the  bare  question,  what  ''things"  ultimately  are,  quite 
outranks  in  interest  the  question,  ivhat  ''things"  do,  or  what 
happens. 

But  to  others  the  problem  is  of  greatest  interest  because  of 
the  practical  bearing  on  life  which  certain  specific  solutions  of 
it  are  held  to  have.  Thus,  if  investigation  will  only  lead  to  this 
result,  many  a  person  attaches  a  peculiar  sanctity  to  the  con- 
clusion, e.g.,  that  all  "things"  are  ultimately  psychical  or 
spiritual, — a  position  which  is  identical  with  certain  idealistic 
and  theological  doctrines.  Indeed  in  this  conclusion  some  find 
the  only  ground  or  justification  for  conducting  their  lives  in 
accordance  with  certain  ethical  principles,  especially  those  of 
optimism,  whereas  a  debasement  and  a  pessimism  would  be 
attached  to  the  opposed  conclusion,  that  all  "things"  are 
material. 

The  ontological  problem  thus  becomes  not  only  prior  in  inter- 
est, but  also  in  procedure  for  many.  The  position  is  taken,  that 
law  and  order  in  the  universe,  and  especially  purpose,  and  a 
victory  of  good  over  evil,  can  be  guaranteed  only  if  the  universe 
has  a  specific  ontological  character, — namely,  that  ultimately  it 
is  all  rnental  or  spiritual  in  its  being.  Others,  on  the  contrary, 
hold  that  the  solution  of  the  problem  as  to  the  law  and  order 
and  purpose  of  the  universe  should  not  in  the  least  he  made 
dependent  on  the  solution  of  the  ontological  problem.  For,  it 
is  argued,  if  the  universe  has  these  characteristics,  then  they 
are  ineradicahly  there,  whether  the  further  character  of  the 
universe  be  one  of  complete  and  exclusive  spirituality,  or  of 
materiality,  or  of  something  else.  Still  others  contend,  that, 
while  the  ontological  problem  may  be  first  historically,  and  also 
psychologically — for  some, — it  nevertheless  cannot  be  the  first 
to  receive  solution.  The  reason  for  this  contention  is  the  posi- 
tion, held  very  widely  in  the  philosophy  of  at  least  the  last 
hundred  and  fifty  years,  that  the  solution  of  all  other  problems 
is  dependent  on  the  prior  solution  of  the  problem  of  knowing. 
Thus,  after  this  manner,  many  a  philosopher  maintains  that, 
indeed,  no  other  philosophical  problem  can  be  satisfactorily 
considered,  much  less  solved,  until  a  solution  is  found  for  the 
question,  as  to  ivhat  is  involved  in  the  fact,  that  all  things  which 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  53 

are  known,  even  an  ultimate  "stuff,"  are  in  relation  to  a  know- 
ing process  or  mind.  It  is  evident  that  those  who  take  this 
position  regard,  not  the  ontological,  but  the  epistemological 
problem  as  prior  to  all  others, — certainly  as  a  matter  of  method, 
and  perhaps,  also,  in  respect  to  psychological  interest. 

However,  at  the  present  time,  not  all  philosophers  accept  this 
much  protested  priority  of  the  problem  of  knowing, — indeed 
not  even  as  regards  its  psychological  interest,  and  there  is  much 
evidence  to  confirm  such  a  disavowal.  For  the  very  outcome  of 
the  study  of  the  problem  of  knowing  may  be  the  conclusion 
(1)  that  the  fact  that  knowing  is  related  to  every  known 
"thing,"  has  no  bearing  as  to  the  character  of  what  is  known, 
so  that,  (2)  "things"  can  be  genuinely  known  without  previ- 
ously ascertaining  how,  whence,  and  ivherefore  we  know  them. 
Such  an  absence  of  the  prior  investigation  of  the  epistemological 
problem  has  characterized  the  greater  part  of  the  development 
both  of  common  sense  and  of  science.  Indeed,  ever  since  the 
epistemological  problem  came  to  the  fore  in  philosophy,  espe- 
cially with  Kant  (1724-1804),  the  larger  part  of  scientific  de- 
velopment and  discovery  has  been  the  work  of  men  who  have 
ignored  this  problem,  and  who  have  contributed  directly  to  the 
detailed  solution  of  other  problems. 

For  a  number  of  reasons,  therefore,  the  ontological  problem 
is  placed  first  in  our  list.  It  is  a  relatively  simple  problem  to 
state,  if  not  to  solve,  and  it  arises  very  naturally  in  our  reflective 
thinking.  It  also  came  first  historically.  Stated  broadly,  how- 
ever, in  the  form,  Is  substance  ultimate,  or  are  relations  and 
events  and  qualities f  and,  How  is  the  less  idtimate  related  to 
the  more  ultimate?  the  ontological  problem  is  part  of  a  still 
more  inclusive  problem,  namely,  the  problem  of  cosmology.  In- 
deed, within  this  last  problem  there  also  falls  the  problem  of 
knowing,  or  of  knowledge,  since  it  may  be  asked,  whether  it  is 
not  alone  within  a  law-abiding  universe,  a  cosmos,  that  knowing 
has  its  ''place,"  its  function,  and  its  specific  relations  to  other 
entities.^ 

»  See  Chap.  XLIV,  i. 


54  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  VI 

THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM 

Briefly,  this  problem  may  be  said  to  concern  the  question 
of  the  order,  the  laws,  and  the  organization  of  the  universe.  It 
is  the  problem  of  Cosmos  versus  Chaos.  More  specifically  it  is 
the  question  as  to  whether  law  and  order,  e.g.,  classes,  series, 
correlated  series,  and  the  like,  are  present  among,  or  absent 
from  the  universe,  and,  in  the  former  case,  what  the  character 
and  source  of  this  law  and  order  is. 

Clearly,  however,  the  logically  prior  problem  here  is  whether 
law  and  order  are  present  in  or  ahsent  from  the  universe,  i.e., 
whether  the  universe  is  a  cosmos  at  all.  For,  if  there  were  no 
law  and  order,  then  it  is  clear  that  there  would  be  no  further 
problems  as  to  their  character  and  source.  According,  of  course, 
to  the  prevailing  scientific  point  of  view,  this  prior  problem 
seems  quite  artificial,  but  it  is,  nevertheless,  regarded  as  a 
genuine  problem  by  at  least  one  contemporaneous  philosophical 
school.  Thus  the  pragmatists  and  the  modern  humanists,  the 
romanticists,  and  some  of  the  mystics,  frankly  contend,  that  all 
that  there  is  of  law  and  order  is  what  human  beings  "read 
into,"  or  impose  upon  a  universe  that  is  of  itself  chaotic,  ca- 
pricious, lawless,  and  orderless.^  However,  whether  those  very 
conditions  that,  on  the  one  hand,  permit  of,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  lead  to,  such  an  accession  and  imposition,  are  not  them- 
selves identical  with  law  and  order  and  cosmos,  is  a  question 
that  is  not  considered  by  the  philosophers  of  this  school. 

Opposed  to  this  there  is  the  position,  which  is  much  more 
frequently  taken,  that  law  and  order  are  '' resident''  in  ''things," 
and  thus  present  to  be  discovered,  whether  by  methods  difficult 
or  easy,  and  notwithstanding  that  error  may  precede  success. 
Differing  but  slightly  from  this  there  is  also  the  position,  that 
the  source  of  all  law  and  order  is  a  single,  infinite  spiritual 
Being,  God,  who  is  either  the  one  substance  of  the  universe,  or 

^  E.g.,  James,  Some  Prohlems  of  Philosophy,  Chaps.  X.,  XIII.;  and 
Schiller,  Studies  in  Humanism,  1907. 


THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  55 

its  creator,  or  its  architect,  or  at  least  its  legislator.  Each  of 
these  subordinate  positions  is  taken  as  a  result  of  the  endeavor 
to  solve  minor  cosmological  problems,  or  groups  of  problems. 

The  general  cosmological  problem  is,  however,  the  7nost  in- 
clusive of  all  the  philosophical  problems.  Thus,  if  there  are 
ultimate  entities,  one  or  many,  that  ynanifest  themselves  in  other 
things  as  appearances,  there  is  the  problem  as  to  the  relations 
between  and  among  these  entities,  both  manifesting  and  mani- 
fested, both  realities  and  appearances.  The  cosmological  prob- 
lem thus  includes  the  ontologieal.  But  it  also  includes  the 
teleological,  the  theological,  the  epistemological,  the  valuational, 
and  the  psychological  prrblems.     For  such  questions  as  those 

(1)  as  to  the  absence  or  presence  of  purpose  in  the  universe, 

(2)  of  the  fact  and  character  of  the  Deity,  (3)  of  the  relation 
of  knowing  to  that  which  is  known,  (4)  of  the  fact  and  character 
of  values  and  worths,  and  (5)  of  the  nature  and  function  of 
consciousness,  are  each  directed  to  some  specific  problem  con- 
cerning one  or  more  aspects  of  a  universe  that  is  a  cosmos.  A 
good  part  of  philosophy  and  science  is  to  be  regarded,  therefore, 
as  aiming  to  solve  the  detailed  problems  of  cosmology. 

But  there  are  also  cosmological  problems  of  more  general 
character  than  these  last.  Thus  there  is  the  problem  as  to 
whether,  by  any  possibility,  the  many  laws  of  the  universe 
(assuming  that  there  are  laws  in  some  sense)  may  not  be  merely 
specific  instances  of  one  fundamental  law,  so  that,  side  by  side 
with  an  apparent  pluralism,  there  is  a  fundamental  logical 
monism.  There  is  also  the  similar  question  as  to  whether  there 
is  one  fundamental  law  that  applies  to  all  entities.  To  this 
there  is,  e.g.,  the  affirmative  answer,  that  causation  is  such  a 
law,  and  that  all,  indeed  quite  all  the  entities  of  the  universe 
causally  affect  one  another,  so  that  the  universe  is  like,  or, 
indeed,  is  an  organism."  Or,  is  the  universe  patterned  after  the 
model  of  a  classification  of  plants  and  animals,^  with  differences 
yet  with  similarities,  so  that  finally  an  all-denoting  class-concept 
is  reached  that  denotes  everything,  even  as  "living  being"  is 
the  generic  class  for  all  plants  and  animals.    And  what  is  such 

'E.g.,  in  the  philosophy  of  Fechner  (1801-87)  and  of  Paulsen  (1846- 
1908). 

'  Aristotle,  and,  with  certain  limitations,  Plato,  and  Spinoza. 


56         HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

an  ultimate  siimmum  genus,  if  it  exists?  Is  it  "existential 
entity,"  with  the  physical  and  the  mental  as  species,  or  is  it 
mere  "entity,"  or  "being,"  or  "subsistent,"  with  "existent" 
and  "non-existent"  (such  as,  e.g.,  a  perpetual  motion  machine) 
as  species  ? 

Or,  again,  if  the  universe  is  not  organized  either  in  this  way 
or  as  an  organic  whole,  do  its  various  basic  laws  form  a  complete 
mutually  implicative  system,  or,  are  they  merely  consistent  with 
one  another,*  after  the  model  of  the  postulates  (axioms)  of 
geometry?  Or,  finally,  is  the  universe  stratified,  after  a  rough 
analogy  with  the  layers  of  rock  in  the  earth,  so  that  there  are 
certain  entities,  called  logically  subsequent,  that  are  dependent 
on  others  that  are  logically  prior,  but  with  the  latter  inde- 
pendent of  the  former?  If  this  is  the  case,  then  would  not 
each  later  "layer,"  as  being  something  more  than  all  the  pre- 
ceding ones,  possess  the  positive  freedom  of  following  the  law 
or  laws  of  its  own  positive  peculiarities?  For  example,  would 
not  life  be  "free  unto  itself,"  yet  law-abiding  at  that  level  where 
life  first  exists  ?  And  would  not  a  free  will  be  the  law  of  moral- 
ity in  that  "stratum"  where  morality  alone  occurs,  namely, 
where  conscious  'beings  first  form  a  society?^ 

Each  of  these  views  can  be  found  somewhere  in  contemporane- 
ous philosophical  literature, — a  fact  which  indicates  that,  taken 
broadly  in  a  psychological  as  well  as  in  a  logical  sense,  they 
constitute  a  list  of  solutions  to  a  set  of  problems  that  concern 
the  nature  of  the  cosmos. 

But  there  are  still  other  specific  and  very  important  cos- 
mological  problems.  One  of  these  concerns  the  question  as  to 
the  types  to  which  the  complex  entities  of  the  universe  belong. 
For  example,  are  there  not  groups  of  individuals  in  the  universe 
that  not  only  resemble  one  another,  so  as  to  form  classes,  but 
that  also  have  an  order  and  form  series,  after  the  manner  of 
the  positive  integers  in  order  of  magnitude?  Also,  if  there 
are  series,  are  there  not  relations  betiveen  series  such  that  a 
particular  individual  of  one  series  is  correlated  with  one  and 
only  one  of  another  series,  after  the  manner  of  the  correlation 
of  a  particular  velocity  (of  a  moving  body)  with  one  and  only 

*  The  position  of  modern  science.     See  Chap.  XLI ,  vi. 

•  See  Chaps.  XLIII.,  v.,  and  XLIV.,  n. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  57 

one  particular  instant  of  time?  Another  closely  allied  cos- 
mological  problem  concerns  the  questions  as  to  what  entities  in 
the  universe  are  strictly  continuous  in  the  precise  scientific  sense 
of  this  term,  and  what  ones  are  as  strictly  discontinuous.  Are 
there,  also,  both  infinities  and  finitenesses?  Which  of  these, 
indeed,  is  the  universe  itself  as  a  whole — in  respect  to,  e.g.,  its 
spatial  and  temporal  characteristics  ? 

All  of  these  are  problems  of  cosmology  that  have  for  the  most 
part  long  persisted  in  both  philosophy  and  science.  However, 
through  recent  investigations  they  have,  in  some  instances  at 
least,  received  a  seemingly  definitive  answer,  while  the  princi- 
ples and  the  logic  discovered  and  used  in  their  solution  go  far 
toward  solving  the  other  prohlems  of  cosmology.^ 


CHAPTER  VII 
THE  TELEOLOGICAL  PROBLEM 

Stated  briefly,  the  teleological  problem  may  be  said  to  concern 
the  question,  whether  or  not  there  is  purpose  in  the  universe  as 
a  whole,  and,  if  so,  in  what  sense.  It  is  clear,  however,  that 
this  problem  logically  precedes  the  problem  as  to  ivhat  is  the 
source  and  origin  of  such  purpose,  since,  if  purpose  were  not 
in  some  sense  a  fact,  there  could  exist  no  question  about  its 
origin  or  source. 

However,  for  psychological  reasons,  these  two  problems  are 
frequently  confused  and  their  order  reversed.  The  fact  of  pur- 
pose in  at  least  some  sense  undoubtedly  becomes  first  known  in 
the  realm  of  our  own  human  desires,  ideals,  and  deeds.  Al- 
though the  analysis  that  is  made  of  it  in  this  sphere  varies 
somewhat,  nevertheless,  in  general,  purpose  is  held  to  involve 

(1)  the  desire  or  acceptance  of  something  not  yet  a  fact  as 

(2)  worth  realizing  in  the  future,  and  (3)  the  adoption  of  some 
means  to  attain  this  end.  But  with  the  idea  of  purpose  thus 
once  become  present,  its  transfer  to  other  realms  is  made  with 
ease,  so  that  it  soon  may  be  held  to  characterize  even  the  uni- 

•  See  Chap.  XLIII. 


68  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

verse  itself  as  a  whole.  This  specific  transfer  is  accelerated,  and 
the  order  of  the  two  problems  as  to  the  source  and  fact  of  pur- 
pose is  confused  and  reversed,  if  the  conclusion  has  been  previ- 
ously derived,  that  the  universe  is  a  vast  order  and  uniformity 
of  "things,"  a  realm  of  law  and  adaptation,  and  that  all  this 
demands  an  Orderer,  a  Lawgiver,  even  a  Creator.^  For  from 
this  conclusion  there  readily  follows  the  conviction,  that  such 
a  Being  is  also  a  Purposer,  and  that  the  Cosmos  is  one  great 
system  of  means  to  the  accomplishment  of  ends.  Thus,  without 
prior  and  independent  investigation  as  to  whether  or  not  there  is 
purpose  in  the  universe  as  a  whole,  a  positive  answer  to  this 
problem  is  derived  from  one  of  the  specific  solutions  of  the 
cosmological  problem,  i.e.,  from  the  possibility  of  there  being 
purpose,  the  conclusion  is  drawn,  that  this  purpose  is  actual 
in  the  realm  of  existing  "things." 

If,  now,  for  some,  the  teleological  problem  receives  a  positive 
solution  in  this  manner,  it  is  clear  that  the  further  character  of 
the  teleology  that  is  accepted  will  depend  largely  upon  the  char- 
acter of  the  cosmology  from  which  it  is  derived.  For  in  each 
case  here.  Lawgiver,  Source  of  law,  Orderer,  Purposer,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  universe,  on  the  other  hand,  are  held  to  be  in 
some  sense  apart."^  Thus,  as  one  possibility,  the  two  may  be 
regarded  as  distinct  in  the  sense  that,  the  universe  having  once 
been  made  a  Cosmos  of  law  and  purpose,  the  Lawgiver  and  Pur- 
poser then  withdrew,  to  leave  His  work  alone  ever  afterward, 
and,  indeed,  perhaps  quite  unable  subsequently  to  interfere. 
This  position  is  Deism.^  Or  it  may  be  held,  that  the  Lawgiver 
and  Purposer  can  interfere  at  any  time,  either  to  institute  new 
instances  of  law  and  purpose,  or  to  withdraw  old  ones,  so  that 
He  is  ever  present  and  never  remote.  This  view  is  one  form 
of  Theism.*    Both  Deism  and  Theism,  in  that  they  are  positive 

*  The  Physico-theological  argument. 

*  Cf .  H.  Hoflding,  The  Philosophy  of  Religion,  pp.  14-05. 

'  A  product  of  modern  scientific  speculation  as  this  developed  into 
18th  century  rationalism,  and  a  position  taken  by  a  great  many  of  the 
philosophers  of  that  (18th)  century.  See  Leslie  Stephen,  History  of 
English  Thought  in  the  18th  Century,  2  vols.;  J.  G.  Hibben,  The  Philosophy 
of  the  Enlightenment. 

*  The  position  taken  by  most  orthodox  Christians  and  one  whose  apolo- 
getics is  found  in  the  works  of  Kant,  Berkeley,  Leibniz,  Descartes, 
Aquinas,  and  a  host  of  others.  Galileo,  Newton,  and  Robert  Boyle  were 
theists. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  59 

solutions  both  of  the  cosmological  and  of  the  teleological  prob- 
lems, tend  to  accept  a  Being  who  is  Himself  prior  in  time  to 
that  Cosmos  which  He  is  held  io  order,  perhaps  even  to  create, 
but,  at  least,  to  use  as  a  means  to  an  end. 

Opposed  to  these  there  is  also  the  position  in  which  the  Or- 
derer  and  Purposer  of  the  universe  is  regarded  as  The  Ultimate 
Eeality,  who  is  eternal  in  the  sense  of  being  timeless,  and  who, 
as  thus  apart,  manifests  Himself  in  the  universe  of  temporal 
and  spatial  things.  This  view  is  a  modified  Theism,  which  tends 
to  become  Pantheism.^  It  is  held  to  account  logically  for  an 
immanent  as  opposed  to  a  transcendent  or  external  teleology, 
which  is  the  position  of  Deism  and  the  first  kind  of  Theism, 

Deism,  Theism,  and  Pantheism  are  all  in  agreement,  however, 
in  holding  not  only  that  there  is  order  and  law  in  the  universe, 
but  also  that  this  establishes  the  fact  both  of  purpose  and  a 
Purposer.  They  are  in  agreement  also  in  holding  that  this  Pur- 
poser is  external  to  that  to  which  purpose  is  given,  at  least  as 
a  means  to  an  end,  namely,  the  universe.  The  first  two  positions 
maintain  this  very  clearly,  but  the  third  position.  Pantheism, 
does  so,  also,  since  the  manifestations  of  a  Deity  cannot  be 
identical  with  Himself  as  Manifestor,  but  must  be  numerically 
distinct  from  Him. 

However,  it  is  quite  evident,  as  has  been  said,  that  the  teleol- 
ogy which  each  of  these  three  positions  accepts,  is  entirely 
subsequent  to  and  dependent  upon  that  specific  solution  of  the 
cosmological  problem  which  holds  that  order  and  law  demand 
an  Orderer.  For,  having  once  reached  this  last  conclusion,  it 
is  easy  to  attribute  purpose  to  this  Being  in  analogy  to  the  fact 
of  purpose  as  we  discover  it  in  our  own  conduct. 

But  the  situation  becomes  radically  different,  if  the  argu- 
ments for  such  an  Orderer  and  Purposer  are  invalid,  for  we 
are  then  thrown  back  upon  the  bare  question.  Does  purpose 
characterize  the  universe  quite  hy  itself  and  independent  of  any 
entity  that  is. external  to  the  universe?  But  through  this  ques- 
tion the  teleological  problem  leads  at  once  to  the  further  prob- 
lem as  to  whether  there  are  in  the  universe,  side  by  side  with 

'  The  position  held  by  a  Jargo  number  of  the  great  philosophers  of 
history,  notably  Roger  Bacon,  Spinoza,  Fechner,  Schopenhauer,  Hegel, 
Bradley,  and  perhaps  Royce. 


60  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

those  entities  which  are  non-values,  such  as  the  physical  sciences 
deal  with,  still  other  entities  that  are,  in  contrast,  worths  or 
values.'^  Indeed,  it  may  be  asked,  whether,  if  there  is  purpose, 
this  does  not  itself  presuppose  these  value-entities?  For,  does 
not  purpose  mean,  ends  deliberated  about,  chosen  among,  and 
sought  for,  because  they  are  ultimately  worth  while  for  them- 
selves, and  not  merely  as  means  to  an  end?  Are  not  such  ulti- 
mate ends  worths?  Indeed,  if  some  "things"  are  valuable  as 
means,  does  not  this  imply  still  other  "things"  that  are  valuable 
as  ends? 

This  question  states  the  teleological  problem  in  perhaps  its 
most  modern  form,  but  in  a  way  that  is,  indeed,  almost  as  old 
as  philosophy  itself,  since  it  is  the  very  center  around  which 
the  philosophy  of  Plato  turns,  and  the  answer  usually  given  to 
it  is  affirmative.  Just  as,  e.g.,  there  are  the  realms,  or  fields, 
of  motion  and  of  spatial  extension,  yet  with  the  two  not  identical, 
so  it  is  maintained,  there  are  the  two  realms  of  values  or  worths 
and  of  non-worths,  with  the  two  quite  distinct  and  different. 
And  further,  just  as  it  is  conceivable  that  the  laws  of  motion 
are  not  of  necessity  "legislated"  for  moving  things  by  an 
external  agent,  but  are  of  "the  very  nature"  of  moving 
"things,"  so  may  values  not  come  from  without,  but  may  them- 
selves be  entities  or  facts  side  by  side  with  other  kinds  of  facts. 
But  also  it  may  well  be  that,  just  as  one  and  the  same  entity 
can  be,  e.g.,  both  spatially  extended  and  moving,  so  also  can  an 
entity  be  a  value  in  one  realm  or  relational  field,  and  a  non- 
value  in  another.  Indeed  it  may  be  asked  if  this  is  not  exem- 
plified by  such  an  entity  as  a  picture,  which,  as  a  thing  of 
beauty,  is  in  one  relationship  an  ultimate  aesthetic  worth,  but 
which  is  also  a  physico-chemical  complex  of  oils  and  pigments, 
and  as  such  a  non-worth  or  physical  fact. 

However,  whether  or  not  one  agrees  with  the  positive  answers 
that  are  given  to  these  questions,  they  nevertheless  indicate 
problems  that  strike  to  the  very  root  of  the  teleological  problem, 
while  in  solution  of  them  one  may  be  led  to  the  position,  in 
place  of  either  Deism,  Theism,  or  Pantheism,  that  there  is  in 
the  universe  an  efficient  value-  or  worth-principle,  and  that  this, 

'  The  position  of  Kant,  Fichte,  Herbart,  and,  among  recent  writers, 
MUnsterberg ;  see  his  Eternal  Values,  1909. 


THE  TELEOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  61 

rather  than  the  Orderer,  Lawgiver,  and  Manifestor  of  tradi- 
tional theology,  is  "the  power,  not  ourselves,  that  makes  for 
righteousness. ' '  ^ 

Still  other  specific  teleological  problems  concern  the  questions 
as  to  (1)  what  the  specific  purpose  of  the  universe  is,  if  it  all 
has  a  purpose,  and  (2)  whether  or  not  there  are  entities  that 
are  directly  opposed  to  values,  or  goods,  i.e.,  whether  there  is  an 
irreducible  and  ultimate  Bad  in  the  universe, — something  not 
merely  non-value,  but  positive  Evil.  The  first  of  these  questions 
may  indeed  indicate  the  proper  method  of  approach  to  the  whole 
problem  of  purpose.  For,  might  not  the  proposition,  that  there 
are  both  purpose  and  a  Purposer,  perhaps  be  best  established  by 
first  ascertaining  what  the  specific  purpose  of  the  universe  is? 
Historically,  the  happiness,  the  Avell-being,  and  the  salvation  of 
mankind  have  each  been  regarded  as  the  specific  end  "of  all 
creation,"  but  at  the  present  time  there  is  a  reaction  against 
such  an  anthropocentric  point  of  view. 

As  regards  the  second  question,  concerning  the  reducibility 
of  evil,  the  fact  of  at  least  three  different  solutions  indicates  as 
many  specific  subordinate  problems.  Thus  it  is  asked,  Is  not 
the  ultimate  character  of  all  things  good,  so  that  evil  is  mere 
appearance?  The  objective  idealist  answers  "yes,"  since  for 
him  everything  else  is  "absorbed"  into  One  Being  that  is  good. 
The  evolutionist  and  pragmatist  disagree  with  this  solution,  and 
maintain  that  evil  is  relative  to  good,  and  conversely,  and  that 
each  is  relative  to  the  time  and  the  circumstances,  so  that  neither 
is  absolute.  In  turn  the  realist  disagrees  with  this,  and  ad- 
vances the  view  that  evil  as  such  is  ultimate  and  indestructible 
either  by  argument  or  by  action,  although  the  number  of  its 
concrete  instances  may  be  decreased  by  fighting  them  with  good. 

'  Hoffding's  position  in  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  pp.  215-278. 


62  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  THEOLOGICAL  PROBLEM 

The  teleological  problem  leads  naturally  to  the  theological 
problem.  Let  there  be  order,  regularity,  and  uniformity  in  the 
universe;  let  there  be  an  adaptation  of  one  "thing"  to  another, 
e.g.,  of  the  eye  to  light,  of  body-color  to  surrounding  foliage, 
and  the  like,  and  the  question  at  once  arises.  Whence  this  order 
and  law,  this  uniformity,  this  adaptation?  Do  they  not  demand 
an  Orderer,  a  Lawgiver,  an  Adapter,  even  as  the  watch  implies 
a  maker,  the  building  an  architect,  the  bridge  an  engineer? 
That  they  do,  is  the  answer  given  by  the  Deist,  the  Theist,  and 
the  Pantheist,  all  of  whom  infer  from  the  observed  order  and 
law  and  adaptation,  the  existence  of  a  Being,  God,  who  is  their 
source.  This  argument  for  a  Deity  is  called  "the  argument 
from  design. "  ^  It  is  obvious,  however,  that  it  makes  of  the 
Deity  only  the  designer,  the  architect,  or  the  engineer  of  the 
universe,  and  not  the  creator  of  its  matter  and  substance. 

But  further,  the  universe  consists  not  alone  of  static,  un- 
changeable, resting  "things,"  if,  indeed,  there  are  any  such 
"things"  at  all.  Change,  motion,  and  evolution  are  also  facts, 
and  indeed  may  be  universal.  Then  the  question  arises,  Whence 
comes  this  change,  this  motion,  this  possibly  universal  evolu- 
tion? Who  started  all  this  process  going,  endowing  it,  at  the 
same  time,  perhaps,  with  order  and  law,  whereby  to  fulfil  a 
purpose  ?  For  must  it  not  have  had  a  starter,  an  initiator  ?  Is 
not  one  billiard  ball  moved  by  another,  and  the  cue  ball  in  turn 
moved  by  the  arm  of  the  billiardist?  And  does  not  food  make 
the  player's  arm  move,  while  rain  and  plowing  and  soil  produce 
foodstuffs?     And  were  not  these  happenings  caused  by  other, 

•  An  argument  that  is  used  by  all  who  accept  a  positive  teleology, 
whether  this  be  immanent  or  transcendent,  and  whether  it  leads  to  deism, 
theism,  or  pantheism.  Among  those  who  Tise  this  artj^ument  are  Aristotle, 
Augustine,  Anselm  in  the  Monologium,  Thomas  Aquinas,  Berkeley,  Leibniz, 
Ficht?,  Hegel,  and  Royce.  8ee  the  latter 's  Religious  Aspects  of  Philosophy, 
188.') ;  The  Concept  of  God,  1897;  Studies  of  Good  and  Evil,  181)8;  Th0 
World  and  the  Individual,  2  vols.,  1900,  1901,  and  The  Problem  of  Chris- 
tianity, 2  vols.,  1913. 


THE  THEOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  6^ 

earlier  happenings,  and  these  by  still  earlier  ones,  and  so  on 
indefinitely  far  back?  Where  shall  the  stop  be  made  or  does 
there  seem  to  be  no  stop  at  all  implied  in  this  (infinite?)  series 
of  causes  and  effects? 

Two  positions  are  taken  in  answer  to  this  question,  the  one 
holding  that  there  is  an  end,  the  other,  no  end  to  this  series. 
The  former  is  that  solution  which  is  accepted  as  the  outcome 
of  the  so-called  "cosmological  argument"  for  the  existence  of 
God.  There  must  be  a  -first  cause,  this  argument  runs,  that  is 
itself  uncaused,  in  order  that  it  may  be  adequate  to  produce  or 
cause  the  "world"  as  a  whole.  It  must  itself  be  uncaused, 
since,  were  it  not,  there  would  still  be  another  cause  "behind" 
it,  and  so  on,  so  that  the  problem  is  repeated  until  at  last  there 
is  reached  a  first  cause  which  is  not  in  turn  effect.  This  cause 
is  "first"  in  the  sense  that  it  is  either  prior  temporally  to  all 
effects,  or  prior  metaphysically  in  that  it  "underlies"  and  con- 
ditions through  all  time  all  other  causes  and  effects.  In  both 
cases,  however,  such  a  first  cause  is  identified  with  God.- 

However,  in  addition  to  these  several  problems  as  to  whether 
or  not  there  is  an  architect  and  possibly  a  creator  of  the  uni- 
verse, or  a  Being  who  started  all  "things"  going,  or  one  who 
did  this  and  v/ho  also  continually  maintains  "things"  in  a 
certain  order  and  to  a  certain  purpose,  there  is  the  further  aiid 
related  prohlem,  whether  or  not  there  is  a  perfect  Being,  who 
plays  one  or  more  of  these  roles,  and  who  is  complete  in  His 
goodness,  power,  and  insight. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  the  view  that  there  is  such  a  Being, 
and  that  this  Being  is  God,  is  a  most  widespread  one.  There 
is  both  the  idea  of  a  perfect  Being,  and  the  belief  in  His  exist- 
ence, or  His  reality.  Yet  in  criticism  of  this  belief  it  may  be 
asked,  if  we  do  not  have  many  ideas  to  which  there  corresponds 
no  existent  object.  My  idea  of  a  perfectly  frictionless  machine 
does  not  seem  to  imply  the  existence  of  such  an  object.  No 
more  does  our  idea  of  universal  justice  among  men  mean  the 
actual  attainment  of  this  ideal.  May  it  not  be  asked,  therefore, 
if  the  idea  of  and  belief  in  a  perfect  Being  prove  that  Being's 

'  This  argument  is  given  by  Aristotle,  Augustine,  Anselm  in  the  Mono- 
logium,  Thomas  Aquinas,  Geulinx,  Spinoza,  Hegel,  Ficbte,  Bradley,  and 
many  others. 


64  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

existence?  The  answer  given  to  these  questions  by  many  is 
"yes."  For  it  is  argued,  that  a  Being  perfect  in  many  ways, 
such  as  goodness  and  power,  would  still  be  imperfect  were  He 
not  also  real  or  existent.  In  other  words,  that  perfection  implies 
existence,  is  the  reply  given  to  him  who  doubts.  ''Things"  with 
which  we  are  commonly  acquainted,  even  the  whole  universe, 
are  imperfect,  it  is  argued,  and  these  imperfect  entities  imply 
the  perfect.  The  imperfect  leaf  implies  a  perfect  one  as  a 
pattern  or  ideal ;  the  unjust  act,  a  standard  just  one.  We  thus 
at  least  have  the  idea  of  the  perfect,  though  we  cannot  see, 
touch,  or  hear  this  entity.  And,  since  perfection  is  held  to 
imply  existence,  God,  as  a  Perfect  Being  who  is  in  some  relation 
to  this  imperfect  world,  must  be  concluded  to  exist.^  Without 
raising  the  question  at  this  point  whether  this  "ontological 
argument"  is  valid  or  not,  one  must  admit  that  it  is  very  widely 
advanced  and  accepted,  either  clearly  or  obscurely,  as  are  also 
the  teleological  and  cosmological  arguments. 

Science  as  such  does  not,  however,  concern  itself  with  these 
problems,  taking  merely  an  attitude  of  indifference  toward 
them,  but  many  individual  scientists,  prompted  by  a  wider 
philosophic  interest,  do  attempt  solutions  of  them  through  the 
use,  perhaps,  of  scientific  data  alone.  Most  philosophers,  how- 
ever, have  considered  that  science  as  such  is  not  capable  of  giving 
either  proof  or  disproof  of  God's  existence,  but  that  both  the 
problem  and  the  means  for  its  solution  lie  in  quite  a  different 
realm  of  fact.  In  accordance  with  this  view  different  lines  of 
proof  are  advanced.  One  of  these  argues  from  the  historical 
fact  of  an  almost  universal  belief  in  a  Deity  and  the  effectiveness 
of  this  belief,  to  the  Deity's  existence.  This  is  the  historico- 
pragmatic  proof.*  Another  line  of  argument  bases  its  proof 
on  revelation/'  However,  both  of  these  proofs  can  be  reduced 
to  the  ontological  proof, — the  historico-pragmatic  proof,  since  it 
substitutes  for  the  idea  of  a  perfect  Being  as  "held"  by  the 
hidividual,  that  same  idea  as  "held"  hy  many,  both  historically 
and  racially;  and  the  proof  from  revelation,  because  it  argues 

'  Anaelm,  Proslogium,  Chap.  III.,  trans,  by  S.  N.  Deane;  Descartes, 
Discourse  on  Method,  and  Meditations. 

*  E.g.,  Father  Tyrell,  Lex  Orandi,  1903;  Lex  Credendi,  1906. 

'  The  Apologists,  such  as  Justin  the  Martyr,  Tertullian,  Origen,  Augus- 
tine, Aquinas. 


THE  THEOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  65 

from  the  idea  of  God  as  given  in  revelation  to  revelation  as 
given  by  {an  existing)  God.  In  this  second  proof  it  is  main- 
tained that,  if  tradition  is  trustworthy,  revelation  also  is,  and 
then,  that  God  exists  because,  according  to  revelation,  He  asserts 
His  existence.  Appeal  is  then  made  to  the  identity  of  God  with 
the  Perfect  Being,  and  from  His  perfection  is  deduced  His  exist- 
ence and  veracity.  This  veracity  guarantees  the  truth  of  reve- 
lation, and  from  this  last  there  is  in  turn  derived  the  trust- 
worthiness of  that  tradition  in  which  both  the  belief  in  God  and 
revelation  have  been  handed  down.°  This  is  essentially  the  argu- 
ment of  both  the  Protestant  and  the  Catholic  churches,  with 
the  difference,  that  the  former  rests  its  proof  on  the  infallibility 
of  the  Scriptures  and  the  reliability  of  tradition,  whereas  the 
latter  bases  its  proof  on  what  by  its  own  philosophy  is  its  own 
exclusive,  God-given  ability  and  knowledge  to  interpret  both 
tradition  and  Scriptures  correctly,  and  to  distinguish  truth 
from  falsity. 

Each  position  is  difficult  to  grapple  with,  since  each  logically 
can  deny  to  him  who  is  "outside"  and  v/ho  may  doubt,  the  very 
ability  to  get  at  truth,  maintaining  that  this  is  given  alone  to 
him  who  believes  and  accepts  and  is  within  the  church.  Also, 
either  position  may  be  true,  since  truth  is  independent  of  proof, 
while  disproof  of  either  is  impossible,  or,  at  least,  difficult,  since 
attempted  disproof  of  either  position  is  possible  only  from  a 
standpoint  that  is  ' '  outside ' '  the  realm  of  that  which  it  is  desired 
to  disprove,  and  therefore  gets  no  logical  leverage. 

The  theological  problem  in  its  various  aspects  is  one,  there- 
fore, that  has  arisen  in  the  past  and  that  still  presents  itself 
for  solution.  Psychologically  it  is,  perhaps,  not  a  problem  to 
the  unthinking  adherent  of  some  orthodox  religion.  But  to  the 
reverent  thinker  and  critic  who  does  not  hesitate  to  submit  any 
question  to  the  examination  of  reason,  and  who  holds  that  all 
of  mankind's  beliefs  and  theories  must  be  so  subjected,  it  is  a 
most  important  problem. 

•  A.  Sabatier,  Religions  of  Authority. 


c 


6Q         HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

ft 

CHAPTER  IX 

THE  PROBLEM  OF  VALUES 

The  theological  problems  which  have  just  been  briefly  Mis- 
cussed  are  most  intimately  connected  with  the  problem  of  values. 
A  value  may  be  defined,  tentatively,  as  anything  that  is  desired 
and  accepted  as  an  end  to  be  attained,  or  as  anything  that  brings 
about  the  attainment  of  an  end.  For  example,  individual  and 
general  happiness  are  values,  as  are  also  a  clear  conscience,  con- 
tentment, good  health,  all-round  development,  honesty,  honor, 
loyalty  to  friends,  love,  unselfishness,  education,  exercise,  good 
laws,  and  thrift  and  industry.  Some  of  these,  such  as  the  last 
five,  may  be  means  by  which  other  values  are  attained.  These 
other  values  might  therefore  be  ultimate  ends  or  goods,  and  the 
means  to  attain  them  be  right  ways  or  mediate  values.  This 
may  be  the  difference  between  the  good  and  the  right. 

As  already  indicated,  the  problem  of  values  is  closely  related 
to  the  theological  problem.  It  is,  also,  no  less  closely  connected 
with  the  teleologieal  and  the  cosmological  problems.  For  it  may 
be  asked.  Have  not  the  order,  the  arrangements,  and  the  exquisite 
adaptations  which  we  seem  to  discover  in  nature,  been  instituted 
by  a  Supreme  Being  primarily  for  man's  welfare,  or  for  his 
happiness  and  contentment,  or,  at  least,  for  his  strength  of 
character  after  much  trial  and  tribulation?  Do  not  all  "things" 
seem  finally  to  lead  to  that  which  we  regard  as  good  or  even  as 
best,  so  that  they  must  have  been  meant  for  this  purpose  by  a 
Supreme  Being  who  so  intended  and  established  them,  and  in 
this  way  Jios  revealed  a  proof  of  his  existence  and  character? 

In  terms  of  the  problem  of  value,  therefore,  God  is  that  Being 
who  cares  for  the  good  and  who  also  brings  about  the  attain- 
ment of  or  the  tendency  of  "things"  toward  that  which  is  good, 
let  this  be  human  happiness,  or  contentment  from  well-doing,  or 
a  life  in  heaven.  Then  God  must  himself  he  good.  Indeed,  it 
may  be,  that  He  himself  is  the  Good,  and  that  to  attain  good 
is  to  be  one  with  God.  But  if  He  is  good,  and  so  cares  for  the 
good,  and  brings  it  about,  then  must  He  also  be  a  God  who 
knows  and  wills  and  has  power. 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  VALUES  67 

This  teleological  argument  both  for  God's  existence  and  for 
His  nature  is  advanced.  It  is  clear,  however,  that,  leaving  open 
the  question  whether  it  is  a  valid  argument  or  not,  there  would 
be  no  occasion  for  making  it,  were  one  not  convinced  that  there 
is  something  of  value,  either  as  an  ultimate  end,  such  as  happi- 
ness and  justice  on  earth,  or  as  a  means  to  these  ends,  such  as 
thrift  and  foresight,  honesty  and  brotherly  love. 

But  there  is  no  denying  that  values  are  discovered.  Thus, 
e.g.,  we  speak  of  that  inherent  worth  of  each  personality  or  soul 
which  commands  our  respect,  and  our  recognition  of  the  princi- 
ples of  duty  and  justice.  Happiness,  too,  seems  to  be,  under 
certain  conditions,  worth  while  of  itself,  and  even  more  cer- 
tainly do  the  sublimity  and  beauty  of  nature,  as  well  as  of 
some  of  man's  creations,  such  as  the  beautiful  picture  and 
statue.  Or,  if  these  are  not  inherent  worths,  then  they  are  at 
least  valuable  as  means  to  some  end  as  a  final  value,  and  the- 
essence  of  the  situation  remains  the  same.  There  are  values  or 
worths,  some  ethical  or  moral,  others  assthetic;  some  are  means 
to  ultimate  ends,  others  are  these  ends  themselves.  Every-day 
life  in  all  of  its  relations  of  love,  friendship,  occupation,  citizen- 
ship, religion,  art,  science,  and  philosophy  is  based  upon  them. 
Indeed,  to  deny  values  is  to  presuppose  them — unless  one's 
denial  be  quite  unmotivated. 

The  existence  of  values,  then,  is  a  fact  that  has  been  uni- 
versally admitted  by  all  people,  of  all  times.  Concerning  the 
relationship  and  classification  of  values,  however,  there  is  a 
specific  value-problem.  Is  there  one  highest  value  to  which  all 
others  are  subordinate?  Is  there  a  highest  ethical  value?  Ought 
we,  e.g.,  to  make  the  attainment  of  happiness,  especially  of 
others,  our  chief  aim  of  life  ?  Or  ought  we  to  set  the  unflinching 
doing  of  the  right,  even  at  the  cost  of  pain  and  suffering,  above 
all  else?  Or,  again,  is  the  harmonious  development  of  our  mental 
and  physical  nature  that  for  which  we  ought  chiefly  to  strive  ? 

Which  standard  shall  we  accept?  Indeed,  by  what  test  ot 
standard  shall  we  be  able  to  reach  a  decision  in  this  issue  between 
standards?  This,  after  all,  is  the  important  question.  For,  with 
the  ultimate  value  once  decided,  other  values  can  be  "measured" 
by  it.  Yet  it  may  be  that  there  is  no  ultimate  standard,  or,  at 
least,  not  one  that  is  known.     For  to  know  that  there  is  a 


68  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

standard,  and  to  knoiv  what  this  standard  is,  are  two  distinct 
"things."  Or,  there  may  be  only  a  standard  that  changes  from 
generation  to  generation,  even  as  it  also  differs  from  nation  to 
nation.  Here,  therefore,  is  another  problem  of  values.  It  is  the 
problem,  not  of  what  the  standard  is,  but  whether  there  is  an 
absolute  and  eternal  standard  that  is  knowable,  though  perhaps 
now  unknown,  or,  whether  there  is  only  a  changing  standard, 
created  by  the  past  for  the  present,  but  to  be  supplanted  in  the 
future  by  that  which  grows  out  of  this  present.  Here  we  have 
the  contrast  and  perhaps  the  conflict  between  Absolutism,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  Relativism  or  Evolutionism  or  Pragmatism, 
on  the  other. 

Yet,  while  it  is  admitted  that  we  recognize  values,  accept 
them,  and  act  upon  this  acceptance,  since  we  are  concerned  with 
character,  with  happiness,  with  duty  and  the  like,  it  is  still  to 
be  asked.  Just  what  is  a  value?  To  exemplify  and  be  specific, 
let  us  ask,  whether  there  would  be  happiness  and  character,  if 
there  were  no  conscious  human  beings  to  be  happy,  to  have  char- 
acter, and  to  seek  these  as  ends?  Or,  do  these  values  exist  also 
for  other  living  beings  than  man  ?  However,  even  granted  that 
they  do  so  exist,  are  they  not  limited  to  beings  that  are  con- 
scious, so  that  there  may  be  desires,  interests,  and  ideals  f  This 
question  is  answered  in  both  the  affirmative  and  the  negative. 
Thus  it  is  held  that  all  values  are  in  some  way  dependent  upon 
the  presence  of  consciousness  as  this  is  found  in  living  beings, 
and  that  values  are  facts  07ily  if  there  are  beings  that  have 
purposes  and  interests  and  ideals,  and  that  use  means  for  the 
attainment  of  ends.  This  position  is  taken  with  reference  both 
to  ethical  values  and  to  aesthetic  values,  such  as  beauty,  in  which 
latter  case  it  is  not  unconvincing.  For  is  not  that  which  is 
accepted  as  beauty  either  in  the  concrete  or  as  a  standard  of 
beauty  known  to  vary  both  with  the  individual  and  with  the 
nation  or  race,  as  is  exemplified  by  the  different  Eesthetic 
standards,  e.g.,  of  the  European  and  the  Oriental? 

Is  not  beauty,  therefore,  dependent  upon  a  subjective  factor? 
Is  the  picture  beautiful  except  to  the  observer?  By  itself  is  it 
not  just  so  much  paint  and  line?  The  completely  subjective 
view  of  the  nature  of  value,  thus  suggested,  is  accepted  by  some 
thinkers.     By  others,  however,  it  is  maintained  that  at  least 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  VALUES  69 

certain  values  are  quite  objective,  in  the  sense  that  they  exist 
quite  independently  of  all  desire,  interest,  and  appreciation, — 
indeed  of  all  consciousness.  For  example,  one  may  hold  the 
view,  that  there  must  have  been  value  in  the  universe  'before 
consciousness  existed,  in  order  that  there  might  be  at  a  later 
stage  that  situation  in  which  there  is  consciousness  and  those 
values  which  are  dependent  on  consciousness. 

Accordingly  we  have  the  problem,  Are  all  values  dependent 
upon  consciousness,  or  are  only  some  values  so  dependent;  or, 
are  all  quite  independent  of  this  entity?  Several  solutions  are 
given  to  this  problem,  and  each  has  interesting  consequences. 

Thus,  let  us  first  consider  the  view  that  all  values  are  wholly 
dependent  upon  a  consciousness.  It  follows  from  this  position, 
that  there  would  be  no  values  prior  to  the  existence  of  con- 
sciousness,— a  conclusion  that  is  not  invalidated  by  the  argu- 
ment which  maintains,  on  the  one  hand,  that  there  always  are 
values,  because  there  always  is  a  divine  consciousness,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  there  is  this  divine  consciousness,  because 
there  are  values.  //  all  values  are  thus  dependent  upon  a  human 
or  an  animal  consciousness,  and  God  is  defined  as  that  Being 
who  is  identical  ivith  values, — a  current  definition — then  it  fol- 
lows either  that  there  is  no  God  in  the  orthodox  sense  of  the 
term,  or  that  God  is  man-made,  or  both. 

However,  as  opposed  to  this  extreme,  subjectivistic  view,  it 
may  be,  that  there  are  some  values  which  can  be  demonstrated 
to  be  independent  of  all  consciousness,  so  that  the  Deity  may  be 
identified  with  that  which  is  value  in  the  universe.  For  the 
conviction,  that  there  exists  or  that  there  is  actual  in  the  uni- 
verse, such  a  principle  of  the  conservation  or  even  of  the 
increase  of  value,  may,  after  all,  constitute  the  deepest  and  most 
fundamental  religious  consciousness,  so  that  there  is  a  rational 
defense  of  the  belief  in  a  Deity  who  is  not  a  mere  replica  of 
human  personality,  but  who  is  a  Being  supra-personal,  and 
perhaps  supra-conscious. 

It  remains  to  consider  one  more  phase  of  the  problem  of 
values,  namely,  whether  Truth  itself  is  not  a  value}    Is  it  not 

'  The  pragmatists  and  humanists  would  say  that   it   is.     Cf.   also  W. 

VVindleband,   Wiile  zur  Wahrheit,   1909,  and  H.   Kickert,  Die  Grenzen  der 

Naturwissenschaftlichen  Be  griff  shildung,  2nd.  ed.,  1913}   Miinsterberg,  op. 
cit. 


70         HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

this,  because,  e.g.,  in  searching  for  truth  in  the  spirit  of  "truth 
for  its  own  sake"  and  quite  regardless,  as  we  may  think,  of 
values  and  their  fate,  we  are  nevertheless  seeking  for  something 
that  is  of  value?  From  this  cannot  the  inference  be, drawn,  that, 
because  our  valuing  truth  conditions  our  search  for  it,  and 
because  truth  is  valuable,  therefore  truth  is  conditioned  hy  its 
value,  or  by  our  attitude  toward  it  ? 

The  reply  to  this  inquiry  is,  that,  while  truth  undoubtedly 
is  a  value  either  quite  for  itself  or  because  of  its  usefulness,  or 
both,  nevertheless  the  value  aspect  of  the  truth  does  not  con- 
stitute the  truth,  but  that  the  truth  and  the  value  are  merely 
two  aspects  of  one  and  the  same  "thing"  in  different  relations. 
In  support  of  this  position  it  wall  be  admitted,  that,  e.g.,  one 
and  the  same  individual  man  may  be  a  brother  in  relation  to 
one  person,  and  a  father  in  relation  to  another.  Further,  while 
a  father  is  not  of  necessity  a  brother,  nor  a  brother  a  father, 
these  two  characteristics  are  quite  compatible  in  the  same  indi- 
vidual. By  the  same  logical  principle,  there  may  be,  therefore, 
"something"  that  in  one  relationship  is  truth,  and  in  another, 
value,  so  that  not  only  is  truth  a  value,  but  values,  as  known, 
are  truths. 

To  explain  this  further,  let  us  assume  that  there  is  a  world 
of  fact,  with  no  minds  or  consciousness  present  in  it.  Let  us 
assume,  next,  that  under  certain  conditions  consciousness, 
awareness,  or  "knowing"  appears,  and  that  accordingly  our 
world  becomes  known  (as  it  really  is)  in  certain  details.  When 
there  is  this  very  specific  relatio'nship  between  a  knowing  process 
and  that  which  is  known,  we  will  say  that  truth  exists  or  sub- 
sists. Yet  it  must  also  be  granted  that  conscious  processes  can 
take  place,  and  yet  this  specific  relationship  be  lacking,  i.e.,  that 
there  can  be  error  as  well  as  truth. 

Truth,  then,  is  a  specific  relational  state  of  affairs  that  sub- 
sists between  certain  conscious  processes  and  that  which  is 
known.  It  can,  perhaps,  be  defined  only  in  a  circle,  namely,  as 
that  relational  complex  which  subsists  when  things  arc  known 
as  they  really  are.  But  this  specific  complex  is  also  a  value,  since 
either  its  attainment  is  desired  or  purposed,  or  it  is  a  means  to 
something  else  that  is  desired.  In  other  words,  a  certain  relation 
is,  by  itself,  truth;  but  this  relation  may  in  turn  be  related  to 


THE  PROBLEM  OF  VALUES  71 

something  else  even  as,  e.g.,  hrotJierliood  is  a  relation  that  is 
,  related  to  sisterhood.  Thus  that  relation  which  by  itself  is 
V  truth,  is,  in  relation  to  purpose,  also  a  value. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM 

The  discussion  of  the  preceding  chapter  has  already  intro- 
duced certain  phases  of  the  episteraological  problem.  Is  truth 
a  value?  And,  if  it  is,  what  is  to  be  inferred  from  this  fact 
regarding  the  further  character  of  science,  philosophy,  and 
common  sense  ?  What  is  the  nature  of  knowledge  and  of  truth  ? 
Are  they  distinct  from  one  another,  and  both  in  turn  distinct 
from  fact;  or,  does  knowing  in  some  way  itself  ''make"  fact? 
Again,  are  truth  and  fact  identical?  What  is  the  origin  of 
knowledge?  Does  it  all  come  from  sensation,  or  does  some 
knowledge  have  some  other  source?  What  are  the  limits  of 
knowledge?  Are  there  realms  to  which  we  cannot  penetrate 
by  either  intellect,  intuition,  feeling,  or  sensation?  These  are 
all  special  epistemological  problems,  around  which,  as  a  center, 
most  philosophical  investigation  of  the  modern  period  has 
turned. 

One  of  the  most  important  of  these  problems  concerns  the 
possible  distinction  between  fact,  knowledge,  and  truth.  The 
prevailing  view  in  both  science  and  common  sense  is,  that  fact 
is  independent  of  the  knowledge  of  it,  that  knowledge  is  a 
specific  kind  of  mental  process,  and  that  truth  is  a  relation  of 
"correspondence"  between  knowledge  and  fact.  Accordingly, 
a  true  idea  is  regarded  as  a  sort  of  mental  picture  of  that  of 
which  it  is  an  idea. 

This  view,  however,  is  not  only  challenged  now,  but  it  also 
has  been  frequently  questioned  ever  since  the  time  of  the  Eng- 
lish philosopher,  John  Locke  (1632-1704),  who  was  its  modern 
sponsor.  All  philosophers  do  not  accept  the  distinction  between 
fact,  knowledge,  and  truth,  and  among  those  who  do  not  are 


72  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

the  pragmatists,  the  phenomenalists,  and  the  idealists.  Yet 
each  of  these  "schools"  raises  different  questions  concerning 
the  distinctness  and  the  relation  of  these  three  "entities,"  and 
thus  each  discovers  specific  epistemological  problems. 

The  pragmatists,  or,  at  any  rate,  some  pragmatists,  maintain 
that  the  very  nature  of  truth,  namely,  that  which  is  sometimes 
called  the  "correspondence"  between  an  idea  and  its  object,  is 
only  the  later  experiencing  of  that  to  which  the  idea  previously 
"pointed."  They  contend  that  an  "idea  becomes  true,"  and 
that  that  which  is  commonly  regarded  as  the  independent  object 
is  only  the  content  and  the  product  of  an  idea  to  which  truth 
has  happened,  because  the  idea  has  led  to  success  and  satisfaction 
of  one  kind  or  another.^  The  idea  merges,  as  it  were,  into  an 
object,  and,  behold,  there  is  truth ! 

This  point  of  view  is  not  altogether  easy  to  understand,  but 
a  figurative  description  may  help  us  to  make  the  matter  clear. 
The  position  may  be  said  to  mean,  that  truth  is  "made"  in 
a  single  line  of  experience,  of  ideas,  of  purposes,  and  the  like. 
The  opposed  and  usual  position  may,  in  contrast,  be  described 
as  the  right-angled  view.  According  to  the  latter  there  is  one 
series  or  line  of  ideas,  and  another  series  of  facts,  and  between 
the  two,  striking  across  at  right  angles,  as  it  were,  there  is  the 
relation  of  correspondence. 

A  problem  arises,  therefore,  because  it  is  so  difficult  to  under- 
stand and  especially  to  justify  such  a  "copy  theory,"  as  the 
"parallel  line"  and  "right-angled  view"  may  also  be  called. 
For  there  is  the  question  as  to  how,  if  we  as  knowers  are  on  or 
are  identical  with  "the  idea  line,"  as  we  seem  to  be,  we  can 
ever  "get  off"  this  line  so  as  to  compare  it  with,  and  thus  dis- 
cover that  it  is  a  copy  of,  "the  object  line."  In  the  case  of  a 
picture  and  its  object  one  can  do  this,  but  one  then  has  the  two 
entities  before  him,  and  readily  discovers  the  "picture" — or  cor- 
respondence relation.  But  the  critical  question  arises.  How  could 
a  picture  itself  discover  that  it  is  a  picture,  since  it  could  never 
get  outside  of  or  beyond  itself,  thus  to  look  back  and  compare 
itself  with  its  object?  Would  not  a  third  "point"  be  necessary, 
on  which  to  stand,  in  order  to  make  the  comparison  and  the 

^  E.g.,  James,  Pragmatism,  especially  Chaps.  II.,  VI.,  and  VII.  Cf.  also 
the  works  cited  in  the  later  discussion  of  Pragmatism  in  Chap.  XXXIII. 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  73 

discovery?  Then  it  may  be  asked,  How  can  the  ego,  or  the 
knowing  process,  be  successful  in  such  an  attempt,  if  the  knower 
is  that  very  series  of  ideas  which  are  supposed  to  be  the  "copies" 
or  ''mental  pictures"?  Is  there  any  proof,  or  any  way  of  prov- 
ing, that  an  idea  is  in  any  sense  a  copy?  Indeed,  is  it  not  an 
unwarranted  assumption,  both  of  common  sense  and  of  science, 
that  such  a  relation  in  any  way  constitutes  true  knowledge? 
This  is  the  problem,  and  this  the  criticism  made  by  the  prag- 
matist,  who  reaches  the  conclusion,  therefore,  that  the  truth  of, 
an  idea  does  not  consist  in  a  "right-angled"  correspondence 
between  the  idea  and  its  object,  but  that  an  idea  J)ecomes  or  is 
made  true  through  that  later  experience  in  which  there  is  some 
sort  of  confirmation,  successful  working,  and  satisfaction.^ 

The  pragraatist,  therefore,  does  not  distinguish  in  the  same 
way  as  do  some  other  philosophers,  fact,  truth,  and  knoivledge. 
Fact,  for  him,  is  that  which  fits  consistently  into  a  system  of 
ideas  whicii  are  made  knowledge  or  truths  by  later  experiences. 
Fact  is  the  content  of  that  knowledge  which  thus  becomes  true. 
And,  finally,  everything  is  ''experience";  for  it  is  inferred  that, 
because  everything  that  we  mention,  think  of,  and  experience,  is 
mentioned,  thought  of,  and  experienced,  no  object  can  exist 
apart  from  thinking  and  experience,  and  all  objects  are  merely 
content  of  experience  or  are,  indeed,  themselves  experience. 
Truth,  knowledge,  and  fact  are  thus  all  reduced  to  a  common 
"something,"  experience,  and  in  this  respect  do  not  differ  from 
one  another.^ 

The  phenomenalists  and  the  idealists  agree  to  a  large  extent 
with  the  pragmatists  in  this  conclusion,  although  their  mode  of 
approach  is  somewhat  different.  For  both,  facts  or  "things" 
are  "made"  or  constituted,  at  least  in  part,  by  virtue  of  their 
relation  to  perception,  or  knowing,  or,  in  general,  to  experience ; 
i.e.,  since  it  is  held  that  experience  can  never  he  eliminated  from 
the  "things"  which  are  experienced,  it  is  concluded,  that  the 
experienced  world  is  constituted,  in  part  at  least,  hy  the  experi- 
ence, so  that  we  are  confined  to  experience   (as  regards  that 

*  See  James,  Pragmatism,  especially  Chap.  VI. 

'  This  position  is  taken  by,  e.g.,  Professor  Dewey  all  through  his  writings 
of  at  least  the  last  thirteen  or  fourteen  years;  cf.  the  bibliography  of 
Chap.  XXXIII. 


74.  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

which  we  experience).  It  is  thus  that  the  idealist  argues  that 
the  universe  itself  is  psychical  or  mental*  and  the  phenomenalist 
that  the  knoivn  or  experienced  world  is  psychical.  But  the 
latter  philosopher  holds  that  there  is  also  another,  a  possibly 
non-mental  world  beyond,  that  never  can  ie  known,  since  to 
experience  it  is  to  alter  it.'^  For  both  idealist  and  phenomenalist, 
however,  fact,  truth  and  knowledge  are  mental  in  nature.  In 
\  this  respect  at  least  there  is  no  difference  between  these  two 
'  philosophies. 

All  philosophers,  however,  do  not  agree  with  the  three  posi- 
tions just  presented.  For  example,  the  realist  does  not,  and, 
as  he  maintains,  for  good  reasons.  He  agrees  with  the  prag- 
matist  that  truth  may  not  be  identical  with  a  "picture-like  cor- 
respondence" between  idea  and  object,  and  that  at  least  some 
ideas  are  tested  for  their  truth  by  their  outcome.  But,  against 
the  universality  of  this  last  doctrine  the  realist  finds  that,  while 
every  idea  has  an  outcome  of  some  sort — an  outcome  presumably 
satisfactory  to  some  mind,  especially  when  there  is  belief  in  the 
idea — the  mere  outcome  nevertheless  fails  to  give  the  requisite 
distinction  between  the  true  and  the  false.  It  is  not  the  mere 
/outcome,  he  finds,  but  the  differeyice  among  outcomes  that  dis- 
itinguishes  the  true  from  the  false — a  difference  that  may  itself 
Iwell  be  conditioned  by  the  respective  truth  and  falsity  of  that 
which  has  an  outcome.  Truth  and  the  test  of  truth,  therefore, 
may  be  two  very  different  "things."  The  truth  of  an  idea 
may,  indeed,  be  that  very  characteristic  which  conditions  the 
specific  kind  of  outcome  which  is  a  successful  test  for  truth, 
when  the  idea  is  not  antecedently  held  to  be  true.  Thus  con- 
ditioned, this  outcome  in  turn  is  of  the  kind  that  may  serve  as 
a  test  for  truth.® 

From  such  discussions,  given  us  by  the  pragmatists,  another 
,  epistemological  problem  emerges.  Is  there  an  absolute  truth  to 
{  which  our  knowledge  may  approach  nearer  and  nearer,  though 
\never  reaching  it?  Realist,  idealist,  and  phenomenalist  for  the 
■    most  part  agree  that  there  is,  and  in  this  respect  are  "abso- 

*  For  the  subjective  idealist  the  experience  is  that  of  a  finite  conscious 
being,  while  for  the  objective  idealist  it  is  that  of  an  absolute,  divine, 
conscious  Being.     Cf.  Chaps.  XXX.,  and  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 

"  For  Kant  and  the  Kantians,  see  Chap.  XXIX. 

'  See  Chap.  XXXIII.,  rv.,  and  Chap.  XLIV. 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  75 

lutists."  But  the  pragmatist  demurs.'^  For  him,  since  truth 
is  "made"  by  a  shifting,  evolving  experience  in  which  success 
and  satisfaction  may  finally  emerge,  trut\_cfianges.  It  is  rela- 
tive to  the  time,  the  place,  the  nation,  the  sect,  and  even  the 
individual.  Therefore  there  are  7nany  truths,  even  though  they 
conflict,  as  is  well  illustrated  by  the  "truths"  of  Christianity 
and  of  Buddhism.  For  the  pragmatist,  both  of  these  religions, 
so  far  as  they  contain  doctrines  that  succeed,  or  that  have  satis- 
factory effects,  are  (theoretically)  true. 

The  argument  advanced  for  this  view  is  two-fold.  It  is  main- 
tained, on  the  one  hand,  that,  because  experience  "makes"  both 
truth  and  fact,  and  yet  itself  grows,  changes,  and  varies,  there 
is  also  only  a  shifting  truth  and  fact.^  On  the  other  hand,  it 
is  argued,  that  the  very  ideal  of  absolute  truth,  as  well  as  all 
tests  therefor,  and  all  the  methods  of  proof,  do  themselves  but 
shift  and  vary,  imbedded  as  they  are  in  an  ever-changing  experi- 
ence.^ 

With  this  view  the  absolutist  disagrees.  For  him  there  is 
only  one  truth,  one  state  of  affairs,  one  set  of  facts,  to  he  dis- 
covered in  each  field.  This  position,  he  contends,  is  established 
by  the  reductio  ad  ahsurdum  of  the  opposite  position,  since  to 
claiyn  that  all  truth  is  relative  and  shifting,  is  to  presuppose  that 
this  claim  or  position  is  itself  an  absolute  and  permanent  and 
not  a  relative  and  shifting  truth }°  But  it  is  also  argued,  that, 
since  truth  and  fact  may  be  independent  of  their  tests  and  of 
proof,  there  may  be  absolute  truth  and  fact,  although  we  have 
no  absolutely  certain  methods  of  identifying  or  "recognizing" 
these  in  the  process  of  obtaining  knowledge.^^ 

Truth,  however,  supposing  there  is  one  truth  about  each  fact, 
or  each  set  of  facts,  consists  of  many  truths.  Truths  form  a 
system.  There  is  the  problem,  therefore,  as  to  hoiv  truths  form 
this  system,  how  they  are  related,  or  what  kind  of  system  truths 
form.  Does,  e.g.,  the  relatedness  of  truths  imply  that  each  truth 
is  dependent  upon  other  truths,  so  that  it  is  impossible  to  get 

''  E.g.,  James  in  his  Pragmatism,  Schiller  in  his  Humanism,  and  Dewey 
in  Essays  in  Experimental  Logic,  1916. 

^  James  and  Dewey,  ibid. 

®  Schiller,  ibid. 

'"  Royce,  "  The  Eternal  and  the  Practical,"  Phil.  Revieio,  Vol.  XIII., 
p.  103  ff.,  and  "Principles  of  Logic,"  op.  cit.j  cf.  Chap.  II.,  supra. 

"  Cf.  Chaps.  XXXIII.,  XLII.,  XLIV. 


76  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

at  the  truth  about  any  one  "thing"  unless  we  also  get  at  the 
truth  about  all  other  "things"?  Or,  are  truths  related  and  yet 
independent,  so  that  it  is  quite  possible  to  discover  now  one 
truth  and  now  another,  as  knowledge  progresses?  The  first 
view,  that  truths,  because  they  are  related,  mutually  depend 
on  and  modify  one  another,  like  the  parts  of  an  organism,  is 
called  the  "organic"  or  "coherence"  theory  of  truth/'  The 
second  view  may  be  called  the  pluralistic  theory.  Obviously 
the  basic  problem  here  is  again  the  question,  whether  relatedness 
as  such  carries  with  it  a  mutually  modifying  action  of  related 
terms  on  one  another,  or  whether  this  is  only  sometimes  the 
ease,  and  thus  presents  a  specific  type  of  relation?  ^^ 

At  this  point,  therefore,  the  further  problem  arises,  if  it  is 
not  to  the  growth  of  our  united  social  attempt  to  obtain  knowl- 
edge, rather  than  to  the  system  of  truths,  that  the  organic  view 
applies, — while  the  system  of  facts,  which  we  endeavor  to  know, 
is  pluralistic  in  the  sense  above  defined.  Indeed,  is  not  even 
this  very  difference  itself  a  state  of  affairs  that  is  a  typical  ease 
of  such  pluralism  ? 

Truth,  however,  might  either  be  an  organic  whole,  or  consist 
of  truths  related  to  and  yet  independent  of  one  another,  and 
yet  there  might  be  but  One  Truth,  i.e.,  one  system  of  truths.^'^ 
But  there  would  still  be  the  problem  as  to  how  we  can  discover 
or  make  certain  that  this  One  Truth  has  been  attained  either  in 
whole  or  in  part,  i.e.,  there  is  still  the  question  as  to  what  is  the 
test  of  absolute  truth,  and  of  genuine  and  certain  knowledge. 
Indeed  to  have  such  truth  and  knowledge,  must  we  not  have 
an  absolute  test?  But  to  have  this  must  we  not  in  turn  have 
a  test  for  this  test,  and  so  on  indefinitely  ?  ^^  Or  could  a  test  he 
used  to  test  itself  f  These  questions  are  raised,  and  many  an- 
swers are  given.  Various  tests  for  truth  and  knowledge  are 
advanced,  but  in  every  case  more  than  one  interpretation  is 
made  of  their  character.  Consistency,  freedom  from  internal 
contradiction,  presupposition  by  attempted  denial,  immediate, 
direct,  and  undeniable  experience,  subsequent  verification,  self- 
evidence,  and  the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite,  are  among 
the  tests  and  criteria  that  are  accepted  and  used,  one  or  more 

**  Joachim,  The  Nature  of  Truth.  "  See  Chap.  XLI.,  xv. 

"  Sec  Chap.  XXVI.  "  See  Chap.  XLI.,  ix.-xi. 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  77 

of  them,  by  each  of  the  several  philosophies.^®  Disagreement 
exists,  however,  as  to  which  of  these  tests  is  superior.  But 
against  all  other  parties  the  pragmatist  maintains  that  all  of 
these  tests  are  but  useful  means  to  an  end,  or  kinds  of  satisfac- 
tion and  success,  and  thus  relative  and  not  absolute.  From  this 
he  infers  that  truth  itself  bears,  or  is  the  same  characteristic, — 
namely,  usefuhiess. 

From  this  inference  the  absolutist  demurs.  He  grants  that 
tests  and  testings  may  be  fallible  (though  he  usually  insists  upon 
the  high  degree  of  probability  of  certain  tests  as  absolute),  but 
he  also  maintains  not  only  that  there  is  an  absolute  truth  and 
an  absolute  state  of  affairs  to  be  discovered,  but  also  that  these 
may  be  actually  revealed  in  certain  instances  even  though  abso- 
lute proof  of  this  is  lacking.  Truth  and  knowledge  are  inde- 
pendent of  proof,  although  certainty  may  not  be,  and  one  may 
"really  know,"  without  being  able  to  demonstrate  that  he  does}"^ 
Indeed,  were  this  not  the  fact,  then  whoever  advances  the  con- 
trary position  would  be  quite  precluded  from  maintaining  that 
his  position  is  itself  true,  unless  it  were  absolutely  established 
by  absolute  tests  and  proof. 

'"  Still  another  epistemological  problem  emerges  in  the  question 
as  to  what  is  involved  in  the  fact  that  knowledge  and  knowing 
appear  in  many  individuals.  Is  it  not  therewith  necessitated 
that  these  individuals  are  essentially  alike?  Must  not  their 
knowing  processes,  their  "thinking  machinery,"  be  quite  the 
same  in  order  that  they  shall  be  able  to  get  at  the  one  truth, 
or  the  one  set  of  facts  in  each  case?  But  how  can  these  con- 
ditions be  attained,  and  where  can  they  be  found?  Are  two 
individuals  ever  quite  alike?  Are  not  their  sense  organs  dif- 
ferent? Do  they  not,  therefore,  perceive  differently?  Are  they 
not  also  of  different  temperaments?  Will  they  not,  therefore, 
rely  upon  different  tests  of  truth,  and  start  their  arguments 
from  different  convictions?  Will  even  the  same  word  convey 
the  same  meaning  to  two  individuals?  With  such  obstacles  as 
these,  how  can  there  be  any  such  thing  as  knowledge,  which,  by 
/  its  very  nature,  should  be  the  same  for  all?  How  can  two  iudi- 
l  viduals  ever  have  one  fact  revealed  to  them  in  precisely  the 

'"  See  Chap.  XV. 

"  See  Chaps.  XXXIII.,  XLII.,  and  XLIV. 


78  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

same  way,  unless  it  be  by  pure  chance?  Will  not  one  or  the 
other,  perhaps  both,  distort  it? 

Both  the  individualistic  position,  thus  suggested,  and  its 
opposite  are  taken  by  philosophers.  The  problem  is  that  of 
the  "universality"  and  common  validity  of  knowledge,  and  of 
the  conditions  for  this.  Both  positions  are  compatible  with  the 
view,  that  facts  are  facts, — to  be  got  at  if  possible, — and  that 
there  is  but  one  system  of  truths,  the  attainability  of  which  is 
an  ideal ;  but  they  differ  on  the  question,  as  to  whether  it  is 
possible  to  get  at  facts  at  all,  or  to  attain  to  the  one  truth?  In 
the  one  position  it  is  maintained  that,  while  there  are  differ- 
ences among  individuals,  this  does  not  preclude  likenesses  and 
identities  in  our  "knowing  apparatus,"  and  that,  relying  upon 
these,  we  are  justified  in  further  claiming  that  the  ideal  one 
truth  may,  at  least  in  certain  cases,  be  attained.  This  is  also 
possible,  since,  although  there  may  be  no  absolute  test  of  absolute 
truth,  truth  may  be  quite  independent  of  proof  and  of  testing. 
The  other  and  opposed  position,  if  it  will  not  admit  of  likenesses 
in  knowing  processes  in  the  midst  of  differences,  has  only  one 
recourse  left.  It  must  acknowledge  complete  individualism  in 
respect  to  intellect,  moral  judgment,  and  testhetic  feelings  and 
appreciation.  Each  individual  can  rely  only  upon  himself,  and 
that  completely  in  each  of  these  fields,  with  no  apparent  means 
of  bridging  the  chasm  from  one  individual  to  another. 

Destructive  as  this  position  seemingly  is  of  all  motives  for 
social  intercourse  and  cooperation,  it  has,  nevertheless,  been 
theoretically  maintained  now  and  then  ever  since  the  Sophists 
first  advanced  it.  But,  it  may  be  asked,  Is  not  the  means  for 
the  refutation  of  this  position  rather  freely  offered  by  him  who 
argues  it?  If  one  cannot  get  beyond  the  individual  peculiari- 
ties and  differences  to  that  in  which  individuals  are  alike,  as 
they  are  supposed  to  be  in  their  "pure  reason,"  then,  on  the 
one  hand,  why  should  one  ever  attempt  to  convince  others  of 
the  truth  of  the  individualistic  position?  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  one  makes  this  attempt,  does  he  not  therewith  presup- 
pose that  there  is  something  which  is  common  to  and  alike  in 
individuals  side  by  side  with  differences — something,  namely, 
that  is  "over-individual,"  even  as  reason  is  supposed  to  be?  It 
suffices  to  say,  that  the  latter  alternative  is  accepted  by  most 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  79 

philosophers,  and  that  the  first  alternative  is  regarded  as  worthy 
of  little  attention.  Yet  the  problem  must  be  regarded  as  a 
legitimate  one,  with  individualists  and  "antis"  as  the  eon- 
tending  parties,  and  with  various  ramifications,  from  both  posi- 
tions, extending  into  the  solutions  given  to  other  philosophical 
problems.^** 

Suppose  it  be  granted,  then,  that,  side  by  side  with  feelings, 
desires,  motives,  and  the  like,  which  may  be  purely  individual, 
there  are  also  reason,  knowing,  and  knowledge  that  may  be  the 
same  in  many  individuals,  there  remain  still  other  problems. 
Hotv  does  knowledge  arise?  "What  is  its  source?  Using  the 
term  "cognition"  to  designate  all  perception,  memory,  imagina- 
tion, and  reasoning  processes,  there  is  the  problem,  Does  all 
cognition  have  the  same  source?  Does  it  all  come  ultimately 
from,  and  is  it  all  like  in  kind  to,  sensation?  Or,  is  some  cogni- 
tion, notably  reasoning,  together  with  its  principles,  an  inde- 
pendent and  peculiar  kind  and  source  of  knowledge  in  con- 
junction with,  but  different  in  kind  from,  sensation?^'*  Two 
positions  are  taken  in  solution  of  this  general  problem.  Ac- 
cording to  one,  namely,  Sensationalism,  all  cognition,  all  knowl- 
edge, comes  from,  and  is  but  a  transformation  of  sensation.  Ac- 
cording to  the  other,  Rationalism,  at  least  spwe  knowledge  does 
not  thus  originate,  but  is  reason's  own  peculiar  contribution. 

Empiricism,  in  the  historical  and  narrow  sense  of  the  term, 
either  agrees  with  Sensationalism  in  '^ reducing"  reason  to  sensa- 
tion, or,  if  it  does  not  go  quite  so  far  as  this,  at  any  rate  denies 
reason's  independent  ability  to  discover  fact  and  to  get  at  truth, 
and  allows  it  by  itself  only  the  function  of  vain  speculation 
and  castle-building.  However,  we  are  all  empiricists  in  the 
broad  meaning  of  the  term,  since  experience  of  some  kind  must 
be  accepted  as  the  one  source  of  discovery.  But  historically 
the  term  "empiricism"  has  been  almost  exclusively  used  to 
designate  the  view,  that  hoth  the  source  of  all  knowledge  and 
the  test  of  all  truth  is  ultimately  sensation.  Then  the  term 
"rationalism"  may  be  used  to  designate  the  position,  opposed 
to  this  narrow  empiricism,  that  all  experience,  evei?  sensation, 
must  be  subjected  to  reason's  test  as  the  court  of  last  resort. 

"  See  Chap.  XLI.,  vin. 

"  Bee  Chaps.  XLI.,  xiii.,  XLIII.,  and  XLIV. 


80         HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

Distinct  in  some  ways  from  this  problem  as  to  whether  reason 
or  sensation  furnishes  the  ultimate  test  for  truth,  is  the  question, 
whether  reason  reveals  fact  and  reality  to  us,  or  only  invents 
schemes  that  are  useful  methods  for  the  accomplishment  of 
practical  results  and  purposes.  Both  positions  are  taken,  the 
former  by  the  intellectualists,  the  latter  by  the  "antis,"  and 
ioth  parties  present  arguments  for  their  position,  the  anti- 
intellectualists  tliereby  placing  themselves  in  the  embarrassing 
position  of  using  intellectual  and  rational  means  and  principles 
in  order  to  establish  the  very  position  which  denies  the  validity 
of  the  means  by  which  it  has  been  established.  One  of  their 
arguments  is  that  that  analysis  with  which  reasoning  methods 
are  at  least  partly  identical,  leads  to  results  that  are  self-con- 
tradictory, and  therefore  false.^°  Thus  the  claim  is  made  that 
only  immediate  and  intuitive  experience  reveals  fact,  and  that 
the  great  fact  revealed  is  that  of  an  ever-flowing  and  ever- 
changing  universe,  which  intellectual  analysis  "makes"  into 
a  manifold  of  unchanging  elements  or  parts.  Motion  is  the 
typical  case  selected;  and  it  is  argued  (falsely)  that  the  analysis 
of  motion  shows,  that  at  every  instant  a  moving  body  is  at  a 
specific  point,  and  so  at  rest — rest  being  tlie  contradictory  of 
the  "thing"  analyzed,  namely,  the  motion.  Thus  the  conclusion 
is  reached,  that  only  non-intellectual,  non-rational  methods,  such 
as  intuition,  appreciation,  and  feeling,  reveal  reality  and  fact, 
and  that  accordingly  we  must  be  intuitionists,  emotionalists,  and 
evolutionists. 

The  intellectualist  opposes  all  this  with  the  position  that, 
although  non-rational  processes  may  reveal  fact,  they  are  not  the 
only  processes  that  do  this.  For  it  can  be  shown  that  reason 
and  intellect,  and  the  methods  of  analysis  in  general,  also  reveal 
reality,  and  that  the  falsifying  character  that  is  ascribed  to 
them  disappears,  if  one  but  state  tlieir  analytical  results 
correctly,^^ 

It  remains  yet  to  present  one  other,  very  important  epis- 
temological  problem,  upon  the  several  solutions  of  which  there 
depend  some  of  the  most  distinctive  features  of  Idealism, 
Phenomenalism,  and  Realism.    This  problem  concerns  the  ques- 

""  E.g.,  by  Bergaon  in  Creative  Evolution  in  any  number  of  statements. 
"  See  Chaps.  XXII.,  XXIII.,  and  XXIV. 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  81 

tion  as  to  what  is  involved  in  or  implied  hy  the  fact,  that  every 
reality,  every  fact,  even  every  illusory  object  that  is  known, 
thought  of,  conceived,  mentioned,  or  perceived,  and  the  like, 
is  a  reality  that  is  known,  thought  of,  conceived,  mentioned,  or 
perceived,  so  that  any  attempt  to  know  a  reality  as  it  is  as  not 
so  known,  is  apparently  doomed  to  failure.  For,  it  is  asked,  Is 
not  the  only  world  which  we  can  ''get  at,"  one  that  is  related  to 
our  knowing,  or  to  our  experiencing  in  some  manner?  There- 
fore, is  not  the  question,  what  the  world  is,  as  not  so  related, 
incapable  of  solution,  since  to  attempt  to  answer  it  is  but  ogavn 
to  relate  the  xcorld  to  some  "knowing"  or  "experiencing"?  The 
difficulties  of  this  situation  constitute  the  so-called  ''ego-centric 
predicament."  ^' 

The  possibility  of  a  solution  to  this  problem  depends  on 
whether  or  not  the  fact,  that  all  reality  which  is  experienced  is 
related  to  an  "experience"  or  an  "experiencer,"  implies  that  a 
difference  is  thereby  made  to  the  reality  or  the  entity  experi- 
enced.-^ For,  on  the  one  hand,  if  the  "experiencing"  does  make 
a  difference  to  or  does  affect  the  experienced  reality  in  some  way 
other  than  to  make  it  "experienced,"  then  clearly  unexperienced 
realities  are  different  from  experienced  ones,  though  we  may 
never  be  able  either  to  know  in  what  respects  they  differ,  or, 
indeed,  experience  them  in  any  way.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
if  the  "experiencing"  makes  7io  difference  to  the  reality  experi- 
enced, then,  of  course,  the  reality  is  the  same  "when"  experi- 
enced as  "when"  not,  and  exists  or  subsists  as  quite  independent 
of  experience,  to  be  experienced  only  when  those  specific  condi- 
tions exist  through  which  experience  arises.  In  fact,  objects  as 
experienced  might  themselves  give  evidence  not  only  of  their 
own  independence  of  experience,  but  also  of  the  existence  or 
subsistence  of  still  other  objects  that  have  never  before  been 
experienced,  at  any  rate  in  certain  specific  ways. 

The  second  position  is  the  one  that  is  at  least  tacitly  held  by 
the  common  sense  man  and  by  most  scientists.  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, looked  upon  with  favor  by  many  of  those  who  are  sophisti- 

''  R.  B.  Perry,  "  The  Ego-centric  Predicament,"  Jonr.  of  Phil.,  Psych., 
and  Scientific  MetJiods,  Vol.  VIII.,  pp.  5-14;  also  see  The  New  Realism, 
E.  B.  Holt  and  others,  Introduction,  and  Perry,  Present  Philosophical 
Tendencies,  Chap.  VI. 

"'  Cf.  Chap.  XXVI,  on  The  Theories  of  Relations. 


82  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

cated  in  the  ways  of  philosophy,  and  who  find  one  reason  or 
another  for  maintaining  Qiot  only  that  "the  world"  is  always  an 
experienced  one,  but  also  that  "experience"  affects  "the  world" 
in  some  way  and  makes  it  what  it  is  either  in  whole  or  part. 
One  may  be  of  the  opinion  that  the  issue  thus  raised  is  to  be' 
easily  settled  by  appealing  to  fact,  and,  indeed,  each  party  seems 
to  think  that  it  makes  just  this  appeal.  But  the  facts  to  which 
the  appeal  is  made  are  not  simple,  especially  since  such  a  means 
of  settling  the  issue  only  again  repeats  the  difficulty  of  finding 
a  fact  that  is  not  experienced  in  some  way.-*  However,  let  it 
be  granted  that  all  that  we  can  perceive,  think  of,  appeal  to, 
and  the  like,  is  thereby  experienced — in  some  way ;  and  let  it 
be  granted  also — as  it  must  be — that,  in  the  case  of  all  experi- 
enced reality,  the  "experiencing"  and  the  reality  are  related. 
Then  what  follows  from  this  experienced  factf  Can  it  be  (cor- 
rectly) inferred  from  the  ever  repeated  presence  of  "experi- 
ence" to  "experienced  fact,"  or  from  the  mere  fact  of  the 
relatedness  of  experienced  reality  to  "experience,"  that  the 
experiencing  affects  the  reality?  Assuredly  not!  This  infer- 
ence can  be  made  only  provided  it  is  universally  true,  that, 
because  entities  are  related,  they  affect  one  another.  But  this 
is  the  very  question  at  issue.  Does  relatedness  universally  carry 
with  it,  or  imply,  causal  dependence  and  action  ?  Or  is  this  the 
case  only  with  some  instances  of  related  terms?  And  if  it  is 
thus  the  case,  may  not  the  relation  in  question,  namely,  that 
between  "experience"  and  "object  experienced,"  be  one  of  the 
exceptions,  so  that  we  should  be  justified  in  concluding,  with  the 
realists,  that,  although  "experience"  and  "experienced  entity" 
are  related,  the  latter  is  quite  unaffected  by  the  former,  and  is 
experienced  as  if  the  experience  were  not  present  ? 

Whether  this  conclusion  can  be  established  or  not,  it  is, 
nevertheless,  one  that  is  not  accepted  by  most  philosophers, 
notably  by  the  idealists  and  the  phenomenalists.  These  phi- 
losophers insist — unconsciously,  perhaps, — that  relatedness  im- 
plies dependence,  or  causal  modification;  and,  secondly,  that 
experiencing  is  related  to  all  realities  experienced,  i.e.,  re- 
dundantly, that  all  (experienced)  realities  are  experienced  reali- 
ties.   From  these  premises  are  derived  those  consequences  which 

'*  The  ego-centric  predicament  again. 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  8S 

are  identical  with  the  main  features  of  their  philosophical 
systems.^^ 

However,  as  regards  this  procedure  it  is  quite  clear,  that,  if 
it  is  assumed  (1)  that  all  related  terms  are  mutually  dependent 
on  and  affect  one  another,  and  (2)  that  all  realities  are  experi- 
enced realities,  and  so  are  related  to  experience,  then  it  follows, 
of  course,  that  all  experienced  realities  are  experience-modified- 
realities.  But  it  is  also  quite  clear,  that  from  this  second 
premise  alone  this  conclusion  cannot  be  correctly  inferred.  It 
is  correctly  inferable  only  if  this  premise  is  taken  with  the  other, 
the  major  premise,  namely,  that  all  related  terms  are  mutually 
dependent  on  and  affective  of  one  another.  It  is  only  these  two 
premises  together  that  imply  that  an  experienced  object  is 
affected  by  the  experience  of  it,  whereby  it  becomes  the  experi- 
ence-object. 

The  question  at  issue  between  the  realist  and  his  opponents 
is,  therefore,  whether  this  major  premise  applies  to  all  related 
terms,  and  so  to  the  specific  relational  situation  of  "experience" 
and  reality.  Accordingly  it  is  important  to  ask  hoiv  the  idealist 
and  phenomenalist  endeavor  to  establish  this  premise  or  princi- 
ple. The  answer  is,  that  there  are  certain  instances  in  which 
the  related  terms  do  seem  to  exert  a  causal  and  modifying  influ- 
ence on  one  another.  Good  examples  of  this  are  the  mutual 
dependence  of  the  parts  of  any  organism  on  one  another,  the 
causal  influence  of  physical  masses  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  gravitation,  and  the  mutual  induction  between  positive 
and  negative  charges  of  electricity.  Let  the  knowing,  the  ex- 
periencing, the  cognizing  of  an  object  be  of  the  type  of  these 
instances, — and  that  they  are  is  precisely  what  the  phenomenalist 
concludes  in  generalizing  from  them  as  typical  instances, — and 
it  then  follows  (1)  that  "things"  '^ outside"  of  the  "knowing" 
and  "experiencing"  relation  are  different  from  what  they  are 
"m"  it;  (2)  that  knowing  and  experience  do  affect  things;  and 
(3)  that  the  nature  of  "things"  "outside"  of  this  relation  can 
never  be  known,  since  to  attempt  to  know  "things"  is  to  affect 
and  change  them.  In  other  words,  it  follows,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  there  is  a  realm  of  unknowable,  and  not  merely  unknown, 
things-in-themselves,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  our  world 

"  See  Chaps.  XXIX.,  XXX.,  and  XXXIII. 


84         HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

or  universe — the  only  world  that  we  know — is  made  what  it  is, 
at  least  in  part,  by  'being  known. 

To  the  support  of  this  conclusion  the  idealist  brings  what  he 
regards  as  the  discovery  of  certain  instances  of  related  terms 
that  are  constitutive  of  one  another  either  partially  or  totally. 
This  seems  to  be  the  case,  e.g.,  with  dream-objects  and,  indeed, 
with  illusory  objects  in  general,  as  it  seems  to  be  the  case,  also, 
with  color,  odor,  and  temperature, — provided  the  world  outside 
our  skins  consists  only  of  hard,  fast-moving  particles  or  masses. 
Why,  then,  should  not  all  experience  be  of  this  type  that  is 
creative  of  its  own  content?  Certain  idealists  unhesitatingly 
conclude  that  this  is  the  case,  and  there  results  either  Subjective 
Idealism,  if  the  experience  is  that  of  human  beings,  or  Objective 
Idealism  if  it  is  the  experience  of  a  universal  consciousness. 

The  realist  opposes  both  of  these  conclusions  and  arguments. 
For  him,  "things"  depend  upon  knowing  in  no  other  way  than 
for  being  known;  knowledge  does  not  condition  reality;  and 
epistemology  is  only  psychologically  prior  to  other  philosophical 
problems;  i.e.,  one  is  first  interested  in  the  problem,  only  subse- 
quently to  arrive  at  the  conclusion,  ( 1 )  that  knowing  and  experi- 
ence do  not  make  any  difference  to  the  "thing"  known  and 
experienced,  and  so  (2)  are  virtually  separable  from  that 
"thing." 

The  realist  reaches  this  result  by  finding  certain  instances 
of  terms  that  are  related  to  and  yet  independent  of  one  another, 
and  by  then  looking  for  other  instances.  The  knoivi7ig  processes 
of  the  idealist  and  the  phenomenalist  and  the  theories  that  they 
propose  as  known  and  experienced  ^'states  of  affairs"  prove  to 
be  excellent  initial  instances  of  this  compatible  relatedness  and 
independence.  For,  while  the  knowledge  and  the  "state  of 
aft'airs"  proposed  as  true — in  their  respective  theories,  are  cer- 
tainly related,  it  is  nevertheless  presupposed,  as  the  very  con- 
dition for  such  a  "state  of  affairs"  being  "the  real  genuine 
one,"  that  it  is  independent  not  only  of  the  specific  knowing 
and  experiencing  process  in  the  knowing  individuals  who  main- 
tain it,  but  also  of  any  implied  repetition  of  knowing  in  other 
individuals. 

Other  instances  of  terms  that  are  both  independent  and 
related  are  found  in  the  case  of  the  points  of  space  and  the 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  85 

instants  of  time.  Points  and  instants  are  absolute  simples  that 
are  not  made  up  of  other  elements  on  condition  that,  if  they  were 
so  made  up,  there  would  still  be  some  other  absolute  "simple" 
which  we  should  then  call  a  point  or  an  instant.  But  as  "com- 
posing" space  and  time  respectively,  these  "simples"  are  re- 
lated in  a  very  definite  way,  namely,  so  as  to  form  a  series  with 
the  same  relations  present  as  are  found,  e.g.,  in  the  series  of 
real  numbers  in  order  of  magnitude.  But  no  point  is  affected 
hy  heing  related  to  oilier  points  on  condition  that,  if  it  were,  it 
would  be,  not  simple,  hut  complex,  since  it  would  then  be  hoth 
itself  and  the  affects  thus  resulting;  or,  it  would  be  affected  by 
an  infinite  number  of  other  points,  and  so  would  be  infinitely 
complex,  and  thus  again  presuppose  ultimate,  simple  "ele- 
ments" that  would  be  the  real  points.  Then  it  would  be  these 
elements  that  would  be  related  and  yet  independent  in  the  sense 
that  they  would  not  be  affected  by  other  elements.  In  a  per- 
fectly analogous  way  instants  can  be  &hown  to  be  independent 
of  one  another,  and  yet  to  be  so  related  so  as  to  form  that  specific 
series  which  is  time. 

Still  other  instances  of  cosuhsisting  relatedness  and  inde- 
pendence are  as  follows:  Space  as  a  whole  is  related  to  matter, 
but  is  independent  of  it.  Empty  space  is  quite  conceivable,  and 
is  examined  scientifically  in  geometry  with  no  implication  of 
matter,  or  of  physical  forces.  So  also  are  matter,  motion,  and 
change  in  general  related  to  time,  and  time  to  them;  but  time 
is  independent  of  all  these  entities.  The  clock  does  not  create 
time,  nor  affect  it  causally  in  any  way;  it  only  measures  time 
in  ^inits  that  are  relative  to  one  another,  but  time  itself  is  not 
relative. 

If  there  are  these  cases  of  related  and  independent  terms, 
then  can  it  be  consistently  argued  from  the  fact  of  mere  related- 
ness, either  that  knowing  modifies,  or  that  it  is  in  any  way 
necessary  to  the  existence  of,  (known)  entities?  And  also  can  it 
be  consistently  maintained  that,  if  all  finite  minds  were  anni- 
hilated, there  must  still  be,  as  necessary  to  the  existence  of  the 
universe,  an  "infinite"  mind  or  spirit,  analagous  to  a  human 
finite  mind  ? 

For  the  realist  the  answer  to  these  inquiries  can  only  be 
**No."    For,  if  there  is  a  single  case  of  the  knowing  of  a  genuine 


86  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

and  true  "state  of  affairs/'  then  the  knowing  and  the  (com- 
plex) entity  known  are,  together,  one  instance,  at  least,  of  the 
principle,  that  some  entities  are  related  and  yet  independent, — 
and  there  may  be  other  instances  of  this  principle.  This  is  the 
paradox.  "Things"  are  known  and  are  related  to  the  knowing; 
but  they  are  known  as  if  they  were  not  known. 

But  further,  entities  can  become  specifically  related,  and  then 
cease  to  be  so  related.  Thus  a  moving  body  of  a  certain  volume 
occupies  a  certain  space  for  an  instant,  and  then  no  longer 
occupies  it.  "Occupying"  is  the  relation  that  is  both  gained 
and  lost.  By  this  and  innumerable  other  instances  the  realist 
is  supported  in  his  contention,  that  "things"  can  get  into  and 
out  of  the  relation  of  being  known  without  being  affected 
thereby, — which  alone  is  the  condition  on  which  "things"  can 
be  known  as  they  really  are,  i.e.,  on  which  there  can  be  genuine 
knowledge. 

But,  still  further,  an  entity  in  gaining  and  losing  a  specific 
relation  can  retain  its  relations  to  other  entities.  Thus  a  man 
can  retain,  his  several  blood-relationships,  and  yet  gain  new 
relations  of  friendship.  So  also  may  an  entity  retain  its  several 
relations  to  other  entities,  and  yet  gain  that  relation  to  an  organ- 
ism which  is  identical  with  being  experienced  in  some  specific 
way. 

These  are  instances  of  the  evidence  which  the  realist  finds 
in  proof  of  his  contention  (1)  that  entities  can  be  related  and 
yet  be  independent,  (2)  that  specific  relations  can  be  gained 
and  lost,  and  (3)  that,  with  this  the  case,  other  relations  can 
stiir  persist.  Especially  does  the  realist  maintain  that  these 
principles  apply  to  the  knowing  and  experiencing  situation,  and 
that  thereby  a  solution  is  obtained  for  the  ego-centric 
predicament. 

This  solution  is  essentially  the  same  logically  as  that  which 
is  obtained  in  the  analysis  of  space.  A  point  of  space  cannot 
be  annihilated  in  order  to  determine  what  effect  this  annihila- 
tion would  have  upon  other  points.  But  by  an  analysis  that 
leaves  all  the  points  in  situ  it  is  found  that,  as  the  condition  for 
a  point  being  a  point  and  not  a  complex,  a  point  is  related  to 
another  point  as  if  it  were  not  so  related,  i.e.,  without  being 
affected  in  its  simplicity  by  being  related.     Similarly,  while 


THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  87 

knowing  and  experience  cannot  be  annihilated  in  the  instance 
of  a  known  and  experienced  object,  it  is  discovered  by  an 
analysis  in  situ,  that,  as  the  condition  for  there  being  genuine 
knowledge  in  any  specific  instance,  the  object  is  known  as  if 
the  knowing  were  not  present.  This  sohition  is  presupposed 
even  for  that  situation  in  which  the  opposed  "state  of  affairs" 
is  asserted  and  claimed  to  be  true,  as  it  is  in  fact  by  the  idealist, 
the  phenoraenalist,  and  by  some  pragmatists.  For,  notwith- 
standing that  these  philosophers  attempt  to  base  their  respective 
positions  on  the  insolubility  of  the  ego-centric  predicament,  they 
themselves  tacitly  solve  it  by  an  analysis  in  situ,  when  they 
present  specific  states  of  affairs  as  true. 

But  further,  wdth  the  realist  presenting  well-established  ex- 
ceptions to  the  position,  that  all  "things"  are  what  they  are 
because  of  their  relations  to  other  "things,"  his  opponents 
cannot  maintain  the  universality  of  the  theory  of  internal  rela- 
tions.-® One  is  thus  relieved  from  the  necessity  of  admitting  the 
positions  frequently  taken  in  epistemology,  (1)  that  no  problem 
can  be  isolated,  since  it  is  related  to,  and  so  modified  by,  other 
problems;  (2)  that  we  cannot  know  the  truth  about  anything 
until  we  know  the  truth  about  everything;  and,  (3)  that  truth 
cannot  be  truth  because  it  is  a  value.  Contrary  to  these  posi- 
tions, which  condition  various  specific  tendencies  in  philosophy, 
the  evidence  just  considered  shows  it  to  be  possible,  (1)  that 
one  problem  at  a  time  can  be  studied  and  solved;  (2)  that  the 
knowledge  of  the  "things"  involved  in  one  problem  will  not  be 
changed  by  the  knowledge  of  other  "things";  and  (3)  that 
truth  remains  truth,  although,  as  related  to  appreciation,  desire,  / 
and  purpose,  it  is  also  a  value. 

The  epistemological  problem  in  its  several  aspects  still  per- 
sists. In  fact  it  is  the  problem  that  is  most  discussed  in  con- 
temporaneous philosophy.  But  only  one  party  thinks  that  it  is 
not  a  problem  that  is  logically  prior  to  all  others,  and  this  party 
— the  realists — takes  this  position  because,  having  considered  the 
problem,  it  finds  that,  in  order  to  know,  one  need  not  first  fin4 
the  how  or  whence  or  wherefore  of  "knowing." 

="«  See  Chap.  XXVI.,  ii.,  2  and  3. 


88         HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  AND  THE  NATURE  OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS 

The  preceding  section  has  already  introduced  us  to  the  psy- 
chological problem.  Perception,  thinking,  knowing,  and,  in 
general,  experience,  are  undoubtedly  facts  of  some  kind,  but,  of 
what  kind,  is  the  question.  Already  two  fairly  distinct  answers 
to  this  question  have  been  found  and  to  some  extent  examined, 
especially  as  to  their  implications.  By  one  group  of  philoso- 
phers, the  idealists,  the  phenomenalists,  and  the  pragmatists,  it 
is  maintained,  that  the  cognitive  consciousness  is  such  that  it 
modifies,  or  even  constitutes  known  and  experienced  objects. 
This  position  is  based  on  the  assumption,  that  terms  which  are 
related  affect  one  another.  Clearly  this  view  makes  of  con- 
sciousness, of  knowing,  of  experience,  the  kind  of  "thing"  that 
can  causally  affect  or  even  produce  the  object,  and  a  term  that 
is  a  sort  of  substance  is  able  to  do  this}  By  another  group,  the 
realists,  it  is  argued,  that  the  basic  condition  for  genuine  knowl- 
edge is,  that  the  "thing"  which  becomes  known  shall  enter  into, 
and,  perhaps,  pass  out  of  the  cognitive  situation  without  being 
affected  thereby.  This  is  possible  only  if  the  knowing  is  not  a 
substance,  but  a  relation,  or  a  dimension,  or  a  quality,  or,  possibly 
and  indirectly,  an  event.^  Although  there  may  be  other  sets  of 
conditions  in  which  there  is  knowing,  nevertheless  there  is  much 
evidence  that  the  knowing  situation  arises  when  the  complex  or 
simple  entity  that  is  to  become  known  gets  into  certain  specific 
relations  with  another  entity,  i.e.,  with  an  organism  having  a 
nervous  system  of  a  certain  degree  of  complexity,  and  in  a 
certain  physico-chemical  condition.  Knowing  situations — at 
least  those  with  which  we  are  best  acquainted — disappear 
when  this  specific  complex  disappears.  But  this  means 
that  specific  knowings  appear  and  disappear.  It  follows  that 
knowing  cannot  be  an  absolutely  simple  term,  since  such  a  term, 

'  See  Chap8.  XXIX.,  XXX.,  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 
*  !See  Chaps.  XLl.,  xiv. ;  XLllL,  iii.  and  XI. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  89 

illustrated  by  a  point  and  an  instant,  cannot  appear  and  dis- 
appear. Only  on  the  hypothesis,  therefore,  that  knowing  is  a 
relational  complex — of  a  specific  kind, — and  involving,  of  course, 
a  relation  between  terms,  themselves  either  simple  or  complex, 
can  the  experienced  fact  of  the  appearance  and  disappearance 
of  specific  knowings  be  explained. 

This  is,  in  brief  form,  ''the  relational  view  of  conscious- 
ness." It  is  one  solution  of  the  problem  as  to  ivhat  kind  of  an 
entity  consciousness  is,  and  is  held  at  the  present  time  by  a 
number  of  philosophers.^  It  is  a  view  that  is  also  quite  com- 
patiMe  with  the  more  orthodox  position  of  experimental  psy- 
chology, that  specific  consciousnesses  are  events.  For  events  are 
themselves  relational  complexes, — e.g.,  a  specific  accelerated 
motion  is  a  series  of  velocities, — and  relations  can  themselves  he 
related — as  are,  e.g.,  ''greater  than"  and  "less  than,"  brother- 
hood and  sisterhood.  Therefore  consciousness  as  an  event  could 
be  a  complex  of  specific  conscious  relations  that  are  themselves 
related  in  a  specific  way. 

This  theory  is  also  compatible  with  the  view  of  a  certain  very 
modern  school  of  psychologists,  that  the  important  thing  in 
psychology  is  to  study  the  objective  manifestations,  i.e.,  the 
behavior  of  organisms.*  For,  ivhen  there  are  specific  physio- 
logical conditions  in  this  organic  complex,  and  this  in  turn  is 
related  in  a  specific  way  to  the  entities  to  be  known,  i.e.,  to  the 
stimulus,  then  the  knowing  is  also  present,  perhaps  as  a  char- 
acteristic  of  the  whole  complex,  organism  a7id  stimulus.  Some- 
thing occurs,  something  is  done  when  this  larger  complex  arises, 
and  this  can  be  studied  as  the  behavior  of  an  organism  stimulated 
in  a  specific  manner.  The  interesting  corollary  of  this  position 
is,  that  the  knowing  can  not,  in  all  cases  at  least,  be  said  to  be 
located  within  our  bodies.  Strictly  speaking,  it  has  no  locus  or 
place  or  position.    Its  conditions  have,  but  it  has  not. 

"E.g.,  by  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge,  E.  B.  Holt,  W.  B.  Pitkin,  and  by  the 
writer. 

*  See  E.  P.  Frost,  "The  Belief  in  Consciousness,"  Jonr.  of  Phil.,  Psych., 
and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XIII.,  No.  10,  and  "  Cannot  Psychology  Dis- 
pense with  Consciousness?"  Psych.  Review,  Vol.  XIV.,  No.  21;  D.  Miller, 
"Is  Consciousness  a  Type  of  Behavior?"  Jonr.  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scien- 
tific Methods,  Vol.  XL,  No.  8;  E.  A.  Singer,  Jr.,  "Consciousness  and 
Behavior,"  Jonr.  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XII.,  No.  9; 
Watson,  "  Psychology  as  the  Behaviorists  view  it,"  Psych.  Revieio,  Vo) 
XHI.,  No.  20.     Watson  in  his  Behavior  gives  a  complete  bibliography. 


90         HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

This  view  that  consciousness  is  a  relation  is  perhaps  a  difficult 
one  to  grasp.  Relations  seem  to  be  evasive,  evanescent,  indeed, 
almost  negligible  "things."  Yet  are  they  not  facts?  And 
should  we  hesitate  to  admit  that  consciousness  in  each  specific 
instance  of  its  occurrence  is  a  relation,  or  else  a  "new"  dimen- 
sion, if  this  conclusion  is  necessary  in  order  to  explain  other 
facts  ? 

However,  many  philosophers  and  psychologists  hesitate  to 
accept  this  "relational"  or  "dimensional"  theory,  and  indeed 
historically  it  has  not  been  a  widely  favored  one.  Consciousness 
has  seemed  to  be,  perhaps,  too  tangible,  "solid,"  and  substance- 
like, and  to  involve  too  much  of  a  continuity  and  unity  of 
personality  to  be  a  mere  relation  or  a  dimension.  Indeed,  the 
traditional  view  is,  that  empirically,  both  by  introspection  of 
one's  own  mind  and  by  observation  of  other  minds,  an  entity 
is  discovered  that  is  an  ego,  a  self,  a  soul,  a  "something"  that 
is  of  absolute  constancy,  and  anything  hut  a  relation,  a  dimen- 
sion, an  event,  or  a  disembodied  quality.  In  fact,  it  is  argued, 
that  absolute  unity  and  constancy  are  necessary  in  order  to 
account  for  the  continuity  of  personality  and  the  unity  of 
knowledge,  and  that  this  finally  demands  a  numerically  simple 
and  indestructible  entity  somewhere  in  human  consciousness.^ 
Relations,  it  is  contended,  appear  and  disappear  altogether  too 
readily  to  meet  this  demand,  while  complex  entities,  such  as 
specific  dimensions,  disintegrate,  or,  as  existing,  presuppose  an 
absolute  unity  to  bind  them  together,  and  qualities  imply  some- 
thing of  which  they  are  qualities,  and  in  which  they  inhere. 
Thus  runs  the  argument  of  the  opponents  of  "the  relational 
view,"  and  their  names  include  the  great  names  in  the  history 
of  philosophy. 

A  very  similar  position  has  been  advanced  in  modern  days, 
since  the  law  of  the  conservation  of  energy  and  the  theory  of 
evolution  have  dominated  scientific  thought,  to  establish  what 
amounts  to  a  principle  of  the  evolution  and  yet  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  consciousness.  It  is  argued  (1)  that  consciousness  is 
so  different  from  physical  energy,  that  it  cannot  "come"  from 
or  arise  out  of  this,  yet  (2)  that  it  is  a  fact  and  must  come  from 
something;  and,  therefore  (3)  that  there  must  be  a  preceding 

"  E.g.,  by  Plato  and  Leibniz,  and,  perhaps,  by  Kant. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  91 

consciousness  out  of  which  it  arises  or  is  transformed.  Thus 
the  position  is  derived,  that  there  is  either  an  all-permeating 
universal,  yet  impersonal  consciousness  that  exists  in  varying 
degrees  in  animal,  plant,  molecule,  atom,®  and  even  electron,  or 
a  great  personal  consciousness  that  "wells  up"  and  is  present 
in  ail  "things,"  and  is,  perhaps,  identical  with  God  J 

All  this  shows  that  the  question  of  the  nature  of  consciousness 
is  one  of  the  main  philosophical  problems.  Indeed,  it  is  a  very 
pressing  problem  today  in  this  period  of  revolt  against  many  of 
the  traditional  philosophical  methods  and  positions.  His- 
torically, in  reaching  solutions  of  the  problem,  the  "substance 
view"  of  consciousness  has  been  dominant.  But  this  has  been 
the  case  primarily  because  of  the  influence  of  the  Aristotelian 
tradition,  with  its  preeminent  concepts  of  siibstance  and  cause. 

The  other  psychological  problems  are  more  specific,  and  fall 
within  the  realm  of  empirical  psychology  as  this  is  carried  on 
by  experiment  and  observation  and  by  statistics.  But  this  is 
not  to  say  that  the  more  general  and  philosophical  problem  as 
to  the  nature  of  consciousness  is  not  to  be  solved  by  the  use  of 
similar  methods,  or  that  the  solution  of  some  of  these  more 
specific  questions  does  not  aid  in  the  solution  of  this  wider 
problem.  On  the  contrary,  two  at  least  of  the  specific  psycho- 
logical problems  are  espevrially  important  philosophically. 

Whatever  consciousness  may  ultimately  he,  we  nevertheless 
know  some  of  the  "things"  that  it  does,  and  we  have  an  em- 
pirical classification  of  its  different  forms.  Thus  we  speak  of 
knowing,  feeling,  and  willing,  or  of  cognition,  emotion,  and  voli- 
tion; of  deliberation,  instinct,  and  impulse;  of  attention,  dis- 
crimination, and  analysis;  and  of  perception,  memory,  imagina- 
tion, and  reason. 

If,  now,  evidence  is  found  for  holding  that  consciousness 
evolves  along  with  the  evolution  of  life,  then  the  question  arises, 
what  kind  of  consciousness  was  first.  Was  it  sense  perception, 
or  the  mere  feeling  of  pain  and  pleasure,  or  an  "elementary" 
will,  and  are  all  kinds  of  consciousness  only  gradual  modifica- 
tions or  outgrowths  of  a  first  kind  ?    But  these  questions  suggest 

'E.g.,  by  Paulsen,  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  trans,  by  Thilly.  This  is 
also  the  position  that  is  at  least  implicitly  taken  by  most  text-books  on 
psychology. 

^  The  position  of  many  objective  idealists;  see  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 


92  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

others.  Thus,  instead  of  arguing,  that  in  order  to  account  for 
consciousness  in  higher  forms,  notably  in  man,  its  presence  must 
be  granted  in  the  lowest  forms,  and  even  in  atoms  and  electrons, 
could  we  not  start  with  what  we  directly  find  in  the  lower 
organisms,  namely  tropisms,  reflexes,  organic  discrhninations, 
and  the  like,  and  then  ask,  if  what  we  call  consciousness  in 
higher  forms  is  not  merely  a  complex  of  these  purely  physio- 
logical modes  of  behavior  ?  ^ 

But  there  is  a  second  psycho-philosophical  problem.  Certain 
philosophical  systems  that  are  great  not  only  in  their  influence 
as  philosophies,  but  also  in  their  alliance  with  the  dominating 
religions  of  the  world,  find  reasons  for  concluding  that  tlie  whole 
universe  is  ultimately  conscious  or  spiritual  in  nature.  What, 
then,  is  the  character  of  this  universal  spirit  or  consciousness? 
Is  it  a  self,  an  ego,  a  spiritual  unity?  Is  it  will,  knowing,  or 
feeling?  Or,  if  it  is  all  three  of  these  together,  ivhich  is  domi- 
nant, and  what  is  the  relation  by  which  the  three  form  one 
relational  complex?  In  answering  these  questions  the  great 
idealistic  or  spiritualistic  philosophers  have  differed  and  still 
differ.^ 

One  further  psychological  problem  must  be  mentioned  be- 
cause, through  the  solutions  that  have  been  given  to  it, 
it  has  been  of  great  influence  on  certain  philosophical 
systems.  This  problem  concerns  the  nature  of  illusions, 
of  dreams,  and  of  hallucinations,  and  is  stated  in  the 
question,  Are,  or  are  not,  our  dreams  and  especially  the 
things  of  ivhich  we  dream  wholly  "within  our  heads,"  wholly 
in  our  "dream-consciousness"?  And  yet,  it  may  be  asked,  are 
not  dream-objects  quite  real  to  us  ivhile  we  dream  them.  Then 
the  further  question  arises,  whether  it  might  not  be,  that  every- 
thing in  the  universe,  stars  and  sun  and  planets,  this  earth 
and  all  that  lives  thereon,  is  but  a  persistent  dream  in  which 
we  all  share.  Here  one  might  still  further  ask,  whether  you 
would  not  be  only  my  dream-object,  so  that  I  would  be  all,  and 
all  would  be  in  mef  This  position,  that  everything  except  you 
and  me  and  other  human  beings,  as  spirits  or  souls,  is  a  sort 

'  This  is  done  by,  e.g.,  Jacques  Loeb  in  Physiology  of  the  Brain,  and  in 
The  Mechanistic  Conception  of  Life. 
•  See  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  93 

of  dream  in  which  we  all  share,  with  dream  "effect"  following 
dream  ''cause"  with  regularity  and  according  to  law,  is  Sub- 
jective Idealism.  But  what  right,  once  thus  started,  to  make 
exceptions?  To  be  consistent  must  one  not  also  grant  that  all 
other  human  beings  are  only  one's  own  persistent  dream?  This 
consistent  position  is  Solipsism, 

But  the  instances  of  normal  illusions  also  set  a  similar  prob- 
lem. For  example,  the  rails  of  the  railroad  are  parallel,  but  as 
we  look  down  the  track  they  appear  to  converge.  Also,  the 
stick  that  is  straight  appears  bent,  if  it  is  immersed  in  the  water. 
But  can  the  rails  actually  be  both  parallel  and  not  parallel,  the 
stick  be  both  straight  and  bent?  Are  not  parallel  and  not 
parallel,  straight  and  not-straight  respectively  contradictories,  so 
that  in  each  instance  each  characteristic  must  exist  at  a  different 
place  or  locus?  Much  traditional  philosophy  and  psychology 
have  solved  these  problems  by  making  the  "parallelness"  and 
the  straightness  in  each  case  the  real  "objects,"  and  by  "put- 
ting" the  contradictory  entities,  i.e.,  the  illusory  appearances, 
ifito  some  particular  consciousness,  thus  identifying  their  esse 
with  their  percipi.^'^  For  their  existence  consciousness  is  held 
to  be  necessary.  Therefore,  it  is  further  asked.  Is  not  conscious- 
ness necessary  for  the  existence  of  all  "things,"  even  of  all 
so-called  real  "things"?  Could  not  they  also  be  mere  appear- 
ances and  exist  in  some  personal  consciousness,  or,  if  not  this, 
then  at  least  in  some  divine  consciousness?  This  position  is 
again  Subjective  Idealism,  or,  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion, 
Solipsism, 

The  reply  to  these  arguments  can  be  stated  briefly,  and, 
indeed,  on  the  principle,  that  one  cannot  lift  himself  by  his 
own  boot-straps.  If  some  "things"  arc  concluded  to  exist  only 
"in"  consciousness,  because  other  "things"  do  not,  then  it 
cannot  be  consistently  inferred,  that  these  other  "things"  also 
exist  in  consciousness.  The  scientific  solution  of  the  problem 
of  these  normal  illusions, — if  illusions  they  are — is  one  that 
cuts  the  very  foundation  from  beneath  that  argument  for 
idealism  which  is  based  on  them.  This  scientific  solution  is, 
that  the  illusory  appearances  do  not  exist  "in"  consciousness 
at  all,  but  are  real  parts  of  that  same  world  of  which  the  real 

*"  £.  g.,  by  A.  O.  Lovejoy;  see  the  refprences  given  in  Chap.  XLIII. 


94  HISTORICAL  PROBLEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

objects  are  also  parts.  Rails  and  stick  hy  themselves  are  re- 
spectively parallel  and  straight.  But  the  complex,  rails  and 
light,  has  the  characteristic  of  convergence,  and  the  complex^ 
stick  and  water  and  light,  the  characteristic  of  bentness.  Each 
of  these  contradictory  attributes  has,  indeed,  a  different  locus 
from  that  of  the  original  object,  but  this  locus  may  quite  as 
well  be  another  part  of  the  physical  world  as  a  part  of  a 
consciousness. 


SECTION  III 

METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS   OF   METHOD 

I.   THINKING 

CHAPTER  XII 

REASONING  BY  WORDS,  AND  THE  PSYCHOLOGY  OF 
THINKING 

I.   INTRODUCTORY 

In  this  section  there  will  be  considered  the  various  methods 
that  are  used  in  attempting  to  solve  philosophical  problems. 
But,  since  these  methods  present  problems  of  their  own,  we 
shall  have  problems  of  method,  in  addition  to  problems  of  points 
of  view,  of  ontology,  cosmology,  epistemology,  and  the  like.  The 
methods  to  be  examined  will,  however,  not  be  limited  to  those 
that  are  correct,  but  will  also  include  those  which,  though  un- 
sound, have,  nevertheless,  been  frequently  employed  to  solve 
certain  problems  which  have  arisen  in  the  development  of  certain 
historical  systems  of  philosophy. 

II.   THE   THINKING    SITUATION  ^ 

It  is  an  important,  although  rather  obvious  fact,  that  all 
philosophical    systems,    whatever    their    differences,    must    use 

'Compare  with  the  account  that  follows:  E.  B.  LeRoy,  La  Langue, 
1905;  H.  Odier,  Essai  d' Analyse  Psych,  du  Mechanisme  du  Langdge  dans 
la  Comprehension,  1905:  H.  Steinthal,  Einleitung  in  die  Psychologic  und 
Sprachivissenschaft,  1881;  W.  Wundt,  Sprachgeschichte  und  kiprachpsy- 
chologie,  1901 ;  B.  Erdmann,  Psychologische  Untersuchurtgen  iiber  das 
Lesen,  1898;  G.  VVolil',  Psychologic  des  Erkennens,  1S97;  A.  Binet,  Psy- 
chology of  Reasoning,  1912;  F.  Brentano,  Psychologic  vom  empirischen 
Standpunkte ;  K.  8.  Woodworth,  "  Non-Sensorj'  Components  of  Sense  Percep- 
tion," Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  IV.:  also,  "  Image- 
less  Thought,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  III.,  1906; 
and  "  The  Consciousness  of  Relation  "  in  Essays  Philosophical  and  Psycho- 
logical, in  Honor  of  Wm.  James,  1908;  James,  Principles  of  Psychology, 
Vol.  1.,  p.  243  ff.;   J.  K.  Angell,  "Thought  and  Imagery,"  Phil.  Review, 

95 


g6  METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

words  in  their  processes  of  reasoning,  since  they  are  argued 
about  and  defended,  and  are  thus  presented  for  our  acceptance 
as  true.  This  is  the  case  even  in  such  an  extreme  position  as 
mysticism,  where,  it  is  claimed,  intuition  and  ecstasy  reveal 
certain  facts  which  reason  cannot  apprehend.  When  rationally 
defended,  even  such  a  position  is  reasoned  about  by  the  use  of 
words,  and  thus  the  possibility  that  reason  can  discover  at  least 
some  facts  is  presupposed.  The  problem  as  to  what  is  involved 
in  reasoning  by  the  use  of  words,  or  of  some  kind  of  symbols, 
is,  therefore,  a  general  problem  of  method  that  concerns  all 
philosophical  systems  in  one  way  or  another,  and  all  philosophiz- 
ing to  some  degree. 

Common  also  to  all  philosophizing  is  the  method  of  examining 
the  "world"  about  us  by  some  mode  of  approach,  i.e.,  either  by 
the  senses,  or  by  some  other  mode.  But  different  individuals 
accept  different  methods  of  approach,  and  the  regarding  of 
anything  as  fact  is  made  dependent  on  that  which  is  antecedently 
regarded  as  the  correct  approach.  For  example,  the  mystic 
regards  intuition  as  the  one  correct  method,  and  so  holds  that 
all-adsorbing  miity  which  this  approach  reveals,  to  be  the  im- 
portant fact,  while  the  intellectualist  finds  that  analysis  and 
reasoning  are  correct  approaches,  and  that  plurality  and  differ- 
ences are  quite  as  much  facts  as  is  unity. 

Thus,  in  all  philosophizing  and  in  all  philosophical  systems 
there  are  ttvo  methods,  the  one,  that  of  reasoning  by  words  and 
other  symbols,  the  other,  that  of  observing  in  some  way,  both 
of  which  are  accepted  and  used,  and  freely  allowed  to  supple- 
ment each  other.  Of  these  the  former  will  be  first  considered, 
since  it  is  that  method  to  which  we  are  of  necessity  committed 
in  our  endeavor  to  investigate  philosophical  problems,  methods, 
and  systems. 

III.    THE  PSYCHOLOGY   OF   THINKING;   SYMBOLS 

Words  are  by  themselves  only  physical  objects,  i.e.,  they  are 
either  printed  or  written  marks,  or,  as  spoken  words,  waves  of 
air.     These  objects  are  words  in  the  usual  sense  by  virtue  of 

Vol.  VI.,  1897;  E.  B.  Titcliener,  Eaperimental  Psychology  of  the  Thought 
Processes,  1!)09;  VV.  B.  rillsbury,  The  Psychology  of  Reasoning,  1910; 
J.  JJewey,  IJoio  We  Think;  B.  Erdmann,  "  Umrissc  zur  Psycholofjie  des 
Denkena,"  in  Phil.  Abh.  Chr.  Bigioart  zu  seinem  lOten  Oehurtstage,  1900, 
pp.  3-40. 


REASONING  BY  WORDS  97 

being  associated  with  certain  specific  mental  processes,  namely, 
with  those  which  reveal  the  objects  or  "things"  that  are  experi- 
enced when  these  mental  processes  are  taking  place.  The 
physical  words  are,  then,  symbols  for  these  objects  or  "things." 
It  results,  that  when  one  perceives  or  thinks  of  certain  specific 
marks  or  sounds  that  are  word-symbols,  one  also  tends  to  be 
conscious  of  the  objects  for  which  the  symbols  stand,  i.e.,  to  be 
conscious  of  their  meaning.  This  "meaning"  consciousness, 
therefore,  and  the  consciousness  of  the  words  as  such,  become 
associated,  and  thereafter,  each  tends  to  "arouse"  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  other.  But  further,  the  consciousness  of  a  meaning, 
once  aroused,  arouses  the  consciousness  of  other  meanings,  and 
so  on,  at  the  same  time  that  the  consciousness  of  the  words  for 
these  "things"  is  aroused,  and  there  then  occurs  a  series  of 
word-images,  the  earlier  images  suggesting  later  ones.  Accord- 
ingly, when  we  read  or  hear  words,  these  suggest  or  arouse  the 
appropriate  meanings,  and  when  we  think  quietly,  or  speak,  the 
meanings  seem  to  come  slightly  ahead  of  the  words,  and  to 
suggest  them. 

Three  aspects,  therefore,  are  to  be  distinguished  in  the  situa- 
tion presented  by  the  use  and  meaning  of  words.  There  is 
(1)  the  psychological  aspect,  Avhieh  concerns  the  consciousness 
both  of  the  word-symbols  and  of  the  objects  and  meanings  with 
which  they  are  associated;  (2)  the  grammatical  aspect,  and, 
(3)  the  logical  aspect,  which  merges  into  the  grammatical,  and 
conversely.  These  last  two  aspects  are,  of  course,  also  most 
intimately  connected  with  the  first  aspect,  since  logical  and 
grammatical  facts  are  known  and  have  word-symbols  associated 
with  them. 

The  psychological  processes  with  w^hich  we  are  concerned  are 
classified  as  follows :  Consciousness,  or  psychic  or  mental  process, 
is  the  genus,  and  its  three  main  subdivisions  are:  cognition, 
emotion,  and  volition,  or,  using  synonyms,  knowing,  feeling, 
and  willing.  The  meaning  of  each  of  these  is  sufficiently  well 
known  to  the  reader  not  to  demand  a  discussion.  Knowing  may, 
however,  he  defined  as  awareness. 

Cognition  is  in  turn  classifiable  into  its  specific  kinds,  namely, 
sense  perception,  memory,  imagination,  and  conception,  and 
there  are,  in  turn,  as  many  kinds  of  each  of  these  processes  as 


98  METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

there  are  specifically  different  senses,  namely,  sight,  hearing, 
"equilibrium,"  touch,  taste,  smell,  and  the  "heat,"  "cold," 
"muscular,"  and  "organic"  senses.  This  means  that,  with  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  sense  perception,  also  memory-,  imagination-, 
and  conception-processes  can  take  place  in  terms  of  each  sense, 
although  vision,  hearing,  touch,  and  muscularity  are  the 
dominant  senses. 

There  are  also  processes  of  self-perception,  or  of  introspec- 
tion, that  do  not  take  place  through  the  medium  of  the  special 
sense  organs.  In  this  process  of  self-perception  we  become 
aware  that  we  are  perceiving,  remembering,  imagining,  con- 
ceiving, willing,  having  emotions,  and  the  like.  Thus  self- 
perception  also  furnishes  material  or  content  for  subsequent 
processes  of  memory,  imagination,  and  reasoning. 

This  classification  of  cognitive  processes  means  that  all  sorts 
of  entities,  such  as  things,  qualities,  events,  and  relations,  can 
be  perceived,  remembered,  imagined,  conceived,  judged,  and 
reasoned  about.  Some  of  these  entities  are  physical,  others  are 
mental,  while  still  others  belong  to  neither  of  these  two  classes. 
Among  these  non-physical  and  non-mental  entities  are  terms, 
qualities,  relations,  and  perhaps  also  events,  luhich  our  reason 
shows  us  would  still  he  facts,  even  if  all  physical  and  mental 
entities  were  annihilated.  A  good  example  of  such  entities, 
which  may  be  called  (non-existent)  subsist ents,  are  the  positive 
integers,  1,  2,  3,  n  —  1,  n,  n  -f- 1, — not  these  physical  marks,  of 
course, — hut  that  which  these  signs  symbolize,  and  that  which  is 
presupposed,  biit  not  made  by  counting. 

Written,  printed,  and  spoken  words  are  used  as  symbols  or 
signs  by  which  to  indicate  both  specific  individuals  and  specific 
classes  of  individuals,  and  classes  of  these  classes,  and  so  on. 
To  illustrate  this,  and  at  the  same  time  to  give  examples  of 
some  of  these  classes  of  entities,  the  reader's  attention  may  be 
called  to  the  fact  that  he  can  now  experience,  by  introspection, 
a  series  of  (existent)  mental  processes  as  he  visually  perceives 
these  very  words  (physical  existents).  Thus  his  experience  is 
at  least  twofold.  However,  words  or  symbols  that  are  used  in 
reasoning  can  be  known  in  any  one  of  the  several  cognitive 
processes,  and  not  alone  in  sense  perception;  i.e.,  there  are 
remembered,   imagined,   and   conceived,   as   well   as  perceived 


REASONING  BY  WORDS  99 

words.  Words  read  are  visually  perceived,  and  words  heard  are 
perceived  in  hearing.  But  tvJien  we  reason  in  order  to  write  or 
speak,  we  tend  to  formulate  our  thoughts  in  words  that  are 
conceived,  though,  as  ive  ivrite  or  speak,  and  see  and  hear,  there 
are  also  perceived  words.  But  any  kind  of  a  word  can  be 
associated  with  any  particular  object  or  class  of  objects  that  is 
brought  to  our  knowledge  in  any  way  whatsoever.  Thus  we 
have  words  not  only  for  what  we  perceive  in  sensation  and  in 
terms  of  sensation,  but  also  for  what  is  revealed  in  our  reasoning 
processes  and  in  our  emotions  and  acts  of  will. 

IV.   GRAMMAR 

The  differences  among  the  entities  that  we  perceive,  remember, 
imagine,  and  get  at  by  reason,  or  become  aware  of  emotionally, 
as  in  cesthetic  and  moral  feeling,  and  the  like,  receive  a  certain 
recognition  in  the  grammatical  distinctions  and  differences  of 
language.  Thus,  nouns  for  the  most  part  symbolize  ''things" 
and  qualities;  verbs,  prepositions,  and  conjunctions  symbolize 
events  and  relations;  and  adjectives  and  adverbs,  qualities  or 
attributes.  The  grammatical  structure  of  sentences  also  ex- 
presses and  reveals  to  a  certain  extent  the  relations  between  and 
among  the  entities  to  which  our  judgments,  as  psychological, 
knowing  processes,  are  directed.  In  general,  grammatical  dif- 
ferences correspond  to  objective  characteristics  of  the  entities 
that  are  symbolized  b}^  the  words,  and  that  are  known  in  the 
judgment  which  is  verbally  formulated. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  LOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  THINKING 
INTERPRETATIONS  OF  THE  NATURE  OF  LOGIC 

We  use  our  senses  to  perceive,  we  remember,  we  have  emo- 
tions, and  we  describe  what  is  thus  revealed  to  us,  but  sometimes 
we  do  more  than  this.  We  reason  about  "things."  It  is  a  most 
important  question,  then,  to  ask,  What  is  it,  when  we  reason,  by 


100         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

virtue  of  tvhich  we  are  enabled  to  do  this?  or,  Just  what  do  w& 
do  when  ive  reason? 

As  at  least  a  tentative  answer  to  this  second  question  it  may 
be  said,  that  to  reason  is  to  infer,  or  to  learn  from  something 
that  is  known,  something  that  was  previously  unknown.  To 
reason  may  also  mean  to  systematize,  and  to  ''put"  many 
"things"  together  consistently,  as  is  done,  e.g.,  in  any  science, 
though  to  do  this  seemingly  demands  reason  in  the  former 
sense. 

But  the  first  question  is  more  important  for  our  purposes 
than  the  second,  which  concerns  only  the  psychological  char- 
acter of  reasoning.  What  is  it  in  or  among  the  entities  that 
we  reason  about  that  enables  us  to  infer?  The  answers  given  to 
this  question  have  been  both  varied  and  involved.  Among  them 
three  principal  tendencies  are  distinguishable,  namely,  the 
realistic,  the  psychological,  and  the  pragmatic.  These  are  the 
three  main  views  as  to  the  nature  of  logical  principles  and 
entities.  All  three  agree  that  we  reason  by  using  in  some  way 
the  peculiar,  interesting,  and  very  important  relation  of  implica- 
tion, but  they  differ  in  their  interpretation  of  the  nature  and 
locus  of  this  relation. 

I.   THE  REALISTIC  VIEW  OP  LOGIC 

According  to  the  realistic  view,  implication  is  a  relation  that 
is  objective  in  the  sense  that,  although  related  to,  it  is  inde- 
pendent of,  the  reasoning  process  that  is,  in  part  at  least,  an 
awareness  of  it.  Just  as  there  are  relations  of  similarity,  of 
difference,  and  of  whole  and  part,  so  also,  it  is  held,  there  are 
relations  of  implication,  or  of  the  non-causal,  yet  necessary  con- 
nection between  "things."  By  discovering  and  making  use  of 
these  relations  in  specific  instances,  we  discover  other  relations, 
and  from  certain  entities,  other  entities} 

Just  what  all  the  typical  situations  are  that  present  the  rela- 
tionship of  implication,  is  difficult  to  determine,  but  the  follow- 
ing is  a  simple  illustration  of  one  such  situation:  Among  the 
entities  that  are  discoverable  in  this  universe  of  many  entities 
are  relations,  as  has  already  been  emphasized.  Instances  of 
relations  are  "father  of,"  "equal  to,"  and  "precedes."     If, 

'  See  Chap.  XLI. 


THE  LOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  THINKING  101 

now,  the  terms  that  are  related  are  symbolized  by  a,  h,  c,  etc., 
then  we  can  have  the  relational  complexes,  respectively,  a  the 
father  of  h,  a  equals  h,  and  a  precedes  h.  However,  it  would 
seem  that  none  of  these  relations  subsists  without,  in  each  case, 
another  and  distinct  relation  also  subsisting,  this  other  relation 
being  the  inverse,  or  what  is  sometimes  called  the  converse  of 
the  original.  But  at  the  same  time  that  this  inverse  relation  is 
distinct  from  the  original  relation,  it  is  also  necessitated  by  it, 
though  not  in  a  causal,  but  in  a  logical  manner.  This  specific 
logical  necessity  is  an  instance  of  implication.  Thus,  in  the  case 
of  one  of  our  examples,  "father  of  implies  or  necessitates  the 
inverse  relation,  "child  of,"  and  these  two  relations  are  not 
identical.  So  also  a  =  b  implies  that  h  =^  a,  and  "a  precedes 
b"  implies  that  "ft  follows  a."  In  general  we  may  say  that 
every  relation  implies  its  inverse  or  converse.' 

This  being  so,  we  have  a  most  interesting  situation.  The 
proposition  just  stated  means  that,  with  the  original  relation 
aBh  given,  there  is  of  necessity  the  inverse  relation,  hRa.  But 
this  means  that  aRb  and  bRa  are  themselves  related  both  by 
implication  and  by  "inverseness."  Then,  if  the  proposition 
above  stated  is  correct,  each  of  these  relations  also  implies  its 
own  inverse.  But  this  is  precisely  what  we  find.  The  relation 
of  implication  that  subsists  in  that  aRb  implies  bRa,  itself 
implies  the  inverse,  namely,  that  "bRa  implies  aRb,  i.e.,  "aRb 
implies  hRa"  itself  implies  "bRa  implies  aRb.'* 

This  situation  need  not  be  analyzed  further  for  our  purposes, 
for  the  analysis  thus  far  made  discloses  the  fact,  both  that  the 
relation  of  implication  subsists  in  the  midst  of,  or  side  by  side 
with,  or  on  the  basis  of,  other  relations,  perhaps  of  very  specific 
ones,  and  also  that  it  is  itself  a  basis  for  still  further  relations. 

Another  situation  in  which  we  find  the  relation  of  implication 
cosubsisting  with  other  relations  is  one  that  is  identical  with 
the  orthodox  categorical  syllogism  of  the  Aristotelian  formal 
logic." 

The  traditional  logic  of  Aristotle  is  essentially  the  logic  of 
classes.  A  class  subsists  by  virtue  of  the  relation  of  similarity, 
together  with,  in  most  cases,  that  of  difference  among  entities, 
and  quite  independently  of  their  order.     This  is  quite  evident 

=■  Cf.  Chap.  XXVII.  '  Cf.  Chap.  XIV. 


102         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

when  we  consider  simple  examples  such  as  the  two  classes, 
men  and  vertebrates.  Any  one  individual  of  the  class  is  in  the 
relation  to  the  class  of  being  ''a  member  of"  it.  But  classes 
are  themselves  related  by  complete,  partial,  and  negative  inclu- 
sion (i.e.,  exclusion).  Thus,  to  illustrate,  all  mew  are  included 
in  the  larger  class  vertebrates,  but  the  class  vertebrates  is  only 
partially  included  in  the  class  men,  and,  finally,  the  whole  class 
vertebrates  is  excluded  from  the  whole  class  triangles.  Such 
relations  of  similarity,  difference,  member  of,  and  inclusion, 
positive  and  negative,  between  entities  are,  now,  propositions, 
or  objective  ''state  of  affairs,"  and  the  knowledge  of  such  rela- 
tional complexes  is  in  each  ease  a  judgment. 

One  and  the  same  class,  further,  can  be  in  one  relation  to  one 
class,  and  in  another  relation  to  another  class.  Thus  the  class 
vertebrates  includes  the  class  men,  but  is  included  in  the  class 
living  beings.  With  this  specific  state  of  affairs  subsisting,  there 
also  subsists  of  necessity  the  relation  of  inclusion  of  the  class, 
meyi,  by  the  class,  animals.  This  relation  is  numerically  distinct 
from  the  other  two  relations  of  inclusion,  namely,  of  men  in 
vertebrates,  and  of  vertebrates  in  animals,  yet  it  is  related  to 
them.  It  is,  first,  similar  to,  and,  second,  implied  by  them. 
Thus  we  have  another  case  of  the  relation  of  implication  "resting 
on"  other  relations  between  terms  (in  this  case  those  of  in- 
clusion), and  of  still  another  relation  or  relational  complex 
resting  on  it.  In  the  example  just  given,  if  we  let  S  symbolize 
the  class  (all)  men,  M  the  class  (all)  vertebrates,  P  the  class 
(all)  living  beings,  <  the  relation  ''included  in,"  and  )  the 
relation  of  implication,  then  we  have  S  <.  M  and  M  <  P,  ) 
8  <  P.  This  relational  situation  holds  good  for  any  classes, 
8,  M,  P,  that  are  related  to  one  another  as  are  the  classes,  men, 
vertebrates,  and  animals. 

In  a  very  similar  way  the  relation  of  complete  exclusion  of 
a  class  8  from  a  class  P  is  implied  by  the  two  relations  (1)  of 
the  complete  inclusion  of  the  class  8  by  M,  and  (2)  of  the  com- 
plete exclusion  of  31  from  P.  Thus,  to  illustrate,  if  all  proposi- 
tions are  included  in  the  class  of  analyzable  entities,  and  all 
analyzable  entities  are  completely  excluded  from  the  class  of 
simple  entities,  it  is  implied,  that  all  propositions  are  excluded 
from  the  class  of  simple  entities. 


THE  LOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  THINKING  103 

Other  instances  of  the  relation  of  inclusion,  complete,  partial, 
or  negative,  between  two  classes  ''at  a  time,"  are  discoverable, 
and  the  several  relational  complexes  that  thereby  subsist,  taken 
in  pairs  as  premises  together  with  the  propositions  which  they 
imply,  make  tip  the  several  moods  of  the  four  figures  of  the 
Aristotelian  categorical  syllogism.  The  detailed  examination  of 
these  moods  and  figures  may  be  found  in  any  text-book  on  logic, 
and  need  not  be  presented  here. 

There  are  a  number  of  other,  perhaps  many  other  situations 
in  which  the  relation  of  implication  is  present.  But  the  instances 
given  will,  it  is  hoped,  make  clear  what  the  realistic  position 
is  in  regard  to  the  problem  of  what  it  is  (in  the  situation  rea- 
soned about)  that  enables  us  to  reason,  or  that  we  discover  and 
become  aware  of  when  we  reason.  The  solution  of  this  problem 
is,  that,  just  as  there  are  "things,"  qualities,  events,  and  such 
relations  as  membership  in,  similarity,  and  inclusion,  so  also  is 
there  the  relation  of  implication,  which,  if  the  former  entities 
are  objective  and  discoverable,  is  also  of  this  same  character.* 

There  are  many  further  questions,  some  of  them  of  extreme 
interest,  concerning  the  problem  of  implication.  Thus,  if  cer- 
tain relations  are  implied  by  others,  which  we  find  to  be  the 
ease,  then  it  may  be  asked,  whether  implication  is  itself  implied, 
or  whether  it  merely  occurs  as  one  among  many  relations,  i.e.,  as 
one  that  accompanies,  but  is  not  necessitated  by  other  relations. 
The  writer  is  strongly  convinced  that  the  second  alternative  is 
the  ease. 

Although  all  the  circumstances  that  surround  and  perhaps 
condition  implication  may  be  difficult  to  discover,  nevertheless 
the  realist  holds  that  to  reason  correctly,  even  in  the  study  of 
the  reasoning  situation  itself,  is  to  discover  (objective)  relations 
of  implication  that  are  independent  of  the  reasoning  process, 
though    related    to    it.      For    example,    there    are    i7idividual 

*  The  problem  of  the  nature  of  implication,  the  circumstances  of  its 
occurrence,  etc.,  have  not  as  yet  been  given  much  attention  in  philosophical 
investigation,  although  Russell  has  dealt  with  it  somewhat  in  his  Principles 
of  Mathematics.  The  objective  view  here  presented  agrees,  e.g.,  with  that 
of  G.  E  Moore  in  his  article,  "  The  Nature  of  Judgment,"  Mind,  N.  S., 
Vol.  VIII.,  p.  177  ff.,  and  is  accepted,  I  believe,  by  all  realists.  Cf.,  also, 
on  the  realistic  interpretation  of  logic  and  a  criticism  of  the  psychological 
and  pragmatic  tendencies,  Husserl,  Logische  Untersuchungen,  especially 
Vol.  1.,  1900,  and  Vol.  II.,  1901. 


104.         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

"things,"  that,  through  the  relations  of  similarity  and  differ- 
ence, form  distinct  classes.  Then  there  are  also  the  objective 
states  of  affairs  of  both  similarity  and  difference.  But  in  turn 
there  are  classes  that  are  related  to  one  another  by  inclusion, 
i.e.,  if  A,  B,  and  C  are  classes,  and  <  symbolizes  the  relation  of 
inclusion,  A  <  B,  and  B  <.  C.  Then,  discovering  and  following 
the  "threads"  of  implication,  we  discover  that  A  <.C.  This 
is  typical  of  that  situation  which  is  present  when  we  reason 
by  what  is  called  the  categorical  syllogism. 

The  categorical  syllogism,  however,  is  not  the  only  technical 
method  of  reasoning.  There  are  also  other  methods,  which  will 
be  presented  later.  Yet  in  regard  to  all  of  them  the  realistic 
position  is  the  same.  Not  only  are  indiviO.ual  "things"  inde- 
pendent of  knowing,  but  relations  also  are,  not  excepting  those 
relations  of  implication  which  must  be  discovered  when  we 
reason  and  reason  correctly,  and  by  the  discovery  of  which  we 
are  enabled  to  ascertain  from  certain  facts  other  facts  that  are 
necessitated  by  the  facts  from  which  we  started. 

Indeed  it  is  precisely  this  objective  point  of  view  that  is  at 
least  tacitly  accepted  by  every  philosopher  when  he  reasons  in 
order  to  philosophize.  Every  philosopher  aims  to  arrive  at  or 
to  discover  "large"  general  facts  or  states  of  affairs  that  are 
quite  independent  of  his  own  or  anybody  else's  knowing  proc- 
esses ;  and  in  presenting  his  philosophy  for  acceptance,  he  tacitly 
assumes  that  he  has  succeeded.  In  this  respect  every  philosophy 
is  realistic. 

Eeason  may  not  be  the  only  "method"  by  which  facts  are 
revealed.  Sense  perception,  memory,  emotion,  and  intuition 
must  also  be  admitted  to  be  such  avenues  of  approach.  But 
reason  alone  is  that  method  by  which  these  other  methods  can 
be  examined,  and  a  conclusion  as  to  their  reliability  and  char- 
acter be  obtained.  Also  it  is  reason  alone  that  can  thus  examine 
itself.  Reason  is,  then,  the  court  of  last  resort.  Indeed  it  is 
accepted  as  such  even  by  those  philosophers  who  write  books 
in  advocacy  of  anti-rational  positions.  Thus,  e.g.,  the  mysticism 
of  a  philosopher  like  Bergson  can  he  ratio)ially  supported  only 
by  intellectual  methods. 

The  foregoing  analysis  presents  the  realistic  view  of  that 
situation  which  is  involved  in  any  attempt  to  reason  and  to 


THE  LOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  THINKING  105 

philosophize  hy  the  use  of  words.  Words  are  the  conventional 
instrument  for  this  thinking,  and  for  testing  its  correctness  by 
communication  with  others.  But  that  for  which  certain  words 
and  phrases  are  the  signs  is  not  the  concrete  individuals,  nor 
the  consciousness  of  these,  but  the  various  and  diverse  states  of 
affairs  that  hold  of  these  individuals.  Certain  of  these  states 
of  affairs  are  logical,  or  involve  logical  entities,  including  im- 
plication, and  when  these  are  discovered,  the  way  is  clear  to 
discover  other  "things"  or  entities. 

II.   THE  PSYCHOLOGIZING   TENDENCY 

The  realistic  position,  that  logical  entities  are  objective  and 
independent  of  reasoning  processes  is,  however,  not  accepted 
by  every  one.     It  is  certainly  not  the  traditional  view. 

The  traditional  logic  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  logic  of  classes, 
of  things,  and  of  qualities.  In  it  the  paramount  "principles" 
are  those  of  identity  and  of  contradiction,  and  these  are  made 
"laws  of  thought,"  or  psychological  and  subjective  principles. 
To  make  this  statement  clear,  let  us  consider,  e.g.,  the  proposi- 
tion, a  stone  is  hard,  i.e.,  all  stones  are  hard.  But  there  are  also 
other  hard  things  than  stones.  Our  proposition  would  seem  to 
mean,  then,  that  a  certain  class,  stones,  are,  as  a  whole,  included 
in,  or  identical  with  a  certain  part  of,  a  larger  class,  hard  things. 
In  both  cases,  now,  the  principle  of  identity  appears.  There  is 
an  identity  of  "extension"  between  stones  and  a  certain  specific 
part  of  the  class,  hard  things,  and,  also,  hardness  is  (identical 
with)  a  quality  of  stones. 

Now  in  accordance  with  the  teachings  of  the  traditional  logic 
it  is  impossible  to  reason  without  presupposing  and  using  the 
principle  of  identity  in  both  of  these  senses.  Thus,  whether 
we  start  with  the  proposition,  "hard  things  are  not  mental," 
or  with  "hard  things  are  physical,"  and  from  these  and  the 
proposition,  "stones  are  hard  things,"  conclude  that  stones  are 
not  mental,  but  physical,  we  are  presupposing  and  using  iden- 
tity in  both  of  the  senses  just  mentioned. 

Yet  that  the  principle  of  identity  is  not  only  presupposed  in 
such  instances  but  also  that  it  is  a  law  of  our  thinking,  i.e.,  that 
it  is  a  psychological  and  subjective  law,  is  the  traditional  logical 


106         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

doctrine  that  is  reached  by  the  following  argument,  used  either 
implicitly  or  explictly. 

Thinking  is  held  to  be  specifically  different  from  other  entities, 
or  to  be  sui  genesis  in  at  least  some  aspects,  and  thus  to  have 
a  "nature"  peculiar  to  itself.  The  proposition  is  then  main- 
tained as  self-evident,  that  thinking  cannot  act  in  contradiction 
to  this  "nature,"  but  must  act  in  agreement  with  it.  A  similar 
argument  could,  of  course,  be  made  for  almost  any  entity,  e.g., 
for  electricity.  The  next  question  accordingly  is,  what  those 
laws  are  which,  when  thinking  acts  in  accordance  with  them, 
"fulfil"  and  reveal  its  nature?  This  question  is  answered  by 
finding  what  laws  thinking  must  follow,  whether  it  will  or  no, 
since,  if  it  can  be  shown  that  there  are  certain  laws  that  thinking 
must  follow,  this  necessity  can  be  accounted  for  by  the  hypothesis, 
that  such  laws  are  resident  in  the  thinking  process  itself,  and 
"make  up"  that  nature  in  agreement  with  which  thinking  must 
act. 

But,  what  laws  thinking  must  follow  is  ascertained  by  finding 
what  laivs  or  principles  are  such  either  that  their  opposite 
cannot  be  conceived  or  thought,  or  that  they  are  presupposed 
by  their  own  (attempted)  denial.^  By  applying  these  tests, 
the  conclusion  is  reached,  that  such  laws  must  be  used,  when 
we  think,  indeed  even  when  we  endeavor  to  think  without  them, 
hecause  they  are  laivs  of  thinking. 

This  is  the  argument  that  is  used,  either  tacitly  or  explicitly, 
in  the  traditional  logic  in  order  to  show  that  not  only  the  law 
of  identity,  but  also  the  laws  of  contradiction  and  of  excluded 
middle  are  "laws  of  thought,"  i.e.,  laws  of  a  psychological 
process. 

We  may  now  examine  the  application  of  this  argument  to 
each  of  these  laws,  at  the  same  time  that  we  give  each  law 
a  formulation. 

The  Law  of  Identity.  Even  in  the  endeavor  to  think  without 
/it,  the  principle  is  used,  (1)  that  each  entity  is  identical  with 
itself,  i.e.,  that  it  is  that  particular  entity  and  not  any  other, 
and  (2)  that  it  retains  its  peculiar  character  and  its  indi- 
viduality. 

The  Law  of  Contradiction.  Even  in  the  attempt  to  think 
"  See  Chap.  XV.,  iv.,  5,  6,  7. 


THE  LOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  THINKING  107 

without  it,  the  principle  is  used  (1)  that  each  entity  cannot  be 
both  that  entity  and  not  that  entity,  and  (2)  that  it  cannot  both 
belong  and  not  belong  to  a  specific  class,  either  as  an  individual 
member  or  as  itself  a  class.  The  first  formulation  of  the  prin- 
ciple is  but  a  restatement  of  the  law  of  identity  as  the  principle 
of  the  individuality  of  each  entity,  even  where,  as  in  the  class 
of  the  points  of  space,  all  individuals  seem  to  be  qualitatively 
alike.  The  principle,  in  this  sense,  does  not  mean,  however, 
that  one  and  the  same  entity  cannot  be  in  two  relational  com- 
plexes at  once.  For  that  an  entity  can  have  such  a  dual  rela- 
tionship is  exemplified  by  a  point,  which,  as  the  apex  of  an 
angle,  is  a  member  of  the  two  lines  that  form  the  angle.  The 
principle  of  contradiction  may  be  illustrated  by  that  proposition 
which  concerns  it,  namely,  that  it  itself  cannot  he  both  a 
{psychological)  law  of  thought  a7id  not  such  a  law. 

The  Law  of  Excluded  Middle.  Even  in  the  endeavor  to  think 
without  it,  the  principle  is  used  (1)  that  each  entity,  either  as 
an  individual  or  as  a  class,  must  belong  either  to  a  class,  A, 
or  to  that  contradictory  class,  non-A,  which  logically  includes 
everything  that  the  other  class  does  not  include.  Thus,  any 
logical  principle  must  be  either  a  (psychological)  law  of  thought 
or  not  such  a  law. 

This  position  that  certain  logical  principles  are  laws  of 
thought,  or  of  mind,  or  of  psychical  processes,  is  well  called 
**the  psychologizing  tendency."*^  Its  consistent  outcome  is,  on 
the  one  hand,  that  all  logical  principles  are  subjective  or  mental, 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  that  which  shall  be  regarded  as 
logical  is  determined  by  finding  what  principles  (1)  are  pre- 
supposed by  the  very  endeavor  to  think  without  them,  or  (2) 
are  of  such  a  character  that  their  opposites  cannot  be  conceived, 
or  (3)  are,  perhaps,  also  self-evident.  Historically,  as  this 
tendency  has  developed,  a  numerically  single  "transcendental 
ego,"  and  also  such  "concepts"  as  quantify,  quality,  relation, 
causation,  substance  and  attribute,  possibility,  actuality,  neces- 
sity, unity,  plurality,  totality,  positive,  negative,  and  even  time 
and  space,  have  been  "found"  to  be  such  logical  principles. 
This  is  notably  the  case  in  the  Kantian  philosophy  and  tradi- 
tion, in  which  some  of  these  "concepts"  are  called  "categories." 

'  See  Husserl,  op.  cit.,  for  a  criticism  of  this  tendency. 


108  METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

The  argument  has  been,  that  one  must  think  in  accordance  with 
some  one,  or  a  number  of  these ;  that  the  very  attempt  not  to  do 
so  but  reveals  the  compulsion  to  do  it;  and,  therefore,  that  this 
compulsion  is  to  be  explained  alone  by  the  hypothesis,  that  these 
"concepts"  are  principles  of  thinking.'' 

The  sharp  difference  between  this  psychologizing  tendency 
and  the  opposed  realistic  position  may  be  brought  out  by  con- 
sidering certain  consequences  of  the  former  position.  The 
critical  examination  of  the  traditional  development  in  philosophy 
shows,  as  we  have  already  found,  that  there  has  been  a  strong 
tendency  to  use  the  principle,  that  all  entities,  because  they  are 
related  in  any  way,  are  also  causally  related.  This  principle  is, 
therefore,  applied  to  the  fact  of  the  relation  between  knowing 
and  that  which  is  known.  If,  now,  this  knowing  has  a  nature 
that  consists  of  laws  of  thought,  categories,  and  the  like,  then 
those  ways  in  which  knowing  will  affect  the  entities  that  are 
known  will  be  just  these  laws  and  categories.  It  follows,  that, 
given  an  indeterminate  "something,"  an  x,  to  he  known,  this 
X  will,  as  known,  bear  the  "stamp"  of  these  laws  and  cate- 
gories, and  any  attempt  to  know  an  entity  without  this  * '  stamp ' ' 
will  be  self-defeating. 

In  the  psychologizing  tendency,  therefore,  logical  principles 
and  entities  are  "made"  subjective  or  psychical  entities  that 
are  attributes  of  and  that  inhere  in  the  knowing  mind,  and  that 
also  are  wholly  absent  from  the  realm  of  unknown  x's,  but  that 
nevertheless  appear  to  be  in  the  realm  of  known  "things"  be- 
cause they  are  "read  into"  that  realm  by  the  causal  influence 
of  the  knowing  on  that  which  is  (to  be)  known.    This  philosophy 

'  Aristotle  himself  would  seem  to  have  accepted  the  realistic  interpreta- 
tion of  the  proposition  and  the  syllogism  and,  also,  of  logic.  In  the 
assertion  of  a  proposition  he  recognized  two  aspects,  a  subjective  and  an 
objective.  In  the  subjective  there  is  revealed  the  speaker's  belief  or  dis- 
belief; in  the  objective  the  "state  of  affairs"  to  which  such  belief  or 
disbelief  corresponds.  See  De  Interpretatione,  p.  23,  a  32;  p.  24,  b  1; 
p.  17,  a  22.  The  later  subjectivistic  and  psychological  view  seems  to  have 
grown  up  in  the  tradition  because  of  some  lack  of  clearness  in  Aristotle's 
own  mind,  and  because  of  the  influence  of  the  "  thing "  and  "  substance 
concepts."  This  view  seems  to  have  been  held  in  modern  philosophy  by 
Descartes,  Spinoza,  Leibniz,  Kant,  Fichte,  Hegel,  and  by  most  writers  of 
current  text-books  on  logic.  The  germs  of  opposition  to  it  are  found  in 
Locke's  Sensationalism  and  Empiricism,  in  Berkeley's  Nominalism,  and  in 
Hume's  Positivism;  and  these  "germs"  came  to  their  full  development  in 
Pragmatism  and  Healism.     Cf.  the  later  chapters  on  these  positioua. 


THE  LOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  THINKING  109 

is  called  Phenomenalism.  Concerning  its  logical  genesis  it  is 
only  fair  to  say  that  the  assumption,  that  there  is  a  causal 
influence  of  knowing  on  the  thing  known,  while  it  is  made,  per- 
haps, quite  unawares,  is  due  to  the  influence  of  the  tradition 
that  comes  from  Aristotle. 

The  general  realistic  criticism  of  this  whole  position  is,  that, 
if  it  is  a  condition  of  genuine  knowing  that  "tilings  as  they 
are"  should  be  got  at,  then  (1)  the  act  of  knowing  cannot  alter 
the  "thing"  known,  and  (2)  all  categories  and  logical  principles 
must  subsist,  or  be  facts,  in  and  among  the  entities  known, 
whether  or  not  these  categories  and  principles  are  present  in 
the  knowing  process  itself.*  Indeed,  even  granting  that  there 
are  laws  or  principles  of  the  psychological  process  of  thinking, 
which  laws  this  process  follows,  nevertheless  these  same  princi- 
ples might  also  hold  of  other  entities,  such  as  physical  objects 
and  events,  numbers  and  space  and  time;  or,  it  might  be,  that 
certain  logical  principles  hold  only  of  these  other  "things," 
and  that,  accordingly,  reason  viust  follow  these  principles  be- 
cause, in  order  to  give  genuine  knowledge,  reason  must  conform 
to  "things."  In  fact,  that  reason  must  so  conform,  and  not 
project  itself  into  and  alter  those  entities  that  are  known  by  its 
means,  is  the  very  position  that  is  tacitly  assumed  by  the  ad- 
herent of  the  psychologizing  tendency,  when  he  reasons  about 
the  character  of  reason  in  general,  in  order  thereby  to  discover 
the  facts  concerning  this.^ 

III.    THE   PRAGMATIC   TENDENCY 

The  criticism  just  made  of  the  psychologizing  tendency  can 
also,  with  equal  justification,  be  directed  against  that  tendency 
which  has  recently  received  the  name  of  pragmatism. 

The  pragmatist  sets  out  to  study  the  function  and  develop- 
ment of  knowledge,  and,  within  this  field,  the  nature  of  logic. 
He  solves  the  problem  by  discovering  certain  "states  of  affairs" 
both  by  reasoning  and  by  other  methods,  and,  finally,  by  sys- 
tematizing and  unifying  his  results.  But  in  doing  all  this  he 
tacitly  grants  that  certain  states  of  affairs  imply  others,  and 

"  See  Chap.  II. 

•  Prominent  names  among  recent  writers  who  take  the  psychologizing 
position  in  logic  are:  Sigwart,  Bosanquet,  Ueberweg,  Wundt,  Creighton, 
Hibben. 


110    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

that,  in  the  whole  complex  state  of  affairs  which  his  own  prag- 
matic theory  presents,  implication,  identity,  unity,  consistency, 
and  the  like,  are  quite  objective  in  the  sense  that  they  are  not 
dependent  on  their  being  known,  and  also  are  not  invented  in 
the  sense  that  that  part  of  the  human  race  which  is  European 
in  its  culture  has  unconsciously  contrived  certain  means  of 
thinking,  or  has  formed  the  habit  of  thinking  in  certain  ways. 

This  is  the  position  that  the  pragmatist  takes  toward  his  own 
theory,  but  not  that  for  which  he  contends  explicitly  within  that 
theory  itself.  For,  according  to  the  detailed  theory  of  prag- 
matism, all  logic  is  either  a  mere  invention,  an  intellectual 
instrument  and  machine,  or  a  custom,  a  belief,  that  has  developed 
in  the  tradition,^^  but  in  either  case  something  that  is  useful 
as  an  adaptation  to  man's  environment.^^  Its  seeming  necessary 
character  is  accounted  for  by  the  argument,  that  we  cannot  get 
out  of  the  tradition  in  which  we  are  reared,  because  the  very 
attempt  to  do  this  is  itself  imbedded  in  the  tradition.  This 
implies  that,  had  the  tradition  or  the  original  invention  been 
different,  our  logic  would  also  be  different.  But  it  is  also 
argued,  that,  since  the  only  world  which  we  know  is  one  that 
is  affected  by  being  known  and,  therefore,  by  the  "nature"  of 
the  knowing,  our  present  (known)  world  is  made  in  part  by 
that  very  logic  which  forms  part  of  the  tradition.  Originally, 
and  even  now,  perhaps,  there  is  another  world,  amorphous  and 
plastic  and  quite  different  from  our  known  world.  And,  had 
another  logic  been  invented  and  grown  up  as  a  racial  habit,  then 
would  all  mankind  be  thinking  in  a  world  quite  different  from 
that  in  which  they  now  think  and  live.^" 

This  is  the  pragmatic  view  of  the  nature  of  logic  as  a  method 
or  as  a  set  of  principles  by  which  we  reason  and  investigate 
situations,  even  those  that  furnish  pragmatism  itself  with  its 
problems.  Clearly  this  view  has  many  resemblances  to  the 
psychologizing  tendency.  The  latter  regards  logical  principles 
as  laws  of  certain  psychological  processes;  the   former  inter- 

"  E.g.,  James,  Pragmatism,  Chap.  V.,  and  Schiller,  Riddles  of  the  Sphinx, 
Chap,  v.,  §§  !J-12. 

"  Dewey,  Studies  in  Logical  Theory,  1!)03,  and  James  and  Schiller,  ihid. 

'"  Schiller's  Humanism,  discussed  by  James  in  all  four  of  his  later 
volumes,  Pragmatism,  Meaning  of  Truth,  Pluralistic  Universe,  and  Some 
Problems  of  Philosophy. 


THE  LOGICAL  ASPECTS  OF  THINKING  111 

prets  these  principles  merely  as  something  which,  like  word- 
symbols,  beliefs,  and  superstitions,  are  arbitrary  and  contingent, 
and  are  handed  down  in  the  general  stream  of  social  transmis- 
sion from  generation  to  generation.  This  inheritance  is  con- 
ditioned chiefly  by  the  psychological  process  of  imitation,  while 
certain  principles  have  survived  and  have  been  transmitted  only 
because  of  their  usefulness.  This  usefulness  is,  indeed,  their 
truth  even  as  it  is  the  truth  also  of  every  principle,  hypothesis, 
law,  and  theory  that  survives  and  persists. 

In  further  criticism  of  this  pragmatic  view,  it  suffices  to  com- 
ment that,  if  logic  is  held  to  evolve  and  to  be  a  mere  adaptation 
together  with  other  "things"  like  eyes  and  hands  and  nervous 
systems,  and  perhaps  atoms  and  worlds  and  stars,  nevertheless 
everything  cannot  evolve.  The  priiiciples  of  evolution  cannot 
themselves  be  of  this  process.  It  is  quite  pertinent  to  ask,  then, 
whether  these  principles  may  not  themselves  be  in  part  logical. 
But  if  they  are,  then  the  universality  of  the  pragmatic  theory  is 
invalidated,  and  we  must  conclude  that  at  least  not  all  logic, 
and,  indeed,  perhaps  no  logical  principle  is  merely  an  evolving 
racial  instrument  and  habit. 


XL   THE  TRADITIONAL  TECHNICAL  METHODS  OF 
REASONING  ^ 

CHAPTER  XIV 

THE  CATEGORICAL  SYLLOGISM 

It  is  not  proposed  to  give  in  this  and  succeeding  chapters  a 
detailed  account  of  all  the  technical  methods  of  reasoning,  but 
to  present  only  certain  typical  methods.  All  the  methods  pre- 
sented will,  however,  be  understood  to  be  open  to  each  of  the 
three  interpretations  just  discussed,  although  the  writer  holds 
the  realistic  interpretation  to  be  alone  the  correct  one. 

^  A  complete  presentation  of  the  traditional  methods  will  be  found  in 
almost  any  text-book  on  Logic  as  well  as  in  such  larger  treatises  as 
Sigwart's  and  Bosanquet's. 


112  METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

One  very  common  method  of  reasoning  is  by  what  is  known 
as  the  categorical  syllogism.  This  method  should  be  presented 
and  analyzed,  since  it  is  one  by  which  much  philosophizing  is 
done,  as  is  illustrated  by  any  of  the  usual  arguments  for,  or 
defenses  of,  philosophical  positions.  In  making  this  presenta- 
tion the  distinctions  discovered  in  the  previous  analysis  of  the 
thinking  situation  should  be  borne  in  mind. 

A  typical  situation  in  which  a  categorical  syllogism  subsists 
is  illustrated  by  that  complex  state  of  affairs  in  which  (1)  the 
class  plants  is  included  (related  by  complete  inclusion)  in  the 
larger  class  living  beings,  and  (2)  roses  are  included  in  the  class 
plants,  so  that  (3)  they  are  also  of  necessity  included  in 
the  class  living  beings.  In  this  situation  there  are  present 
(1)  relations  of  similarity,  by  virtue  of  which  groups  of  indi- 
viduals form  respectively  the  classes,  roses,  plants,  and  living 
beings,  denoted  in  each  case  by  the  concept  of  the  class,  namely, 
rose,  plant,  and  living  being,  respectively.  (2)  Each  member 
of  each  class  is  related  to  that  class  as  ^'a  member  of"  it,  and 
the  class  as  a  ivhole,  i.e.,  the  state  of  similarity  of  its  members, 
is  a  fact  that  is  different  and  distinct  from  the  fact  of  each 
individual  member. 

Each  of  the  relational  complexes  involved  in  this  situation  is 
a  proposition,  but  that  complex  to  which  we  elect  to  give  our 
attention  at  this  point  is  that  which  is  generated  (3)  by  the 
relation  of  the  inclusion  of  one  class  in  another,  e.g.,  of  the 
class,  roses,  in  the  class,  plants. 

One  type  of  proposition  is,  therefore,  that  state  of  affairs  which 
is  identical  with  the  relationship  of  inclusion  of  one  class  in 
another. 

But  even  as  classes,  and  so,  also,  concepts  or  states  of  affairs 
that  hold  of  individuals,  are  related,  and,  as  related,  are  iden- 
tical with  one  type  of  proposition,  so,  in  turn,  (4)  are  these 
propositions  themselves  related ;  or,  as  the  situation  may  also 
be  stated,  one  class  may  be  related  to  another  class  as  including 
it,  and  to  still  another  class  as  being  included  by  it.  (5)  Such 
a  relational  complex  we  will  define  as  a  specific  type  of  the  cate- 
gorical syllogism.  Thus  we  have,  in  the  case  of  the 
example  given,  using  the  sign  <  to  mean  "are  included  in," 
roses   <   plants    <    living  beings.     But  7-oses    <    plants,  and 


THE  CATEGORICAL  SYLLOGISM       113 

plants  <  living  beings,  are  two  distinct  states  of  affairs.  They 
are  each  a  proposition.  Yet  together  they  necessitate  or  imply 
a  third  distinct  proposition,  iiamel}',  that  roses  <  living  beings. 

A  still  further  analysis  can  be  made  of  this  specific,  yet 
typical  situation.  The  printed  words,  "rose."  "plant,"  and 
"living  being"  are  symbols  or  signs  that  stand  for  concepts, 
the  concept  in  each  case  being  the  objective  state  of  affairs  that 
holds  of  all  those  individual  things  that  share  in  certain  specific 
characteristics.  Thus,  e.g.,  there  is  something  that  "holds  good" 
of  a  certain  group  of  objects  by  virtae  of  which  all  are  roses. 
This  something,  this  state  of  affairs,  is,  however,  not  itself  a 
rose,  but  it  is  a  concept  that  consists  of  a  number  of  character- 
istics which  are  familiar  to  all,  and  which  are  used  when  we 
recognize  a  flower  as  a  rose.  These  characteristics  form  the  con- 
notation or  intension  of  the  concept,  rose;  rose  connotes  them. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  individuals  of  which  the  concept  holds 
form  its  denotation  or  extension.  In  general,  the  fewer  the 
characteristics  that  make  up  the  connotation,  the  greater  is  the 
denotation  of  a  concept,  and  conversely.  Thus  "rose"  has  a 
greater  connotation,  but  a  smaller  denotation  than  has  "flower"; 
"flower"  a  narrower  connotation  and  a  wider  denotation  than 
"rose." 

A  concept  denotes  the  individuals  of  the  class  of  which  it 
holds,  whether  we  are  conscious  of  those  individuals  or  not.  It 
must  do  this  as  that  state  of  affairs  which  holds  of  these  indi- 
viduals, whether  we  are  aware  of  them  or  not.  Therefore,  in 
order  to  reason  about  individuals,  once  we  have  discovered  the 
concept  for  them,  ive  need  deal  only  ivith  the  concept  with  itsi 
connation,  and  with  its  relations  to  other  concepts.  In  some 
cases  we  must  first  discover  the  individuals  specifically,  before 
we  can  get  at  the  concepts  for  them.  This  we  do  in  induction. 
But  in  other  cases  we  find  the  concept  first,  thus  to  discover 
that  there  are  certain  classes  of  individuals,  although,  in  some 
instances,  we  can  never  perceive  (in  any  sense)  any  particular 
one  of  them.  This  is  the  case,  e.g.,  in  dealing  with  the  points 
of  space.  Such  a  discovery  of  a  new  concept  may  be  made  by 
discovering  what  other,  related  concepts  imply — a  procedure 
that  is  most  important  for  science  and  philosophy,  since,  by  it, 
we  discover  certain  classes  of  individuals  no  one  of  which,  we 


114         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

can  ever  see,  touch,  or  get  at  by  any  of  the  senses.  For  example, 
it  is  in  this  way  that  we  are  forced  to  deal  with  everything  that 
existed  or  took  place  before  we  who  now  live  were  alive. 

In  accordance  with  our  previous  analysis  a  distinction  is  to 
be  made  between  (1)  the  words  or  signs,  (2)  the  percepts  of 
these  signs,  (3)  the  states  of  affairs  or  objective  concepts  holding 
good  of  classes  of  individuals,  (4)  these  individuals  themselves, 
and  the  consciousness  both  (5)  of  these  individuals  and  (6)  of 
the  objective  concepts.  We  are  not  always  aware  of  these  dis- 
tinctions while  we  are  reasoning,  but  to  fail  to  distinguish  is 
not  to  do  away  with  distinctnesses.  As  we  reason  we  can  give 
our  attention  either  to  the  concepts  or  to  the  individuals,  but 
to  the  reasoning  it  makes  no  difference,  in  most  cases,  which  we 
do.  Thus,  whether  we  say  *'a  rose  is  a  flower,"  or  "roses  are 
flowers"  is,  for  reasoning,  a  matter  of  indifference. 

The  example  just  analyzed,  namely,  the  complex  state  of 
affairs,  that  roses  <  plants,  plants  <  living  beings,  implies  or 
necessitates,  roses  <  living  beings,  is  typical  of  a  class  of  specific 
situations  or  relational  complexes,  called  categorical  syllogisms, 
in  which  the  relation  of  implication  is  present.  Prom  many 
such  cases  that  have  been  examined,  the  generalization  is  made, 
that  wherever  there  are  similar  situations,  there,  also,  will  im- 
plication and  the  complex  terms  between  which  it  holds  be 
''present. 

Some  of  the  essential  characteristics  of  these  situations  are 
formulated  in  the  text-books  as  the  rules  of  the  categorical  syl- 
logism, but  they  are  to  be  regarded  as  rules  for  thinking  only 
because  thinking  must  conform  to  the  structure  of  reality  in 
order  to  issue  in  knowledge. 

One  of  these  rules  or  principles  concerns  that  which  is  evident 
in  our  example,  namely,  that  while  roses  possess  certain  specific 
properties  that  are  not  possessed  by  all  flowers,  nevertheless 
they  are  included  in  this  larger  class.  Accordingly,  if  some- 
thing is  a  fact  concerning  roses,  it  is  not  implied,  and  should  not 
be  inferred,  that  that  something  is  also  a  fact  for  all  flowers. 
In  general,  if  something  holds  of  part  of  a  class,  that  "some- 
thing" cannot  validly  be  inferred  to  hold  for  the  ivhole  of  that 
class.  Also,  that  which  holds  of  a  smaller  class  does  not  of 
necessity  hold  of  the  larger  class  of  which  the  smaller  is  a  part. 


THE  CATEGORICAL  SYLLOGISM  115 

It  might  hold,  but.  also,  it  might  not.  When  we  infer,  that 
which  we  infer  should  be  implied  or  necessitated.  Conversely, 
that  which  is  necessitated  must  be  inferred,  if  we  are  to  infer, 
and  infer  correctly. 

That  which  is  necessitated  by  a  proposition  or  by 
propositions  of  the  type  we  are  considering  depends  upon 
the  objective  circumstance,  whether  some  or  all  of  the 
individuals  of  a  class  are  involved  in  the  specific  relationship 
of  inclusion,  complete,  particl,  or  negative,  between  two 
classes.  Thus,  in  the  proposition,  Boses  are  flowering  plants, 
while  all  rose^  are  involved  in  the  relationship  asserted, 
it  is  only  some  flowering  plants,  namely,  those  that  are  roses, 
that  are  also  involved.  Therefore  the  converse  proposition  or 
relational  complex  that  is  implied  by  the  original  one  is  only 
that  Some  (not  all)  lowering  plants  are  roses.  However,  in  the 
proposition,  No  men  are  fishes,  or  its  equivalent.  All  men  are 
not  fishes,  both  all  men  and  all  fishes  are  involved  in  the 
relationship  of  complete  negative  inclusion,  i.e.,  of  complete 
exclusion.  The  converse  proposition  that  is  implied  is,  accord- 
ingly, No  fishes  are  men.  But,  as  different  from  this  example, 
in  the  proposition.  Some  triangles  are  symmetrical  figures, 
neither  all  triangles  nor  all  symmetrical  figures  are  involved  in 
the  relationship,  so  that  the  converse  proposition  (that  is) 
implied  is,  Some  symmetrical  figures  are  (some)  triangles. 

However,  in  the  case  of  the  proposition  just  given,  it  is  not 
implied  that  All  triangles  are  symmetrical  figures,  though  by  the 
proposition,  that  All  roses  are  flowering  plants,  it  is  implied,  that 
Some  roses  also  belong  to  this  larger  class.  Likewise  the  proposi- 
tion, No  men  are  fishes,  implies  that  Some  men  are  not  fishes. 
But,  as  different  from  this,  the  proposition  that  Some  Euro- 
peans are  not  Frenchmen  does  not  imply  that  No  Europeans  are 
Frenchmen. 

These  examples  serve  to  illustrate  an  important  principle, 
which  is,  that  the  relationship  of  the  whole  of  a  class,  either  hy 
inclusion,  or  by  exclusion,  to  another  class,  necessitates  the  same 
relationship  for  some  of  the  individuals  of  that  class;  hut  that, 
conversely,  the  relationship  of  part  of  a  class,  either  hy  inclusion 
or  by  exclusion,  to  another  class,  does  not  necessitate  the  same 
relationship  for  all  the  individuals  of  that  class.  / 


116    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

This  is  but  another  formulation  of  the  celebrated  Aristotelian 
axiom  known  as  the  dictum  de  omni  ct  nullo,  which  may  also  be 
stated  in  the  form  that  Whatever  is  predicated  of  a  term  dis- 
trihuted,  whether  affirmatively  or  negatively,  may  be  predicated 
in  like  manner  of  everything  contained  under  it. 

In  explanation  of  this  formuiation  it  may  be  said  that  a 
term  is  distrihutcd  if  all  the  individuals  which  that  term  denotes 
are  involved  in  any  specific  relationship  either  of  inclusion  or  of 
exclusion. 

Not  to  observe  this  dictum,  i.e.,  to  distribute,  in  the  conclusion, 
as  the  proposition  that  is  inferred,  if  not  implied,  a  term  that 
is  not  distributed  in  the  premises,  is  to  commit  the  technical 
fallacies  either  of  illicit  major  or  of  illicit  minor. 

However,  if  the  dictum  de  omni  et  nullo  is  a  principle  that 
must  be  followed  in  those  situations  where  our  reasoning  con- 
cerns relations  of  inclusion  and  exclusion,  it  is,  nevertheless,  not 
a  principle  that  itself  generates  that  relational  complex  which  is 
the  syllogism.  Rather  this  complex  subsists  by  virtue  of  that 
twofold  relation  which  a  '^middle  term"  bears  to  two  other 
terms,  provided,  also,  all  the  individuals  denoted  by  this  middle 
term  are  involved  in  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  relationships. 
This  specific  condition  is  usually  stated  in  the  form,  that  the 
middle  term  must  be  distributed  once  at  least.  But  it  may  also 
be  given  the  formulation  that  a  syllogism  subsists  (1)  if  there 
is  a  class  31  which  is  related  by  inclusion  or  by  exclusion,  partial 
or  complete,  to  each  of  two  other  classes,  S  and  P,  so  that  there 
is  the  complex,  S  R  M  R  P,  and  so  that  all  the  individuals  of 
the  class  31  are  involved  either  in  its  relation  to  S  or  in  its  rela- 
tion to  P.  HSR  31  R  P  is  the  situation  or  state  of  affairs  in 
which  M  is  distributed  once,  then  this  complex  implies  the  com- 
plex, or  proposition,  S  R  P.  However,  in  endeavoring  to  dis- 
cover this  implication  in  any  specific  case,  we  must  observe  the 
dictum  de  omni  et  nidlo;  i.e.,  8,  the  subject,  and  P,  the  predicate, 
must  not  be  distributed  in  the  conclusion  unless  they  are  dis- 
tributed in  the  complex,  S  R  31  R  P,  i.e.,  respectively  in  the 
major  premise,  31  R  P,  and  in  the  minor  premise,  S  R  31. 

The  syllogism  consists  in  the  implication  of  a  proposition, 
8  R  P,  as  conclusion,  by  two  propositions  as  premises.  But, 
since  every  proposition  implies  its  inverse,  or  converse,  there 


THE  CATEGORICAL  SYLLOGISM       117 

may  be,  as  a  major  premise,  either  31  R  P,  or  P  R  M,  and,  as  a 
miliar  premise,  either  S  R  M,  or  M  R  S.  The  several  combina- 
tions of  these  four  propositional  forms  give  what  are  technically 
called  the  four  figures  of  the  syllogism.  Thus  M  R  P,  S  R  M, 
S  R  P,is  the  first  figure ;  P  R  M,  8  R  M,  8  R  P,  the  second 
figure ;  31  R  P,  M  R  8,  8  R  P,  the  third ;  and  P  R  31,  31  R  8, 
8  R  P,  the  fourth. 

But  further,  since  the  relation,  R,  may  be  that  of  inclusion 
or  of  exclusion,  partial  or  complete,  between  the  two  terms  of 
each  premise,  there  are  the  several  so-called  moods,  which  consist 
of  a7iy  two  of  the  four  kinds  of  propositions  subsisting  as  pre- 
mises, and  of  any  one  of  these  four  kinds  subsisting  as  conclusion. 
These  four  kinds  or  types  of  propositions  are:  The  universal 
affirmative,  All  x's  are  y's,  A;  the  universal  negative.  No  x's  are 
y's,  E;  the  particular  affirmative.  Some  x's  are  y's,  I;  the  par- 
ticular negative,  Some  x's  are  not  y^s,  0. 

Universal  propositions  distribute  their  subjects,  negative 
propositions  their  predicates,  as  do  also  exclusive  propositions 
of  the  type,  only  x's  are  y's. 

Although  the  text-books  on  logic  present  a  list  of  the  several 
valid  as  distinct  from  the  invalid  moods  of  the  four  figures,  such 
a  presentation  and  the  committing  of  it  to  memory  are  both  quite 
superfluous,  if  only  the  following  principles  are  observed  in 
using  the  categorical  syllogism :  (1)  The  middle  term  must  be  dis- 
tributed at  least  once.  (2)  No  term  may  be  used  distributively 
in  the  conclusion,  if  it  is  not  distributed  in  the  premise  in  which 
it  occurs;  it  should  not  be  so  used  for  the  simple  reason,  that 
it  is  not  so  implied;  i.e.,  ''some"  does  not  imply  "all,"  nor 
does  "some  not"  imply  "none."  (3)  Two  negative  premises 
give  no  conclusion,  for  the  exclusion  of  the  whole  or  of  part 
of  two  classes  from  the  whole  of  the  third  class  does  not  i)nply 
the  exclusion  of  those  two  classes  from  each  other;  they  may 
be  so  excluded,  but,  also,  they  may  not.  (4)  The  middle  term 
must  be  the  same  in  the  two  premises;  or,  stated  negatively,  one 
must  guard  against  an  apparent  constancy  in  the  meaning  of 
the  middle  term,  while,  nevertheless,  a  change  is  introduced 
through  the  use  of  ambiguous  words  and  phrases.  This  rule  of 
procedure  also  applies  both  to  the  minor  term,  as  it  appears  in 
the  conclusion  as  subject,  and  also  in  that  premise  in  which  it 


118    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

occurs,  namely,  the  minor  premise,  and  to  the  major  term,  as  it 
occurs  as  the  predicate  of  the  conclusion  and  in  that  premise 
which  is  made  the  major  premise  by  its  presence.  Briefly,  it  is 
the  same  terms,  8  and  P,  that  occur  in  the  complex,  8  B  M  R  P, 
and  in  the  conclusion,  8  B  P,  that  is  implied  by  this. 

As  illustrative  of  violations  of  these  four  rules,  the  following 
examples  may  be  given : 

Illustrating  false  syllogisms  in  which  the  middle  term  is  not 
distributed: — 

I  Some  symmetrical  figures  are  triangles. 
A  All  rectangles  are  symmetrical  figures. 
A    Therefore  all  rectangles  are  triangles. 

Illustrating  false  syllogisms  that  employ  two  negative  pre- 
mises : — 

E     No  true  proposition  is  dependent  on  being  proved. 

E     No  postulate  of  geometry  is  dependent  on  being  proved. 

E     Therefore  no  postulate  of  geometry  is  a  true  proposition. 

Illustrating  false  syllogisms  in  which  the  major  term  is  dis- 
tributed in  the  conclusion,  but  not  in  the  premise  in  which  it 
occurs : — 

A    All  structures  of  living  beings  are  "  things  "  that  evolve. 

E     No  mineral  is  a  structure  of  living  beings. 

E     Therefore  no  mineral  is  a  "  thing "  that  evolves. 

Illustrating  false  syllogisms  in  which  both  the  middle  term 
and  the  major  shift  in  meaning: — 

A    All  that  perceives  is  mind. 

A     The  existence  of  objects  consists  in  being  perceived. 

A    Therefore  the  existence  of  objects  depends  on  mind. 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES         119 

CHAPTER  XV 

THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES 

I.   THE   REGRESS   OF   PREMISES 

In  the  process  of  reasoning  by  means  of  the  categorical  syl- 
logism, as  well  as  by  syllogisms  of  other  types,  one  can  distin- 
guish the  formal  correctness  of  the  process  from  the  "' material" 
truth  of  the  premises  and  the  conclusion.  The  reasoning  process 
is  formally  correct,  if,  in  the  case  of  the  categorical  syllogism, 
it  conforms  to  some  one  of  the  several  situations  determined  by 
the  principles  just  laid  down.  But  formal  correctness  is  not  of 
itself  a  guarantee  of  material  truth.  However,  leaving  unde- 
termined at  this  point  what  the  nature  of  "material  truth"  is, 
but  distinguishing  it  only  from  "formal  correctness,"  it  is  clear 
that  there  are  the  following  types  or  variations  of  reasoning 
processes:  (1)  the  syllogism  formally  correct,  and  also  both 
premises  and  conclusion  materially  true;  (2)  the  syllogism 
formally  correct,  but  premises  and  conclusion  materially  false; 
(3)  both  the  syllogism  (?)  formally  incorrect,  and  the  premises 
and  conclusion  materially  false;  (4)  the  syllogism  ( ?)  formally 
incorrect,  but  premises  and  conclusion  materially  true  as  proposi- 
tions, although  not  so  related  as  to  form  a  sj^llogism. 

The  last  three  "variations"  are  both  interesting  and  im- 
portant, yet  it  is  with  the  first  type  that  we  are  here  most  con- 
cerned. For  the  desideratum  is,  ivhen  we  reason  by  means  of 
the  categorical  syllogism,  that  hoth  our  reasoning  process  should 
be  formally  correct,  and  our  conclusion  be  materially  true. 

The  formal  correctness  of  the  reasoning  process  seems,  how- 
ever, to  be  relatively  easy  to  obtain,  or  to  certify.  To  do  this 
one  need  only  observe  the  rules  for  correct  formal  reasoning, 
such  as  those  rules  that  have  just  been  presented  for  the  cate- 
gorical syllogism.  But  a  more  difficult  problem  is  that  of 
making  certain  of  the  material  truth  of  the  propositions  thati 
appear  as  premises,  or  as  conclusion. 

Although,  now,  there  are  a  number  of  different  interpreta- 
tions, by  the  several  philosophical  positions,  of  the  nature  of 


120         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

truth,  these  can  be  neglected  at  this  point,  since  no  position 
fails  to  recognize  truth  {and  error)  in  some  sense.  Accord- 
ingly, without  defining  truth,  it  may  be  said  that,  in  the  formally 
valid  categorical  syllogism,  the  conclusion  is  materially  true,  if 
the  premises  are  materially  true.  But  the  premises  are,  like  the 
conclusion,  propositions.  Accordingly,  tlie  prohlem  of  getting 
a  materially  true  conclusioyi  becomes  that  of  getting  two  ma- 
terially true  premises,  and  of  again  finding,  if  possible,  tiva 
materially  true  premises  that  in  turn  imply  each  of  these  pre- 
mises. However,  these  "premises  of  premises"  in  turn  "rest 
on"  and  presuppose  others  "still  further  back,"  and  so  on, 
indefimtely.  What,  then,  is  the  outcome  of  this  repeated  pre- 
supposition of  premises?  Is  there  an  infinite  series  of  premises 
which  it  is  quite  impossible  to  complete,  so  that  the  best  one  can 
do  is  to  plunge  in  mcdias  res  and  boldly  assert  certain  premises? 
This  might  be  done  either  on  the  ground  that,  although  not 
actually  inferred  deductively  from  others,  these  premises  might, 
nevertheless,  be  materially  true,  or  on  the  ground,  that  there  is 
a  "stopping  place"  where  certain  propositions  imply,  hut  are 
not  implied.  But  it  may  also  be  asked,  if  there  are  not  other 
methods  of  establishing  premises  than  by  means  of  the  cate- 
gorical syllogism,  or,  finally,  if  all  three  of  these  suggestions 
might  not  conform  to  fact?  May  not  implication  be  limited  in 
its  range,  so  that  certain  propositions  are  (1)  consistent  with 
other  propositions,  but  not  implied  by  them,  and,  therefore,  are 
(2)  deductive  "starting-places,"  and  must,  accordingly,  be  dis- 
covered non-deductively?  To  the  answering  of  these  inquiries 
we  now  turn. 

II.    COMMON    SENSE   AND   THE   SOCIAL   TRADITION 

The  physiological  transmission  of  structural  and  functional 
characters  is  not  the  only  kind  of  heredity.  There  is  also  a 
psychological  inheritance  through  imitation  and  by  precepts, 
and  the  like,  from  all  who  have  contributed  to  that  whole  social 
tradition  in  philosophy,  religion,  literature,  art,  science,  and 
common  sense  into  which  each  one  of  us  is  born.  It  is  in  this 
way  that  we  obtain  a  mass  of  general  knowledge  to  be  used  as 
premises  from  which  to  reason,  as  is  illustrated  by  our  common 
law,  our  system  of  morals,  and  our  common  sense.     Such  sur- 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES  121 

vivals  are  based  on  a  method  which  in  the  main  conforms  to  the 
canons  of  correct  observation,  analysis,  and  generalization. 

This  method  is,  broadly  speaking,  induction,  practised  in- 
formally, uncritically,  unconsciously,  almost  instinctively. 

III.   INDUCTION  ^ 

So  long  as  men  relied  chiefly  upon  a  tradition  that  vras  rooted 
in  uncritical  observation  and  generalization,  comparatively  little 
ftiat  was  new  was  discoverable.  Yet  it  was  in  this  tradition 
that  men  lived  until  the  realization  came  that  the  secrets  of 
nature  were  beneath  the  surface,  and  that,  if  they  were  to  be 
revealed,  nature  must  be  analyzed  by  a  method  more  penetrating 
and  more  discriminating.  The  time  came,  first  at  spasmodic 
intervals,  but  later  more  continuously,  when,  by  carefully  con- 
ducted experiments,  the  aspects  of  nature  were  isolated  and 
their  relations  to  one  another  ascertained.  At  the  same  time 
it  was  fair  and  natural  to  suppose  that  there  were  otJicr,  indeed, 
many  other  instances  of  these  "things"  that  were  thus  exam- 
ined. But  all  of  these  instances  could  not  be  observed,  e.g., 
either  because  they  were  too  numerous  or  too  remote,  or  because 
they  were  in  the  past  or  in  the  future.  Yet  the  conviction  was 
present,  that  nature  was  orderly,  that  it  acted  in  accordance  with 
law,  that  it  had  uniformity,  and  that  the  orderliness,  the  law, 
the  uniformities  were  revealed  by  the  few  cases  examined  with 
care  and  by  experiment. 

It  was  in  this  manner  that,  e.g.,  Galileo  (1564-1642)  discov- 
ered that  the  velocity  of  bodies  falling  to  the  earth  increases 
with  the  time, — at  that  rate,  namely,  which  is  given  by  multi- 
plying the  time-interval  taken  to  fall  a  definite  distance  by  this 
same  time-interval,  i.e.,  by  the  time  squared.  Galileo  made  his 
observations  on  bodies  which  he  either  let  fall  from  different 
heights  on  the  leaning  tower  of  Pisa,  or  rolled  down  different 
distances  on  an  inclined  plane.  From  his  observations,  measure- 
ments, and  analysis  of  these  motions,  in  which  he  distinguished 
the  distances,  the  times,  the  rates,  and  the  change  of  rate, 
Galileo  generalized.  Thus  he  discovered  the  laws  of  all  falling 
bodies.     But  he  did  not  observe  all.     Too  many  bodies  were 

'  The  best  complete  discussion  of  induction  is  by  B.  Erdmann,  Logik, 
2nd  ed.,  pp.  730  ti'.;  cf.  Venn,  Principles  of  Inductive  Logic,  1907,  p.  344  ff., 
and  J.  S.  Mill,  System  of  Logic,  7th  ed.,  Bks.  III.  and  IV. 


122         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

falling  elsewhere  than  in  Pisa,  too  many,  indeed,  in  Pisa  itself, 
for  him  to  do  this;  too  many  also  had  fallen  before,  and  too 
many  would  fall  after  his  day. 

It  is  in  ways  such  as  the  method  of  Galileo  illustrates,  that 
the  scientist  proceeds  in  order  to  get  laws,  principles,  and  gen- 
eralizations that  can  subsequently  be  used  as  premises  for  making 
deductions, — such  deductions,  indeed,  as  enable  men  to  control 
the  forces  of  nature  and  to  make  predictions,  computations,  and 
plans  that  are  realized  in  the  concrete  facts. 

One  is  not  compelled,  in  all  cases,  therefore,  to  continue  the 
search  for  premises  indefinitely  far  hack.  There  is  ultimately 
an  appeal  to  concrete  fact,  and  a  basis  for  precise  generalization. 
This  procedure  may  be  formulated  as  follows : — 

I.  A  certain  number  of  typical,  particular  cases,  c^,  c,,  Cg — Cq, 
such  as  the  instances  of  the  motion  of  falling  bodies,  are  exam- 
ined, and  are  found  to  have  a  specific  property,  P,  such  as  the 
property,  that  the  velocity  of  a  falling  body  is  at  any  instant 
directly  as  the  square  of  the  time — typical  cases  being  such  as 
are  taken  at  random. 

II.  It  is  assumed,  though  not  proved  (since,  e.g.,  all  cases 
of  the  motion  of  falling  bodies  cannot  be  examined)  that  all 
C's  are  like  the  relatively  few  typical  cases  examined.  This 
assumption  is  more  justified  if  the  cases  are  examined  by  scien- 
tific methods  of  analysis  than  if  they  are  not.  From  I.  and  II. 
it  is  concluded,  that 

III.  All  C's  have  the  property,  P. 

This  principle  and  procedure  are  present  in  all  induction,  as 
this  is  used  both  in  common  sense  and  in  science.  Clearly,  how- 
ever, there  is  an  element  of  risk,  of  uncertainty  in  it.  Are  all 
diseases  caused  by  micro-organisms?  Science  has  shown  that  at 
least  some  are.  Are  atoms  absolutely  simple?  Science  used  to 
maintain  that  they  were,  but  does  so  no  longer.  In  induction, 
then,  a  "leap"  is  made  from  "some"  to  "all,"  and  this  leap 
is  hazardous.  For,  while  "some"  is  included  by  "all,"  "all" 
is  not  implied  by  "some,"  as  we  have  previously  seen. 

IV.    HOW   FACTS   ARE   GIVEN 

Induction  proceeds,  first,  by  examining,  in  various  ways,  con- 
crete, particular  facts  that  are,  if  possible,  typical  cases,  and. 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES  123 

second,  by  generalizing  from  these.  Science  is  built  up  in  part 
in  this  way,  as  are  also  common  sense  and  tradition,  religion 
and  philosophy,  since  each  of  these  is  characterized  by  at  least 
the  claim  that  facts  are  given  which  warrant  a  generalization 
from  them.  In  a  broad  sense,  then,  all  knowledge  is  inductive, 
^ut  ivJiat  is  a  factf  Concerning  this  important  question  there 
is  disagreement,  not  only  as  regards  what  shall  be  accepted  05 
fact,  but  also  as  regards  the  criteria,  the  tests,  the  methods  by 
which  a  distinction  is  made  between  that  which  is  accepted  as 
fact  and  that  which  is  not.  We  may,  therefore,  examine  these 
two  questions  together,  relying  upon  the  actual  procedure  which 
we  find  adopted  in  different  fields,  both  as  to  what  are  accepted 
as  facts,  and  what  as  criteria. 

1.  Sense  Experience 

In  daily  life  and  in  scientific  investigation  we  get  at  what 
in  these  fields  are  certainly  regarded  as  one  class  of  facts, 
namely,  those  that  "come"  to  us  through  our  senses.  Vision, 
hearing,  touch,  smell,  and  taste  and  other  modes  of  sensation 
are  held  to  reveal  facts  to  us,  and,  if  there  are  occasional  illu- 
sions, this  fact  is  itself  disclosed  by  the  senses  a7id  by  reasoning 
about  those  data  which  the  senses  give  us.  However,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  go  into  many  of  the  details  of  this  familiar  field. 
Things,  qualities,  events,  and  relations  in  the  world  round  about 
us  become  known  to  us  through  our  senses.  For  example,  this 
red  book  and  that  brown  one,  the  howling  of  the  wind  outside 
and  the  odor  of  this  burning  tobacco,  the  motion  of  the  smoke 
as  it  curls  upward  and  its  height  from  the  floor, — all  these  are, 
for  me,  facts  as  my  senses  now  reveal  them  to  me,  as  I  sit  in  my 
laboratory.  In  our  usual  sense  experience  we  do  not  go  beyond 
this,  although  science  and  philosophy  take  us  beyond,  finally 
leading  us  even  to  doubt,  e.g.,  that  our  real  eye  sees  its  own  real 
image  in  a  real  mirror.  For  the  process  of  sense  perception  has 
itself  been  made  the  subject  of  much  study  in  both  psychology 
and  philosophy,  one  of  the  important  typical  problems  here 
being  whether,  in  perceiving,  we  get  at  the  object  directly,  or 
have  a  mental  state  that  is  perceived  and  that  copies  the  object, 
so  that  we  perceive  the  object  only  indirectly.  There  are  many 
other  questions  concerning  sense  perception,  but  common  sense 


124         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

does  not  raise  them.  Rather,  whatever  may  be  the  manner  and 
the  mechanism  of  perceiving  through  the  senses,  in  common 
sense  it  is  held  that  such  perception  gives  us  facts. 

A  great  part  of  scientific  investigation,  perhaps  practically 
all  of  it  in  the  field  of  the  natural  sciences,  is  based  on  the  same 
assumption.  The  perception  of  the  scientist  is,  however,  dif- 
ferent in  some  respects  from  that  of  the  layman,  since  his  is 
a  perception  that  is  controlled  and  assisted  by  instruments  of 
observation  and  of  measurement.  Telescopes  and  microscopes, 
and,  indeed,  a  variety  of  machines  and  instruments  enable  the 
scientist  to  observe  what  the  layman  cannot,  and  technical 
methods  of  experimentation  that  are  suggested  by  hypotheses 
and  theories,  reveal  to  the  scientist  realities  which,  without  such 
methods,  would  remain  hidden.  Yet,  however  much  the  sci- 
entist's perception  may  be  thus  controlled  and  assisted,  still,  in 
the  last  resort,  it  is  to  his  sense  perception  that  facts  are  revealed, 
and  upon  its  deliverances  that  the  discovery  of  specific  laws, 
principles,  and  generalizations  is  based. 

2.  Intuition,  Feeling,  and  Emotion} 
Sense  perception,  however,  is  not  limited  to  the  disclosure  of 
"things"  that  are  not  ourselves.  For  we  perceive  our  own 
bodies  through  both  vision  and  touch,  and  also  through  our 
muscular  sensations  and  a  whole  group  of  organic  sensations. 
But  we  also  perceive,  though  not  through  the  senses,  that  ive 
have  sense  percepts,  memory,  and  reasoning  processes,  and  the 
like,  i.e.,  we  perceive  that  we  are  conscious,  in  several  specific 
ways.  This  is  self-consciousness.  We  discover  in  this  way,  that 
we  are  also,  at  times,  in  certain  specific  moods,  such  as  those  of 
joy,  sorrow,  and  expectancy.  There  is  often,  also,  a  feeling  of 
the  wholeness  and  unity  of  "things,"  even  of  the  oneness  of 
ourselves  with  nature,  as  opposed  to  the  analytical  and  dis- 
criminating perception  of  common  sense  and  science.  Must  it 
not  be  admitted,  that  such  emotions  and  feelings  also  reveal 
facts? 

If  we  accept  the  evidence  of  those  generalizations  that  con- 

''Cf.  E.  Underbill,  Mysticism,  4th  od.,  1912;  F.  Von  Hiigel,  TJxe  Mystical 
Elements  of  Religion;  A.  B.  Sharp,  Mysticism,  Its  True  Nature  and  Value, 
1910;  cf.  also  James,  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience,  XVI. -XVII.; 
Bergson,  all  through  Creative  Evolution,  Matter,  and  Memory,  and  Time 
and  Free  Will. 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES  125 

stitute  a  good  part  of  traditional  religious  systems  and  beliefs, 
of  moral  ideals,  of  standards  of  art,  and  the  like,  then  we  can 
only  answer  this  question  affirmatively.  Religion,  morality,  and 
art  are  based  on  the  deliverances  of  certain  specific  emotions 
and  modes  of  appreciation,  and  the  facts  thus  given  are  often 
called  values.  Sometimes  they  are  given  only  once  in  a  lifetime, 
though  more  often  they  are  repeated,  and  they  come,  also,  to 
many  individuals. 

But  even  in  those  eases  in  which  it  is  not  so  much  either  the 
emotion,  or  the  analytical  perception  of  parts,  as  it  is  the  in- 
tuition of  wholes,  that  is  to  be  emphasized,  does  not  this  intuition 
also  give  facts?  For  example,  is  not  the  whole  space  that  the 
reader  now  perceives  quite  as  much  a  fact  as  are  its  parts,  i.e., 
hoth  the  smaller  spaces,  and  the  points,  of  which  both  whole 
and  part  are  composed  ?  Is  not  a  year  as  much  a  fact  as  a  day, 
the  ivhole  motion  of  a  stone  as  much  a  fact  as  the  occupation  of 
specific  points  at  successive  instants?  Indeed,  do  not  stone  and 
motion  and  path  and  time  together  form  one  whole  and  unitary 
fact?  And  is  not  the  similar  fact  sometimes  experienced,  of 
the  unity  of  the  self  and  all  else,  with  no  distinctness  between 
the  two? 

To  each  of  these  inquiries  the  answer  "yes"  is  sometimes 
given,  with  certain  definite  scientific,  philosophical,  and  religious 
positions  resulting.  But,  while  in  science  the  whole  is  given  a 
status  which  is  equal,  as  fact  and  as  value,  to  that  of  the  parts, 
in  philosophy  a  more  extreme  position  is  frequently  taken.  The 
whole  is  given  a  higher  status,  and  the  part  is  regarded  as  de- 
serving and  winning  a  place  07ily  in  the  whole.  "With  the  whole 
thus  "made"  reality,  the  part  is,  also,  frequently  "made"  only 
appearance,  or,  when  analysis  is  regarded  as  serving  only  our 
practical  needs,  the  part  is  allowed  to  be  only  an  artefact.  Thus 
it  is  that  in  religion  and  theology  the  whole  is  often  identified 
with  God,  while  all  else  is  allowed  to  be  but  His  manifestation. 
Self-consciousness,  emotions,  feelings,  and  intuitions,  then,  as 
well  as  sense  perception,  are  accepted  as  ways  and  means  by 
which  facts  are  disclosed,  and  from  which  generalizations  are 
made,  thus  to  furnish  premises  for  deductive  procedure,  and  to 
cut  off  the  indefinite  regress  of  premises  that  seemingly  would 
otherwise  obtain. 


126    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

Memory  is  that  specific  conscious  process  hy  or  in  which  what 
has  been  experienced  is  now  represented  to  us.  We  can  remem- 
ber, with  greater  or  less  detail,  that  which  has  been  experienced, 
and  also,  perhaps,  the  time  and  jylace  of  the  experience.  Much 
of  that  which  is  remembered  is  imaged  in  terms  of  some  one  of 
the  senses,  but  some  "things,"  as  e.g.,  past  emotions,  are  dif- 
ficult to  image,  although  they  can  be  remembered.  However, 
the  question  that  here  concerns  us  is  whether  memory  gives  us 
facts  from  which  to  generalize.  Obviously,  by  definition,  facts 
that  are  remembered  have  been  experienced  before ;  the  memory 
is  not  the  original  experience  of  these  facts.  And  yet  we  rely 
on  it,  and  must  do  so,  in  order  to  secure  the  requisite  basis  for 
our  generalizations. 

Without  memory  there  would  be  no  imngination,  since  this 
process  depends  upon  the  materials  that  memory  furnishes.  Ac: 
Qordingly,  without  memory,  on  the  one  hand,  to  represent  the 
past,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  furnish  a  basis  for  the  presenta- 
tion of  the  future,  our  awareness  of  "things"  would  be  limited 
to  the  immediate  present  (whatever,  in  the  last  analysis,  this 
"present"  may  prove  to  be),  so  that,  unless  we  could  get  at 
a  sufficient  nmyiber  of  concrete  facts  in  the  immediate  present 
to  furnish  a  basis  for  generalization,  we  could  derive  no  general 
propositions  to  use  as  premises.  Such  propositions  are  ob- 
tained by  comparing  and  analyzing  a  number  of  concrete  cases, 
so  as  to  discover,  if  possible,  similarities,  and  then  to  generalize. 
But,  it  would  seem,  that  if  there  were  no  memory,  no  com- 
parison would  be  possible,  and,  therefore,  no  similarities  be 
discovered,  and  no  generalizations  be  justified.  Indeed,  if  we 
were  organisms  with  an  awareness  of  only  the  immediate  present, 
we  would  not  even  have  the  tendency  to  generalize,  and  then  we 
could  neither  think  nor  reason.  But  the  fact  is,  that  we  do 
retain,  do  remember,  and,  on  this  basis,  do  compare  and 
generalize. 

4.  Imagination 

Does  imagination  also  give  us  facts,  and  furnish  material  for 
generalization?  Imagination  is  that  conscious  process  in  which 
we  are  aware  of  at  least  some  entities,  or  combinations  of  en- 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES  127 

titles,  that  have  not  been  presented  in  the  past.  However,  the 
materials  for  imagination  to  work  with  must  have  been  given 
or  be  now  given  in  some  way,  although  the  complex  is  new. 
Oftentimes,  indeed,  in  fancy  and  creative  imagination,  the  mode 
of  the  relating  of  formerly  given  parts  is  such  that  distinctly 
new  qualities  of  the  whole  result.  Such  a  creation  is  character- 
istic of  those  facts  that  are  given  to  the  imaginations  of  the 
painter,  the  architect,  the  sculptor,  and  the  musician,  and  also, 
oftentimes,  to  those  of  the  scientist  and  the  philosopher.  Turner 
imaging  his  sunsets,  and  Beethoven  his  symphonies,  are  cases 
in  illustration,  but  Newton  also  must  have  reached  out  in  imag- 
ination to  discover  gravitation,  and  Plato,  to  get  to  his  Theory 
of  Ideas. 

Imagination  is  to  a  large  extent  free ;  it  must  accept  its  ma- 
terials, but  with  these  once  given,  what  restrictions  can  be 
placed  upon  it?  For  example,  who  would  be  so  bold  as  to 
prescribe  future  accomplishments  of  miagination  in  art?  Yet, 
free  as  it  is,  imagination  gives  us  data,  which  are  facts  of  some 
kind,  and  from  which,  especially  in  the  development  of  re- 
ligion and  art,  generalizations  are  drawn  that  oftentimes  become 
the  dogmas  for  posterit3^  In  some  fields,  therefore,  imagination 
may  act  as  freely  as  it  will  and  can. 

Has  imagination  this  freedom  also  in  science,  or  must  it  in 
this  field  be  kept  within  certain  bounds  by  the  exigencies  of 
prediction,  of  explanation,  of  consistent  systematization,  and 
the  like?  Hypotheses,  theories,  laws,  all  play  their  part  in 
science,  but  there  are  also  threads  of  compulsion,  either  of  im- 
plication or  of  consistency,  that  are  not  on  the  surface.  Im- 
agination in  science  plays  its  part,  therefore,  by  folloiving  these 
threads  as  much  as  possible,  until  it  is  finally  led  to  entities  that, 
previously  unknown,  thereby  become  known.  It  is  in  this  way 
that,  e.g.,  gravitation,  electro-magnetic  waves,  osmotic  energ\% 
and,  indeed,  a  very  large  number  of  the  other  entities  of  modern 
science  have  been  discovered.  These  were,  fir'st,  mere  hypo- 
thetical entities,  with  possibly  feiv  connections  with  observed 
facts.  But,  subsequently,  deductions  and  predictions  from  them 
led  to  their  confirmation.  Imagination,  having  done  its  work, 
was  subsequently  supplanted  by  reason. 

In  contrast  with  imagination  in  art,  therefore,  where  it  is, 


128         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

perhaps,  free  without  limit,  in  science  imagination  must  be 
controlled  by  the  discovery  of  relations  of  implication,  or,  at 
least,  by  such  relations  as  are  prescribed  by  the  exigencies  of 
explanation,  prediction,  and  system. 

Which  example  shall  philosophy  follow?  Shall  it  be  the 
example  of  art,  in  which  imagination,  by  the  freest  play,  leads 
to  data  that  we  appreciate  and  value,  or  the  example  of  science, 
in  which  lue  guard  ourselves  as  much  as  possible  from  accepting 
anything  as  fact  merely  hecause  we  value  it,  and  in  which, 
seemingly,  ''truth  at  all  costs"  is  the  chief  concern.  This 
question  is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  fundamental  philosophical 
problems.  Both  motives  are  present  in  contemporaneous  phi- 
losophy, though  usually  in  disguised  form.  The  one  motive 
would  have  philosophy  an  art,  an  appreciation,  a  personal 
reaction ;  the  other  would  have  it  a  science.^ 

This  concludes  the  consideration  of  one  class  of  means  by 
which  premises  for  deductive  use  are  obtained.  Appeal  is  made 
to  the  concrete  facts  of  sense  perception,  of  emotion,  of  intuition, 
of  memory,  and  of  imagination.  All  facts,  thus  presented,  can 
be  represented  in  memory,  and  from  typical  cases,  generaliza- 
tions be  derived.  These  generalizations  are  of  the  type  that 
such  and  such  is  the  positive  or  negative  "state  of  affairs"  for 
such  and  such  a  class.  This  method  of  discovering  general 
propositions  and  of  putting  an  end  to  the  indefinite  series  of 
premises  is  induction. 

Our  next  question  is  whether  there  are  still  other  methods  by 
which  premises  for  deductive  purposes  can  be  found.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  in  the  history  of  science  and  philosophy,  a 
number  of  such  methods  have  been  accepted  as  fulfilling  this 
function.  Thus  certain  geiieral  propositions  in  such  sciences  as 
logic,  mathematics,  geometry,  physics,  and  ethics  have  been  held 
to  he  true  either  hecause  they  were  self-evident,  or  hecause  their 
opposites  were  inconceivable,  or  because  they  were  presupposed 
by  their  aiicmpted  denial.  Indeed,  in  many  cases,  it  is  on 
these  grounds  tliat  certain  propositions  have  been  regarded  not 
only  as  factually,  but  also  as  necessarily  true,  and  have,  there- 
fore, been  called  axioms.  Frequently,  also,  some  of  those  prin- 
ciples which  have  been  mo>it  important  as  a  basis  for  certain 

"  Cf.  W.  T.  Marvin,  First  Book  of  Metaphysics,  Chap.  I. 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES  129 

specific  philosophical  systems  have   heen  established  hy   these 
tests. 

5.  Self -Evidence^ 

The  principle  of  self-evidence  may  be  stated  briefly  in  the 
form  of  the  proposition,  that  that  which  is  self-evident  is  true, 
or  is  a  fact.  As  applied,  this  means  that  some  proposition  or 
principle  appears  to  be  true  ''on  the  face  of  it,"  or,  that  it  does 
not  need  proof,  or,  indeed,  that  it  is,  perhaps,  incapable  both  of 
proof  and  of  disproof.  Examples  of  propositions  that  have  been 
regarded  as  self-evident,  and,  therefore,  as  ultimate  and  neces- 
sarily true,  are:  (1)  the  whole  is  greater  than  any  of  its  parts; 
(2)  every  effect  has  a  cause;  (3)  the  cause  equals  the  effect; 
(4)  everything  in  its  individuality  is  identical  with  itself  and 
distinct  from  every  other  thing;  (5)  of  two  contradictory 
propositions,  one  must  be  true;  (6)  everything  must  act  in 
accordance  with  its  own  nature;  (7)  we  can  know  only  our 
own  ideas;  (8)  through  a  point,  C,  not  on  a  straight  line,  D, 
there  is  only  one  line  parallel  to  D. 

However,  the  position  taken  at  the  present  day  toward  the 
test  of  self-evidence  is,  that  it  is  not  a  criterion  of  absolute  or 
necessary  truth,  but,  at  best,  only  an  empirical  test,  which, 
though  it  may  be  used  on  occasion,  is  very  liable  to  error. 
Indeed,  the  critical  examination  of,  and  perhaps  the  inductive 
generalization  from,  a  large  number  of  important  historical 
instances  of  principles  that  have  been  regarded  as  absolutely 
true  because  of  their  self-evidence,  but  that  are  now  known  not 
to  be  true,  or,  at  least,  not  necessarily  true,  demands  this  inter- 
pretation. On  the  other  hand,  the  necessity  of  using  self- 
evidence  as  an  empirical  criterion,  which,  though  it  is  liable  to 
error,  nevertheless  reveals  a  fair  and  perhaps  high  degree  of 
probability,  can  also  be  shown.  For  example,  that  there  is  a 
rigorous  logical  connection  of  implication  between  the  premises 
and  the  conclusion  of  a  syllogism,  is  ultimately  accepted  only 
because   of   its   self-evidence.     For   if   we    doubt    any   specific 

*  The  principle  of  self-evidence  was  used,  e.g.,  by  Euclid  in  arriving  at 
his  axioms,  and  by  Aristotle  in  getting  at  the  intrinsic  properties  of 
things.  It  was  really  recognized  as  a  criterion  by  Descartes,  in  both  his 
Meditations  and  his  Discourse,  and  by  Leibniz  in  his  Meditationes  de 
Vognitione,  Veritate  et  Ideis. 


130    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

instance  of  syllogistic  reasoning,  and  therefore  test  it  for  its 
validity  by  further  reasoning,  then  we  must  accept  the  logical 
connection  of  the  several  steps  in  the  final  reasoning  process, 
on  the  ground  alone  that  they  are  self-evidently  valid  or  correct. 

However,  it  is  evident,  perhaps  self-evident,  that  a  criterion 
of  truth  can  be  such  a  test  provided  only  that  it  itself  is  true. 
As  applied  to  the  criterion  of  self -evidence  this  means  that  the 
question  must  be  raised  whether  it  is  self-evident,  that  that 
which  is  self-evident  is  necessarily  true.  To  the  writer  of  this 
book  it  is  7iot.  This  alone  suffices  to  show  that  self-evidence 
cannot  be  an  unequivocal  and  absolutely  certain  test  of  truth, 
for  here  there  is  at  least  one  exception.  The  principle  of  self- 
evidence  is  itself  not  self-evident  to  every  one.  It  does  not  stand 
its  own  test.  Then  it  cannot  be  a  necessarily  true  and  abso- 
lutely certain  criterion. 

"We  must  conclude  that  self-evidence  is  only  a  psychological 
test  of  truth.  What  is  self-evident  to  one  is  not  to  another. 
Therefore,  so  far  as  this  test  is  accepted  and  used,  as  perhaps 
it  must  be  in  certain  cases,  there  is  always  the  proviso,  that  it 
is  liable  to  error,  and  is  not  absolute. 

6.  The  Inconceivability  of  the  Opposite  ^ 

Almost  the  entire  characterization  and  criticism  that  has  just 
been  made  of  the  criterion  of  self-evidence  holds  also  of  this 
second  test  or  criterion.  Historically,  this  test  has  been  applied 
to  many  principles  to  which  the  test  by  self-evidence  has  also 
been  applied,  i.e.,  that  which  is  self-evident  has  been  further 
tested  by  attempting  to  conceive  its  opposite,  and,  with  this 
attempt  failing,  has  been  regarded  as  necessarily  true.  This 
test  may  be  stated,  in  the  form  of  the  proposition,  that  that 
ivhose  opposite  cannot  he  conceived  must  itself  he  conceived  and 
he  true,  so  that  we  cannot  think  without  it, — if  to  think  is 
to  conceive.  For  example,  if  we  cannot  conceive  that  the  part 
should  be  equal  to,  or  be  greater  than  the  whole,  it  would  be 
concluded  hoth  that  it  is  necessarily  true,  and  that  we  must 
think,  that  the  part  is  less  than  the  whole.     Historically,  this 

'  The  principle  of  the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite  was  recognized, 
e.g.,  by  Herbert  Spencer,  Principles  of  Psychology,  §§420-437;  cf.  J.  S. 
Mill,  Logic,  8th  ed.,  II.,  VII.,  1-4. 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES  131 

proposition  as  regards  the  relation  of  whole  and  part  was  estab- 
lished as  a  principle  in  just  this  way — though  it  is  now  known 
to  hold  only  for  finite  wholes.  For  infinite  wholes  the  relation- 
ships of  "less  than,"  ''equal  to,"  and  "greater  than"  do  not 
apply  at  all,  or,  more  accurately,  are  not  -present  at  all.  As 
further  examples,  one  may  ask,  if  it  can  be  conceived,  (1)  that 
a  "thing"  should  be  hoth  itself  and  something  else;  and,  accord- 
ingly, provided  mind  is  different  from  matter,  (2)  that  mind 
should  act  in  contradiction  to  its  own  nature.  Also,  can  one  con- 
ceive, (3)  that  a  thing  should  cease  to  be  itself  and  become 
something  else,  i.e.,  that  it  should  change;  or  (4)  that  two 
"things"  should  be  related  and  not  influence  each  other?  If 
one  cannot  conceive  these  propositions,  then  must  one  not  think 
the  opposite  of  each  07ie  of  them,  and  conclude  that  this  opposite 
is  absolutely  true? 

Such  examples  might  be  added  to  almost  indefinitely,  with 
the  result  that  a  list  could  be  obtained  which  would  include 
many  a  proposition  or  principle  that  has  been  of  great  influence 
on  both  philosophy  and  science. 

But  the  test  of  the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite  proves, 
after  all,  to  be,  like  self-evidence,  only  a  psychological  test.  It 
cannot  be  absolute,  since  it  has  been  applied  to  establish  the 
truth  of  many  a  principle,  in  both  science  and  philosophy,  that 
subsequently  has  been  shown  to  be  false.  Many  an  inconceivable 
"thing"  has  turned  out  to  be  quite  conceivable;  as,  e.g.,  the 
propositions,  that  the  earth  is  round;  that  a  moving  body  con- 
tinues to  move  with  no  outside  force  acting  on  it;  that,  in  a 
plane,  there  may  be,  through  a  point,  more  than  one  parallel  to 
a  line  not  containing  that  point.  Therefore,  some  things  at 
least  that  formerly  were  inconceivable  are  now  no  longer  so. 
Also,  that  which  is  inconceivable  to  one  mind  is  not  to  another. 

All  this  is  evidence  that  this  test  does  not  reveal  what  must 
be  conceived.  Indeed,  to  the  writer  it  is  not  inconceivable,  that 
the  proposition,  that  that  whose  opposite  is  inconceivable  is 
true,  should  itself  be  false.  The  test  does  not  establish  itself, 
but,  like  self-evidence,  reveals,  not  what  all  must  think  and 
conceive,  but  only  what  some  must  and  do  think — for  psycho- 
logical reasons.  It  is  a  test  that  is,  at  best,  only  empirical  and 
quite  fallible,  having  been  derived,  in  fact,  by  induction  from 


132    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

certain  positive  eases  for  which  it  has  seemed  to  work  success- 
fully. But  that  which  is  inconceivable  today,  may  nevertheless 
he  true,  and  tomorrow  be  conceived,  primarily  because  it  is  dis- 
covered to  he  a  fact. 

7.  Presupposition  hy  Denial " 

This  principle  differs  from  the  tests  of  self-evidence  and  the 
inconceivahility  of  the  opposite  in  that  it  is  a  logical  test,  whereas 
they  are  psychological  criteria.  For  to  he  presupposed  is  to  he 
implied.  Only  if  we  take  something  to  be  presupposed  which 
really  is  not,  does  the  psychological  factor  enter,  for  then  there 
is  error. 

The  principle  of  presupposition  by  denial  is,  however,  closely 
connected  with  the  test  by  ''the  inconceivability  of  the  oppo- 
site" and  also  with  the  "reductio  ad  ahsurdum."  This  latter 
test  proceeds  by  first  assuming  the  contradictory  of  that  principle 
which  is  to  be  established,  and  by  then  finding  that  this  con- 
tradictory is,  in  some  way,  absurd,  so  that  the  opposite,  the 
original  principle,  must  be  accepted  as  necessarily  true.  But 
this  raises  the  question  as  to  what  the  absurd  is.  Is  it  that 
which  is  inconceivable,  or,  that  which  is  ')>ot  yet  known,  hut 
seems  most  improbable,  or,  that  which  is  self-contradictory? 
The  first  two  kinds  of  absurdity  are,  however,  only  psycho- 
logical, for,  the  absurd,  thus  defined,  has  oftentimes  proved  to 
be  fact.  To  this  extent  the  method  of  reductio  ad  ahsurdum 
turns  out  to  be  only  a  very  fallible  test.  Wireless  telegraphy, 
and  automatic  adding  machines,  and  six-day  trans-Atlantic 
steamships  were  at  one  time  absurd  and  inconceivable,  but  they 
subsequently  proved  to  be  facts. 

However,  when  the  absurd  is  identified  with  the  self-contra- 
dictory, the  reductio  ad  ahsurdum  becomes  the  test  of  (or  proof 
by)  "presupposition  by  (attempted)  denial."  Within  the  field 
of  seemingly  self-contradictory  "things"  one  can  distinguish 
self-contradictory  terms,  such  as  round-square.  But,  as  distinct 
from  such  terms,  there  are  also  self-contradictory  propositions; 

"  The  best  statement  of  the  principle  of  presupposition  by  denial  is  by 
P.  Coffey,  Logic,  1!)12;  ef.  Jevons,  Principles  of  Hcienee,  1874.  This  is  also 
the  principle  of  Kant's  "deduction"  of  the  categories;  see  Miiller's 
translation,  p.  21  and  p.  4. 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES  133 

such  as  the  proposition,  there  are  no  propositions.  This  is  self- 
contradictory,  since  it  is  itself  a  proposition.  Terms  as  such  do 
not  imply,  and  so  it  may  be,  that,  strictly  speaking,  there  are 
no  self-contradictory  terms.  Accordingly,  a  term  that  seems  to 
be  self -contradictory,  such  as  round-square,  may  be  a  mere  join- 
ing of  symbols.  But,  if  this  is  the  case,  then  it  can  be  proposi- 
tions alone  that  are  true  on  the  ground  that  they  are  presup- 
posed hy  their  own  attempted  denial,  and  by  their  contradic- 
tory. Such  a  denial  is  also  an  ahsurdity,  in  that  it  contradicts 
itself  by  presupposing  the  very  "thing"  that  it  denies.  Fop 
example,  the  position  of  the  skeptic,  that  there  is  no  truth,  is 
self-contradictory  and  absurd  in  that  it  is  itself  advanced  as  a 
truth,  and  so  presupposes  that  there  is  some  truth — to  the 
extent,  at  least,  of  one  truth.  Therefore,  the  proposition  there 
is  truth,  is  one  that  is  established  by  its  own  denial. 

Other  examples  of  propositions  which  are  established  or 
proved  in  this  manner  are:  (1)  There  is  thinking;  to  deny  this, 
is  to  think  and,  therefore,  to  presuppose  that  there  is  thinking; 
(2)  there  are  propositions ;  that  there  are  not,  is  itself  a  proposi- 
tion; (3)  the  principle  of  excluded  middle;  to  deny  this,  i.e., 
to  assert  that  there  is  a  third  possibility  between  two  contra- 
tradictories,  presupposes  that  there  is  no  third  possibility  be- 
tween the  two  contradictories  of  the  universality  of  this  princi- 
ple and  some  exceptions  to  it. 

But  if  there  are  certain  propositions  which  are  estal)lished  by 
the  principle  of  "presupposition  by  denial,"  it  is  important  to 
determine  by  what  test  this  principle  is  itself  true.  The  necessity 
of  putting  the  principle  to  some  test  is  evident,  since,  if  it  itself 
is  not  true,  it  cannot  be  a  (true)  test  for  truth  and  fact,  even 
when  it  is  correctly  applied.  However,  as  at  least  a  partial 
response  to  this  just  demand  it  can  be  shown,  that,  unlike  the 
tests  of  self -evidence  and  the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite, 
this  principle  does  apply  to  itself,  i.e.,  that  it  is  true  by  its  own 
test.  This  demonstration  can  be  made  as  follows,  though  in  a 
manner  that  is,  perhaps,  of  necessity  somewhat  involved. 

The  question  is,  whether  the  principle  that  "that  which  is 
presupposed  by  its  own  denial"  is  itself  presupposed  by  its  own 
denial.  If  it  is,  then  it  is  true  by  its  own  test.  To  give  one 
proof,  let  us  call  this  principle,  A,  and  then  deny  that  this  prin- 


134  METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

ciple  is  true,  i.e.,  assert  that  it  is  false.  The  problem  then  is, 
Does  this  denial  presuppose  the  principle  in  question,  namely, 
that  that  which  is  presupposed  by  its  own  denial  is  true?  The 
answer  to  this  question  is  "yes,"  and  the  reasons  for  this  answer 
are  as  follows:  If  the  specific  denial  under  consideration  is  true, 
it  is  true  only  on  the  ground  of  a  specific  principle,  namely, 
one  that  concerns  the  relationship  between  a  universal  affirmative 
proposition,  A,  and  a  particular  negative,  0.  litis  principle  is, 
that  if  a  particular  negative,  0,  is  true,  the  corresponding  uni- 
versal affirmative.  A,  must  be  false,  and,  conversely,  that,  if  A 
is  true,  0  must  be  false.  But  this  principle,  holding  between 
propositions  A  and  0,  is  the  very  principle  that,  in  the  instance 
under  investigation,  is  identical  with  proposition  A.  That  is, 
it  is  the  principle,  that  the  reason  why  a  contradictory,  either 
A  or  0,  must  be  true,  if  the  other  contradictory,  0  or  A  respec- 
tively, is  false,  is,  that  a  proposition  is  presupposed  (implied) 
as  true  hy  its  denial  (the  contradictory).  Therefore  the  denial 
of  this  proposition  or  principle  itself,  or  the  assertion  of  its  con- 
tradictory, presupposes  this  very  principle.  In  other  words,  this 
principle  is  itself  presupposed  by  its  own  denial,  and,  therefore, 
applies  to  itself,  or  is  true  by  its  own  test. 

The  original  principle  thus  confirms  itself,  and  in  this  respect 
is  different  from  the  two  criteria  previously  discussed.  For 
this  very  reason  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  logical,  and  not  a 
psychological  criterion.  Its  norm  is  w^hat  is  "presupposed"  or 
"implied,"  as  against  what  is  "evident"  and  what  is  exclusively 
"conceivable."  The  only  psychological  element  that  concerns 
it,  has  to  do  with  the  question  whether  or  not  it  applies  in  a 
specific  instance.  But,  if  it  does  apply,  it  applies  logically, — 
and  not  psychologically,  as  do  the  other  two  criteria.  Yet  it 
may  be  difficult  to  determine  whether  or  not  it  does  apply  in 
a  particular  instance.  For  example,  does  it  apply  to  that  situa- 
tion which  is  asserted  in  pragmatism,  namely,  that  there  is  no 
ahsolute  truth,  hut  that  all  truth  is  relative,  since  it  (all  truth) 
is  identical  only  with  that  which  is  adaptative,  and  works  and 
bring  satisfaction?  The  anti-pragmatist  claims  that  this  ivhole 
pragmatic  theory  of  truth  is  advanced,  not  as  a  theory  that  is 
true  by  its  own  explicit  definition  of  truth  as  fluctuating,  but 
as  one  that  is  true  absolutely,  and,  therefore,  that  absolute  truth 


THE  TRUTH  OF  PREMISES  135 

is  presupposed  by  its  attempted  denial  in  pragmatism^  The 
pragmatist  can  repudiate  this  accusation  only  by  the  counter 
claim  of  consistency,  namely,  that  his  pragmatic  theory  is  itself 
true  only  pragmatically.  Which  party  is  correct  in  his  claim? 
It  is  difficult  to  decide,  since  there  is  no  criterion  or  standard 
of  correctness  by  which  to  settle  such  a  question  between 
standards.* 

The  difficulty  in  such  an  instance  is,  however,  not  in  the 
principle  (of  presupposition  by  denial)  itself,  but  in  its  applica- 
tion. But  there  are  many  cases  in  which  the  application  of  the 
principle  is  not  so  difficult,  and  the  resultant  demonstration  of 
truth  is  entirely  clear.  For  example,  geometry  is  replete  with 
such  instances,  as  are  also  logic  and  the  whole  modern  "theory 
of  numbers."  Some  of  these  instances  will  be  examined  in 
subsequent  chapters. 

In  summary  it  may  be  said,  that  the  principle  of  presupposi- 
tion hy  denial  is  established  by  induction  from  those  cases 
where  it  applies,  and  that  it  also  confirms  itself.  No  exception 
to  it  has  been  discovered  in  the  realm  of  those  instances  to 
which  it  has  been  applied,  nor  has  it  been  proved  false  as  have 
the  principles  of  "self-evidence"  and  the  " inconceivahility  of 
the  opposite."  Accordingly,  both  the  principle  itself  and  that 
phase  of  it  which  is  the  reductio  ad  ahsurdimi  are  to  be  accepted 
as  extremely  reliable  logical  criteria. 

''  E.  g.,  by  Royce,  the  Eternal  and  the  Practical,  Phil.  Review,  Vol.  XIII., 
No.  2,  1904. 

^  Consistency,  it  may  be  remarked,  is  open  to  two  interpretations,  the 
pragmatic  and  the  anti-pragmatic.  Common  to  both  is  the  definition  of 
consistency  as  freedom  from  contradiction.  The  pragmatist  interprets  this 
as  expressing  a  certain  need  that  we  feel,  which,  when  satisfied,  is  identical 
with  one  kind  of  truth.  The  anti-pragmatist  interprets  it  absolutely,  as 
a  characteristic  holding  of  an  objective  "  state  of  affairs,"  especially  of 
that  one  which  characterizes  that  whole  which  is  the  universe.  The 
universe  of  facts  must  be  marked  Vjy  consistency.  To  the  anti-pragmatist 
this  is  self-evident;  its  opposite  is  inconceivable.  It  is,  indeed,  presupposed 
hy  its  own  denial. 


136    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  NATURE  OF  CONTRADICTION 

The  term  contradiction  has  already  been  used  in  a  number 
of  discussions.  Thus  the  "law  of  eontradietion,"  "contra- 
dictory terms,"  "contradictory  propositions,"  and  "self-contra- 
diction" have  been  referred  to,  or  discussed.  The  more  precise 
meaning  of  the  term  must  now  be  determined. 

On  the  one  hand,  contradiction  would  seem  to  mean  or  to 
involve  negation  in  some  way,  and  in  some  sense.  Yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  experience  always  has  a  content.  ^'Something"  is 
experienced.  Indeed,  it  would  seem  to  be  impossible  to  experi- 
ence, and  yet  experience  nothing.  Must  there  not  be,  then, 
something  positive  when  we  experience  negation  and  contradic- 
tion, and,  if  there  is,  ichat  is  this  positive  " something"  f^  An 
answer  to  this  question  may  be  sought  as  follows : — 

Examples  of  contradictory  terms  are,  red  and  not-red,  one  and 
not-one,  moving  and  not-moving :  of  contradictory  propositions, 
All  even  numbers  are  divisible  by  two,  and.  Some  even  numbers 
are  not  thus  divisible;  No  energy  can  be  destroyed  or  anni- 
hilated, and  Some  energy  can  be  destroyed:  of  self -contra- 
dictory terms,  round-square:  of  self-co)itradictory  propositions, 
"Epimenides,  being  a  Cretan,  said,  'All  Cretans  are  liars.'" 
Some  of  these  examples  and  the  states  of  affairs  typified  by  them 
may  now  be  examined  and  analyzed. 

Let  us  consider  first  the  contradictory  terms,  red  and  not-red. 
It  may  be  assumed  that  all  know  (to  some  degree)  what  is  meant 
by  red,  and  what  red  is,  and  also,  that  it  is  generally  realized 
that  the  term  denotes  a  certain  specific  group  of  colors,  namely, 
the  different  kinds  of  red.  There  are  many  reds.  But  there 
are  also  not-reds, — perhaps,  an  infinite  number  of  them,  includ- 
ing not  only  all  the  other  colors,  hut  also  everything  else  that, 
like  motion,  space,  time,  mass,  hardness,  and  electricity,  is  not 
a  color  at  all. 

^  Cf.  Whitehead,  Introduction  to  Mathematics,  on  the  meaning  of  zero, 
Chaps.  V.  to  VII.;  also  Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  and  Scientific 
Method  in  Philosophy  (see  his  index)  ;  cf.  also  Bergson,  Creative  Evolu- 
tion, Chap.  IV. 


THE  NATURE  OF  CONTRADICTION  137 

Now  it  is  found  to  be  a  fact,  that  e.g.,  one  and  the  same 
surface  is  not  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  area  both  red 
and  blue.  It  is  either  red,  or  some  other  color.  Colors  are,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  of  such  a  character  that  they  exclude  one 
another  from  existing  at  exactly  the  same  time  and  place.  But 
a  color  and  something  not  a  color  can  coexist  under  these  condi- 
tions. For  example,  a  specific  red  and  a  specific  degree  of  hard- 
ness can  simultaneously  be  qualities  of  one  and  the  same 
surface. 

In  relation  to  a  particular  red,  then,  all  other  "things"  are 
(formally)  not  this  red,  yet  they  are  first  experienced  as  quite 
as  positive  '"things"  as  is  red  itself.  Not  by  themselves,  there- 
fore, but  only  in  relation  to  red  are  they  negative  entities.  How- 
ever, among  the  not-red  "things"  there  are  tivo  kinds;  the  one 
kind  consists  of  other  colors,  and  these  are  excluded  from  co- 
existing with  red  at  the  same  time  and  place;  the  other  kind 
consists  of  such  "things"  as  hardness,  extension,  and  motion, 
that  are  not  so  excluded.  These  other  "things"  and  red  can 
coexist  in  the  same  place  and  at  the  same  time.  It  is  the  first 
kind  of  "thing,"  namely,  the  other  colors,  that  is,  therefore, 
the  real  contradictory  of  red,  for  only  between  other  colors  and 
red  '■s  there  the  specific  exclusion.  But  even  this  exclusion  sub- 
sists only  under  the  specific  conditions  of  the  same  time  and 
place.  For,  under  the  other  specific  conditions  either  of  dif- 
ferent times  and  the  same  place,  or  of  the  same  time,  and  dif- 
ferent places,  there  can  be  both  red  and  some  other  color. 

Contradiction  in  the  case  of  terms  is  thus  shown  to  be  a  rela- 
tion that  is  dependent  upon,  or  that  is  identical  with,  exclusion. 
When  and  where  there  is  genuine  exclusion,  there  also  is  con- 
tradiction. But  the  exclusion  is  itself  a  positive  relation  between 
positives.  Contradiction  and  negation  are,  therefore,  only 
derivatives  of  this  specific  relation.  For  this  exclusion  to  sub- 
sist there  must  be  certain  specific  conditions.  The  two  positive 
"things"  that  exclude  each  other  must  (1)  belong  to  the  same 
kind,  i.e.,  to  the  same  genus,  as,  e.g.,  do  blue,  red,  green,  and 
yellow,  as  colors.  The  positive  "things"  must  be,  to  express 
the  matter  figuratively,  like  the  arms  of  a  lever,  parts  of  the 
same  complex  entity.  But,  just  as  a  lever  must  rest  on  a 
fulcrum,  so  also,  in  order  to  have  a  genuine  contradiction  or 


138    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

exclusion,  there  must  be  a  "logical  fulcrum."  This  fulcrum 
is  given,  in  the  instance  of  the  entities  just  examined,  by  the 
specific  conditions  of  the  same  place  and  the  same  time. 

The  conditions  on  which  a  genuine  contradiction  subsists  be- 
tween propositions  are  essentially  the  same  as  those  for  con- 
tradictory terms.  In  every  case  of  contradictory  propositions, 
one  proposition  is  negative,  at  least  in  its  "logical  form."  But 
a  proposition  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  relational  complex,  and, 
although  there  are  different  types  of  propositions,  all  such  com- 
plexes are  identical  with  positive  states  of  affairs.  A  negative 
proposition  is,  therefore,  merely  the  fact  of  the  exclusion  of  one 
positive  state  of  affairs  by  another,  but  this  relationship  is  itself 
positive.  It  may  be  that  in  discovering  negative  propositions, 
we  first  endeavor  to  discover  the  compatibility  of  one  state  of 
affairs  with  another,  and,  failing,  formulate  the  result  in  a 
negative  judgment.  But  this  judgment,  then,  only  expresses 
the  positive  fact  of  the  exclusion. 

All  this  may  be  illustrated  by  an  examination  of  one  of  our 
previous  examples,  namely,  that  which  concerns  the  divisibility 
of  even  numbers  by  two.  Let  us  grant  that  there  is  the  objective 
state  of  affairs  or  proposition,  "that  all  even  numbers  are  divisi- 
ble by  two,"  and  also,  that  there  is  another  state  of  affairs  of 
"divisibility  by  two"  only  with  a  remainder.  If  this  is  the 
case,  then  there  is  also  the  state  of  affairs  of  the  exclusion  from 
all  even  numbers  of  "divisibility  by  two  with  a  remainder." 
But  this  specific  "state  of  affairs"  is  also  a  proposition,  which 
one  asserts  in  the  form  of  the  judgment,  that  it  is  false  that  some 
even  numhers  are  not  divisible  by  two.  This  last  could  itself 
be  a  proposition,  provided  only  there  were  a  consistent  and 
implicative  number  system  in  which  even  numbers  are  divisible 
by  two  with  a  remainder.  But,  if  this  were  the  case,  this  would 
be  a  proposition  in  a  distinct  and  different  universe  of  dis- 
course from  that  in  which  even  numbers  are  divisible  by  two, 
just  as,  e.g.,  the  several  postulates  concerning  parallels  are  in 
those  distinct  universes  of  discourse  which  are  known  respec- 
tively as  the  Euclidean,  Lobatschewskian,  and  Riemannian 
geometries. 

The  examination  of  further  similar  instances  confirms  our 
assertion,  that  the  situation  as  regards  contradictory  proposi- 


THE  NATURE  OF  CONTRADICTION  139 

tions  is  the  same  in  principle  as  it  is  in  the  case  of  contradictory 
terms.  Such  terms  are  positive  facts  or  entities  that  exclude 
one  another,  but  that,  accordingly ,  in  the  case  of  physical  ex- 
istents,  are  either  in  the  same  place  at  different  times,  or  are  at 
different  places  at  the  same  time.  In  the  case  of  propositions 
these  conditions  of  place  and  time  do  not  hold,  but,  instead, 
there  are  conditions  which  may  perhaps  best  be  called  logical, 
and  hy  virtue  of  which  contradictory  propositions  subsist  in 
different  universes  of  discourse.  These  different  universes  may, 
in  analogy  to  different  places,  be  called  different  logical  loci. 

The  problem  of  a  proposition  that  is  self-contradictory  is  per- 
haps more  difficult  than  that  of  two  propositions  that  are  con- 
tradictory of  each  other,  yet  the  solution  of  this  problem  is 
similar  to  that  of  the  two  preceding.  Propositions,  at  least 
those  which  are  identical  with  the  relation  of  inclusion,  complete 
or  partial,  positive  or  negative,  between  classes,  have  two  op- 
posites,  a  contradictory  and  a  contrary.  Thus  A  and  0,  and 
E  and  I  are  pairs  of  contradictory  opposites;  and  A  and  E, 
I  and  0,  of  contrary  opposites,  with  the  latter  two  called  sub- 
contraries,  as  distinct  from  A  and  E  as  contraries.  For  example, 
as  opposed  to  the  proposition.  Nothing  is  a  proposition,  there  is 
the  contradictory  opposite.  Some  "things"  are  propositions,  and 
also  the  contrary  opposite.  All  "things"  are  propositions.  The 
first  of  these  is  a  self -contradictory  proposition,  and  exemplifies 
the  type. 

Self -contradictory  propositions  imply  or  presuppose  their  con- 
tradictory opposite.  Thus,  Nothing  is  a  proposition,  implies  that 
So7ne  "things"  are  propositions,  since  it  itself  is  a  proposition. 
Self-contradictory  propositions  are  false  for  the  reason  that  they 
do  thus  presuppose  their  contradictory.  They  are,  therefore, 
one  class  of  propositions  that  imply,  showing  that  even  so  called 
false  propositions  have  some  status,  and  must  subsist  in  some 
universe  of  discourse,  namely,  in  one  that  is  excluded  from  the 
universe  of  true  propositions.  But,  further,  in  the  case  of  the 
example  under  examination,  whereas  nothing  is  a  proposition, 
implies  that  some  "things"  (at  least  one)  are  propositions,  this 
last  relational  complex  or  proposition  does  not  exclude,  but  is 
compatible  with,  the  specific  suhcontrary  state  of  affairs,  that 
some  "things"  are  not  propositions.    These  two  ''states  of  af- 


140    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

fairs"  can  cosubsist  even  as  red  and  extension,  mass  and  motion, 
biological  and  moral  situations  can  cosubsist.  As  an  example  of 
this  we  have,  within  the  same  universe  of  discourse  both  proposi- 
tions and  the  '' elements"  or  terms  of  these — some  of  which  "ele- 
ment" are  not  propositions. 

From  this  examination  of  several  instances  of  contradiction 
we  reach  the  conclusion,  that  this  relation  is  a  specific  one,  and 
that  it  rests  in  every  case  upon  the  positive  relation  of  exclusion 
between  entities  that  are  themselves  positive  and  not  negative 
in  character.  Contradiction  is,  then,  not  a  law  that  is  resident 
in  the  thinking  process,  as  the  psychologizing  tendency  in  logic 
interprets  it  to  be,  nor  is  it  an  instrument  invented  unconsciously 
by  the  collective  ingenuity  of  men  of  European  stock;  but  it  is 
an  empirically  discovered  fact  that  is  characteristic  of  many 
"things"  in  an  empirically  discovered  world,  and  thinking  must 
conform  to  it  only  because  thinking  must  conform  to  "things," 
to  facts.  And  that  fact  which,  above  ail,  thinking  must  conform 
to,  in  order  that  it  shall  be  correct  thinking  in  regard  to  the 
principle  of  contradiction,  is  the  fact  of  exclusion. 

One  of  the  instances  which  might  be  used  in  our  analysis  is 
the  very  exclusion  or  prohibition  of  thinking  certain  corrollaries 
of  the  principle  of  contradiction  to  be  false.  For  example,  to 
attempt  to  think  that  two  contradictories  should  both  be  true, 
or,  that  something  should  be  both  (1)  excluded  and  (2)  not 
excluded  from  a  universe  of  discourse,  presupposes,  in  form,  the 
very  principle  of  contradiction  or  of  exclusion,  and  its  cor- 
rollaries, and,  in  result,  is  precluded  by  this  principle.  In  other 
words,  the  principle  of  contradiction  is  itself  presupposed  in  the 
very  form  of  the  attempt  to  deny  it.  It  therefore  presupposes 
itself,  or,  it  excludes  its  own  contradictory. 


THE  DISJUNCTIVE  SYLLOGISM  141 

CHAPTER  XVII 

THE  DISJUNCTIVE  SYLLOGISM 

This  method  of  proof  need  not  long  detain  us.  It  is  appro- 
priately introduced  at  this  point  because  of  its  connection  with 
exclusion  and  contradiction.  A  disjunction  is  an  analysis,  fol- 
lowing the  objective  facts,  into  distinct  and  mutually  exclusive 
entities.  These  entities  may  be  either  terms,  such  as  "verte- 
brate" and  "invertebrate,"  or  propositions,  such  as  "all  related 
terms  are  dependent  on  one  another,"  and,  "some  related  terms 
are  independent  of  one  another."  The  fundamental  principle 
of  the  disjunction,  to  be  observed  in  all  cases,  is,  that  it  shoidd 
he  complete.  Since  it  is  identical  with  exclusion,  it  is  complete 
in  fact.  It  therefore  should  also  be  complete  in  those  judgments 
which  aim  to  assert  the  facts.  The  disjunction  is  expressed  as 
complete,  if  all  the  entities  that  are  excluded  by  that  entity 
which  forms  one  member  of  the  disjunction,  are  expressed  or 
referred  to  in  the  judgment  that  formulates  the  disjunction. 
This  completeness  of  reference  can  be  obtained  either  by 
enumerating  in  positive  form  all  the  several  entities  that  are 
excluded  from  one  another,  or  by  using  contradictories,  and, 
with  the  disjunction  thus  expressible  in  either  positive  or  nega- 
tive form,  these  two  forms  can  be  converted  into  each  other. 

As  an  example  of  these  assertions  we  select  the  fact  that  a 
particular  animal,  say,  a  whale,  is  either  a  vertebrate  or  not 
a  vertebrate,  i.e.,  an  invertebrate,  and  also  the  fact,  that  a  whale 
is  either  an  invertebrate  or  a  mammal,  bird,  reptile,  amphibian, 
or  fish,  for  these  five  "orders"  are  the  suh-classes  of  verte- 
brates. But,  from  the  fact  that  a  whale  is  not  an  invertebrate, 
it  follows,  that  it  is  both  a  vertebrate  and  also  either  a  mammal, 
bird,  reptile,  amphibian,  or  fish.  And,  by  further  exclusion,  if 
the  whale  is  not  any  one  of  these  last  four,  it  is  a  mammal. 

This  example  illlustrates  the  logical  structure  of  the  dis- 
juntive  syllogism.  The  major  premise  asserts  the  exclusion — 
exhaustively,  if  possible.  This  is  done  either  by  using  contra- 
dicforicr.  whiih  are  always  exhaustive,  since  there  is  no  middle 


142    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

ground,  or  by  enumerating  all  the  positive  possibilities  that 
come  under  either  one  of  the  contradictories.  The  minor  pre- 
mise consists  in  the  assertion,  either  that  one  of  the  possibilities 
is  an  actuality,  or,  that  it  is  not.  If  it  is  one  possibility  become 
actual,  then,  since  by  the  law  of  identity  a  "thing"  is  itself 
and  not  something  else,  and,  since  by  the  law  of  contradiction  it 
cannot  be  both  itself  and  something  else,  there  is  the  implication, 
that  it  is  not  any  of  the  other  possibilities;  conversely,  if  there 
is  evidence  that  a  "thing"  is  not  any  one  of  a  certain  set  of 
possibilities  except  one,  it  follows,  that  it  is  that  one.  This  asser- 
tion or  denial,  in  the  minor  premise,  of  one  or  the  other  of  the 
terras  of  the  disjunction  in  the  major  premise,  follows  the  usual 
principle  in  logic  and  mathematics,  that  to  negate  a  negative 
is  to  affirm.  Thus,  if  the  minor  premise  is  of  the  form  A  is  not 
not-B,  where  the  major  premise  is  of  the  form,  A  is  either  B  or 
not-B,  the  conclusion  is  implied,  that  A  is  B. 

In  constructing  a  disjunctive  syllogism  by  the  use  of  con- 
tradictories in  the  major  premise,  care  must  be  taken,  however, 
that  the  terms  of  the  disjunction  are  such  that,  if  an  entity 
"belongs"  to  one  of  the  two  contradictories,  it  cannot  belong  to 
the  other,  i.e.,  is  excluded  from  that  other.  The  danger  to  be 
avoided  is  illustrated  by  the  judgment  that  a  line  must  he  either 
finite  or  infinite.  This  judgment  is  false  for  the  reason  that  a 
line  can  be  hoth  finite  and  infinite — finite  in  respect  to  smaller 
lines,  as  units  of  length,  and  infinite  in  respect  to  points.  For 
certainly  a  line  is  "made  up"  of  both  smaller  lines  and  points, 
and  can,  therefore,  belong  "at  the  same  time"  to  the  two  dis- 
tinct universes  of  discourse  that  logically  determine  finiteness 
and  infinity  respectively.  The  genuine  exclusion  or  contradic- 
tion in  such  a  case  subsists  in  the  fact  that  as  regards  points 
a  line  cannot  be  both  finite  and  infinite,  and  that,  if  it  is  the  one, 
it  is  7iot  the  other;  also,  that  as  regards  smaller  lines,  it  cannot 
be  both  finite  and  infinite,  and  that,  if  it  is  the  one,  it  is  not 
the  other. 

The  "material"  truth  of  the  conclusion  of  a  disjunctive  syl- 
logism depends,  then,  upon  two  conditions:  first  upon  the  fact 
of  the  complete  and  genuine  disjunction  or  exclusion  with  which 
the  major  premise  is  identical,  and,  second,  upon  the  fact,  ex- 
pressed in  the  minor  premise,  that  a  certain  "thing"  either  is 


T^E  DISJUNCTIVE  SYLLOGISM  143 

or  is  not  (identical  with,  or  included  in)  one  of  the  terms  of 
this  disjunction.  Thus  the  two  premises  are  "materially"  true 
(1)  if  the  disjunction  subsists  between  genuine  contradictories, 
and  (2)  if  the  "thing"  under  consideration  belongs  to  the 
genus  which  conditions  those  contradictories.  For  example,  a 
''thing"  must  be  either  red  or  not-red,  i.e.,  some  other  color, 
provided  it  belongs  to  the  class  of  colored  ''things."  Also,  in 
this  instance,  the  major  premise  is  true,  if  all  positive  colors 
are  enumerated.  In  general,  the  major  premise  is  correct,  if  all 
the  positive  sub-classes  of  the  genus  to  which  the  "thing" 
belongs,  are  enumerated. 

However,  to  ascertain  whether  or  not  in  any  particular  case 
the  major  premise  is  materially  true  in  this  sense  is  a  problem 
for  empirical  investigation,  and  here  our  knowledge  is  always 
fallible.  Evidently  it  is  incumbent  upon  us  in  this  connection 
to  discover  as  many  actual  positive  differences  among  "things" 
as  we  can,  and  to  guard  ourselves  against  inferring,  from  our 
failure  to  distinguish,  the  absence  of  objective  distinctnesses. 
The  minor  premise  of  the  disjunctive  syllogism  is  to  be  estab- 
lished by  any  method  which  will  show  that  the  entity  under 
investigation  is  included  in,  or  excluded  from,  one  or  more  of 
the  entities  involved  in  the  disjunction  of  the  major  premise. 

While  the  disjunctive  syllogism  has  a  certain  limited  use  by 
itself  as  a  method  of  elimination,  its  chief  value,  however,  con- 
sists in  its  union  with  the  hypothetical  syllogism  to  form  the 
dilemma.  As  an  illustration,  let  us  assume,  in  accordance  with 
our  previous  discussion,^  that  there  are  only  three  possibilities 
as  to  the  nature  of  logical  principles  and  entities,  namely,  that 
they  are  all  either  (1)  psychological,  or  (2)  instrumental,  or 
(3)  objective.  The  establishment  of  any  one  of  these,  excludes 
the  other  two,  or  the  disproof  of  any  two  establishes  the  third. 
This  is  disjunctive  reasoning,  pure  and  simple. 

But  how  disprove  any  of  these  possibilities?  To  do  this  one 
might  show  them  to  be  (1)  absurd  in  some  sense,  i.e.,  to  be  incon- 
ceivable or  self-contradictory,  or  (2)  false  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
or  (3)  false  because  they  involve  consequences  that  are  not  facts. 
With  any  of  these  demonstrations  successful  for  one  possibility, 
the  remaining  possibilities  would  be   inferable   as  true.    But, 

'  Chap.  XIII. 


9M         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

in  a  process  of  this  kind,  we  have  a  dilemma,  or  a  trilemma, 
according  as  two  or  three  possibilities  are  enumerated,  and  their 
consequences  developed.  This  method  should,  accordingly,  be 
presented  in  some  further  detail,  with  a  preliminary  presenta- 
tion of  the  hypothetical  syllogism,  which  is  a  constituent  of 
every  dilemma. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
THE  HYPOTHETICAL  SYLLOGISM 

The  hypothetical  and  disjunctive  syllogisms  and  the  dilemma, 
while  they  are  methods  of  establishing  conclusions,  do  not  put 
an  end  to  the  indefinite  regress  of  premises  any  more  than  does 
the  categorical  syllogism,  for  their  conclusions  are  materially 
true  only  provided  their  premises  are  materially  true.  These 
premises  can  in  many  instances  be  established  by  deductions 
from  other  premises,  but  ultimately  an  appeal  to  some  other 
method  of  establishment  must  be  made.  This  has  just  been 
seen  to  be  the  case  with  the  disjunctive  syllogism.  To  establish 
the  major  and  minor  premises  of  this  syllogism  there  must  in 
most  instances  be  an  appeal  to  fact;  i.e.,  by  some  analytical 
method  one  must  discover  differences  among  ''things"  in  order, 
first,  to  set  up  the  disjunction,  and,  second,  to  include  or  not 
include  the  entity  under  examination  in,  or  to  identify  or  not 
identify  it  with,  some  one  or  more  of  the  distinct  entities  that 
are  asserted  by  the  major  premise. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  all  establishment  of  our  judg- 
ments is  hypothetical  or  conditioned.  This  mmt  he  the  case:, 
in  the  absence  both  of  any  one  absolute  test  of  truth  and  of  the 
means  for  the  certain  application  of  such  tests  as  we  do  have. 
All  deductive  proof,  all  induction,  all  self-evidence,  all  "con- 
ceivahility,"  and  all  proof  through  "presupposition  by  denial" 
lack  absoluteness  both  in  themselves  and  in  their  application. 
Therefore,  even  these  methods  and  tests  are,  in  this  respect, 
hypothetical  in  character. 


THE  HYPOTHETICAL  SYLLOGISM  145 

However,  although  we  have  no  test  or  method  by  which  to 
insure  the  absolute  correctness  either  of  our  tests  or  our  methods, 
or  of  their  application,  and  also  no  means  by  which  to  make 
ourselves  absolutely  certain  of  the  material  truth  of  our  pre- 
mises, nevertheless,  in  both  cases,  a  high  degree  of  probability 
is  attainable  in  a  great  many  instances.  Indeed  there  is  an 
immense  body  of  knowledge  that  is  true  in  this  sense,  and  there 
are  methods  of  establishment  and  of  proof  that  have  the  same 
standing.  Thus,  a  high  degree  of  probable  truth  characterizes 
our  knowledge  of  a  great  many  (1)  "things,"  qualities,  and 
events,  and  also  (2)  of  the  connections  and  relations  in  and 
among  these  entities. 

One  kind  of  knowledge  is,  however,  almost  exclusively,  if, 
indeed,  it  is  not,  in  some  cases,  wholly  a  knowledge  of  connec- 
tions. Such  knowledge  is  found,  e.g.,  in  pure  mathematics  and 
in  logic.  This  means  that  e.g.,  in  mathematics  we  freely  assume 
or  select  various  differing  sets  of  propositions,  and  then  proceed 
to  discover  their  implications.  The  assumed  propositions,  pro- 
vided they  give  an  implicative  system,  must  be  facts  in  some 
sense,  though  they  need  not  be  existent  facts. 

An  illustration  of  such  knowledge  is  presented  by  the  follow- 
ing example  from  the  field  of  geometry:  Let  it  be  assumed  (1) 
that  the  spatial  universe  is  bounded  by  a  spherical  film  and 
(2)  that  all  "things,"  including  human  beings,  change  in 
size  in  inverse  ratio  to  their  distance  from  the  center  of  such 
a  sphere.  Then  it  follows  from  or  is  implied  by  these  two 
assumptions,  that  if  the  boundary  of  the  sphere  were  ap- 
proached, it  would  continue  to  seem  to  be  as  tremendously, 
even  as  infinitely  distant  as  it  would  from  near  the  center.  For, 
although  there  would  be  "a  smaller  and  smaller  distance  to  go," 
nevertheless,  as  the  boundary  was  approached,  a  human  being 
and  all  his  means  of  measurement  would  approach  zero  in  size. 
Accordingly,  the  distance  ever  still  remaining  to  be  covered, 
would  continue  to  seem  quite  as  great,  in  relation  to  any  ^mit 
of  measurement,  as  it  now  seems  to  be  from  our  own  terrestrial 
center,  and  with  our  bodies  of  five  cubits  stature.^ 

Who  can  prove  that  all  this  is  not  the  case?     For,  are  not 

*  This  Non-Euclidean  world  is  described  by  Poincar6,  Science  and 
Bypotheals,  trans,  by  Q.  B.  Halsted.  p.  49  ff. 


146         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

size  and  distance  wholly  relative?  But,  if  all  "things"  were 
changing  size  in  the  same  ratio,  could  we  ever  become  aware  of 
this  from  observation?  Then  is  not  the  above  hypothesis  one 
that  cannot  be  disproved,  although,  also,  it  cannot  be  shown  to 
state  the  existent  fact?  Yet  one  can  make  the  hypothesis,  and 
deduce  from  it,  i.e.,  discover  its  implications.  If  we  do  this, 
we  are  introduced,  however,  to  a  world  and  a  space  which  are 
not  described  by  that  Euclidean  geometry  which  we  learned  in 
our  school-days,  but  by  that  other  geometry,  namely,  the 
Lobatschewskian,  in  which  parallel  lines  meet  at  the  boundary 
of  a  sphere,  and  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  plane  triangle  is  less 
than  two  right  angles. 

It  is  to  be  carefully  noted,  however,  that  in  this  example  it 
is  not  asserted,  that  either  the  original  hypothesis  or  its  conse- 
quences portray  the  actual  state  of  affairs  in  the  space  in  which 
we  live.  Indeed,  there  are  reasons,  due  to  the  grossness  of 
measurement,  why  neither  the  hypothesis  nor  its  consequences 
can  be  either  shown  or  not  shown  to  accord  with  this  space.  Yet 
if  the  original  hypothesis  could  be  established  for  our  space, 
say,  by  measurement  or  experimentation,  then  would  the  conse- 
quences which  have  been  stated  be  the  fact  about  our  space, 
provided  those  consequences  as  stated  are  really  implied  by  the 
hypothesis. 

Although,  now,  in  this  example,  the  hypothesis  can  be  neither 
affirmed  nor  denied  to  be  the  existent  fact,  and  although  there 
are  any  number  of  similar  hypotheses,  there  are,  also,  an  ex- 
tremely large  7iumher  of  propositions,  which,  as  hypotheses  for 
certain  consequences,  ca^i  he  affirmed  to  be  existent  facts  with,  a 
high  degree  of  probability.  In  fact,  propositions  of  this  kind 
make  up  the  greater  part  of  all  the  natural  sciences.  But,  with 
the  hypotheses  asserted  to  be  existent  facts,  the  consequences 
likewise  are  so  asserted.  It  is  in  this  way  that  science  becomes 
systematic.  Connections  of  various  kinds  between  states  of  af- 
fairs are  discovered  and  asserted  in  hypothetical  propositions. 
Thus,  to  illustrate,  we  find  that  if  the  moon  moves  around  the 
earth  in  a  certain  path,  there  will  be  a  solar  eclipse.  But  we 
discover  that  the  moon  does  so  move,  and  we  affirm  the  ante- 
cedent— the  hypothesis.  But  therewith,  also,  we  affirm  the  con- 
sequent, namely,  the  occurrence  of  the  eclipse. 


THE  HYPOTHETICAL  SYLLOGISM  147 

This  example  illustrates  the  structure  of  the  hypothetical  syl- 
logism. In  general,  this  method  of  reasoning  and  of  establishing 
conclusions  consists  of  a  major  premise  which  is  the  assertion 
of  a  connection  between  two  proposition^,  an  antecedent  and  a 
consequent,  in  the  typical  abstract  form,  if  a  is  h,  c  is  d.  By 
the  orthodox  rules,  the  minor  premise  must  be  either  the  affirma- 
tion of  the  antecedent,  or  the  denial  of  the  consequent.  Af- 
firmation of  the  antecedent  carries  with  it  the  affirmation  of 
the  consequent :  denial  of  the  consequent,  the  denial  of  the  ante- 
cedent. But,  denial  of  the  antecedent  is  usually  maintained  not 
to  necessitate  the  denial  of  the  consequent,  nor  affirmation  of 
the  consequent,  the  affirmation  of  the  antecedent, — for  there 
may  be  other  conditions  for  the  consequent  than  the  particular 
antecedent  stated.    These  rules  are  held  to  apply  to  all  cases. 

Undoubtedly,  however,  there  are  some  connections  between 
certain  antecedents  and  consequents  so  precise  and  unequivocal 
that  the  limitations  stated  by  these  rules  do  not  hold,  so  that 
denial  of  the  antecedent  does  necessitate  denial  of  the  consequent, 
and  affirmation  of  the  consequent,  affirmation  of  the  antecedent. 
In  illustration,  this  may  be  said  to  be  the  case  with  the  con- 
nection asserted  by  the  premise,  if  one  atom  of  hydrogen  and 
two  atoms  of  oxygen  combine,  water  is  formed.  However,  these 
unequivocal  connections  do  not  seem  to  be  universal.  For  ex- 
ample, if  electricity  passes  through  a  copper  wire,  heat  is  gen- 
erated. But  from  the  fact  of  heat  somewhere,  we  cannot  infer 
the  presence  of  electricity  in  a  conductor.  The  rules  for  the 
hypothetical  syllogism  can  only  be  so  formulated,  therefore,  as 
to  cover  all  cases  with  certainty.  This  is  done  by  the  rule  which 
demands  that  we  must  "either  affirm  the  antecedent,  or  deny  the 
consequent." 

Our  discussion  will  have  made  it  clear  that  there  is  a  funda- 
mental difference  between  merely  asserting  a  connection  of  im- 
plication between  two  propositions,  and  asserting  the  existential 
character  of  the  antecedent,  or  denying  that  of  the  consequent, 
i.e.,  to  assert  that  if  a  is  h,  c  is  d,  and  if  c  is  d,  e  is  f,  and  so  on, 
is  quite  different  from  asserting  that  a  is  h. 

This  difference  is  most  important.  Wherever  we  can  discover 
connections  and  yet  are  not  able  to  assert  antecedents  or  deny 
consequents,  we  can  nevertheless  discover  whole  systems  of  con- 


148         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

sistent  and  implicatively  connected  propositions  which,  for  this 
very  reason,  and  in  this  very  sense,  are  facts. 

This  method  offers  a  means  of  discovering  entities  that  are 
not  limited  to  the  field  of  existents.  In  other  vs^ords,  it  is  possible 
rationally  to  discover  entities  and  states  of  affairs  that  are  con- 
trary to  existent  fact,  or  that  do  not  exist,  i.e.,  we  can  discover 
what  would  be  the  state  of  affairs,  if  certain  "things"  did  not 
exist,  indeed,  if  nothing  existed, — defining  an  existent  as  that 
which  is  correlated  either  with  a  specific  part  of  space  and  a 
specific  part  of  time  (physical  existents),  or  with  a  specific 
time  alone  (mental  existents).  Such  entities — that  do  not  exist, 
but  that  are,  nevertheless,  discovered  to  be  facts  by  developing 
consistent  systems  of  propositions,  are  called  suhsistents.^ 
Indeed,  all  propositions  that  concern  existents  may  ultimately 
presuppose  propositions  that  concern  suhsistents.  For  example, 
propositions  concerning  matter  and  conscious  processes  presup- 
pose certain  related  states  of  affairs  concerning  space  and  time 
and  numher.  But  space  and  time  and  number,  though  facts, 
are  discovered  to  be,  not  existents,  but  subsistents.  This  dis- 
covery agrees  with  the  scientific  point  of  view  that  these  entities 
are  peculiar  "things"  that  concern  infinity,  endlessness,  con- 
tinuity, and  the  like,  and  that  are  studied,  not  by  physical  ex- 
perimentation, but,  independently  thereof,  by  the  rationalizing 
methods  of  thought  and  reason.' 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  DILEMMA 

The  dilemma  is  usually  defined  in  the  text-books  as  a  syl- 
logism in  which  the  major  premise  consists  of  a  disjunction 
between  two  hypothetical  propositions,  the  minor  premise,  of 
ya  disjunction  between  two  categorical  propositions,  and  the  con- 

"  See  Chaps.  XLI.,  XLIV. 

"  iScientilie   proof    of   this   distinction    is   found    in    the    fact,    e.g.,  that 

nowhere   in   the   implicative   ayatcra   of   any   kind   of   geometry   are  such 

entities  as  mass,  momentum,  and  the  like — entities  usually  identified  with 
matter  and   existence — found   to  be  implied.     Space   is  thus  demonstrated 

to  be  independent  of  that  ivhich  exists,  and,  in  this  sense,  to  be  a  sub- 
sistent. 


THE  DILEMMA  149 

elusion,  of  a  disjunction  between  either  the  antecedents  or  the 
consequents  of  the  major  premise.  To  illustrate,  we  may  assert 
as  a  major  premise,  that,  "If  education  is  popular,  compulsion 
is  unnecessary;  if  unpopular,  compulsion  will  not  be  tolerated"; 
and  as  a  minor,  that  "education  is  either  popular  or  unpop- 
ular"; the  conclusion  is  implied,  that  compulsion  either  is 
unnecessary,  or  will  not  be  tolerated. 

This  example  is  a  constructive  dilemma,  because  a  disjunction 
between  the  antecedents  of  the  two  hypothetical  propositions  of 
the  major  premise  is  asserted  as  a  minor  premise.  On  the  other 
hand,  where  a  disjunction  between  the  de^iials  of  the  two  con- 
sequents is  asserted,  the  dilemma  is  called  destructive.  In  either 
case,  of  course,  either  the  antecedents  or  the  consequents  may 
themselves  be  negative  in  meaning,  as  is  the  case  with  one 
antecedent  and  the  two  consequents  in  the  example  just  given, 
and  the  rule  then  holds,  that  the  denial  (in  the  minor  premise) 
of  a  negative  is  an  affirmation. 

The  technical  rules  for  the  dilemma  are  those  of  its  constitu- 
ents. The  consequent  must  genuinely  depend  in  some  way  on 
the  antecedent,  and  the  disjunction  must  be  complete.  This  it 
is,  if  it  subsists  between  contradictories,  or  if,  in  the  case  of 
contraries,  all  the  possibilities  are  recognized  and  stated.  The 
minor  premise  must  be  a  disjunction  either  between  antecedents 
asserted  or  consequents  denied. 

For  our  purposes,  however,  the  dilemma  may  be  advan- 
tageously defined  more  broadly  as  that  method  of  establishing 
a  position,  or  of  showing  the  necessity  of  accepting  a  proposi- 
tion, by  demonstrating  that  the  opposed  position  or  positions 
lead  to  consequences  that  cannot  be  accepted  for  the  reason 
either  that  they  are  not  facts,  or  that  they  are  absurd,  or  incon- 
ceivable, and  the  like.  This  may  be  illustrated  by  an  example, 
which,  though  not  materially  correct  in  every  way,  shows  the 
form  of  this  method  of  reasoning. 

Let  us  first  assert  the  disjunctive  proposition,  that  we  must 
either  tax  ourselves  or  tax  other  nations,  in  order  to  support 
our  own  government,  and  then  show  the  necessity  of  accepting 
the  first  alternative  by  developing  the  consequences  of  the  second, 
to  find  that  they  are  not  acceptable.  This  is  done  as  follows: 
First,  the  hypothetical  judgment  is  asserted,  that,  if  we  tax 


150         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

other  nations,  we  must  do  this  cither  by  force  or  by  beggary. 
If,  now,  we  can  show  that  this  consequent  must  be  denied,  then 
its  antecedent  must  also  be  denied,  and,  accordingly,  the  alterna- 
tive, that  of  taxing  ourselves,  be  accepted. 

But  this  consequent  (forcing  or  begging  other  nations  to  pay 
our  taxes)  must  he  denied  because  of  its  consequences — i.e.,  the 
dilemma  in  which  it  places  us.  For,  if  we  force  others  to  pay 
our  taxes,  then  we  are  a  pirate  nation,  while  if  we  ne^  others 
to  pay  our  taxes,  we  are  a  pauper  nation. 

But  the  taxing  of  others,  asserted  by  our  opponent,  means 
either  the  forcing  of  others  or  the  begging  of  others  to  pay  our 
taxes,  in  order  to  support  our  government.  Therefore  it  means 
either  that  we  are  a  pirate  nation,  or  a  pauper  nation, — a  choice 
that  we  cannot,  in  all  conscience,  accept. 

Therefore,  with  this  disjunctive  conclusion  thus  denied,  or 
not  accepted,  its  antecedent,  namely,  that  we  force  or  beg  other 
nations  to  pay  our  taxes,  is  also  denied,  as  is  in  turn  its  ante- 
cedent, and,  therewith,  the  alternative,  that  we  must  tax  our- 
selves, is  asserted. 

This  example,  however,  involves  a  material  fallacy  in  the  fact, 
both  that  it  ignores  the  real  point  at  issue  concerning  the  nature 
of  import  duties,  namely,  the  question,  whether  direct  or  in- 
direct taxation  is  most  advantageous,  and,  also,  that  it  finally 
identifies  the  method  of  indirect  taxation  by  import  duties  with 
taxing  other  nations.  However,  this  material  fallacy  does  not 
affect  the  logical  form  of  the  argument. 

I  This  method  of  establishing  propositions  by  the  dilemma  is 
used  very  frequently  in  philosophy,  both  in  getting  at  basic 
positions  and  in  arriving  at  details.  In  certain  cases  it  is  used 
in  connection  with  the  reductio  ad  absurdum  ^  and  the  principle 
of  "presupposition  by  denial."  To  give  an  illustration, — and 
one,  also,  that  is  of  importance  for  some  of  our  future  discus- 
sions— let  us  examine  the  question  as  to  whether  the  "^latural 
numbers"  are  dependent  on  counting,  in  order  to  show  that  they 
are  not.  Here  we  shall  show  that  the  proposition,  that  the 
natural  numbers  are  not  dependent  on  counting,  can  be  demon- 
strated by  the  fact  that  the  opposed  position  reduces  to  on 
absurdity;  it  presupposes  its  contradictory. 

^  Aristotle  recognized  the  reductio  ad  absurdum,  Anal.  Prior,  1,  v. 


THE  DILEMMA  151 

There  is  the  major  premise,  that,  if  numbers  depend  on 
counting,  then  "1,"  as  that  natural  number  which  has  no 
predecessor,  became  a  fact  with  the  first  act  of  counting;  while, 
if  numbers  are  not  so  dependent,  then  "1"  was  not  made  a  fact 
by  the  first  act  of  counting. 

But  there  is  the  minor  premise,  either  that  numbers  are 
thus  dependent  on  counting  or  that  they  are  not. 

The  conclusion  follows,  either  that  "1"  became  a  fact  with 
the  first  act  of  counting,  or  that  it  did  not  so  become. 

Let  us  next  examine  the  consequences  of  the  first  of  the  two 
alternatives  stated  by  this  disjunctive  conclusion.  To  do  this, 
let  us  assume  that  "1"  ivas  made  a  fact  hy  the  first  act  of  count- 
ing. Now  counting  is  an  act,  and  an  act  requires  time,  and 
begins  and  ends.  Then  a  time  is  implied,  before  this  first  act 
of  counting  took  place,  when  there  was  no  counting.  In  other 
words,  the  time  period  when  there  was  7io  counting  precedes  the 
time  period  when  the  first  act  of  counting  took  place.  Therefore 
this  time  period — of  the  first  act  of  counting — cannot  be  in 
correlation  with  the  natural  number  "1"  defined  as  the  only 
natural  number  that  has  no  predecessor,  but  must  be  in  correla- 
tion with,  at  least,  the  nattiral  number  "2,"  which  has  a  prede- 
cessor, namely  "1."  Therefore  ''1"  does  not  depend  on 
counting. 

Our  dilemma,  therefore,  leads  to  a  conclusion  consisting  of 
a  disjunction  between  contrary  opposite  propositions,  one  of 
which,  namely,  that  "1"  depends  on  counting,  reduces  to  an 
absurdity  in  that  it  presupposes  its  opposite,  namely,  that 
"1"  does  not  depend  on  counting.  But  this  opposite  is  the 
denial  of  the  consequent  in  one  of  the  hypothetical  alterna- 
tives of  the  major  premise  of  the  dilemma.  Therewith,  how- 
ever, the  antecedent  of  this  consequent  is  denied,  and  the 
opposite  proposition,  that  numbers  are  not  dependent  on  count- 
ing, asserted. 

By  quite  similar  arguments — differing  only  in  ''matter,"  but 
not  in  form — one  can  demonstrate  that  the  natural  numbers  do 
not  depend  on  consciousness  or  knowing  in  any  form,  nor  on 
physical  things,  nor  on  space,  nor  even  on  time.-  All  these 
entities  are  numerical  in  several  ways,  but  the  natural  numbers 
=  See  Chaps.  XLIII.,  vii.-x.,  and  Chap.  XLIV. 


152         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

themselves  are  facts  that  are  quite  independent  of  these  other 
entities. 

This  is  an  important  conclusion, — given  here  in  illustration 
— since  upon  the  principle  which  it  involves  there  depends  one 
of  the  greatest  philosophical  systems  of  history,  the  Platonic, 
with  its  acceptance  of  the  reality  of  universals,  of  abstractions, 
and  of  ideals  as  independent  of  the  concrete,  particular  ''things" 
of  the  physical  and  mental  world.  It  is,  indeed,  by  the  principle 
just  illustrated  that  such  ideals  as  justice  can  be  proved  to  be 
real  although  they  are  never  realized  in  a  world  of  human  beings 
that  exist  in  space  and  time.^ 


CHAPTER  XX 

ANALOGY 

Eeasoning  by  analogy  is  a  method  that  is  frequently  used  in 
philosophy.  For  example,  in  a  great  many  systems  the  entire 
universe  is  regarded  as  being  like  a  living  organism,  and  there- 
fore as  having  a  unity  in  the  midst  of  its  manifoldness,  even  as 
the  parts  of  a  plant  or  an  animal,  especially  a  highly  organized 
one,  influence  one  another  and  function  together  to  make  one 
living  being.  The  same  analogy  is  also  frequently  used  to 
demonstrate,  further,  that  the  universe  is  immanently  purpose- 
ful or  teleological.  Carried  to  its  consistent  outcome,  this  rea- 
soning leads  to  the  conclusion,  that  the  universe  is,  indeed,  an 
organism  that  manifests,  perhaps,  all  the  characteristics  of  life.^ 
Indeed,  if  one  finds  that  it  is  between  the  universe  and  higher 
organisms,  such  as  ourselves,  that  the  analogy  holds,  then  the 
conclusion  is  reached,  that  this  all-inclusive  living  being,  the 
universe,  is  conscious  in  all  that  this  may  mean,  in  fact  that 
it  may  be  self-conscious,  have  memory,  purposes,  and  aims,  and 
even  a  moral  consciousness,  and,  indeed,  be  a  person  and  a  self.^ 

»  See  Chap.  XLV. 

'  E.g.,  by  Paulsen  in  his  Introduction  to  Philosophy,  and  by  Bergson  in 
Creative  Evolution. 

'  The  position  of  most  modern  objective  idealists;   cf.  Chaps.  XXXIV.- 

xxxvm. 


ANALOGY  153 

Another  example  of  an  analogy  that  is  frequently  used  in 
constructing  philosophical  positions  is  the  argument  from  the 
similarity  of  the  universe  to  a  man-made  mechanism  or  machine. 
Such  a  mechanism  reveals  a  delicate  and  nice  adjustment  and 
working-together  of  parts  in  order  to  bring  about  a  certain 
result  and  thus  accomplish  a  certain  purpose.  But  this  adjust- 
ment is  brought  about  by  a  mechanician  and  contriver.  By 
analogy,  it  is  argued  that  in  nature  there  are  discoverable  con- 
trivances and  mechanisms  which  are  even  more  exquisite  and 
more  beautifully  adaptative  and  purposeful  as,  e.g.,  the  eye, 
the  heart,  and,  indeed,  even  the  v\^hole  universe  itself.  Accord- 
ingly it  is  inferred  that  for  the  universe  there  is  also  a  maker 
and  a  purposer.  This  conclusion  is  reached  in  this  way  by 
those  who  accept  an  external  teleology  as  a  position  that  means 
a  mechanistic  view  of  the  physical  and  even  the  psychical  uni- 
verse, and  the  theistic  view  that  there  is  a  Deity,  who,  as  in 
some  sense  outside  the  universe,  is  its  mechanist,  its  designer, 
or  its  architect,  if  not  its  absolute  creator.^ 

The  logical  structure  of  the  argument  by  analogy  becomes 
clear  through  these  examples.  Given  two  "things,"  as,  e.g., 
the  eye  and  a  watch,  that  are  similar  in  certain  respects,  namely, 
in  the  mutual  adjustment  of  structures  and  the  functioning- 
together  of  parts,  then  are  they  not  similar  in  further  respects, 
e.g.,  that  the  eye,  like  the  watch,  has  a  maker  and  a  purposer? 
By  analogy  one  concludes  that  this  is  the  fact. 

Stated  formally  this  method  of  establishing  premises  is  as 
follows:  Certain  entities.  A,  B,  and  C,  are  similar  in  respect  to 
the  characteristics,  x  and  y;  but  A  and  B  are  characterized  also 
by  z;  therefore  C  is  also  characterized  by  z. 

Clearly  the  presupposition  of  this  argument  is  the  principle, 
that  whatever  is  similar  in  certain  respects  is  also  similar  in 
others.  But  it  requires  only  the  statement  of  this  presupposi- 
tion to  make  the  fact  equally  clear,  that  partial  similarity  does 
not  of  necessity  carry  with  it  further,  much  less,  complete 
similarity.  In  certain  instances  such  further  similarity  is 
found ;  in  other  instances  it  is  not.  The  most  that  we  are  justi- 
fied in  concluding,  is,  therefore,  that  if  there  is  some  similarity, 
there  may  be  more.  That  it  is  even  highly  prohaMe  that  there 
'  Cf.  Chaps.  VI.  and  VII. 


154.         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

is  more,  can  be  justifiably  asserted  provided  only  that  analogy 
ceases  to  be  analogy,  and  becomes  induction.  Given  two  typical 
and  random  instances,  A  and  B,  with  each  characterized  by  an 
X,  but  with  X,  e.g.,  causally  or  functionally  connected  with  y 
in  these  cases;  then,  if  other  entities,  C,  D,  E,  etc.,  are  char- 
acterized by  X,  they  are  also,  with  a  high  degree  of  probability, 
characterized  by  y. 

The  crucial  problem,  therefore,  in  employing  the  argument  by 
analogy  is  that  of  ascertaining  whether  or  not  further  similarity 
really  holds  or  not.  But  if  it  does,  there  is  some  other  reason  than 
analogy  for  it  so  doing.  It  is  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  the  sev- 
eral cases  are  instances  of  a  law,  a  principle,  a  type,  or  a  class, 
that  similarity  in  respect  to  certain  characteristics  carries  with 
it  similarity  in  respect  to  others.  Thus  there  is  a  resemblance 
in  many  respects  between  the  rocks  as  we  find  them  often  in 
extremely  distinct  strata,  and  the  layers  of  material  that  are 
deposited  by  the  waters  of  the  earth's  surface  today.  Does  the 
resemblance  go  further?  The  geologist  advances  the  inductive 
theory  that  it  does,  but  finds  in  these  two  sets  of  phenomena 
the  results  of  the  action  of  a  common  cause.  Even  as  the  sedi- 
ments are  to  be  observed  today  in  a  process  of  stratification,  so 
were  the  stratified  rocks  slowly  deposited  in  past  ages,  gradually 
to  harden  through  the  addition  of  other  materials. 

Can  we  discover  by  a  similar  procedure  such  features  of  the 
universe  as  will  give  inductive  proof  that  it  belongs  to  the  type, 
organism,  or  to  the  type,  machine?  If  we  cannot,  then  to  infer 
on  the  basis  of  analogy  that  the  universe  is  an  organism,  or  a 
machine,  is  extremely  hazardous. 

In  general  we  may  conclude,  that,  if  reasoning  by  analogy  is 
valid,  then,  paradoxically,  this  validity  rests  on  some  further, 
non-analogical  basis.  At  best  analogy  can  serve  only  as  a  basis 
for  the  suggestion  that  there  is  a  certain  range  of  possibilities 
within  which  to  investigate.  Thus  the  universe  may  be  an 
organism,  or  it  may  be  a  machine;  hut  it  may  he  neither.  On 
the  basis  of  analogy  one  should  neither  accept  nor  reject  these 
possibilities,  but  should  hold  his  judgment  in  suspense  regarding 
them  until  evidence  and  proof  from  ether  sources  are  at  hand 
to  justify  a  highly  probable  conclusion  one  way  or  the  other. 


FURTHER  IMPLICATIVE  SITUATIONS  155 

III.   ANALYSIS  AND  THE  NEW  LOGIC 

CHAPTER  XXI 

FURTHER  IMPLICATIVE  SITUATIONS  AND  NEW  METHODS 
OF  ESTABLISHING  PREMISES 

The  discussion  of  the  dilemma  and  of  analogy  completes  the 
presentation  of  those  tests  and  methods  that  are  used  in  ordinary 
discourse  and  argumentation  in  order  to  establish  premises  and 
furnish  proof.  But  such  tests  and  methods,  even  if  they  are 
not  discredited,  as  is,  e.g.,  the  test  by  self-evidence,  are  inade- 
quate to  deal  with  all  the  problems  and  situations  that  the 
universe  presents  to  the  inquiring  mind. 

The  tests  and  methods  that  we  have  been  considering  are 
those  that,  for  the  most  part,  directly  constitute  the  logic  of  the 
tradition.  This  traditional  logic  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  doctrine 
that  emanated  from  Aristotle,  and  is  essentially  a  logic  of 
classes.  As  a  logic  of  classes  it  is,  as  we  have  also  seen,^  based 
on  the  physical  thing  as  that  model  in  analogy  to  which  all 
entities  are  conceived  of  and  thought  about.  Accordingly  the 
principles  that  form  the  chief  characteristics  of  this  traditional 
doctrine  are:  (1)  the  relations  of  similarity  and  of  difference, 
of  "member  of,"  of  additiveness,  of  inclusion,  complete,  partial, 
and  negative,  of  causation,  of  inherence,  of  identity,  and  of  con- 
tradiction; (2)  the  subsistence,  by  virtue  of  the  first  four  rela- 
tions, of  classes  (which  are  either  included  in  or  excluded  from 
other  classes  completely  or  partially)  ;  (3)  the  principle  of  iden- 
tity as  applying  to  each  individual  and  to  each  class ;  (4)  causa- 
tion as  holding  between  individuals,  and  (5)  inherence  as  holding 
between  the  qualities  and  their  sul) stratum,  and  finally  (6)  the 
propositions  that  are  constituted  by  any  of  these  relations, — in 
their  function  of  relating  terms. 

This  traditional  Aristotelian  logic  has  controlled  the  ma- 
jority of  the  great  historical  systems  of  philosophy,  and  domi- 
nates much  philosophy   even  at  the  present  time.     Indeed  it 

^  Chaps.  I.-III. 


156         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

exercises  its  influence  even  on  some  philosophers  who  endeavor 
to  criticize  both  it  and  the  systems  that  are  built  upon  it.- 

However,  in  mathematics  and  in  other  fields  of  research  in 
which  appeal  is  made  to  fact,  and  not  to  authority  and  tradi- 
tion, modern  investigation  has  shown  that  the  logic  of  classes 
is  not  the  only  logic,  and  that  the  situations  described  by  it 
are  not  the  only  ones  in  which  the  relation  of  ijnplication  is 
present. 

By  way  of  sharply  contrasting  the  two  logics  one  may  say 
that,  if  the  logic  of  the  Greek  and  Medijeval  period  was,  with 
few  exceptions,  one  of  classes,  the  logic  of  modern  exact  science 
is  one  of  series.  In  such  isolated  instances  as  the  geometry  of 
Euclid,  the  mechanics  of  Archimedes,  and  the  astronomical 
theories  of  Aristarchus,  Hipparchus,  and  Ptolemy,  situations 
were  recognized  in  which  series  and  their  logic  are  present.  But 
this  logic  received  no  formulation  either  from  Aristotle  or  from 
his  successors  in  that  tradition  to  which  he  was  the  chief  con- 
tributor. Indeed,  not  until  the  Archimedean  spirit  of  an  appeal 
to  nature  was  revived  by  such  pioneers  as  Leonardo  and  Galileo, 
and  continued  by  the  host  of  their  noble  successors,  was  there 
opportunity  for  a  break  with  the  tradition  and  the  use  of  the 
logic  of  series.  Galileo  ^  sounded  the  trumpet  call  for  the 
coming  advance  when,  with  the  insight  of  genius,  he  showed  by 
experiment  that  uniformly  changing  velocity,  i.e.,  acceleration, 
ife  in  a  functional  relaiion  to  the  time  series.  In  such  a  rela- 
tionship there  is  present  much  of  that  logic  which  received  at 
least  partial  formulation  in  the  Calculus  of  Newton  and  of 
Leibniz,  and  which  has  received  its  more  complete  statement 
in  the  recent  work  of  such  men  as  Cantor,  Dedekind,  Peano, 
Eussell,  and  Royce.* 

The  present  knowledge  of  this  modern  logic  makes  it  quite 
clear  that  the  Aristotelian  doctrine  wholly  omits  the  formula- 
tion of  certain  logical  principles  that  subsist  in  certain  situa- 
tions. These  principles  are  found  where  there  are  series.  A 
series  is  an  ordered  class  of  individuals,  in  which  each  individual 

*  See  the  modification  and  the  underlying-reality  theories  of  relations, 
Chap.  XXVI.,  and  the  whole  of  Section  1  of  Part  II. 

•  Galileo  (Jaliloi,  Dialogues,  ed.  by  A.  de  Salvio,  trans,  by  H.  Crew, 
1914;  cf.  Mach,  Science  of  Mechanics,  on  Galileo. 

*See  references  for  Chaps.  I. -111.,  XXVII.,  XLI.-XLIV. 


FURTHER  IMPLICATIVE  SITUATIONS  157 

has  a  specific  "position"  in  relation  to  the  position  of  all  the 
other  individuals  of  the  series.  The  Aristotelian  logic  is  wholly- 
incapable  of  dealing  with  such  entities  (series),  since  it  recog- 
nizes no  principle  of  order  other  than  that  of  the  positive  or 
negative  inclusion  of  one  class  in  another.  It  accordingly  is 
identical  with  the  (tacit)  assumption  that  individuals  or  parts 
are,  in  most  cases,  related  only  additively  to  constitute  a  whole, 
and  is,  therefore,  incapable  of  logically  accounting  for  a  whole 
that  has  properties  different  from  those  of  the  parts,  as,  e.g., 
has  a  chemical  compound  in  contrast  with  its  elements,  and  a 
living  being  in  contrast  with  the  chemical  and  physical  forces 
of  which  it  is  composed.  For,  parts  added,  i.e.,  related  addi- 
tively, give  only  a  swm,  i.e.,  a  whole  which  has  properties  like 
those  of  the  parts. 

In  contrast  with  the  traditional  doctrine,  the  new  logic  recog- 
nizes, therefore,  the  principle,  that  a  whole  may  consist  of  tivo 
or  more  kinds  of  parts,  and  that  the  individuals  of  some  of 
these  kinds  tnust  be  related  non-additively  in  order  to  constitute 
the  whole.  Such  a  non-additive  relation  is  asymmetrical,  and 
is  present  in  every  series. 

But,  further,  the  Aristotelian  logic  is  also  wholly  ignorant 
of  the  functional  relationship,  which  plays  such  a  dominant  role 
in  modern  exact  science.  Yet  that  it  must  be  thus  ignorant  is 
to  be  seen  from  the  fact  that  it  excludes  series,  and  a  function 
is  a  correlation  between  scries.  Accordingly  the  traditional 
logic  omits  the  use  of  the  principle,  that  two  entities  can  be 
related  and  yet  be  independent.^  This  principle  is  typified  in 
the  character  of  that  relation  which  subsists  between  the  two 
variables  (series)  of  a  function.  The  Aristotelian  logic  accepts 
and  insists  on  the  opposed  principle,  that  all  relatedness 
carries  with  it  the  mutual  causal  modification  of  the  related 
entities. 

Finally,  the  traditional  logic  omits  the  principle,  that  a  rela- 
tion itself  unites,  in  some  specific  way,  the  entities  related,  so 
that  a  substance  or  substratum  is  not  needed  to  hold  these 
entities  together  and  to  mediate  the  relation.  Indeed,  modern 
logic  centers  very  largely  on  the  concept  of  relations,  and  the 
Aristotelian  logic,  in  contrast,  on  the  concepts  of  substance  and 
'  Sep  Chap   XXVI..  n.,  1. 


158    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

causation.  This  it  must  do,  since  its  model  is  interacting 
physical  things,  with  a  physical  thing  defined  as  a  group  of 
qualities  that  inhere  in  a  core-like  substance.*^ 


CHAPTER  XXII 

ANALYSIS 

The  methods  of  the  new  logic  are  both  analytical  and  syn- 
thetical. To  analyze  is  to  discover  parts — in  or  of  a  whole, — 
and  also  the  character  of  the  relations  between  the  parts,  but, 
with  this  accomplished,  there  is  also  synthesis.  For  the  pre- 
liminary to  the  synthesizing  of  parts  experimentally  is,  after 
discovering  the  parts,  to  find  how  to  put  thera  together.  But, 
if  experiment  is  impossible  in  certain  cases,  then,  with  the 
discovery  of  parts  and  the  specific  character  of  their  relatedness, 
there  already  is  synthesis.  This  second  method  is  analysis  and 
synthesis  in  situ.  We  start  with  a  whole,  and  in  it  discover 
parts ;  but  the  parts  are  left  undisturhed;  still  we  discover  that, 
related  in  a  certain  way,  they  give  the  whole  "back  again."  It 
is  this  method  of  analysis  and  synthesis  in  situ  that  is  used  in 
mathematics,  geometry,  and  to  a  large  extent  also  in  mathe- 
matical physics,  chemistry,  and  many  other  sciences.  But  it  is 
an  important  characteristic  of  this  method,  that  it  is  not  only 
an  analysis  and  a  synthesis  in  situ,  but  also  a  means  whereby 
one  discovers  facts  hy  implication  and  hy  type  rather  than  by 
the  specification  of  each  particular  indivitlual.^ 

Such  a  procedure  may  be  illustrated  by  the  example  of  that 
analysis  of  space  which  is  made  by  geometers  at  the  present 
time.  In  giving  this  example,  some  of  the  teims  may  be  left 
undefined,  since  they  will  be  readily  understood  in  essentially 
their  correct  sense. 

The  space  in  which  we  perceive  physical  entities  is  found  to 

e  See  Chap.  III. 

^  Cf.  my  "  Defense  of  Analysis  "  in  The  'New  Realism,  and  the  article  by 
H.  T.  Costello,  "A  Neo-realistic  Theory  of  Analysis,"  in  the  Jour,  of 
Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  X.,  p.  494  ff. 


ANALYSIS  159 

consist  of  three  dimensions,  with  each  at  right  angles  to  the 
other  two.  Each  of  these  dimensions  is  itself  a  straight  line 
with  no  breadth  or  thickness,  and  thus  quite  unlike  the  pencil 
or  crayon  line  by  which  it  can  be  represented.  But  while  this 
analysis  of  space  is  being  made,  these  three  dimensions  are  left 
in  situ,  since  we  cannot  experimentally  separate  them.  Further, 
any  one  finite  line  is  of  definite  length  in  relation  to  some  unit 
of  measurement,  and,  therefore,  can  be  analyzed  into  smaller 
lines,  even  as  a  foot  is  analyzable  into  twelve  inches.  Each 
such  smaller  line,  however,  is  in  turn  analyzable  into  still  smaller 
lines.  Let  this  analysis,  now,  be  continued  and  repeated  up  to 
that  point  beyond  which  our  instruments  of  measurement  do 
not  take  us,  and  it  will  be  then  discovered  that  the  analysis 
can  be  "ideally"  continued.  This  realization  is  accompanied 
by  the  further  discovery  that  tliere  is  a  limit  which  the  smaller 
and  smaller  lines  approach  but  do  not  reach,  and  that  this  limit 
is  a  point.  Such  a  point,  as  the  limit,  has  no  length,  no  breadth, 
and  no  thickness.  We  cannot  see  or  touch  it,  indeed,  in  some 
cases  we  cannot  even  specifically  name  it.  Yet,  hy  discovering 
implications,  we  find  that  there  are  such  points,  in  fact,  a  whole 
class  of  them.  This  is  knowledge  hy  type,  and  not  by  specifi- 
cation. 

But  the  analysis  further  reveals  both  the  character  of  the 
relation  between  these  points  and  their  numher.  The  relation 
is  of  the  same  type  as  is  that  relation  which  subsists  between 
the  positive  integers,  1,  2,  3,  4,  5,  6,  n  —  1,  n,  n  -\-  1,  i.e.,  it  is 
asymmetrical  and  tramitive.  This  means  that,  if  the  symbol  < 
stands  for  the  relationship  of  "precedes,"  then,  e.g.,  4  <  5,  but 
not  5  <  4;  i.e.,  the  relation  is  asymmetrical ;  also,  that,  if,  4  <  5 
and  5  <  G,  then  4  <  6;  i.e.,  the  relation  is  transitive,  or  "goes 
across"  from  4  to  6.  This  means  that,  like  the  positive  integers, 
the  points  of  a  line  form  a  series,  or  that  the  line  is  a  series  of 
points.  Further,  the  number  of  points  is  infinite  in  the  sense 
that  any  finite  part  of  a  finite  line  contains  as  many  points  aa 
the  whole  line  does, — a  discovery  that  is  made  by  finding  that, 
in  respect  to  points,  the  whole  line  is  in  one-one  correspondence 
with  a  proper  part  of  itself,  a  "proper  part"  being  defined  as 
a  part  that  is  like  tho  whole,  i.e.,  that  is  itself  a  line.  Again, 
in  this  respect  iho  lino  ir-.  like  the  series  of  positive  integers, 


160    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

since,  in  this  series,  there  are  as  many  even  integers  as  there 
are  odd  and  even.  In  other  words,  the  whole  series  is  in  one-one 
correspondence  with  a  proper  part  of  itself,  namely,  with  the 
even  integers,  as  it  is,  also,  with  the  odd  integers. 

The  example  just  given  is  illustrative  of  a  type  of  whole  that 
has  furnished  philosophy  and  science  with  many  difficult  prob- 
lems from  the  time  of  earliest  Greek  thought  to  the  present. 
However,  some  of  these  difficulties  have  come  from  the  fact 
that  the  analysis  which  has  been  attempted  has  not  followed 
correct  logical  principles,  or  that  the  logic  which  is  actually 
involved  in  the  entities  analyzed  has  not  been  discovered.  In 
some  cases,  also,  while  the  analysis  has  been  correct  up  to  a 
certain  point,  it  has  been  incomplete.  Often,  also,  correct 
analysis  has  been  misinterpreted.  Accordingly,  in  the  case  of 
such  entities  as  space,  time,  and  motion,  various  self-contradic- 
tions, and  peculiar  logical  situations  called  "antinomies"  have 
appeared  to  be  involved,  and  have,  indeed,  been  considered  to 
be  back-handed  proofs  of  the  correctness  of  certain  philosophical 
positions,  as,  e.g.,  of  Phenomenalism. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

ANALYSIS  BY  INCORRECT  PRINCIPLES 

An  example  of  a  philosophy  that  derives  support  from  the 
difficulties  that  arise  from  a  fanlty  analysis  of  space  and  time 
is  Phenomenalism,^  This  is  the  position  of  the  philosopher,  Ira- 
manuel  Kant  (1724-1804),  who  is  considered  b}^  some  to  be  the 
greatest  of  all  modern  philosophers.  In  one  part  of  his  work, 
The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  Kant  develops  four  so-called 
"antinomies."  By  an  "antinomy"  Kant  means  a  pair  of  con- 
trary-opposite propositions  each  of  which  can  be  both  proved 
and  disproved.  Each  can  be  proved  by  the  rcductio  ad  ab- 
surdum  of  the  other,  i.e.,  each  is  shown  to  be  presupposed  by 
its  own  denial.    Thus  it  is,  also,  that  each  can  be  disproved. 

The  Second  Antinomy  is  here  selected  in  order  to  illustrate 
'  See  Chap.  XXIX. 


ANALYSIS  BY  INCORRECT  PRINCIPLES  161 

this  peculiar  situation  and  the  way  in  which  it  is  artificially 
created  by  faulty  analysis.  Kant 's  formulation  of  this  antinomy 
is  as  follows: — 

Thesis 

"  Every  composite  substance  in  the  world  is  made  up  of  simple  parts, 
and  nothing  whatever  exists  but  the  simple,  or  that  which  is  composed 
out  of  the  simple." 

Proof 

*'  Assume  that  composite  substances  are  not  made  up  of  simple  parts. 
Then,  if  we  think  all  composition  to  be  away,  no  composite  part  will 
be  left.  And,  by  hypothesis,  there  is  no  simple  part.  Hence,  nothing 
at  all  will  remain,  and  therefore  no  substance.  Either,  then,  it  is 
impossible  to  think  all  composition  to  be  away,  or  even  after  composition 
is  thought  to  be  away,  there  must  be  something  left,  which  exists 
without  composition,  that  is,  the  simple.  In  the  former  case,  the  com- 
posite cannot  be  made  up  of  substances,  for  composition  is  merely  an 
accidental  relation  of  substances,  which  may  be  taken  away  without  at 
all  affecting  their  existence  as  permanent  realities.  But,  by  hypothesis, 
substances  do  exist,  and  hence  we  must  adopt  the  other  supposition, 
that  the  composite  substances  in  the  world  consist  of  simple  parts. 

It  directl}'  follows,  that  all  the  things  in  the  world  are  simple;  that 
composition  is  merely  an  external  state  of  those  things;  and  that, 
although  we  can  never  take  elementary  substances  out  of  their  state 
of  composition  and  isolate  them,  reason  must  think  of  them  as  the 
primary  subjects,  which  exist  as  simple  beings  antecedently  to  all 
composition." 

Antithesis 
"  No  composite  thing  in  the  world  is  made  up  of  simple  parts,  nor 
does  anything  simple  exist  anywhere  in  the  world." 

Proof 
"  Assume  that  a  composite  thing  or  substance  is  made  up  of  simple 
parts.  Then,  as  no  external  relation,  and  therefore  no  composition 
out  of  substances,  is  possible  except  in  space,  the  composite  thing  must 
be  made  up  of  exactly  the  same  number  of  parts  as  the  space  which 
it  occupies.  Now,  space  is  not  made  up  from  simple  parts,  but  consists 
of  spaces.  Evei'y  pai"t  of  the  composite  thing  must  therefore  occupy 
a  space.  But  the  absolutely  primary  parts  of  every  composite  thing 
are  simple.  Hence  each  of  those  simple  parts  occupies  a  space.  Now, 
as  every  real  thing,  which  occupies  a  space,  contains  within  itself  a 
number  of  parts  that  are  outside  of  one  another,  and  is  therefore 
composite;  and  as  this  real  composite  thing  is  not  made  up  of  accidents, 
since  these  could  not,  apart  from  substance,  be  outside  of  one  another; 
we  must  conclude,  that  simple  substance  is  composite.  .    .    ."^ 

'  Watson,  The  Philosophy  of  Kant,  ed.  1895,  pp.  160-161. 


162         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

Kant's  formulation  of  this  Antinomy  is,  very  evidently,  rather 
obscure,  but  if  it  is  subjected  to  a  rather  violent  paraphrasing, 
it  is  found  to  mean: — 

Thesis:  Every  (composite)  substance  is  made  up  of  simple 
parts  as  the  condition  for  there  being  suhstances  at  all.  For 
(proof)  if  there  were  no  simple  parts,  and  yet  substances  were 
derived  by  composition  of  parts,  then  we  should  have  something 
"coming"  out  of  nothing — which  is  impossible.  Therefore  there 
must  he  ultimate  simples  (such  as  are  recognized  in  science 
today  as  atoms,  or  as  electrons)  in  order  that  there  may  be 
substance  at  all. 

Antithesis:  No  substance  is  made  up  of  simple  parts,  since 
(proof)  if  a  substance  "occupies"  space  (and  it  does),  it  is 
as  "repeatedly  divisible,"  again  and  again,  into  ever  smaller 
parts,  as  is  the  space  which  it  occupies,  i.e.,  no  "smaller 
part,"  such  as  an  atom  or  electron,  is  absolutely  simple, 
because,  as  extended  in  space,  it  is  divisible,  and  therefore 
complex. 

A  clearer  formulation  of  the  same  antinomy  is  one  that  does 
not  run  the  danger  of  examining  both  substance  and  space  "at 
the  same  time,"  but  that  considers  space  alone. 

Such  an  antinomy  of  space  may  be  stated  in  the  form : — 

Thesis:  Space  does  not  consist  of  points,  revealed  by  analysis, 
but  must  consist  of  simple  parts  or  spaces  (lines,  planes,  or 
volumes). 

Proof:  Assume  the  contrary-opposite  proposition,  namely,  that 
space  does  consist  of  points.  But  a  point  is  unextended.  There- 
fore, if  extension  be  derived  from  points, — in  other  words,  if 
space  of  one,  two,  or  three  dimensions  is  composed  of  points, 
then  something  "comes"  from  nothing,  i.e.,  the  extended 
"comes"  from  the  ttnextended.  But  this  is  (for  Kant)  im- 
possible (perhaps  because  it  is  inconceivable).  Therefore  that 
entity  to  which  the  analysis  of  space  leads  must,  by  whatever 
name  it  may  be  called,  be  extended,  i.e.,  it  must  itself  be  space 
or  extension. 

Antithesis:  Space  does  consist  of  ultimate,  unextended  simple 
parts,  i.e.,  of  points. 

Proof:  Assume  the  contrary-opposite  proposition,  namely,  that 
space  does  not  consist  of  points,  but  of  spaces,  i.e.,  of  lines, 


ANALYSIS  BY  INCORRECT  PRINCIPLES  163 

planes,  and  volumes.  Then,  as  extensions,  these  parts  are  divisi- 
ble, as  are  their  parts  in  turn,  and  so  on,  until  finally  unex- 
tended  and  absolutely  simple  parts  are  reached.  Then  it  is  of 
such  parts,  i.e.,  of  points  that  space  consists.^ 

Kant  arrives  at  this  antinomy  because  he  unknowingly  ac- 
cepts an  incomplete  and  faulty  analysis.  This  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  his  attention  is  directed  exclusively  to  points,  and 
that  he  ignores  the  character  of  the  specific  relations  between  the 
points.  But  points  actually  are  related  in  a  very  specific  way, 
and  through  the  specific  relations  that  hold  among  them  (unex- 
tended)  points  do  constitute  an  extended  "something"  which 
is  space  of  one,  two,  and  three  dimensions. 

To  demonstrate  this,  one  has  but  to  grant  the  principle,  that 
points  are  related  non-additively,  or  more  specifically,  that  they 
are  related  by  an  asymmetrical  and  transitive  relation^  It 
follows  from  this  principle,  that  that  whole  which  results  from 
points  so  related,  namely,  space  of  one,  two,  or  three  dimensions, 
has  characteristics  that  are  different  from  those  of  the  parts, 
even  so  different  as  to  "mean"  that  extension  is  derived  from 
that  which  is  not  extended, — just  as,  by  the  same  principle, 
that  which  is  chemical  (atoms)  is  derived  from  that  which  is 
not  chemical  (electrons),  and  that  which  is  life  (cells)  is  de- 
rived from  that  which  is  not  life  (physico-chemical  forces). 
For  it  is  only  a  whole  which  is  an  additive  result  of  its  parts, 
that  must  resemble  these  parts  as  to  its  characteristics.  Kant, 
however,  quite  neglected  all  such  non-additive  relations.  But 
he  was  guilty  of  this  neglect  because  he  was  unknowingly  shut 
up  within  the  limitations  of  the  Aristotelian  logic,  as  this  had 
come  down  in  the  tradition. 

The  modern  Kantian,  however,  concludes  that  this  second,  as 
well  as  the  other  antinomies,  confirms  the  main  contention  of  the 
phenomenalistic  philosophy,  namely,  that  what  we  perceive  and 
know  is  only  appearance,  and  not  ultimate  reality.  For, — he 
argues,  that,  while  we  undoubtedly  perceive  both  space  and 
spatial  "things,"  nevertheless,  since  iy  the  antinomy  space  or 
extension  is  self-contradictory,  no  better  proof  than  this  could 

'  Cf.    Russell's   discussion   of   Kant's   Antinomies   in    The   Principles   of 
Mathematics,  pp.  188,  190-193,  259,  458-461. 
*  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  vu.,  for  details. 


I6i         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

be  had,  that  the  perceived  ''world"  of  sense  is  mere  appearance 
or  phenomenon. 

Modern  analytical  science,  however,  solves  and  disposes  of  the 
second  antinomy  of  Kant  by  showing  that  both  thesis  and  anti- 
thesis are  true.  It  succeeds  in  doing  this  by  discovering  that, 
e.g.,  the  line  is  made  up  of  two  kinds  of  parts,  namely,  points 
and  smaller  lines.  The  former  are  not  related  additively  to 
make  up  the  line,  while  the  latter  are  so  related  in  certain 
respects.  Further,  the  line  has  certain  specific  and  distinct 
characteristics  by  virtue  of  each  of  the  two  kinds  of  parts.  Thus, 
as  made  up  of  points,  it  is  infinite,  and  may  also  be  continuous, 
while,  as  made  up  of  smaller  lines,  it  is  finite.  It  is  in  this  way 
that  both  points  and  smaller  lines  cosuhslst  as  the  parts  of  a 
finite  line,  and  with  the  result  that  finitude  and  infinity  are  not 
inconsistent,  but  quite  compatible,  as  distinct  characteristics  of 
one  and  the  same  entity.  Thus  it  is  that  modern  analysis 
rationalizes  the  line,  the  plane,  and  the  three-dimensional  mani- 
fold, and  avoids  those  difficulties  which  were  met  with  by  the 
earlier  analysts. 

Much  of  modern  exact  science  depends  upon  principles  which 
the  analysis  that  has  just  been  presented  well  illustrates.  This 
analysis  leads  to  the  discovery  of  doth  the  parts  and  the  rela- 
tions between  the  parts.^  By  it  such  wholes  as  time,  space, 
motion,  acceleration,  and  change  in  general  are  rationalized 
without  any  contradiction  or  antinomy  appearing.  Its  results 
are,  therefore,  to  be  accepted  at  their  face  value,  and  are  not 
to  be  regarded  either  as  human  inventions,  or  as  mere  appear- 
ances, and  the  like,  until  there  are  good  reasons  for  so  doing. 
And  up  to  the  present  all  the  reasons  that  have  been  advanced 
for  so  regarding  these  results  have  been  fallacious.  They  have 
been  fallacious  reasons,  either  (1)  because,  with  the  failure  of 
the  attempt  to  analyze  and  to  rationalize  in  accordance  with 
some  one  principle,  another  principle  has  not  been  tried ;  or 
(2)  because  the  analysis  has  been  incomplete,  and,  therefore, 
has  not  discovered  all  the  parts  and  all  the  relations,  one  of 
both;  or  (3)  because  the  actual  results  of  correct  analysis  have 
been  misstated. 

Our  second  example  will,  therefore,  illustrate  those  difficulties 

'  Cf .  the  writer's  "  Defense  of  Analysis  "  in  The  New  Realism. 


ANALYSIS  BY  INCORRECT  PRINCIPLES  l65 

and  failures  that  are  conditioned  by  incomplete  analysis,  but 
that  disappear  if  the  analysis  be  made  complete.  The  example 
is  that  of  the  incomplete  analysis  of  the  continuity  of  a  line. 
Because  of  its  incompleteness,  the  analysis  readily  leads  to  an 
antinomy  of  continuity,  but  an  antinomy  that  as  readily  dis- 
appears if  the  analysis  be  made  complete. 

To  demonstrate  this,  let  us  consider  an  instance  of  an  analysis 
of  the  continuity  of  a  line  that  endeavors  to  account  for  this 
continuity  by  means  of  the  concepts  of  gaps  and  of  hetweenness. 
It  is  then  found  that  it  can  be  both  proved  and  disproved  both 
that  the  continuity  consists  in  the  absence  of  gaps,  and  also  in 
their  presence.    This  situation  constitutes  the  antinomy : 

Thesis:  Continuity  is  the  absence  of  gaps.  Proof:  Assume  that 
the  line  is  made  up  of  points,  so  that,  from  any  one  point  to 
another,  there  is  a  distance,  or  gap.  Then,  between  these  points 
there  are  other  points,  and  so  on.  Therefore,  if  there  are  enough 
points  to  ''fill  in"  all  such  gaps,  the  line  is  continuous.  But 
there  are  enough  points,  since,  not  only  between  any  two  points 
is  there  a  third  point,  but  also,  in  any  line  or  distance,  there 
is  an  infinite  number  of  points.  Therefore  the  line  is  continuous 
in  that  there  are  no  gaps. 

Antithesis:  Continuity  is  the  presence  of  gaps  in  the  line. 
Proof:  Assume  that  the  line  is  made  up  of  points,  and,  there- 
fore, since  there  is  a  point  between  every  two  points,  that  there 
are  no  gaps — all  gaps  being  filled  up.  Now  if,  e.g.,  the  line  is 
of  unit  length,  so  that  the  end  points  are  in  correlation  with  0 
and  1,  then  the  other  points  are  in  correlation  with  the  rational 
fractions.  For  it  is  the  character  of  these  fractions  that  between 
any  two  of  them  there  is  a  third.  But  the  rational  fractions  are 
also  of  such  a  character  (as  is  well  known)  that  the  difference 
between  any  two  of  them  is  finite.  Accordingly,  if  the  rational 
fractions  are  correlated  with  the  points,  as  they  must  be,  if  any 
two  of  them  are  correlated  with  two  specific  points  by  any  scale 
of  measurement,  then  the  finite  differences  between  the  rational 
fractions  stand  for,  or  are  correlated  with,  7iot  points,  but  lines, 
distances,  or  gaps,  between  points.  Therefore  continuity  con- 
sists in,  not  the  absence  of  gaps,  but  their  presence. 

This  whole  antinomy  arises  from  the  fact  that  the  analysis 
is  made  in  exclusive  reliance  upon  intuition  and  self -evidence 


166    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

rather  than  upon  intellectual  experiment  and  supplementary 
analysis  and  testings.  To  intuition  the  repeated  "betweenness" 
of  points  does  seem,  perhaps,  to  explain  or  to  define  continuity, 
but  it  turns  out,  in  fact,  not  so  to  explain  or  define  this,  but 
to  lead  to  contradictions  and  antinomies.  However,  by  a  sup- 
plementary and  complete  analysis,  in  which  something  more 
than  mere  "betweenness"  is  discovered,  the  genuine  character 
of  continuity  is  revealed  and  all  seeming  contradictions  in  it  are 
removed." 

We  may  next  consider  an  example  of  getting  into  a  difficulty, 
an  antinomy,  a  paradox,  through  rationalizing  and  analyzing 
by  means  of  an  incorrect  rather  than  a  correct  principle. 

Zeno  (about  490-430  B.C.)  endeavored  analytically  to  ration- 
alize, or  rationally  to  analyze  motion.  He  tried  to  do  this  in 
a  number  of  ways,  but  found  that  every  analysis  of  motion 
revealed  a  contradiction  somewhere  and  somehow.  Accordingly 
he  concluded  that  motion  and  change  in  general  are  only 
illusions,  and  that  rest  and  permanence  are  alone  real.'^ 

One  of  his  analyses  consisted  in  reducing  motion  to  an  ab- 
surdity. In  doing  this  Zeno  assumed  an  instance  of  motion, 
say  from  a  point  A  to  a  point  B.  Concerning  this  he  then 
argued,  that,  before  one  travels  this  whole  distance,  one  must 
travel  the  first  half  of  it,  and,  before  this  half,  the  first  half  of 
it,  and  so  on.  Therefore,  he  concluded,  one  barely  gets  started, 
or,  indeed,  one  does  not  get  started  at  all.  For  similar  reasons, 
he  argued,  one  could  never  qtiite  reach  a  destination,  since,  if 
one  has  gone  half  the  distance,  then,  before  one  can  go  the 
remaining  half,  one  must  cover  half  of  it,  etc.,  so  that  there  is 
always  still  remaining  a  fractional  part  yet  to  be  traveled. 
Therefore  in  neither  case  is  there  motion. 

Where,  now,  is  the  error  in  this  reasoning?  It  must  be 
admitted  that  analysis  does  show  that  a  finite  distance  consists 
of,  e.g.,  halves,  quarters,  eighths,  etc.,  and  also  that  one  must 
cover  the  first  of  these  fractional  parts  before  one  covers  the 
subsequent  parts.  The  error  in  the  argument  consists,  however, 
in  ignoring  the  rather  technical  principle,  that,  if  x  and  y  be 

"  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  vii.-x. 

'See  Burnett,  Early  Greek  Philosophy,  1892,  p.  331  ff.;  cf.  Russell, 
Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy,  p.  165  ff.,  and  Principles  of  Mathematics 
in  a  number  of  places  (see  his  index). 


ANALYSIS  BY  INCORRECT  PRINCIPLES  l67 

any  two  commensurable  finite  quantities  of  which  x  <iy    ( < 

meaning  "less  than"),  there  is  always  a  number  n  such  that 

nx  =  y.     Contrariwise  the  error  consists  in  assuming  the  false 

II  II 

principle,  that,  if  x  = ,  where  .     is  any  fractional  part  of  y, 

/     \  n  n 

then  n   (  —  I    <  2/-    ^s  applied  to  the  problem  of  motion,  this 
\n/ 

last  assumption  means  that,  even  with  a  start  admitted  in  which 

the  distance  x  is  traversed  in  the  time  t,  the  distance,  y  =  nx 

{y  >  x),    cannot   be   traveled   in   the   time    nt,   but    only   the 

y 
distance,  y —,  can  be ;  in  other  words  it  means,  that,  if  a 

11/ 

certain  distance  x,  say,  -j-  of  y,  is  traveled  in  the  time  t,  then 

4 
m  the  time,  ^  X  4,  —  y  cannot  be  traveled. 

Obviously,  however,  this  conclusion  is  false,  if  there  is  such 
an  entity  as  uniform  rate.  For,  if  there  is,  then,  if  any  start  at 
all  is  admitted,  so  that  a  finite  distance  x  is  traversed  in  the 

time  t,  at  the  rate  — ,  it  must  be  granted  that  in  the  time, 

nt,  the  distance  nx  {=^  y)  can  be  traversed. 

One  cannot  avoid  this  conclusion  by  maintaining  either  that 
there  is  no  start,  or  that  the  rate  itself  is  changing.  For,  on 
the  one  hand,  finite  distances  are  implied  by  that  which  is  the 
limit  of  the  series  of  decreasing  finite  distances,  namely,  the 
point,  at  which  there  would  be  no  motion,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  there  are  finite  distances,  then,  for  some  distance  x, 

X 

no  matter  how  small,  there  is  uniform  velocity  — . 

However,  that  there  are  both  finite  distances  and  uniform 
velocities,  is  presupposed  by  those  very  assumptions  which  are 
used  by  Zeno  to  demonstrate  that  motion  is  impossible.  But 
if  there  are  such  distances  and  velocities,  then  in  due  time, 
motion  over  any  distance  y  is  possible,  even  though  it  is  true 

that  any  first  distance  —  must  be  traversed  before  the  second 

n 

distance  is  traversed,  and,  also,  that  after  any  first  distance  JL 

n 

is  traversed,  the  distance,  e.g.,  -^,  must  be  traversed  before  the 


168         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

next  '~  is  traversed,   and  so  on.     For,   although   there   is   a 

sum,  JL  JL.  M. — lJI     ,    .    .    i^  ^  there  is  also  the  product ^o 

n        n"      n^  n°  ^ 

Zeno's  whole  difficulty,  therefore,  was  incurred  by  rationaliz- 
ing in  accordance  with  an  incorrect  assumption  or  principle. 
It  is  evident,  then,  that  when  one  rationalizes,  one  should  use 
not  only  correct  methods,  but  also  correct  material  principles 
or  premises.  Otherwise  it  is  quite  easy  to  create  seemingly  real, 
but  actually  only  artificial  difficulties,  and  to  reach  seemingly 
rational  conclusions  that  contradict  sense-given  facts,  as,  e.g., 
the  reality  of  motion. 

At  this  point  we  may  advantageously  present  still  another 
example  of  an  attempt  at  rational  analysis  by  a  false  principle 
rather  than  by  a  correct  one,  of  the  consequent  failure  of  this 
attempt,  of  the  conclusions  that  are  derived  from  such  a  failure, 
and,  finally,  of  a  consistent  and  satisfactory  analysis  of  the 
same  complex  by  a  principle  that  is  correct. 

Ever  since  Zeno  and  the  other  Eleatics,  certain  philosophers 
have  endeavored  to  analyze  change  by  the  use  of  the  two  prin- 
ciples of  identity  and  contradiction.^  This  attempt  fails,  so 
that  the  conclusion  is  reached,  that  change  is  only  appearance, 
and  that  rest  and  permanence  are  alone  realities. 

The  analysis  that  is  made  may  be  stated  as  follows:  Under 
the  influence  of  the  traditional  logic,  with  its  dominant  concept 
of  thing,  the  problem  is  stated  in  the  form  of  the  question,  How 
can  a  thing  change?  In  solution  of  this,  it  is  found,  that  the 
law  of  identity  applies  to  a  thing,  i.e.,  that  a  thing  is  identical 
with  itself.  Change,  then,  if  it  is  a  fact,  seems  to  mean  that 
a  thing  ceases  to  be  identical  with  itself  and  becomes  something 
else,  i.e.,  that  a  thing,  A,  becomes  its  contradictory,  non-A.  At 
a  certain  instant,  therefore,  the  thing  is,  or  seems  to  be,  both 
A  and  non-A,  which  "condition"  violates  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction, namely,  that  a  thing  cannot  both  be  and  7wt  be,  have 
and  not  have,  a  certain  property.  Change,  therefore,  involves 
this  contradiction,  or,  it  may  be  said  to  be  self -contradictory  in 
this  respect,  so  that,  with  it  tacitly  assumed,  that  that  which  is 
self-contradictory  cannot   he   real,  it  must  be   concluded  that 

*  F.  H.  Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  Chaps.  I.-V.,  especially  pp. 
45-48;   also  pp.  231-233. 


ANALYSIS  BY  INCORRECT  PRINCIPLES  169 

change  is  not  real,  but  only  illusory  and  apparent,  while  rest 
and  permanence,  or,  more  generally,  that  which  remains  identical 
with  itself,  is  alone  reality. 

Let  us  now,  in  contrast,  examine  the  results  of  the  endeavor 
to  analyze  change  by  the  use  of  other  principles  than  those  of 
identity  and  contradiction,  with  these  latter  supplemented,  how- 
ever, and  not  displaced  by  such  other  principles.  With  our 
present  knowedge  of  the  several  specific  kinds  of  relations,  of 
the  precise  nature  of  continuity,  infinity,  and  the  like,  let  us 
assume,  at  least  for  the  sake  of  making  the  experiment,  that 
change  is  a  continuous  series,  with  all  that  this  means  by  way 
of  those  logical  principles,  entities,  and  relations  that  a  series 
involves.  The  analysis  that  results  not  only  does  not  show 
change  to  involve  any  contradiction,  but  also  reveals  the  opposed 
analysis  to  be  most  inadequate. 

In  the  first  place,  a  series  is  not  the  mere  individuals  that  are 
present  in  it,  but  is  these  individuals  related  ni  a  very  specific^ 
way,  namely,  by  an  asymmetrical  and  transitive  relation.**  Cer- 
tain minor  limitations  of  this  statement  may  be  neglected  here. 
And,  secondly,  a  series  is  continuous,  if  it  is  in  one-one  cor- 
respondence with  the  real  numbers,  namely,  the  series  of  positive 
integers,  rational  fractions,  and  irrationals  in  order  of  magni- 
tude.^'^ A  series  is  thus  quite  consistent  with  the  self-identity 
of  each  of  its  members,  while  it  is  also  more  than  these  members. 
In  a  continuous  series  no  member  is  next  to  any  other,  and  there 
is  no  finite  difference  between  members,  or  from  any  one  member 
to  another  member. ^^ 

If,  now,  we  analyze  change  in  accordance  with  this  logic,  we 
limit  the  use  of  the  principle  of  identity,  and  accordingly  give 
up  that  definition  of  change  which  makes  it  "the  ceasing  of 
something  to  be  identical  with  itself"  and  the  "becoming  some- 
thing else."  For  by  this  new  logic,  there  is  no  such  ceasing, 
although  there  are  individuals,  A  and  B  (non-A),  that  remain 
identical  with  themselves.  But  there  are  not  only  these  two 
individuals,  but  there  are  in  a  continuous  series  an  infinite 
number  of  individuals  betM'een  A  and  B.  The  change,  then,  is; 
the  ordered  complex  or  series  of  these  individuals,  each  of  which, 
like  the   change  itself,   is   identical   with   itself,   and  does  not 

»  See  Chap.  XLIII.  "  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  vii.-x.  " /6td. 


170    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

change.  Change,  therefore,  is  a  different  kind  of  entity  from 
the  individuals  that  are  present  in  it,  &nd  is  not  to  be  analyzed 
by  the  principles  that  apply  to  those  individuals,  any  more  than 
the  moral  situation  is  to  be  analyzed  by  examining  those  uni- 
verses of  discourse  from  which  morality  is  absent.  In  a  similar 
way,  "individual"  and  "change"  are  entities  that  belong,  each 
to  a  distinct  universe  of  discourse,  with  each  capable  of  con- 
sistent analysis,  unless  the  individuals  are  simple,  each  equally 
real,  and  neither  to  be  confused  with  the  other. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

MISINTERPRETATIONS  OF  CORRECT  ANALYSIS 

We  now  reach  the  third  way  in  which  doubt  is  thrown  upon 
the  reality  of  certain  entities,  e.g.,  space,  time,  and  motion.  This 
is  done  by  misinterpreting  actual,  correct  results  obtained  by 
analysis.  Misinterpretation  is  quite  excusable,  if  it  is  not  wilful, 
but  quite  unpardonable,  if  it  is  intentional.  With  Zeno  it  was 
not  intentional  when  he  analyzed,  e.g.,  the  motion  of  the  arrow, 
and  interpreted  the  arrow's  being  at  a  point  at  an  instant  as 
rest.  From  this  Zeno  reached  the  conclusion  that  motion  was 
only  a  sum  of  rests,  and,  therefore,  was  not  real,  but  only  ap- 
parent. 

But  Zeno  also  made  a  misinterpretation.  The  arrow's  occu- 
pation of  a  point  for  an  instant,  is  not  rest, — whatever  else  it 
may  be.  To  be  at  rest  the  arrow  must  be  at  a  point  for  at  least 
two  instants,  and  if  for  two  instants,  then  for  an  infinite  number 
of  instants  between  the  two.^  Zeno's  conclusion  therefore  falls 
to  the  ground. 

Among  contemporaneous  philosophers  Bergson  does  not  hesi- 
tate to  accept  Zeno's  misinterpretation  and  to  base  an  anti-intel- 
lectualistic  philosophy  upon  it.^  Bergson 's  argument  is,  that, 
because  the  analysis  of  motion  leads  to  its  contradictory,  rest, 

*  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  vii.-x. 

-  In  Creative  Evolution,  Matter  and  Memory,  and  Time  am,d  Free  Will. 


MISINTERPRETATIONS  OF  CORRECT  ANALYSIS        171 

the  analysis  falsifies  that  which  is  analyzed.^  However,  this 
specific  analysis  is  regarded  as  typical  of  all  analysis,  and  there- 
fore all  analysis  is  held  to  falsify.  Accordingly,  the  position  is 
arrived  at,  that,  to  get  at  fact,  one  must  not  analyze  at  all,  but 
must  rely  upon  the  immediate  experience  of  the  (unanalyzed) 
whole,  through  intuition,  emotion,  and  the  like.* 

To  refute  Zeno  and  Bergson,  and  to  undermine  those  philo- 
sophical conclusions  which  the  latter  bases  on  that  (false) 
analysis  of  motion  which  he  accepts,  one  has,  however,  only  to 
state  correctly  the  actual  scientific  analysis  of  motion  that  is 
ready  at  hand.  This  analysis  shows  that  the  occupation  of  a 
point  at  an  instant  is  neither  rest  nor  motion.  It  shows,  on  the 
one  hand,  that  rest  is  the  occupation  of  a  point  for  two  and 
indeed  for  an  infinite  number  of  instants,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  motion  is  the  one-one  correlation  of  two  points  and 
therefore  of  an  infinite  number  of  points  with  two  instants 
and,  therefore,  with  an  infinite  number  of  instants.  Or,  stated 
in  another  way,  motion  is  a  series  of  complexes  each  of  which 
is  itself  a  one-one  correlation  of  a  point  with  an  instant.^  But 
in  order  to  analyze  motion  in  this  way  into  parts  that  are  them- 
selves neither  motions  nor  rests,  one  must  accept  the  two  prin- 
ciples, (1)  that  a  whole  can  be  made  up  of  two  or  more  kinds 
of  parts,  and  (2)  that,  even  though  the  parts  of  one  type  may 
be  related  additively  to  form  the  whole,  those  of  certain  other 
types  cannot  be  so  related.  In  anything  that  is  an  ordered  class 
or  series,  this  last  must  be  the  case. 

Motion  is  a  series.  It  consists,  in  the  case  of  any  finite  motion, 
of  smaller  motions,  but  it  also  consists  of  another  type  of  parts, 
each  of  which  is  the  complex,  point-correlated-with-instant. 
These  parts,  however,  are  neither  rests  nor  motions;  yet,  as 
related  non-additively,  or,  more  specifically,  as  related  asym- 
metrically and  transitively,  they  are  that  whole  which  is  motion, 
and  which  has  properties  that  are  different  from  those  of  the 
parts. 

The  results   of  this  analysis   furnish,   therefore,   no  oppor- 

'  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution,  pp.  163,  303-313,  and  a  number  of  other 
places.  Cf.  my  "  Defense  of  Analysis  "  in  The  New  Realism,  and  H.  3.  H. 
Elliot,  Modern  Science  and  the  Illusions  of  Bergson. 

*  See  Chap.  XV.,  rv.,  2,  and  Chap.  XL.,  vu.-ix. 

"  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  x. 


172    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

tunity  for  a  valid  claim  that  analysis  falsifies,  on  the  ground 
that  parts  are  reached  which  are  the  formal  contradictory  of, 
and  inconsistent  with,  the  whole.  Parts  that  are  different  from 
the  whole  are  indeed  reached  by  analysis,  namely,  such  parts 
as  both  instants  and  points,  and  also  those  complex  parts  each 
of  which  is  an  instant  related  in  a  one-one  manner  to  a  point. 
But  none  of  these  parts  is  of  such  a  character  that  it  is  pre- 
cluded from  cosubsisting  with  a  whole  that  is  a  non-additive 
result,  and  that  has  distinct  and  peculiar  properties  of  its  own. 
Such  a  consistent  analysis  demands,  however,  the  principles  that 
are  formulated  above,  and  that  are  accepted  in  the  new  logic, 
but  ignored  by  the  old. 

All  this  presentation  of  the  methods  and  results  of  the  modern 
analysis  of  space,  time,  motion,  and  change  is  most  important 
for  our  purposes.  For  it  shows  that,  since  such  entities  can  be 
analyzed  and  rationalized  in  a  manner  that  is  quite  free  from 
contradictions  and  antinomies,  we  are  relieved  from  attaching 
any  more  philosophical  importance  to  them  than  we  attach  to 
the  other  innumerable  facts  of  science  and  common  sense. 
Nevertheless  a  great  many  influential  philosophical  systems  have 
been  founded  in  part  upon  the  difficulties  and  contradictions  that 
have  been  found  in,  e.g.,  the  infinity  and  the  continuity  of  space 
and  time,  in  motion  and  in  change,  and  the  like.  Every  phi- 
losophy must,  indeed,  consider  these  problems  in  connection  with 
the  cosmological  problem.  But  today,  with  a  consistent  analysis 
of  all  these  entities  at  hand,  one  is  left  free  to  consider  the 
fundamental  differences  between  philosophical  systems  upon 
some  other  basis — a  procedure  that  will  be  adopted  in  consider- 
ing, in  the  later  sections  of  this  volume,  the  solution  of  philo 
sophical  problems. 


THE  METHODS  OF  THE  NEW  LOGIC  173 

CHAPTER  XXV 
THE  METHODS  OF  THE  NEW  LOGIC 

Summary 

The  foregoing  presentation  of  analyses  that  are  made  of  such, 
entities  as  change  and  motion,  shows  that  there  are  logical 
methods  and  principles  that  are  quite  different  from  those  of 
the  logic  of  the  tradition.  Some  of  the  most  essential  features 
of  contrast  between  the  two  doctrines  may  now  be  advanta- 
geously summarized. 

I.  The  new  logic  is  opposed  both  to  the  psychologizing  tend- 
ency, and  to  the  pragmatic.  The  standpoint  of  the  new  logic 
is,  that  logical  principles  are  present  in  entities,  i.e.,  that  they 
are  objective.  Toward  them  one  takes  the  attitude  of  empirical 
procedure  and  of  discovery.  This  means  that  there  may  be  in 
this  richly  endowed  universe  any  number  of  different  logical 
principles,  entities,  and  situations.  It  is,  therefore,  the  em- 
pirical study  of  entities  that  extends  the  field  of  logical  science, 
and  no  one  should  be  so  brash  as  to  delimit  this  field  to  certain 
logical  principles,  thus  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  its  exten- 
sion by  new  discoveries.  Indeed,  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
the  ''open  door'-  in  this  respect,  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  it 
is  impossible  to  solve  certain  problems  by  the  principles  of  the 
old  logic,  but  quite  possible  to  solve  these  same  problems  by  the 
new  logic. 

II.  The  old  logic  is  a  logic  of  substance  and  qualities, — of 
things  with  a  core  in  which  qualities  inhere.  The  new  logic  is, 
in  contrast,  one  in  which  these  concepts,  even  if  they  are  not 
given  up  entirely,  play  a  minor  part,  and  the  concept  of  rela- 
tion plays  the  major  role. 

III.  The  new  logic  emphasizes  relational  propositions,  exem- 
plified by  '^A  is  less  than  B.''  These  propositions  cannot  be 
reduced  to  the  subject-predicate  propositions  of  the  old  logic, 
in  which  the  predicate  is  interpreted  to  be  a  property  of  the 
;§ubject.^ 

*  Cf.  Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics,  in  various  places,  and  Royce's 
Essay,  the  "  Principles  of  Logic,"  in  the  Encyclopedia  of  the  Philosophical 
kiciencea. 


tl74        METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

IV.  The  new  logic  consists  largely  of  those  principles  which 
are  discovered  by  the  analysis  of  series.  This  means,  again,  that 
the  new  logic  recognizes  many  types  of  relations  which  the  old 
logic  quite  ignores.  The  old  logic  makes  no  recognition  of  series, 
but  only  of  such  wholes  as  are  additive,  conceptual,  causal, 
organic,  thing-like  (substance  and  attribute),  syllogistic,  and 
numerically  single.  The  chief  relations  which  the  old  logic 
accordingly  recognizes  are  additiveness,  similarity  and  differ- 
ence, causation,  inherence,  "member  of,"  inclusion,  identity, 
and  contradiction.  It  therefore  omits  ynany  very  fundamental 
relations,  especially  such  as  are  involved  in  series. 

Some  of  the  most  important  types  of  these  relations  are  the  fol- 
lowing: (1)  Asymmetrical  relations,  defined  as  such  relations,  R, 
between  a  and  h,  as  preclude  the  identity  of  the  inverse  relation, 
E,  with  the  original:  e.g.,  a  <h,  precludes  h  <,  a.  (2)  Transi- 
tive relations :  e.g.,  a  <.h,  h  <i  c  implies,  a  <  c.  Asymmetrical 
and  transitive  relations  are  recognized  by  the  new  logic  as  sub- 
sisting between  individuals  as  well  as  between  classes ;  but,  by  the 
old  logic,  they  are  recognized  as  subsisting  only  between  classes; 
e.g.,  if  A,  B,  and  C  are  three  classes,  and  A  is  included  in  B, 
and  B  in  C,  then  A  is  included  in  C  (3)  Correlating  relations, 
e.g.,  between  the  men  of  a  regiment  and  their  guns,  where  one 
and  only  one  specific  gun  is  assigned  to  each  man;  such  cor- 
relating relations  are  present  in  one-valued  functions.  (4)  The 
new  logic  recognizes  functional  relations,  where  the  old  logic 
accepted  only  causal  relations.  The  entities  that  are  function- 
ally related  are  variables,  and  a  variable  is  a  series.  (5)  A 
functional  relation  is  identical  with  a  specific  type  of  relation 
that  is  compatible  with  both  r elatedness  and  independence,  as 
is  illustrated  by  the  relation  between  time  and  motion.  (6)  The 
new  logic  emphasizes  the  method  of  using  relations  of  implica- 
tion to  discover  types  of  entities  of  which  no  individual  is 
specifiable.  Thus  it  is  possible  to  discover  that,  e.g.,  V  2  is  the 
limit  of  two  series,  the  one  series  with  individuals  that  are  all 
greater  than  this  limit,  the  other  series  with  individuals  that 
are  all  less  than  this  limit,  without  it  being  possible  to  specify 
that  limit,  other  than  to  say,  that  it  is  a;  (ic  =  V  2  ),  and  is  such 
that  x'^  ■=■  2. 

V.    The  old  logic  ignores  this  principle  and  method  of  dis- 


THE  METHODS  OF  THE  NEW  LOGIC  175 

covering  limits,  although  upon  it  is  dependent  the  discovery, 
that  a  whole  can  consist  of  non-finite  as  well  as  of  finite  parts, 
e.g., — in  the  case  of  a  line, — of  points  as  well  as  of  finite  smaller 
lines. 

VI.  The  new  logic  solves  the  problems  of  infinity  and  con- 
tinuity through  its  recognition  of  this  principle  of  limits  in 
connection  with  its  recognition  of  asymmetrical,  transitive,  and 
one-one  correlating  relations.^ 

VII.  The  new  logic  recognizes  and  uses  the  principle,  that 
most  wholes  are  of  that  type  in  which  the  parts  are  related 
non-additively  to  constitute  the  whole.  This  allows  for  different 
kinds  of  parts  in  the  same  whole,  each  set  of  parts  being  related 
in  perhaps  a  specifically  different  non-additive  manner.  Also, 
one  class  of  parts  may  be  related  additively,  while  all  others  are 
related  non-additively. 

VIII.  It  results  that  one  and  the  same  whole  may  belong  to 
different  universes  of  discourse, — to  one,  by  virtue  of  one  kind 
of  part,  to  another,  by  virtue  of  another  kind.  Accordingly 
those  characteristics  of  a  whole  that  are  the  relational  result  of 
one  kind  of  part  are  not  deducible  from  those  that  are  the  rela- 
tional result  of  another  kind.^ 

IX.  The  old  logic  accepts  the  principles  of  the  inconceiva- 
bility of  the  opposite  and  of  self-evidence  as  norms  of  absolute 
truth ;  the  new  logic  looks  askance  at  these  tests,  and  sets  up 
propositions  only  as  postulates  from  which  to  develop  conse- 
quences. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  following  are  some  of  the  articles  and  books  in  which  the  principles, 
the  details,  and  the  application  of  the  new  logic  are  ]jresented  (cf.  the 
bibliography  for  Chap.  XLIIL):  Cassirer.  tiuhptanzhegriff  vnd  Funktions- 
begriff ;  Huntington,  "The  Continuum  as  a  Type  of  Order,"  Annals  of 
Mathematics,  1905;  A.  B.  Kempe,  "The  Subject-matter  of  Exact  Thought," 
Nature,  Vol.  XLIII.,  1890,  p.  156  ff.;  Nernst,  Theoretische  Chemie,  trans. 
K.  A.  Lehfeldt,  p.  365;  C.  8.  Peirce,  "The  Logic  of  Relations,"  Monist, 
Vol.  VII.,  1897,  p.  353  ff.;  Royce,  "The  Relations  of  the  Principles  of 
Logic  to  the  Foundations  of  Geometry,"  Transactions  of  the  Am.  Math, 
t^oc.  Vol.  VI.,  1905,  p.  161  ff.;  also '"  The  Principles  of  Logic"  in  the 
Encyclopedia  of  the  PhilosopJiical  Sciences;  B.  Russell,  Principles  of 
Mathematics,  1903,  and  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophij,  1914;  White- 
head and  Russell,  Principia  Mathematica ;  Whitehead,  Introduction  to 
Mathematics ;  J.  W.  Young,  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Algebra  and 
Geometry. 

'  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  viu.-x.  '  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  iv.,  v.,  vi. 


176         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 


IV.   THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS 

CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE  THEORIES  OF  EXTERNAL  AND  INTERNAL 
RELATIONS 

I.   THE  FORMULATION   OF  THE   THEORIES 

A  FURTHER  point  of  contrast  between  the  old  and  the  new 
logic  concerns  the  problem  as  to  how  a  relation  relates.  The, 
examination  of  this  problem  is  of  fundamental  importance,  since 
certain  specific  theories  that  are  advanced  in  solution  of  it 
logically  condition  each  of  the  great  philosophical  systems  that 
we  shall  examine  in  detail  in  Part  II. 

This  problem  has  itself  come  to  recognition  primarily  because 
of  the  influence  of  that  relational  point  of  view  which  is  the 
core  of  modern  logic.  For,  if  it  is  not  substance  and  not  cause, 
but  events,  disembodied  qualities,  and  relations,  especially  the 
last,  that  form  the  basis  of  the  new  logic,  then  the  problem 
very  naturally  arises  as  to  how  a  relation  relates. 

Whatever  the  specific  character  of  the  relation  may  be,  and 
to  whatever  type  of  relation  it  may  belong,  there  are  at  the 
present  time  two  main  theories  in  answer  to  this  problem.  Each 
theor}^,  further,  is  regarded  by  at  least  some  of  its  adherents 
as  holding  exclusively  for  all  relations. 

These  two  main  theories  are,  respectively,  those  of  external 
\relations  and  of  internal  relations.  The  latter  theory  is  in  turn 
subdivided  into  what  may  be  called  the  mutual  modification 
theory,  and  the  underlying-  or  transcendent-reality  theory.  The 
adherents  of  each  of  these  theories  maintain  that  their  par- 
ticular theory  can  be  established  both  by  induction  and  by 
other  proof,  such  as  "the  presupposition  by  denial." 

In  order  to  formulate  these  theories,  we  will  use  a  and  h  for 
the  two  related  terms,  K  for  the  relation  between  the  terms, 


THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS  177 

and  the  symbols  |  for  "independent,"  >  for  "influences," 

and  ^ — y^— '  for  "underlying  and  mediating." 

The  theory  of  external  relations  may  then  be  expressed  in 
the  form  oi  a\R\h,  meaning  by  this,  (1)  that,  if  two  terms  are 
related,  neither  term  influences  the  other,  (2)  that  the  absence 
of  either  term  would  be  ivithout  effect  on  the  other,  (3)  that 
either  term  may  come  into  being  and  into  relation  with  the 
other  term  without  affecting  it,  (4)  that,  accordingly,  no  terra 
is  complex  by  virtue  of  being  related,  and   (5)   that  no  third 

term,  u,  underlying  a  R  b  in  the  sense  of  « — . — -  .  is  necessary 

U 
in  order  to  mediate  the  relationship  between  a  and  6.    Briefly, 

the  theory  of  external  relations  is,  that  relaiedness  and  inde- 
pendence are  quite  compatible. 

The  theory  of  internal  relations  is  a  direct  denial  of  these 
main  propositions  of  the  theory  of  external  relations. 

The   "modification  aspect"  of  the   internal    theory  may  be 

expressed  by  the  symbol,  a^Rb^,  meaning  by  this,  that,  if  two 

terms  are  related,  (1)  each  term  influences  the  other,  (2) 
that  related  terms  are  complex.  (3)  that  either  terra  out 
of  relation  with  the  other  would  be  different  from  what  it 
is  in  relation  to  that  other,  (4)  that  terms  are  what  they 
are  by  virtue  of  being  related  to  other  terms  (the  organic 
view). 

This  modification  theory  of  relations  may,  or  may  not  be  held 
together  with  the  "underlying  reality  aspect"  of  the  theory  of 
internal  relations.     This  last  theory  by  itself  is  expressed  by 

^ — , — '  ,  meaning  by  this,  that,  if  two  terms  are  related,  and 

V 
whether  they  modify  each  other  or  not,  there  is  an  underlying 

or  transcendent  reality,  U,  to  mediate  this  relation,  indeed  to 
make  it  possible  at  all. 

Some  of  the  adherents  of  the  theory  of  external  relations 
regard  it  as  holding  without  exception  for  all  terras  and  rela- 
tions,^ while  others  maintain  that  it  holds  only  for  some  rela- 
tional complexes.^  In  contrast  with  this,  the  advocates  of  the 
"internal  theory,"  as  it  may  be  called,  insist,  according  to  that 

'  I"].  B.  Holt  in  The  New  Realism  and  in  The  Concept  of  Consciousness. 
*  The  writer  in  the  present  volume. 


178         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

aspect  to  which  they  are  inclined,  either  that  the  "modification 
theory"  or  the  "underlying-reality  theory"  holds  for  all  rela- 
tions. 

II.    THE  PROOFS   OR   ARGUMENTS   FOR   THE   THEORIES   OP   RELATIONS 

1.  The  Theory  of  External  Relations 

We  may  first  consider  the  proof  of  the  theory  of  external 
relations.  This  proof  is  twofold.  One  part  of  it  depends  on 
the  result  of  an  appeal  to  concrete  fact;  the  other  part  is  the 
demonstration,  that  the  validity  of  the  external  theory  is  pre- 
supposed by  that  very  denial  which  it  receives  in  the  internal 
theory.    This  last  demonstration  will  be  presented  first. 

To  prove  that  there  are  terms  which  are  related  and  yet  do 
not  affect,  modify,  or  influence  one  another: — 

First  Proof.  Let  this  proposition  be  denied,  i.e.,  let  us  assume 
that  any  two  related  terms  do  affect  each  other.  Then  these 
related  terms  are  complex.^  But,  as  complex,  they  consist  of 
parts,  which  in  turn  are  related.  Therefore,  these  parts  must, 
by  the  same  hypothesis,  also  affect  one  another  and  be  complex, 
and  so  on,  in  an  infinite  series.  Ultimately,  therefore,  there 
must  be  simple  terms  that  make  all  this  complexity  possible,  but 
that  are  themselves  not  complex.  Yet  these  ultimate,  simple 
terms  are  related  to  one  another.  Therefore,  as  related,  and 
yet  as  simple,  they  do  not  modify  one  another,  but  are 
independent, — in  just  this  sense,  namely,  of  not  modifying  one 
another. 

Points  and  instants  are  examples  of  such  ultimate  simple 
terms,  which,  though  they  cannot  be  isolated  or  identified  by 
physical  experiment,  are  nevertheless  discovered  by  an  analysis 
in  situ.  It  is  also  found  by  the  same  method  that  these  entities 
are  related,  and  yet  that  they  do  not  affect  one  another,  so  as 
to  make  one  another  complex,  although  as  related  by  specific 
relations  they  form  specific  complexes,  namely,  space  and  time 
respectively.  The  modern  analysis  of  space  and  time  demands, 
therefore,   the   theory   of   external   relations/   and   accordingly 

'  Cf.  Kussell,  "  The  Basis  of  Realism,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scien- 
tific Methods,  Vol.  VIIL,  1911,  p.  15811. 
*  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  viu.-x. 


THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS  179 

the  thesis  is  proved,  that  at  least  some  terms  do  not,  as  related, 
affect  or  modify  one  another,  and  are,  in  this  sense,  inde- 
pendent. 

This  same  conclusion  can  also  be  established  by  induction, 
i.e.,  we  can  get  instances  of  related  terms  that  do  not  affect  one 
another.  Thus  it  is  evident  that  if,  as  a  result  of  analysis,  one 
accepts  genuine  points  and  instants,  then  these  are  to  be  regarded 
as  instances  of  terms  that  are  both  related  and  independent. 
But  there  are,  also,  other  instances.  One  of  the  most  frequent 
practices  of  physical  science  is  that  of  employing  methods  by 
which  certain  phenomena  are  isolated,  and  yet  left  in  situ,  i.e., 
in  relation  both  to  one  another  and  to  other  phenomena.  Pur- 
suing this  method,  physical  science  discovers  that,  although  time 
is  related  to  space,  to  matter,  and  to  change  in  general,  it  is, 
nevertheless,  independent  of  these.  In  fact,  in  all  physical 
science,  time  is  the  independent  variable.  In  the  case  of  a 
great  many  phenomena  it  is  a  leading  problem,  therefore,  to 
find  how  "things"  are  related  to,  or  vary  with  time.  This 
problem  occurs,  e.g.,  in  the  investigation  of  the  motion  of  a 
falling  body,  in  which  case  it  is  found  that  both  the  body  and 
the  motion  are  related  to  many  other  "things,"  but  that  the 
motion,  in  respect  both  to  itself  as  motion  and  to  the  change  of 
velocity,  or  acceleration,  is  related  to  time  as  if  this  were  the 
only  referent.  The  distance  traveled  by  a  falling  body  is  the 
specific  function,  s  =  t-,  while  the  velocity  is  directly  propor- 
tional to  the  time  elapsed,  and  the  acceleration  is  directly  pro- 
portional to  the  time  increment.  Distance  traveled,  velocity, 
and  acceleration  are,  therefore,  each  related  to  time,  but  the  time 
is  neither  modified  nor  constituted  by  virtue  of  these  relation- 
ships, as  also  conversely,  neither  the  space,  the  velocity,  nor  the 
acceleration  are  causally  affected  by  the  time. 

These  instances  are  typical.  Mechanics,  chemistry,  and 
physics  are  replete  with  cases  of  functional  relationships  between 
variables,  each  of  which  is  a  series  of  individuals,  just  as  time 
is  a  series  of  instants.  Each  variable,  also,  is  related  to  many 
"things,"  of  which  it  is  independent.  There  are,  therefore, 
complex  as  well  as  simple  entities  that  furnish  data,  in  respect 
to  the  relatonships  in  which  they  stand,  for  a  generalization  to 
the  theory  of  external  relations.    This  proof  by  induction  con- 


180    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

jBrms,  therefore,  the  first,  indirect  proof  of  the  external  theory, 
and  together,  both  proofs  show  that  the  modification  theory  of 
relations  is  one  that  is  at  least  limited  in  its  range,  if,  indeed,  it 
is  not  altogether  invalid. 

A  similar  conclusion  is  also  reached  as  a  result  of  the  examina- 
tion of  both  the  argument  and  the  empirical  evidence  for  the 
underlying-reality  theory  of  relations.  This  specific  theory  can 
be  shown  to  presuppose  its  contradictory,  or  contrariwise,  the 
theory  of  external  relations  can  be  demonstrated  to  be  presup- 
posed by  it.  To  give  this  proof,  let  us  assume  that,  in  order 
that  any  two  terms,  a  and  h,  may  be  related,  there  must  be  an 
underlying,  unitary  reality,  U,  to  mediate  the  relation.  Then, 
by  supposition,  this  U  is  simple,  and  not  complex,  since,  if  it 
were  complex,  its  parts  would,  by  hypothesis,  require  another 
V  to  relate  them,  and  so  on  indefinitely.  Let  us  assume,  there- 
fore, that  V  is  absolutely  simple,  and  not  complex.  But  even 
then,  as  the  mediator  of  the  original  relation,  it  is  related  not 
only  to  a,  b,  and  R,  but  also  to  the  complex,  a  R  h,  so  that, 
again,  by  the  original  assumption,  there  is  required  still  another 
TJ  to  mediate  this  relation,  and  so  on  in  an  infinite  regress.  For 
every  U  that  is  thus  reached,  since  each  such  TJ  is  related  to 
that  which  it  mediates,  there  is  implied  still  another  TJ.  There- 
fore each  such  TJ  is  only  a  member  of  a  series,  and  not  such  an 
all-including  and  all-mediating  TJ  as  is  sought.  The  result  is, 
that  no  all-relation-mediating  TJ  is  ever  arrived  at.  Even  on 
the  basis  of  the  original  assumption,  which  is  thus  shown  to 
be  self-contradictory,  it  is  only  the  series  as  a  whole  that  includes 
every  TJ.  But  an  infinite  series  already  subsists  in  its  unity  if 
specific  relations  subsist  to  relate  its  terms.  These  relations 
are  (1)  one-one  correlating  relations  between  proper  part  and 
whole,  and  (2)  asymmetrical  and  transitive  relations  among 
the  individuals  of  both  whole  and  part.  But  another  term,  out- 
side the  series,  is,  by  empirical  methods,  not  found  to  be  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  give  the  series  unity.  The  relations  already 
present  suffice  to  give  it  this.  We  may  conclude,  therefore,  that, 
in  the  case  of  a  being  related  to  b  {i.e.,  a  R  b)  the  relation 
itself  is  sufficient  to  give  all  the  unity  that  there  is,  even  as  is 
the  case  with  the  infinite  series.  No  underlying  U  is  needed 
either  to  give  unity  to,  or  to  mediate  the  relation  between,  the 


THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS  181 

related  terms.  But  that  the  relation  is  itself  thus  sufficient,  is 
precisely  the  position  of  the  theory  of  external  relations. 

The  supplementation  of  this  indirect  proof  of  the  external 
theory  by  the  empirical  disproof  of  the  underlying-reality 
theory  is  remarkably  easy.  Strictly  empirical  procedure,  either 
experimental  or  otherwise,  discloses  not  a  single  instance  of  a 
one  '^  something ,"  of  a  TJ,  that  mediates  the  relation  betweefi 
two  or  more  terms.  Indeed,  every  so-called  instance  proves  to 
be  only  one  that  is  inferred  from  the  tacitly  or  explicitly  as- 
sumed validity  of  the  underlying-reality  theory.  Thus,  e.g., 
previous  to  Locke  and  Berkeley,  the  position  was  commonly 
taken,  that  in  every  physical  thing,  a  suhstance-like  sutstratum 
or  core  held  the  qualities  together,  but  Locke  was  not  very 
certain  of  the  presence  of  this  substratum,  and  Berkeley  denied 
it  entirely  for  physical  things,  though  he  held  to  an  analogous 
substance  for  ideas.  Hume,  however,  denied  even  such  a  soul, 
or  spirit,  and  held  to  the  factuality  only  of  impressions  and 
ideas.^  Physics  of  the  present  day  follows  Berkeley's  position, 
and  psychology  follows  Hume's,  so  that  it  is  disembodied  quali- 
ties, events,  and  relations  that  are  now  studied  in  these  sciences. 
Indeed  both  physics  and  mechanics,  in  arriving  at  general  laws, 
disclose  functional  relations  that  are  instances  of  the  more 
general  theory  of  external  relations.  This  theory  has,  therefore, 
at  least  some  range  of  application,  while  the  underlying-reality 
theory  seems  to  have  no  validity  at  all.  Whether,  now,  this  is 
the  case  also  for  the  modification  theory  we  shall  shortly  con- 
sider. 

The  basis  on  which  the  theory  of  external  relations  rests  is, 
accordingly,  the  twofold  one,  (1)  that  it  is  presupposed  by  its 
own  denial  as  this  is  made  in  both  aspects  of  the  theory  of 
internal  relations,  and  (2)  that  it  is  confirmed  by  induction 
from  positive  cases  of  related  terms  in  which  no  term  modifies 
others,  and  no  underlying  reality  is  found  empirically.  There- 
fore, at  least  some  terms  are  related  in  accordance  with  the 
theory  of  external  relations.  Are  all  terms  so  related,  or,  are 
some  terms  related  in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  the 
modification  theory  ?  '^ 

'  See  Chaps.  XXX.  and  XXXI. 

"The  theory  of  external  relations  is  accepted,  and  evidence  and  proof 


182         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 
2.  The  Modification  Theory  of  Relations 

The  adherents  of  this  theory  usually  maintain  that  it  is  of 
universal  validity,  to  the  complete  exclusion  of  the  theory  of 
external  relations,  though  not  of  the  underlying-reality  theory. 
This  last  theory  may,  or  may  not  be  held  together  with  the 
modification  theory. 

The  proof  that  is  presented  for  this  modification  theory  is 
twofold.  One  proof  is  the  (attempted)  reductio  ad  absurdum 
both  of  the  theory  of  external  relations  and — for  some  related 
terms — of  the  underlying-reality  theory  in  the  form  that  has 
just  been  presented.    The  other  proof  seems  to  be  inductive. 

Let  us  first  consider  the  argument  by  which  it  is  attempted 
to  reduce  the  theory  of  external  relations  to  an  ahsiirdityJ  To 
give  this  proof,  let  us  assume  the  external  theory  to  apply  to 
the  relational  complex,  a  R  h.  This  means  that,  though  a  and  b 
are  related,  they  are  also  independent.  Then,  so  the  argument 
goes,  the  absurdity  appears,  that  the  terms  a  and  b  cannot  be 
related  at  all,  on  the  ground  that,  if  they  are  (assumed  to  be) 
independent  of  each  other,  they  are  also  independent  of  R  (and 

of  it  are  presented  by  the  following  writers:  Perry,  in  The  New  Realism, 
in  his  essay  on  "Independence";  Russell,  Principles  of  Mathematics, 
p.  09  If .  and  p.  221  ff.,  and  in  several  other  places;  "The  Monistic  Theory 
of  Truth,"  Philosophical  Essays ;  "  The  Basis  of  Realism,"  Jour,  of  Phil., 
Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  VIII.,  p.  158  If. ;  "On  the  Nature  of 
Truth,"  Proceedings  of  Aristotelian  Society,  1907,  N.  S.,  Vol.  VII.,  pp. 
28-49;  Spaulding,  "  A  Defense  of  Analysis  "  in  The  Keio  Realism,  p.  155  If.; 
Marvin,  First  Book  of  Metaphysics,  Chaps.  VII. -XIII. 

For  instances  of  the  independence  of  related  terms  and  for  a  discussion 
of  this  problem  see  Chap.  II.  of  this  volume;  also  Perry,  "A  Realistic 
Theory  of  Independence  "  in  The  New  Realism ;  W.  H.  Sheldon,  "  Chance," 
Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  IX.,  1912,  pp.  281-290; 
E.  V.  Huntington,  "  Sets  of  Independent  Postulates  for  tlie  Algebra  of 
Logic,"  Transactions  of  the  American  Mathematical  Society,  Vol.  V.,  1904; 
J.  VV.  Young,  Fundamental  Concepts  of  Algebra  and  Geometry ;  Stout, 
"Alleged  Self-Contradictions  in  the  Concept  of  Relation,"  Proc.  Aris.  Sac, 
Vol.  II.,  pp.  191-192. 

'  This  is  very  definitely  attempted  by  Bradley  in  Appearance  and  Reality, 
pp.  1-120,  and  by  Joachim  in  The  Nature  of  Truth,  especially  in  Chap.  III. 
The  position  is  also  accei)tcd  essentially  without  any  examination  of  its 
grounds  and  almost  as  self-evident  by  Bergaon  in  Creative  Fvolution, 
pp.  9,  11,  160-16.3,  188,  303,  338-340,  and  by  Wm.  James  in  Pragmatism, 
p.  134  ff.  Royce,  in  J'he  World  and  the  Individual,  in  the  first  four 
chapters,  especially  Chaps.  III.  and  IV.,  maintains  it  in  the  form  of  the 
principle,  that  relatednrss  implies  dependence.  This  is  also  the  position 
of  Lotze,  Metaphysics,  I.,  trans.,  ed.  by  Bosanquet,  Chap.  VI.,  pp.  166-169. 
Bradley,  in  Essays  on  Truth  and  Reality,  1914,  does  not  depart  from  his 
earlier  position. 


THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS  183 

so  are  not  related,).^  Accordingly  it  is  to  be  inferred  that 
in  order  to  get  or  to  have  the  terms  related — which  is  the 
desideratum — there  must  be  other  relations  to  relate  the  original 
relation  R  to  a  and  to  h,  and  also,  as  alone  consistent  with  this 
implication,  still  other  relations  to  relate  these  relations  to  one 
another,  and  so  on,  in  an  infinite  series.^  But,  it  is  maintained 
(though  falsely),  an  infinite  series  cannot  by  its  very  nature 
ever  be  completed.  Therefore  it  is  inferred  that,  by  the  princi- 
ples of  the  theory  of  exter^ial  relations,  terms  are  never  re- 
lated. Accordingly  it  is  inferred,  conversely,  that,  in  order  to 
have  terms  related,  or  to  explain  how  a  relation  relates,  one  must 
accept  the  "internal  theory''  to  the  effect,  that  related  terms 
are  dependent  in  the  sense  that  they  influence,  modify,  and 
affect  one  another}'^  As  a  result,  all  terms  hecome,  or  are  com- 
plex, indeed  infinitely  so;  for,  on  the  one  hand,  any  so-called, 
simple  term  is  a  complex  of  the  effects  produced  in  it  through 
its  being  related  to  all  other  terms,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  since 
these  effects  are  in  turn  related,  they  affect  one  another,  and 
so  are  also  complex. 

In  criticism  of  this  modification  theory  of  relations,  one  may 
attack  either  the  foregoing  argument,  or  the  position  that  the 
theory  is  of  universal  applicability.  But  that  the  theory  is  of 
limited  validity  and  applicability  is  shown  by  the  fact,  that  it 
leads  to  the  position,  that  all  terms  are  complex,  and  thus  be- 
comes self-contradictory.  For  complexity  presupposes  at  some 
juncture  ultimate  simples  as  the  components  of  all  else  that  is 
complex,  and  such  simples,  though  related,  must  he  unmodified 
hy  and  independent  of  one  another.  The  argument  for  the 
modification  theory  thus  leads  to  the  limitation  of  the  theory 
itself. 

But,  quite  apart  from  this  outcome,  the  argument  for  the 
theory  may  itself  be  refuted  as  regards  its  logical  procedure. 
For,  at  its  very  beginning,  the  very  question  at  issue  is  begged, 
when  it  is  assumed  that  the  theory  of  external  relations  means 
that,  if  terms  are  independent,  they  cannot  he  related,  and  that 
the  relation  does  not  relate  them.    All  the  rest  of  the  argument 

*  Royce,  ihid. 

'  Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  32-33. 

*°  Maintained  by  all  the  adherents  of  this  position. 


184         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

proceeds  from  this  unwarranted  assumption.  Accordingly  the 
argument  is  71  ot  in  the  least  a  disproof  of  the  theory  of  external 
relations,  but  is  07ily  a  denial,  and  merely  to  deny  is  never  to 
disprove. 

Is  there  any  proof  or  evidence  at  all,  therefore,  for  the  modi- 
fication theory  of  relations,  by  which  this  theory  can  be  shown 
to  hold  even  for  some  instances  of  related  terms,  if  not  for  all  ? 
The  theory  certainly  does  not  hold  for  simple  terms,  nor  for 
those  complex  terms  which,  like  time,  space,  motion,  and  accelera- 
tion, are  either  series  or  functions  in  the  precise  sense  of  these 
terms.  But  for  a  specific  kind  of  complex  term,  namely,  for 
so-called  organic  wholes,  it  does  seem  to  hold. 

An  example  of  such  wholes  is  any  individual  plant  or  animal. 
The  parts  of  these  wholes  are  related,  and  they  do  interact 
causally — though,  perhaps,  not  because  they  are  related,  but 
because  this  is  the  specific  kind  of  relation  between  them.  Thus, 
e.g.f  the  lungs,  heart,  muscles,  and  brain  of  a  vertebrate  causally 
influence  one  another,  and  develop  in  mutual  causal  dependence, 
in  the  growth  of  every  individual  from  a  fertilized  ovum  to 
maturity.  But  living  beings,  both  plant  and  animal,  also 
causally  interact  with  their  physical  environment.  In  fact  it 
would  seem  not  only  that  organic  beings,  but  also  that  the 
"things"  of  the  inorganic  world  are  related  to  and  causally 
influence  one  another.  Yet,  if  this  means  that  the  modification 
theory  of  relations  is  here  applicable,  it  does  not  mean,  how- 
ever, that  this  theory  applies  to  every  complex  of  related  terms. 
For  some  entities,  as,  e.g.,  motion-related-to-time,  are  complexes 
whose  parts  are  related,  yet  are  causally  independent,  i.e.,  whose 
parts  are  related  in  accordance  with  the  theory  of  external  rela- 
tions. In  certain  complexes,  furthermore,  certain  terms  may 
be  related,  and  yet  be  independent,  while  others  are  related 
causally.  Thus,  e.g.,  the  parts  of  a  shooting  sky  rocket  are  in 
causal  (chemical)  interaction  as  the  rocket  moves,  and  yet  the 
mass  and  the  changing  velocity  of  the  rocket  are  in  a  relation 
of  independence  to  the  chemical  composition,  to  the  time,  and 
to  the  "path." 

This  distinction  corresponds  to  that  distinction  which  sub- 
sists between  causal  and  functional  relations.  Functional  rela- 
tions subsist  by  virtue  of  a  specific  correlating  relation  between 


THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS  185 

the  individuals  of  two  series.  Thus  the  changing  velocity  or 
the  acceleration  of  a  falling  body  is  a  function  of  the  time,  but 
it  (the  acceleration)  is  also,  as  are  the  time  and  the  space,  a 
series.  Causal  relations,  on  the  other  hand,  subsist  between 
complexes  that  are  not  series,  aWiough  functional  relations, 
series,  and  the  individuals  that  are  in  the  series,  may  be  present 
in  these  causally  related  complexes.  For  example,  any  living 
organism  is  a  complex  of  organs  and  processes  that  are  causally 
related,  but,  within  these  organs  and  processes,  there  are  strictly 
functional  relationships  of  the  specific  kind  that  chemistry,  espe- 
cially physical  chemistry,  is  concerned  with. 

This  position,  namely,  that  there  are  certain  wholes  which 
consist  of  complexes  which  are  related  dependently  and  causally, 
but  that  also,  within  these  complexes,  there  are  still  other  com- 
plexes which  are  related  and  yet  are  independent,  agrees  with 
the  result  previously  reached,  namely,  that  the  modification 
theory  of  relations  "rests  on"  and  presupposes  the  theory  of 
external  relations.  While  for  each  theory  there  is  therefore  a 
field  within  which  it  holds,  the  theory  of  external  relations  is, 
in  this  respect,  fundamental  to  the  modification  theory. 

3.  The  Underlying  or  Transcendent  Reality  Theory  of 
Relations 

The  criticism  and  brief  formulation  of  this  specific  theory 
have  already  been  given.^^  No  concrete  instances  can  be  found, 
other  than  hy  deduction  from  the  theory  itself,  of  an  extra 
entity  that  mediates  the  relations  between  other  entities.  Yet 
the  theory  is  one  which,  either  as  explicitly  stated  or  as  tacitly 
presupposed,  has  had  a  dominant  influence  in  theology,  phi- 
losophy, and  logic  down  to  the  present  time,  and  in  science 
during  the  middle  ages.  Upon  it,  indeed,  are  based,  e.g.,  certain 
of  the  proofs  of  the  existence,  or  subsistence  of  a  deity,' ^  as  are 
also  certain  doctrines  as  to  the  nature  of  the  soul,"  and  much 
of  the  traditional  Aristotelian  logic.'*  However,  the  theory,  as 
a  theory,  did  not  receive  explicit  recognition  and  formulation 

''  This  chapter,  ii.,  1. 

"  8ee  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 

*' In  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Kant;   see  Part  II. 

"  Chap.  III. 


186         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

until  the  post-Kantian  philosophy  appeared,  but  it  was  then 
advanced  as  the  very  core  of  what  was  styled  a  new  logic, 
namely,  the  Hegelian.^ ^  Nevertheless,  this  new  logic  was  really 
only  a  development  of  the  old,  since  it  was  derived  by  a  specific 
use  of  the  Aristotelian  principle  of  contradiction. 

Thus,  by  the  entirely  formal  use  of  this  principle,  there  must 
be  formed  or  thought,  for  every  term  without  exception,  the 
formal  contradictory,  i.e.,  for  every  a,  whatever  a  may  be,  there 
must  be  thought  a  non-a.  This  relation  seems  to  be  one  of 
necessary,  logical  connection,  which  may  be  stated  in  the  form 
of  the  propositions,  that  for  every  a  there  must  he  a  non-a,  or, 
that  a  cannot  he  without  non-a,  or,  that  a  implies  non-a.  But^ 
if  a  cannot  he  without  non-a,  then  the  two  are  inseparahle,  and, 
therefore,  form  a  unity.  The  important  problem  for  the 
theory  therefore  is,  Where  is  this  unity?  or,  What  is  its  locus? 
And  the  answer  is,  that  the  unity  cannot  be  identical  with,  or 
be  at  the  "level"  of,  a  and  7ion-a,  since  these  are  numerically 
two.  Therefore  it  must  be  at  a  different  level,  either  tran- 
scendent to  or  underlying  hoth  a  and  non-a,  and,  also,  it  must 
be  an  absolute  unity,^*^  and  not  a  concealed  complexity,  since, 
if  it  were  complex,  the  problem  would  be  repeated  in  regard  to 
the  relatedness  of  the  terms  of  this  complex.  This  absolute 
unity  may  be  symbolized  by  TJ,  and,  accordingly,  the  theory 

itself  be  expressed  by  the  symbol . . 

U 
As  an  example  of  the  use  to  which  this  theory  is  put,  we 

may  consider  the  demonstration,  that  change  is  necessary.    This 

demonstration  is  not  difficult  to  make,  since,  if  a  cannot  h& 

without  non-a,  and,  if  change  means  that  a  hecomes  h,  i.e.,  non-a, 

then  it  follows,  that  change  must  he.    This  is,  indeed,  logically 

the  very  demonstration  that  Hegel  himself  made  of  the  necessity 

of  change  and  evolution.^''     It  means  that  for  Hegel  and  his 

faithful  followers,  not  only  must  there  be  change,  evolution, 

"  See  Chaps.  XXXIV.  and  XXXV. 

"  Among  the  prominent  modern  philosophers  who  hold  this  position 
are  Fichte  and  Hegel  (see  Chaps  XXXIV. -XXXVIII. )  ;  Bradley,  Appear- 
ance and  Reality,  p.  520  11'.;  Royce,  as  the  outcome  of  his  discussion  in 
The  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy  and  The  World,  and  the  Individual; 
E.  Caird,  Evolution  of  Religion,  Vol.  I.,  p.  67  fl'. ;  Calkins,  Persistent 
Problems  of  Philosophy,  p.  418  flf.;  T.  H.  Green,  Works,  Vol.  III.,  p.  45. 

''See  Chap.  XXXVl. 


THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS  187 

and  progress,  but  also  that  these  are  logical  in  character,  and 
that,  underlying  them,  there  is  an  absolute  unity. 

Another  example  of  the  application  of  this  theory  is  one  in 
which  it  is  demonstrated  that  there  is  an  underlying  and 
transcendent  Unity  for  the  whole  universe.  To  give  this  demon- 
stration, let  us  select  the  contradictory  terms,  self  and  not-self 
(or  indeed  any  other  pair  of  formally  contradictory  terms), 
and  then  ask,  if  everything  is  not  either  one's  self  or  not  one's 
self?  Then,  hy  the  theory,  must  there  not  be  One  and  only  One 
Being  that  underlies  and  is  transcendent  to  all  else,  and  that  is 
of  a  different  order  from  the  related  terms?  ^® 

Still  another  example  of  the  application  of  this  theory  shows 
how,  by  means  of  it,  one  can  transcend  time,  and  get  to  the 
timeless,  and  perhaps  to  the  eternal.  For,  if  the  present  be  a, 
all  other  time,  past  and  future,  is,  as  not-present  time,  non-a. 
Therefore,  iy  the  theory,  there  is  a  Z7  that  is  different  from 
both  a  and  non-a,  and  that  is  in  this  respect  neither  past,  present, 
nor  future}^ 

The  underlying-realit}^  theory  of  relations  can  be  maintained 
as  valid,  at  the  same  time  that  one  also  holds,  that  some  related 
terms  modify  one  another,  and  that  others  are  externally  re- 
lated. Conversely,  however,  if  one  accepts  the  theory  of  external 
relations,  there  is  no  necessity  for  accepting  the  underlying- 
reality  theory,  since  the  former  theory  means,  that  the  fact 
that  a  relation  relates  its  terms  accounts  for  all  the  unity  that 
there  is  in  the  relational  situation. 

Criticism  of  the  Argument 

The  argument  for  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations 
has  already  been  criticized,^*'  and  need  only  be  referred  to  here. 
If  a  first  U  is  found  to  mediate  the  relation  between  a  and 
non-a,  then,  since  this  U  is  related  to  the  complex,  a  R  non-a, 
another  U  is  in  turn  implied  to  mediate  this  relation,  and  so 
on  in  infinite  series.  Therefore,  either  an  ultimate  underlying 
U  is  never  reached,  or,  if  it  is,  then,  although  it  is  related  to 

**  Well  illustrated  by  Bradley's  arguments  for  an  Absolute  in  Appear- 
ance and  Reality. 

'^^  E.g.,  Bradley's  and  Royce's  Absolute. 
">  This  chapter,  ii.,  1. 


188         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

the  complex  of  the  preceding  complexes,  this  relation  does  not 
demand  an  underlying  reality  to  mediate  it.  But,  if  there  is 
this  one  exception,  then  no  relation  need  demand  an  underlying 
entity  to  mediate  it,  and  the  whole  theory  falls  to  the  ground. 

The  only  seemingly  possible  inductive  evidence  for  the  theory 
is  derived  from  the  examination  of  concepts.  Thus  if  one  take 
either  the  psychologizing  or  the  pragmatic  view  of  eoncepts,^^ 
he  might  go  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  the  individuals  of  what 
we  now  regard  as  a  class,  e.g.,  the  class  of  living  heings,  would 
not  be  so  related  as  to  form  this  class,  if  we  did  not  relate  them. 
For  relations  of  similarity  between  "things"  whereby  they 
form  classes,  are,  in  accordance  with  these  two  positions,  either 
created  or  invented  by  having  "things"  get  into  relation  with 
a  consciousness,  or  with  something,  such  as  an  organism  that 
relates  them.  But  if  this  is  the  case,  then  at  least  these  rela- 
tions, to  a  consciousness,  or  to  an  organism,  would  not  be  so 
created  or  invented,  since  they  must  subsist  before  other  rela- 
tions could  be  created  or  invented.  But,  if  some  relations  are 
thus  independent,  then,  clearly,  others  may  also  be — especially 
those  relations  of  similarity  by  virtue  of  which  there  are  classes. 
Classes,  therefore,  would  seem  to  be  independent  of  a  relating 
consciousness  or  organism. 

However,  if  a  relation  is,  in  this  manner,  ayi  objective  entity 
that  relates  "things,"  then  it  is  specific  relations  of  similarity 
that  unify  individuals  into  specific  classes,  so  that  with  the  unity 
of  the  class  accounted  for  in  this  way,  there  is  neither  the  oppor- 
tunity nor  the  necessity  for  a  transcendent  or  underlying  unity 
either  to  perform  the  function  of  mediating  the  relation,  or  to 
give  the  class  unity.  Thus,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  the  class  of  living 
beings,  there  are  (1)  the  individuals;  these  are  related  by  a 
number  of  specific  relations  of  similarity.  Then  there  is  also 
(2)  the  class,  as  a  class,  whose  members  are  minified  objectively 
by  each  of  these  specific  relations.  But  (3)  each  one  of  the 
relations  which  thus  organizes  the  individuals  into  a  class  is 
distinct  both  from  the  class  as  a  whole,  and  from  its  individuals ; 
yet  these  relations,  e.g.,  similarity  in  respect  to  structure,  are 
not,  in  the  usual  sense  of  the  term,  transcendent,  either  to  the 
class  as  a  whole,  or  to  its  individuals,  even  as  the  class  and  the 

"Chap.  XIII. 


THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS  189 

individuals  are  not  "outside"  of  themselves  in  any  sense.  The 
specific  relations  of  similarity  which  thus  organize  the  indi- 
viduals into  a  class  form,  or  are,  the  objective  concept. 

It  goes  without  saying,  perhaps,  that  this  objective  concept 
can  be  known  quite  as  well  as  can  either  the  individuals,  or 
the  class  as  a  whole,  and  such  knowledge  can  be  called  an 
"abstract  idea."  Humanity,  triangularity,  bravery,  are  exam- 
ples. On  the  other  hand,  the  knowledge  of  the  class  as  a  whole 
is  a  "general  idea," — human  being,  triangle,  brave  act  being 
examples.  By  virtue  of  abstract  ideas  we  can,  without  knowing 
each  individual  specifically,  know  about  classes  as  a  whole, 
i.e.,  we  can  know  that  there  are  individuals  of  a  certain  type, 
because  they  are  related  in  a  specific  way.  We  can  know  any 
individual,  although,  perhaps,  no  particular  one.  In  fact,  in 
certain  instances,  not  only  do  we  not  need  to  know  all  the 
individuals  specifically,  but,  in  many  cases,  we  cannot  so  know 
them,  for  one  reason  or  another.  For  example,  because  counting 
is  a  psychological  process  requiring  for  each  act  of  counting 
a  specific  time,  we  cannot,  by  counting,  know  specifically  all  the 
individuals  of  an  infinite  class.  Yet  we  do  know  that  there  are 
infinite  classes,  and  that  there  are  individuals  which  are  mem- 
bers of  these  classes,  "We  thus  again  discover  the  important 
difference  between  knowing  "things"  as  individuals,  i.e.,  by 
specification,  and  knowing  them  by  type,  by  law,  by  organizing 
concepts,  or  by  intension,  as  it  is  technically  called. 

That  the  concept  of  a  class  should  be  that  underlying  reality 
which  mediates  the  relation  between  the  members  of  the  class 
is  thus  disproved.  Yet  that  the  concept  performs  this  function 
is  precisely  that  view  to  which  the  underlying-reality  theory  has 
been  driven  by  continued  and  repeated  criticism.  The  result 
of  this  criticism  has  been,  when  the  adherents  of  the  under- 
lying-reality theory  have  desired  to  get  to  an  idtimate  and  funda- 
mental unity  underlying  the  whole  physical  and  mental  uni- 
verse, that  they  have  given  up  "making"  this  unity  either 
physical  or  mental,  and  have  been  compelled  to  make  it  a  bare 
concept.  But,  by  the  foregoing  criticism,  if  this  ultimate  con- 
cept were  a  fact,  it  would  be  only  that  concept  or  relation  of 
similarity  which  organizes  a  universe  into  a  whole,  and  the 
universe  would  have  only  as  inach  unity  as  there  is  siniilarity. 


190    METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

Unless  one  could  prove,  therefore,  that  any  two  terms  must  be 
similar  in  order  to  be  related,  the  universe  or  totality  of  entities 
might  consist  of  related,  yet  of  extremely,  perhaps  of  iiholly 
dissimilar  "things."  Or,  there  might  be  many  kinds  of 
"things,"  hut  no  one  kind  of  these  kinds,  such  as,  e.g.,  mind,  or 
matter,  or  existence.  However,  one  cannot  exclusively  prove 
that  terms,  in  order  to  be  related,  must  be  similar.  Such  a  con- 
clusion follows  only  from  the  postulate,  in  accordance  with  the 
modification  theory  of  relations,  that  related  terms  affect  one 
another  and  so  cause  one  another  to  he  similar.  But  this  theory 
has  been  shown  not  to  be  universally  valid.  For  it  presupposes 
that  terms,  in  order  that  they  may  be  modified,  must  first  be 
unmodified  and  yet  related.  But  such  ultimate  unmodified,  non- 
complex  terms  might  be  absolutely  different,  and  still  be  related. 
Yet,  if  terms  can  be  related  and  yet  be  wholly  dissimilar,  there 
is  no  relation  of  similarity  that  relates  them. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  that  inductive  evidence  for  the  valid- 
ity of  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations  cannot  be 
obtained  from  the  examination  of  concepts.  The  concept  is 
either  the  organizing  relation,  known  in  an  abstract  idea,  or  the 
class  as  a  whole,  known  in  a  general  idea,  but  it  is  not  something 
more  than  this  relation  and  this  class.  There  is,  therefore,  no 
one  concept,  which,  as  outside  the  universe,  also  unifies  it. 
Indeed,  empirical  evidence  shows  that  the  universe  is  not  one 
class,  or  one  kind  of  "Ihings,"  but  that  it  is  many  kinds.^^ 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

TYPES  OF  RELATIONS,  OF  WHOLES,  AND  OF  UNITIES 

I.   TYPES   OP  RELATIONS 

Science  and  philosophy  are  both  concerned  with  relations 
between  "things,"  and,  therefore,  also  with  wholes,  which  are 
identical  with  parts  as  related  in  specific  ways. 

Some  of  the  important  types  of  relations  have  already  been 
"  See  Chap.  XLIV.,  n. 


THEORIES  OF  RELATIONS  191 

presented,  but  these  types  may  here  be  advantageously  sum- 
marized, using  R  for  relation,  and  a,  b,  c,  and  d  for  terms.^ 

I.  Every  relation  has  an  inverse.  Thus,  if  a  is  above  b 
{a  R  b),  there  is  the  inverse  relation,  R,  b  below  a;  also,  if 
a=:b,  there  is  the  inverse,  b  =^  a,  where  R  is  the  relation  of 
equality. 

II.  Relations  are  also  classified  as  dyadic,  triadic,  tetradic, 
etc.  A  dyadic  relation  is  expressed  by  the  symbol,  a  R  b;  a 
triadic,  hy  R  (a  b  c)  ;  a  tetradic,  hy  R  (abed).  An  example 
of  a  triadic  relation  is  the  relational  complex,  sender  of  a  mes- 
sage— message — recipient. 

III.  Further  differences  among  relations  are  distinguished 
by  the  names  symmetrical,  non-symmetrical,  and  asymmetrical, 
and  transitive,  non-transitive,  and  intransitive.  These  different 
types  may  be  best  considered  in  the  case  of  dyadic  relations. 

Symmetrical  relations  are  such  as  are  identical  with  their  own 
inverse;  i.e.,  they  subsist,  if  R  is  the  same  as  R.  Examples: 
equality,  similarity,  difference,  contradiction,  consistency. 

Asymmetrical  relations  are  such  as  always  preclude  the  iden- 
tity of  the  inverse  with  the  original  relation.  For  example,  if 
a  precedes  b,  it  is  precluded,  that  b  should  precede  a.  Further 
instances  are:  "greater  than,"  before,  "ancestor  of,"  and  "fa- 
ther of."  Asymmetrical  relations  are  sometimes  called  totally 
non-symmetrical.  Partially  non-symmetrical  relations  are  rec- 
ognized by  Royce  and  Russell,^  these  relations  being  such  as  do 
not  always  preclude  the  identity  of  the  inverse  with  the  original 
relation.  Thus,  if  a  is  friend  of  b,  it  may  be  that  b  is  friend  of 
a  (symmetrical),  but  it  may  also  be  that  b  is  not  a  friend  of  a 
(asymmetrical). 

Transitive  relations  are  such  that,  if  they  hold  between  a  and 
b,  and  between  b  and  c,  they  also  hold  between  a  and  c.  Equal- 
ity, "ancestor  of,"  and  "older  than,"  are  examples.  Intransi- 
tive relations  are  such  as  are  never  transitive.  Thus,  if  a  is  the 
mother  of  b,  and  b  is  the  mother  of  c,  it  is  precluded  that  a 
should  be  the  mother  of  c. 

'  Cf.  Russell,  Hcievtific  Methvd  in  Philosophy,  p.  40  ff.,  and  p.  124  ff., 
iiiid  Frinciples  of  Mathematics  in  various  places  (see  his  index);  also 
Koyce  in  his  essay  on  The  Principles  ot  Logic"'  in  the  Encyclopedia  of 
the  Philosophical  iiciences,  p.  'J7  ti". 

''  Ibid. 


192  METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

Non-transitive  relations  are  such  as  are  not  transitive  in  some 
cases,  but  are  transitive  in  others.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  men,  if 
a  is  half-brother  of  b,  and  b  is  half-brother  of  c,  a  is  not  half- 
brother  of  c,  unless  a,  b,  and  c  have  a  common  parent,  which  is 
not  necessary. 

IV.  Relations  are  also  distin fished  as  one-one,  one-many, 
and  many-one.  If  a  relation,  B,  holds  only  of  a  to  b,  but  not 
of  a  to  c,  d,  etc.,  then  it  is  a  one-one  relation.  Thus,  if  a  is  the 
twin  of  b,  a  is  not  the  twin  of  c.  One-one  relations  are  present 
in  the  case  of  correlated  classes,  as,  e.g.,  in  the  possession  of  a 
gun  by  each  man  of  a  regiment;  also  in  correlated  series,  as, 
e.g.,  the  occupation,  by  the  center  of  mass  of  a  moving  particle, 
of  one  and  only  one  point  at  each  instant.  If  a  relation  R  holds 
between  a  and  b,  c,  d,  etc.,  it  is  one-many,  while  the  inverse  rela- 
tion of  b,  c,  and  (Z  to  a  is  many-one.  For  example,  rest  is  a 
relational  whole  that  is  generated  by  a  one-many  relation  be- 
tween one  point  and  an  infinity  of  instants,  and,  conversely,  by 
a  many-one  relation  between  an  infinity  of  instants  and  one 
point.  Existentially  this  relational  whole  is  generated,  e.g.,  by 
the  center  of  mass  of  a  body  as  it  occupies  a  point  for  many 
instants. 

These  several  types  of  relations  are  found  not  only  among 
dyadic  relations,  but  also  among  triadic  and  tetradie  relations. 
Thus  the  relation  of  similarity,  which  is  symmetrical,  holds 
between  the  members  of  a  class,  and  the  class  subsists  by  virtue 
of  this  relation.  The  class  is  thus  independent  of  the  order  of 
its  members;  R  {a  d  c  b)  is  the  same  as  R  {a  b  c  d) — as  a  class. 
If,  however,  a,  b,  and  c  are  each  a  class  as,  e.g.,  are  Frenchmen, 
men,  and  mortals,  then  the  triadic  relation,  R,  of  inclusion, 
a  <ib  <C  c,  is  asymmetrical  and  transitive.  In  the  case  of  a 
mere  collection  or  aggregate,  in  which  the  individuals  are  re- 
lated by  the  minimum  of  all  relations,  namely,  the  additive 
relation,  as  expressed  by  ''and,"  the  relation  is  symmetrical 
and  transitive. 

II.   TYPES  OP  WHOLES 

If  there  are  terms  and  relations,  then  there  arc  also  wholes; 
or,  conversely,  if  there  are  wholes  other  than  absolutely  simple 
entities,  which  consist  of  no  parts  at  all,  then  there  are  terms 


TYPES  OF  RELATIONS  IpS 

and  relations.  Indeed,  a  relation  may  be  defined  as  an  entity 
which  subsists  by  virtue  of  there  being  complex  wholes.  The 
chief  types  of  wholes  are  as  follows : —  ^ 

I.  Mere  aggregates  or  collections.  In  these  wholes,  in  which 
the  parts  may  be  any  type  of  entity  whatsoever,  the  relations 
between  the  parts  are  such  as  are  expressed  by  mere  ''and." 
No  other  relations,  such  as  the  relations  of  similarity  or  of 
causation,  or  those  relations  that  generate  order,  namely,  asym- 
metrical and  transitive  relations,  need  be  present.  As  an  ex- 
ample, this  page  and  a  chimjera  and  the  number  3  and  last 
evening's  sunset  form  such  a  whole.* 

II.  Classes.  A  class  subsists  by  .virtue  of  a  relation  of  simi- 
larity, which  is  symmetrical  and  non-transitive,  between  indi- 
viduals, which  individuals  may  be  either  simple  or  complex. 
Together  with  the  relation  of  similarity,  there  subsists  in  all 
classes  the  conjunctive  or  additive  relation  expressed  by  "and." 
Further  relations,  such  as  those  which  generate  order,  are,  how- 
ever, not  necessary  to  the  subsistence  of  classes.  Any  indi- 
vidual either  bears  the  asymmetrical  relation,  s,  of  "belonging 
to"  a  specific  class,  or  does  not  bear,  or  stand  in,  that  relation 
to  that  class.  Vertebrates,  triangles,  atoms,  are  examples  of 
classes. 

III.  Series.  In  a  series  there  are  relations  of  conjunction, 
of  similarity,  and  of  "belonging  to."  Yet  a  series  as  such 
subsists  only  if  its  terms  are  also  related  by  an  asymmetrical 
and  transitive  relation.  The  terms  of  a  series  may  be  absolute 
simples,  such  as  the  points  of  a  line,  or  complexes,  such  as  the 
lines  of  a  plane.  Examples  of  entities  that  are  series  are: 
space  of  one,  two,  three,  or  n  dimensions;  also  time,  motion, 
acceleration,  and  any  qualitative  change.  Such  series  are  found 
to  have  the  same  characteristics  as  have  certain  specific  series 
among  the  real  numbers,  positive  and  negative,  and  zero. 

A  series  is  infinite  if  a  one-one  relation  relates  the  individuals 
of  the  whole  series  to  the  individuals  of  any  part  that  is  similar 

'  See  Chap.  XLTII.,  vii.-x.  Cf.  Royce,  Principles  of  Logic ;  Russell, 
Principles  of  Mathematics,  and  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy ;  White- 
head, Introduction  to  Mathematics;  also  the  works  and  articles  referred 
to  in  Chaps.  III.  and  XLIII.,  vii.-x.  Either  these  several  kinds  of  wholes 
are  recognized  by  these  writers,  or  the  basis  for  their  recognition  and 
distinction  is  given. 

*  Cf.  Russell,  Principles,  p.  69,  and  Whitehead,  op.  cit.,  Chaps.  I.  and  VI. 


194         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

in  character  to  the  whole.  For  example,  a  line  is  an  infinite 
series  of  points,  since  in  any  smaller  line  as  a  "proper  part" 
of  a  larger  line,  there  are  as  many  points  as  there  are  in  the 
larger  line  as  the  whole. 

A  series  is  finite,  if  it  is  not  infinite ;  or,  it  is  finite  in  respect 
to  that  by  which  it  is  7iot  infinite.  Thus,  while  a  line  is  infinite 
in  respect  to  points,  it  is  finite  in  respect  to  any  smaller  line 
that  is  taken  as  a  unit  of  measurement. 

A  series  is  discontinuous  if,  as  is  the  case  with  the  series  of 
positive  and  negative  integers  and  zero  .  .  .  -3,  -2,  -1,  0, 
1,  2,  3,  .  .  .,  between  any  two  of  its  terms  there  is  not  another 
term. 

A  series  is  deyise  or  compact  if,  like  the  series  of  rational 
numbers,  namely,  the  integers  and  rational  fractions,  positive 
and  negative  and  zero,  there  is,  betiveen  any  two  of  its  terms, 
another  term. 

A  series  is  continuous  if,  in  addition  to  terms  that  are  in  one- 
one  correspondence  with  the  rational  numbers,  there  are  still 
other  terms  that  are  in  such  correspondence  with  the  irrational 
numbers,  with  both  rationals  and  irrationals  in  the  order  of 
their  magnitude,  as  this  is  determined  by  the  asymmetrical 
transitive  relation,  "less  than,"  or  by  its  converse,  "greater 
than." 

In  every  series,  each  member  of  the  series  has  one  and  only 
one  specific  "place"  or  "position."  Every  series,  also,  by 
virtue  of  being  generated  by  an  asymmetrical  and  transitive 
relation,  has  a  direction,  which,  however,  is  not  spatial,  but 
logical.  There  are  other  characteristics  of  series,  the  mention 
of  which,  however,  may  be  omitted  here.^ 

IV,  Specific  complexes  that  are  neither  collections,  classes, 
nor  series.  These  wholes  are  generated  by  many  different  types 
of  relations,  either  dyadic  or  polyadic,  transitive  or  non-transi- 
tive, symmetrical  or  non-symmetrical,  between  terms  that  are 
either  simple  or  complex.  A  good  example  of  such  a  whole  is 
the  complex  that  is  formed  by  the  one-one  relation  between  a 
point  and  an  instant,  in  the  case  of  the  motion  of  the  center  of 
mass  of  a  particle.  Another  good  example  is  that  complex 
which  is  generated  by  the  one-many  relation  of  one  point  to 
•  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  vii.-x. 


TYPES  OF  RELATIONS  195 

many  instants,  and  which  is  identical  with  rest.  Such  specific 
complexes  may  in  turn  be  members  of  a  series;  e.g.,  motion  is 
the  series  of  complexes,  each  of  which  is  a  point-correlated- 
with-an-instant. 

V.  An  important  specific  type  of  such  complexes  is  the  func- 
tional whole.  The  simplest  type  of  this  whole  is  the  "one- 
valued"  function.  Such  a  whole  is  generated  by  a  one-one  rela- 
tion that  correlates  the  terms  of  one  series  with  those  of  another, 
but  this  relationship  of  one  series  to  another  is  not  of  necessity 
itself  serial  in  character,  although  it  may  be  serial  in  some  cases. 
As  examples  of  such  wholes  we  have  the  well-known  facts,  that 
acceleration  is  a  function  of  time,  and  that  the  pressure  of  a 
gas  is  a  function  of  the  temperature. 

VI.  Another  specific  type  of  complex,  and  one,  also,  that  has 
been  of  great  influence  in  the  development  of  both  science  and 
philosophy,  is  the  causal  or  organic  whole.  It  would  seem  that 
the  causal  relation  is  asymmetrical  and  transitive.  It  is  asym- 
metrical in  that  it  is  precluded  that  B,  as  the  causal  relation 
of  a  to  b,  or  of  a  on  b,  should  be  identical  with  the  inverse  rela- 
tion, B,  of  b  to,  or  on,  a.  The  relation,  however,  is  transitive  in 
that,  if  a  causally  affects  &,  and  if  b  causally  affects  c,  a  is  a 
cause  of  c.  Also,  if  a  affects  b,  then  b  is  modified  and  becomes 
h  -\-  e^,  (e^  =  effect  of  a),  while,  if  6  -(-  e^  in  turn  affects  c,  c 
becomes  c -\-  e  {b  -\-  e°-). 

If,  however,  both  that  which  is  acting  and  that  which  is 
acted  upon  continues  to  exist,  together  with  the  effects,  and  if 
the  causal  relation  be  universal,  then  the  effect  affects  both  the 
cause  and  also  that  of  which  the  effect  is  the  effect,  and  effects 
affect  effects,  and  so  on.  Accordingly,  each  entity  in  an  organic 
whole  thus  becomes  infinitely  complex,  and  reflects  the  whole, 
"which  is  also  infinitely  complex. 

There  may,  however,  be  two  distinct  types  of  causal  or  organic 
wholes.  If  the  relatedness  of  terms  does  not  of  necessity  carry 
with  it  the  presence  of  the  causal  relation,  then,  in  a  whole, 
some  terms  might  be  related  causally,  and  others  not,  which 
would  mean  that  causation  is  limited  in  its  field,  even  as  other 
relations  are  limited.  This  type  of  limited  organic  whole  seems, 
indeed,  to  be  discoverable  by  empirical  investigation  in  the  case, 
e.g.,  of  any  living  organism,  or  any  chemical  compound.     For 


196         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

in  such  wholes  there  are,  in  addition  to  causal  relations,  funC' 
tional  relations  and  a  whole  group  of  non-causal  relations  that 
are  present  in  a  functional  whole.  However,  by  some  phi- 
losophers and  scientists  it  is  held  that  the  causal  relation  is 
universal,  i.e.,  that  two  or  more  terms  cannot  be  related  in  any 
other  way,  without  also  being  causally  related.  There  accord- 
ingly results  the  infinite  complexity  of  both  whole  and  part. 
This  position  is  found  by  the  supporters  of  the  new  logic  to  be 
invalid.  Nevertheless  it  has  grown  up  in  the  Aristotelian  tradi- 
tion, and  has  been  of  profound  influence. 

One  of  the  important  features  of  the  new  logic  is  the  position, 
that  relations  are  quite  as  objective  as  are  terms.  Among  the 
relations  that  fall  under  one  or  more  of  the  several  types  above 
presented  are  (a)  implication,  (b)  consistency  (if  consistency  be 
a  relation),  (e)  contradiction.^  Accordingly  three  further  types 
of  wholes  may  be  added  to  our  list,  since  each  of  these  specific 
relations  can  relate  parts  so  as  to  form  a  whole.  An  example  of 
each  of  these  types  will  make  sufficiently  clear,  without  further 
discussion,  their  distinctness.  All  three  may  be  illustrated  from 
the  field  of  geometry. 

VII.  Contradictory  wholes.  Some  relation,  such  as  that  of 
"and"  subsists  between  Euclidean  space  and  Lobatehewskian. 
Since  a  proposition  is  a  relation  between  terms,  space  may  be 
defined  as  that  system  of  propositions  which  are  identical  with 
specific  relations  between  certain  entities,  whether  these  be 
points,  lines,  planes,  or  spheres.  But  Euclidean  and  Lobatehew- 
skian space  are  contradictory  in  the  precise  sense,  that  the 
latter  denies  the  fifth  postulate,  the  so-called  "parallel  postu- 
late," of  the  former.  The  proposition  or  postulate  which  is 
identical  with  this  denial,  together  with  the  other  postulates, 
implies  that  kind  of  space  which  is  known  as  Lobatehewskian. 
However,  both  this  space  and  the  Euclidean  are  equally  real, 
although  they  are  contradictories.  Together,  therefore,  they 
form  a  whole,  which  is  a  contradictory  whole.'' 

VIII.  Consistent  wholes.  Consistent  wholes  are  such  as  are 
not  necessarily  implicative  in  character.  Thus,  e.g.,  the  efforts 
of  modern  geometers  have  been  in  part  directed  to  the  problem 
of   reducing   the   axioms   and   postulates   of   geometry    to   the 

•  See  Chap.  XLI.,  iii.-v.  ^  See  Chaps.  I.  and  XLI.,  v. 


TYPES  OF  RELATIONS  197 

smallest  possible  mimher.  One  method  for  doing  this  has  been 
to  discover  a  set  of  entities  for  which  a  specific  postulate  does 
not  hold,  while  other  postulates  do.  Then  this  postulate  or 
proposition  is  7iot  implied  by  these  others.  In  this  way  a  group 
of  postulates  that  are  consistent  with  tut  not  iynplicative  of  one 
another,  has  been  discovered.  The  postulates  are,  however, 
related.    Such  a  group  forms  a  consistent  u'hole. 

IX.  Implicative  wholes.  Perhaps  few  wholes  are  entirely  im- 
plicative. Even  the  situation,  A  <.  B  <i  C,  implies  A  <.  C,  is 
not  wholly  implicative,  since,  if  A,  B,  and  C  are  classes,  other 
relations  than  implication  are  present,  namely,  the  relations  of 
similarity,  difference,  "member  of,"  and  inclusion.  But  a 
specific  space  such  as  is  described  by  both  Euclidean  and  Lo- 
batschewskian  geometry,  illustrates  that  distinct  kind  of  whole 
which  is  in  part  implicative  and  in  part  merely  consistent. 

III.   TYPES   OF   UNITY 

What  the  several  types  of  unity  are,  is  an  important  question 
for  philosophy, — indeed  many  systems  as,  e.g.,  monistic  systems, 
not  only  are  chiefly  concerned  with  just  this  question,  but  also 
are,  in  part,  identical  with  a  specific  solution  to  it.  However, 
it  is  evident  that,  if  the  conclusion  is  reached  that,  e.g.,  the 
whole  universe,  the  human  self,  the  living  organism,  or  the 
system  of  knowledge  is  in  each  case  a  unity,  this  conclusion  must 
be  supplemented  by  determining  in  each  case  just  what  kind  of 
unity  each  such  entity  is.  And  that  there  are  different  kinds 
of  unities  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  there  are  different  types 
of  organizing  relations,  and,  therefore,  different  kinds  of  wholes, 
each  of  which  not  only  is  itself  a  unity  in  some  sense,  but  per- 
haps, also,  as  a  complex  presupposes  unities  of  a  specific  kind, 
as,  e.g.,  absolute  simples. 

The  classification  of  wholes  just  given  helps,  therefore,  to 
answer  this  problem,  since  it  shows  that  there  are  at  least  the 
following  different  kinds  of  unity:  (1)  Absolute  units,  or  sim- 
ples, that  are  not  composed  of  any  parts ;  examples,  points,  and 
instants;  (2)  unities  which,  with  one  possible  exception,  are 
identical  with  the  different  kinds  of  wholes.  (3)  The  possible 
exception  is  that  kind  of  unity  which  is  deduced  in  the  argu- 
ment for  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations,  and  which 


198         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

may  be  called  a  metaphysical  or  transcendent  unity.  However, 
as  alone  consistent  with  the  ar^nient  by  which  it  is  derived, 
this  unity  should  be  absolutely  simple,  since,  if  it  is  not,  it  con- 
sists of  parts,  and  thus  repeats  the  very  problem,  as  regards 
the  relation  of  these  parts,  which  it  is  supposed  to  solve.  But, 
in  our  previous  criticism  it  has  been  found  that  such  a  unity 
is  really  never  reached,  since,  as  mediating  the  relation  between 
the  terms  which  lie  above  it,  it  is  related  to  those  terms,  and 
therefore  presupposes  still  another  mediating  unity,  and  so  on 
in  an  infinite  series.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  relation  between 
such  an  underlying  unity  and  the  terms  and  relation  "above" 
it  demands,  not  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations,  but 
the  modification  theory,  then  the  underlying  unity  is  not  simple, 
hut  complex.  Indeed,  it  is  evident,  that,  if  strictly  empirical 
results  be  departed  from,  and  the  universal  validity  of  the 
modification  theory  of  relations  be  insisted  upon,  all  unities 
would  seem  to  become  organic,  causal  complexes.  Yet  we  have 
seen  that  this  specific  theory  is  also  self-contradictory  in  that 
it  presupposes,  as  the  "elements"  of  such  infinitely  complex 
organic  wholes,  ultimate  simples,  which  simples  are  related  and 
yet  independent. 

We  conclude,  therefore,  that  there  are  to  be  accepted  only  as 
many  specific  kinds  of  unities  as  are  shown  by  consistent  em- 
pirical investigation  to  be  specific  kinds  of  organized  wholes,  or, 
as  in  the  case  of  "numerical  simples"  such  as  points  and 
instants,  are  presupposed  by  such  wholes.  Only  provided  the 
modification  theory  of  relations,  or  the  underlying-reality  theory 
is  postulated,  can  the  conclusion  be  derived  Jiat  all  such  wholes 
are,  respectively,  either  organic,  or  those  that  are  mandatory  of 
an  ultimate,  absolute  One. 

IV.   THEORIES   OP  RELATIONS  AND  TYPES   OP  LOGIC 

Just  as  all  wholes  and  all  unities  are,  by  the  modification 
theory  of  relations,  organic,  and  by  the  underlying-reality 
theory,  a  manifold  of  entities  that  are  held  together  by  one 
underlying  entity,  so,  according  as  one  or  the  other  of  these  two 
theories  is  assumed  to  be  universally  valid,  different  types  of 
theories  as  to  the  nature  of  logical  principles  and  entities  are 
derivable. 


TYPES  OF  RELATIONS  199 

The  traditional  logic  is,  as  we  have  seen,  derived  from  the 
thing-quality  view  of  "things."  Everything  which  can  occur 
as  the  logical  subject  of  a  proposition  and  of  which  a  predicate 
is  asserted,  is,  by  this  logic,  made  a  thing,  or  a  substance  witli 
qualities.  The  substance  is  that  in  which  the  qualities  inhere ; 
it  is  that  which  holds  them  together.  But  this  position  as  to 
the  nature  of  propositions  is,  as  stated  in  terms  of  the  theories  of 
relations,  the  underlying- reality  theory.  This  theory,  therefore, 
is  itself  a  fundamental  postulate  of  the  traditional  logic.  Ac- 
cordingly, with  this  logic  dominant  up  to  the  present  time,  it  is 
not  surprising  to  find  that  some  of  the  most  influential  phi- 
losophies are  the  monistic  systems,  in  which  all  else  is 
made  the  manifold  of  attributes  of  One  fundamental  Being  or 
Substance,  whether  this  be  material  or  spiritual,* 

A  derivative  of  this  traditional  logic  is  the  constitutive, 
a  priori  logic  of  Kant,  This  logic  presupposes  both  the  under- 
lying-reality and  the  modification  theories  of  relations.  Thus, 
if  the  principles  of  the  ordinary  logic  be  interpreted  in  accord- 
ance with  the  psychologizing  tendency  as  laws  of  mind,  and 
mind  be  regarded,  in  accordance  with  the  underlying-reality 
theory,  as  a  spiritual  substance  with  attributes,  then  the  laws 
of  the  mind  are  its  attributes.  And  further,  if  the  mind  is 
related,  in  the  act  of  knowing,  to  the  object  that  is  to  be  known, 
and  this  relation  is  interpreted  by  the  modification  theory,  it 
follows  that  objects  are  perforce  modified  by  the  mind's  attri- 
butes, and  are  known  only  as  so  modified.  It  results,  that 
logical  principles  become  constitutive  of  the  known  world? 

The  pragmatic  theory  of  logic  to  the  effect  that  all  logical 
principles  and  entities  are  merely  adaptative  inventions  of  the 
human  race,  is  really  derived  also  from  the  modification  theory 
of  relations  as  this  is  applied  to  human  organisms  and  their 
environment.  Both  human  beings  and  the  environment  can  be 
interpreted  either  as  substances  with  attributes,  or  as  organic 
wholes;  but  in  either  case  human  organisms,  as  beings  that 
adapt  themselves  to  their  environment,  are  beings  in  whom  the 
environment  causally  works  changes,  and  conversely.  But  this 
is  an  instance  of  the  modification  theory  of  relations.  If,  there- 
fore, logical  principles  are  only  adaptations,  then,  as  such,  they 

"  See  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII.  «  See  Chap.  XXIX. 


200         METHODS  AND  PROBLEMS  OF  METHOD 

presuppose  the  modification  theory  of  relations  as  applying  to 
the  relation  between  human  beings  and  their  environment. 

In  criticism  it  may  be  remarked  that,  if  this  be  the  case,  then 
the  state  of  affairs  that  is  formulated  by  this  particular  theory 
could  not  itself  be  a  mere  adaptation  or  invention;  for  its  own 
objectivity  and  independence  are  presupposed  in  order  that 
other  logical  principles  may  be  adaptations.  Yet,  if  one  logical 
principle  is  not  an  adaptation,  it  may  be  that  none  are,  and 
that,  in  fact,  all  logical  principles  are  quite  objective. 

Modern  logic  in  contrast  with  these  two  interpretations  and 
tendencies,  presupposes,  therefore,  the  theory  of  external  rela- 
tions. This  logic  finds  that  things  and  their  qualities  do  not 
present  the  only  instances  of  relations,  but  that  relations  of  a 
specifically  different  kind  are  involved,  e.g.,  in  series,  in  infinity, 
in  continuity,  in  functions,  and  the  like. 

V.    MATERIAL  PRINCIPLES   OF   PROOF 

The  three  theories  of  relations  that  have  been  discussed  are 
material  principles  of  proof.  That  is,  if  one  assumes  these 
theories,  and  deduces  from  them  correctly,  discovering  their 
implications,  one  gets  certain  definite  results.  Two  of  the  the- 
ories, namely,  the  ''external  theory"  and  the  ''modification 
theory,"  are  shown  empirically  to  be  valid,  each  for  a  certain 
sphere  of  terms  and  relations,  but  no  convincing  empirical  evi- 
dence for  the  underlying-reality  theory  has  been  found  up  to 
the  present. 


PART   II 


THE  SOLUTION  OF  PROBLEMS 

THE  TRADITIONAL  SYSTEMS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

THE  CRITICISM  OF  THESE  SYSTEMS 


SECTION  I 

INTRODUCTORY 

CHAPTER  XXVIII 

THE  PROBLEM  ABOUT  PROBLEMS 

Problems  of  the  point  of  view,  of  methods,  of  theories  of 
relations  and  the  like,  having  been  examined  in  the  preceding 
sections,  we  are  now  prepared  to  inquire  how  specific  solutions 
of  specific  problems  are  obtained  logically  hij  postulating  certain 
specific  principles  or  propositions,  and  hy  iuaking  deductions 
from  these  principles.  Such  a  method  of  examining  philo- 
sophical systems,  in  a  manner  that  is  independent  of  their  his- 
torical development,  has  already  been  expounded  somewhat  in 
our  discussion  of  the  problem  of  the  point  of  view,^  and  it  now 
remains  for  us  to  carry  such  a  method  of  procedure  to  com- 
pletion. 

I.   THE  EPISTEMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM 

It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  philosophy  has  developed  in 
cycles,  beginning  with  the  ontological  problem  among  the  ear- 
liest Greeks,  then  going  through  the  cosmological,  the  teleo- 
logical,  the  theological,  the  ethical,  and  esthetic  problems,  and 
finally  reaching  the  epistemological  problem  in  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle, only  again,  on  the  basis  of  their  epistemology,  to  return 
to  the  problems  of  ontology,  cosmology,  teleology,  and  the  like. 
This  recurrent  series  or  development,  in  which  the  other  prob- 
lems received  solution  from  the  standpoint  of  the  Platonic  and 
Aristotelian  epistemology,  persisted  up  to  the  time  of  that 
somewhat  vague  period  called  the  Renaissance,  although  it  did 
not  even  then  lose  its  influence. 

The  Renaissance  was  an  awakening  to  new  points  of  view  and 
of  method  in  literature,  art,  science,  religion,  and  philosophy. 

>  See  Chap.  I.-III. 
203 


204.  INTRODUCTORY 

One  result  was  the  birth,  or  rebirth  of  those  empirical  methods 
which  have  largely  created  our  modern  material  civilization. 
But,  while  the  Renaissance  was  characterized  by  the  adoption 
of  new  methods  of  knowing,  it  did  not  apply  these  to  the  study 
of  knowing,  as  itself  constituting  a  problem.  This  problem  first 
received  clear  recognition  in  the  investigations  of  Descartes 
(1596-1650)  and,  more  especially,  of  Locke  (1632-1704),  with 
the  result  that,  throughout  the  modern  period  which  follows  these 
philosophers,  other  philosophical  doctrines  have,  for  the  most 
part,  been  based  on  epistemologies.  Indeed,  that  characteristic 
which  marks  this  whole  period  in  philosophy,  even  to  the  present, 
is  the  domination  of  the  epistemological  problem,  although  it 
may  be,  that  in  the  near  future,  this  domination  will  cease, 
because  it  will  be  proved,  that  human  beings  can  know  without 
first  ascertaining  how  knowledge  is  possible,  and  what  is  its 
extent  and  origin. 

Science  all  through  this  modern  period  developed  with  rapid 
strides,  and  to  a  large  extent  independently  of  the  philosophy 
of  knowledge,  both  as  regards  the  facts  disclosed  and  the  method 
of  their  discovery.  This  development  was  characterized  by  the 
use  of  new  means  of  knowing  which  for  a  long  time  were  not 
understood  in  all  respects,  but  which  today  have  become  better 
known,  with  the  result  that  there  is  an  increased  efficiency  in 
scientific  method.  The  new  logic,  with  its  emphasis  of  relations, 
and  the  like,  is  itself  a  product  of  the  modern  study  of  such 
methods,  and  it  is  to  this  new  logic  that  we  must  turn  for  the 
solution  of  many  problems  in  both  science  and  philosophy. 

With  such  an  extensive  scientific  development  characterizing 
the  modern  period,  and  yet  with  so  little  attention  given  to  the 
epistemological  problem  by  the  scientists  themselves,  the  ques- 
tion arises,  why  this  problem  has  exercised  such  a  controlling 
influence  over  philosophy.  The  answer  to  this  inquiry  is,  that 
such  an  influence  has  been  due  not  only  to  the  interest  in  the 
knowledge-problem  itself,  but  also  to  the  fact  that  certain 
specific  solutions  of  the  problem  would  seem  to  present  a  way 
by  which  men  should  be  able  to  prove  real  that  which  they 
would  prefer  to  be  real,  and  also  able  to  prove  false  or  illusory 
that  which  they  would  have  of  this  character.  For  it  is  a  fact, 
that,  for  one  reason  or  another,  mast  men  prefer  that,  e.g.,  evil 


THE  PROBLEM  ABOUT  PROBLEMS      205 

were  not  evil,  pain,  not  pain,  hate,  not  hate,  and  death,  not  death, 
even  as  they  prefer  that  such  "things"  as  goodness  and 
beauty  and  life  and  love  should  not  be  illusory,  but  quite  real. 
All  else  may  be  lost,  if  these  but  be  saved;  all  else  be  illusion 
and  appearance,  if  these  but  remain  the  realities. 

But  how,  indeed,  does  epistemology  offer  opportunity  for 
saving  that  which  men  would  have  saved,  and  for  demonstrating 
as  illusory  or  as  merely  apparent  that  which  men  perhaps  detest 
and  abhor?  Why,  indeed,  should  appeal  be  made  in  any  way 
to  philosophy?  Cannot  the  momentous  questions  that  concern 
the  saving  of  what  men  would,  in  most  cases,  prefer  to  have 
saved,  be  settled  on  their  own  merits,  or,  at  least,  by  an  appeal 
to  science.  For  does  not  science  reveal  to  us  suns  and  stars, 
the  depths  of  space,  and  the  eons  of  time;  does  she  not  pene- 
trate beneath  the  surface  of  "things"  to  disclose  otherwise 
hidden  forces  and  energies;  does  she  not  picture  both  the  macro- 
cosmically  great  and  the  microcosmically  small?  Then  why, 
also,  should  not  God  and  soul  and  immortality,  justice  and 
goodness  and  beauty,  come  within  her  realm  to  lose  their  secrets 
too?  The  answer  is,  that  science,  in  that  it  deals  with  such 
things  as  suns  and  stars,  energies  and  forces,  molecules  and 
atoms,  has  to  do  with  that  which  is  known,  hut  that,  as  unknown, 
''things''  may  be  so  different  from  what  they  are  as  known, 
as  to  be  the  realities,  with  the  known  "things"  mere  appear- 
ances or  illusions,  so  that  it  may  be  among  ''things"  as  unknown 
that  the  science  of  what  is  hoped  for  is  to  be  sought  and  found. 

Who  can  deny  that  this  may  not  be  so?  For  does  not  fire 
make  the  iron  red?  Then  may  not  the  awareness  be  to  both 
the  fire  and  the  iron,  even  as  the  fire  is  to  the  glowing  and  the 
redness.  Epistemology,  or  rather,  certain  epistemological  the- 
ories accept  this  analogy  as  a  principle.  For  they  find,  not  only 
that  all  "things"  known  are  related  to  the  knowing,  or  to  the 
knower,  and  that  to  know  what  anything  would  be,  or  be  like, 
as  unknown,  is  impossible,  since  this  would  be  again  to  make 
the  unknown  known,  but  also  that  knowing  makes  a  difference  to 
"things,"  even  as  the  fire  does  to  the  iron,  so  that  we  can  never 
know  without  making  such  a  difference. 

How  great  shall  this  difference  be  ?  Could  it  be  such  a  radical 
difference  as  to  include  such  characteristics  as  extension  and 


4b§  iNTRODUCTdRY 

duration,  hardness  and  coldr,  manifoldness  and  unity?  That 
ihis  is  not  impossible,  is  the  position  that  is  sometimes  insisted 
upon  by  those  who  emphasize  epistemology. 

The  situation,  that  knowing  eatinot  be  elithiriated  from  the 
world  that  we  know,  is  called  the  "ego-centric  predicament"; 
while  the  position  that  knowing  makes  the  world  what  it  is  in 
at  least  certain  respects,  is  an  instance  of  the  application  of 
the  modification  theory  of  relations.  The  outcome  of  these  two 
premises  or  postulates  is  most  interesting,  and  appeals  to  our 
hopes  and  desires.  For  known  ''things"  seem  in  some  instances 
to  be  evil  and  unfriendly,  hopeless  and  forlorn,  ugly  and  fore- 
bidding,  rigid  and  mechanical,  and,  in  general,  of  little  promise. 
But,  iy  the  premises  just  mentioned,  may  not  all  these  unde- 
sirable "things"  be  due  to  the  difference  that  is  made  hy  know- 
ing? Then  enter  the  realm  of  the  good  and  the  affectionate, 
the  hopeful  and  the  inspiring,  the  beautiful  and  the  enlightened, 
the  plastic  and  the  free,  not  by  knowledge,  but  by  faith  and 
intuition.  These  are  what  one  desires,  and  thus  it  is  that  one 
can  argue  oneself  into  the  possibility  of  their  attainment. 

II.   THE  VALUE-CENTRIC  PREDICAMENT  ^ 

If  the  ego-centric  predicament  is  thus  taken  advantage  of,  in 
order  to  demonstrate  the  attainability,  or,  at  least,  the  reality 
of  that  which  one  would  prefer  real,  the  suggestion  lies  near 
that  an  analogous  predicament  may  exist  through  the  fact  that 
our  knowing  is  always  related  to  our  desires,  our  preferences, 
our  yearnings,  and,  accordingly,  perhaps,  that  our  desires  and 
preferences  cannot  be  eliminated  from  our  knowing.  Such  a 
situation  may  be  somewhat  awkwardly  called  the  value-centric 
predicament.^ 

"  See,  e.g.,  James'  discussion  of  tough-mindedness  and  tendsr-mindednesB 
in  Chap.  I.  of  Pragmatism.  However,  why  the  pragmatist,  who  is  ad- 
mittedly a  tough-minded  individual,  should  seek  to  convert  the  tender- 
minded  philosopher,  whose  point  of  view  and  system  satisfy  his  own  vital 
needs,  is  a  puzzle  from  the  standpoint  of  Pragmatism. 

°  N.  Kemp  Smith,  "How  Far  is  Agreement  Possible  in  Philosophy?" 
Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  IX.,  p.  701  flf. ;  see  also 
the  report  of  the  twelfth  annual  meeting  of  the  American  PhiU)8ophical 
Association,  J.  B.  Pratt,  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  X.,  p.  91  ff.;  cf.  also  Marvin,  First  Book  of  Metaphysics,  Chap.  I.; 
Sir  Henry  .Jones,  Idealism  as  a  Practical  Need,  19UU;  and  J.  G.  Hibben, 
Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment,  1910. 


THE  PROBLEM  ABOUT  PROBLEMS      207 

This  predicament — if  it  is  such — lias  two  forms  of  which 
the  one  concerns  us  chiefly  as  individuals,  the  other,  our  member- 
ship in  a  social  group,  whether  this  be  narrow  in  its  confines;, 
or  so  wide  as  to  include  all  human  beings. 

The  effect  of  the  predicament  is,  accordingly,  that,  if  you 
as  an  individual  desire  an  evil  nullified,  then  do  you  accept  as 
true  only  that  philosophy  which  in  some  way  does  away  with 
evil;  but  the  effect  is  also,  that,  if  you  and  I  both  have  those 
hopes  and  longings  which  are  inherited  from  our  forefathers 
and  from  our  race,  then  do  we  endeavor  to  save  whatever  is 
thus  valued,  by  accepting  only  such  a  transformation  of  common 
sense  and  of  science  as  will  accomplish  this  result.  Yet  finally 
we  may  become  aware  of  such  an  influence  of  our  desires  and 
preferences  on  our  knowing,  and  therefore,  in  the  attempt  to 
eliminate  this  influence,  we  may  reach  that  point  where  ive 
prefer  truth  at  all  costs — no  matter  what  the  truth  may  prove 
to  be.  But  the  question  then  arises,  whether  we  are  not  thereby 
valuing  truth  itself,  and  therefore  making  truth  a  value,  thus 
to  condition  it,  like  other  values,  by  our  preferences  and  our 
desires. 

In  answer  to  such  an  inquiry,  it  may,  however,  be  further 
asked,  whether,  e.g.,  the  fact  that  I  prefer  sincerity  in  all  those 
with  whom  I  have  to  deal  in  any  way,  prevents  me  from  discov- 
ering that  in  some  cases  sincerity  is  wholly  absent?  But,  if 
sincerity  can  be  found  to  be  absent,  although  I  prefer  its  pres- 
ence, then  are  not  my  preference  and  that  which  I  prefer  inde- 
pendent, although  they  are  r elated  f  Similarly,  does  not  the 
fact,  that,  although  I  value  truth,  I  may  nevertheless  fail  to 
find  it,  prove  that  my  valuing  and  truth  are  independent,  though 
related?  And  finally,  if  I  desire  to  know,  and  yet  what  I  desire 
to  know  is  the  truth  for  its  own  sake,  no  matter  what  the 
specific  truth  may  be,  then  may  not  any  specific  knowing,  with 
any  specific  content,  be  absent,  even  though  I  prefer  to  find  such 
content  present?  But  does  not  this  possible  absence  prove  that 
any  specific  knowing — of  any  specific  content — although  related 
to  desire  and  preference,  is  independent  of  these?  In  other 
words,  is  there  not  at  least  a  virtual  elimination  of  desire  and 
preference  from  any  specific  knowing — an  elimination  which 
means,  that,  when  the  desire  to  know  is  directed  toward  getting 


20S  INTRODUCTORY 

at  the  truth  for  its  own  sake,  irrespective  of  what  the  specific 
truth  may  turn  out  to  be,  the  value-centric  predicament  is 
solved  f 

Such  a  solution  of  this  predicament  is,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
presupposed  all  through  science  in  its  method  of  awaiting  the 
outcome  of  hypotheses  and  theories,  without  either  believing  or 
dishelieving  them,  and  the  situation  is  not,  of  necessity,  different 
in  philosophy.  Accordingly  we  conclude,  that,  although  many 
philosophical  systems  have  resulted,  at  least  in  part,  from  the 
endeavor  to  save  those  worths  and  values  which  men  would 
prefer  to  he  saved,  nevertheless,  the  disinterested  attitude  is 
quite  as  possible  in  philosophy  as  it  is  elsewhere,  and  that  the 
logical  justification  of  this  attitude  is,  that,  although  "truth 
for  its  own  sake"  is  related  to  (this  specific)  preference,  the 
truth  and  the  preference  may,  nevertheless,  he  quite  independent. 

III.   THE  SOLUTION   OP   THE  EGO-CENTRIC  PREDICAMENT 

The  same  principles  which  enable  us  to  solve  the  value-centric 
predicament  also  make  it  possible  to  solve  the  ego-centric  pre- 
dicament. In  fact  these  principles  form  a  most  important 
method  for  both  science  and  philosophy. 

In  a  great  many  instances  of  entities  which  we  wish  to  analyze, 
it  is  impossible  experimentally  to  remove  the  parts  which  analysis 
discovers.  All  the  parts  must  be  left  in  situ,  and  yet,  if  possible, 
we  must  discover  not  only  the  parts,  but  also  the  relations 
between  the  parts.  This  method  must  be  pursued,  e.g.,  in  his- 
tory, since  we  cannot  alter  the  past ;  in  sociologj'^,  since  we  cannot 
to  any  great  extent  manipulate  sociological  and  economic  forces ; 
in  geometry,  since  we  cannot  experimentally  remove  the  parts 
of  space;  and  also,  in  a  great  many  instances,  in  such  sciences 
as  physics,  chemistry,  and  astronomy.  Where  we  can,  we  experi- 
mentally remove  a  thing,  A,  that  is  in  relation  to  B,  from  its 
presence  and  relation  to  B,  in  order  to  discover,  whether,  thereby, 
B  is  altered  or  removed ;  if  it  is,  then  we  conclude  that  A  influ- 
ences, or  causes  B,  or  that  B  is  functionally  related  to  A;  if  it 
is  not,  then  A  is  not  such  an  influence,  or  cause,  or  variable. 

However,  in  the  fields  of  research  just  mentioned,  it  is  im- 
possible always  to  determine  experimentally  the  question  of 
influence,  cause,  or  function.    Therefore,  if  we  analyze,  we  must 


THE  PROBLEM  ABOUT  PROBLEMS      209 

leave  the  parts  together, — in  situ — to  determine  their  depend- 
ence or  independence.*  Such  a  procedure  is  successfully  prac- 
tised in  a  great  many  cases,  especially  in  science,  in  order  to 
find  specific  functional  relations.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  moving 
projectile,  there  is  the  color,  the  shape,  the  chemical  composition, 
the  mass,  the  gradually  retarded  motion  (negative  accelera- 
tion), and  the  explosion  that  sets  the  projectile  in  motion.  No 
projectile  is  without  all  these  characteristics,  with  each  one  of 
them  of  some  specific  (numerical)  value,  as  determined  by  some 
scale  of  measurement;  and  although  any  specific  value  can  be 
substituted  by  another  specific  value  of  the  same  character,  e.g., 
the  mass  of  100  lbs.  for  the  mass  of  50  lbs.,  nevertheless  no  one  of 
these  generic  characteristics  can  be  experimentally  removed  from 
a  moving  projectile.  Rather,  each  such  characteristic  must  be 
left  in  the  presence  of  the  others,  while  their  specific  relations 
to  one  another  are,  if  possible,  determined. 

Analysis  shows,  however,  that,  e.g.,  although  the  retardation 
requires  time,  it  does  not  cause  time,  nor  time  cause  it,  although 
the  two  are  related.  Rather  the  retardation  is  found  to  be 
a  function  of  the  time;  related  to  time,  and  time  to  it,  time  is 
nevertheless  independent  of  the  retardation.  The  time  is  the 
independent  variable,  the  retardation  the  dependent  variable. 
Thus  the  time  is  functionally  related  to  the  retardation,  but  is 
not  an  effect  of  it.  In  such  an  instance,  therefore,  the  specific 
retardation  and  the  specific  time  must  each  be  left  in  situ,  and 
yet  we  discover  not  only  that  they  are  different  and  distinct, 
but  also  that,  though  related,  they  are  independent. 

But  there  are,  of  course,  causes  for  the  retardation,  as  well 
as  for  the  motion  as  a  whole  and  for  the  initial  velocity.  Dif- 
ferent  "things"  can  be  distinguished,  namely,  the  distance 
traveled,  the  time  required,  the  initial  velocity,  the  final  stop- 
ping, the  initial  "angle  of  flight,"  the  mass  of  the  projectile, 
the  force  of  the  explosion,  and,  finally,  the  relationships  of  these 
entities  to  one  another  can  be  determined,  and  theij:*  dependence 
or  independence  be  ascertained.  Omitting  unnecessary  details, 
it  may  be  said,  that,  by  studying  various  instances  of  moving 
projectiles  in  which  we  are  obliged  to  leave  in  situ  the  several 
parts,  it  is  discovered,  that  the  motion  as  a  whole,  with  its 
*Cf.  Chaps.  XXII    and  XXVI. 


210  INTRODUCTORY 

several  characteristics,  either  depends  functionally  upon,  or  is 
caused  by,  (a)  the  explosive  force,  (b)  the  angle  of  elevation  of 
the  gun,  (c)  the  mass  of  the  projectile,  (d)  the  resistance  of 
the  air.  Change  any  one  of  these,  keeping  the  others  constant, 
and  the  total  motion,  with  its  characteristics  of  change  of 
velocity  and  distance  covered,  is  changed.  Color,  however, 
makes  no  difference,  nor  does  the  chemical  composition  of  the 
projectile,  provided  the  same  mass  is  retained.  Here,  then, 
analysis  in  situ  reveals  two  sets  of  entities  that  are  related  to 
the  motion.  One  set,  namely,  the  explosion,  the  force  of  gravita- 
tion, and  the  mass,  are  constituent  causes,  variables  or  "ele- 
ments" in  the  motion;  the  other  set,  namely,  the  color  and 
the  chemical  composition  of  the  projectile,  are  not  such  causes, 
elements,  or  variables. 

This  example  illustrates  a  most  important  power  of  achieve- 
ment of  modern  scientific  analysis.  "Things"  can  be  analyzed, 
parts  be  discovered  and  distinguished,  and  yet  left  in  situ,  and 
relationships  be  ascertained.  Three  kinds  of  relationships  ap- 
pear, namely,  (1)  functional,  in  which  an  independence  of  re- 
lated terms  is  discovered ;  i.e.,  the  terms  are  related  in  such  a 
way  that,  if  any  term  were  eliminated,  the  elimination  would 
make  no  difference  to  the  other  terms.  There  can  be  only  an 
ideal  elimination  of  such  parts.  Therefore  the  analysis  must  be 
made  in  situ.  (2)  Causal  relationships  are  revealed.  In  these 
a  specific  dependence  of  specifically  related  terms  is  shown.  In 
this  case  certain  terms  are  what  they  are  by  virtue  of  their 
relation  to  other  terms;  i.e.,  the  relation  between  them  is  con- 
stitutive. (3)  Both  non-functional  and  non-causal  relationships. 
In  these  it  is  shown,  both  by  actual  and  by  ideal  elimination, 
that  there  is  not  only  no  causal  dependence  of  certain  terms, 
but  also  no  functional  connection.  In  the  case  of  terms  thus 
related,  each  term  is  independent,  no  term  is  constituted  by 
others,  any  term  can  be  eliminated  without  a  resulting  effect 
on  others,  and  no  term  makes  a  difference  to  others.  For  ex- 
ample, mass  and  time  are  thus  independent. 

The  ego-centric  predicament  can  be  solved,  now,  by  this  same 
method  of  analyzing  in  situ,  and  of  thus  discovering  parts  and 
relations,  and  the  specific  character  of  each.  This  predicament 
consists,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  impossibility  of  experimentally 


THE  PROBLEM  ABOUT  PROBLEMS      211 

eliminating  a  knowing  process  as  really  occurring,  or  as  implied 
as  really  occurring,  from  the  world  that  we  know.  In  other 
words,  the  world  that  we  talk  about,  think  about,  mention,  or 
know,  is  a  known  world.  The  predicament  has  most  important 
consequences  provided  knowing  makes  a  difference  to  the  entity 
known,  but  it  is  of  no  importance,  provided  it  can  be  shown, 
that  knowing  makes  no  difference  to  that  world.  If  this  last 
principle  can  be  established,  then  it  follows  that  the  world  as 
unknown  can  be  quite  the  same  as  the  world  as  knoivn,  and 
knowing  must  be  concluded  not  to  be  causally  related  to  that 
world. 

If,  now,  it  cannot  be  shown  by  an  experimental  elimination 
and  analysis,  that  knowing  is  thus  related  independently  to 
the  entity  known,  nevertheless,  an  analysis  in  situ,  and  an  ideal 
elimination  of  knowing  suffice  to  furnish  this  demonstration. 

Such  an  analysis  and  elimination  is,  in  fact,  made  by  every 
philosopher  and  scientist  who,  even  in  a  philosophy  that  ex- 
plicitly maintains  the  opposite,  advances  any  position  as  a 
portrayal  of  the  real  state  of  affairs  regarding  knowing.^  For 
example,  if  one  is  a  follower  of  Kant,  and  accordingly  main- 
tains, that  all  knowing  makes  a  difference  to  the  object  to  be 
known,  i.e.,  alters  it,  modifies  it,  and  the  like,  so  that  there  is 
a  specific  and  marked  difference  between  the  object  as  known 
and  as  unknown,  then  does  not  one  present  this  position  as  the 
real  state  of  affairs  regarding  knowing,  with  this  state  of  affairs 
nevertheless  in  relation  to  a  specific  knowing  as  its  content  or 
object?  But  does  not  one  therewith  make  an  exception  to  the 
rule  that  is  stated  in  the  position?  For  does  not  one  tacitly 
grant  and  presuppose,  that  here  is  one  instance,  at  least,  in 
which  knowing  is  related  to  its  object,  and  yet  does  not  alter, 
modify,  or  constitute  that  object?  And  does  not  one  tacitly 
presuppose,  that,  *"/  this  specific  knowing  were  not  taking  place, 
this  state  of  affairs  regarding  knowing  would  still  persist  as  the 
real  one? 

To  these  questions  there  seems  to  be  no  other  answer  than 
"yes."  In  fact,  every  philosopher  who  presents  any  position 
in  solution   of   the   problem   of   knowing,    tacitly   presupposes 

"  See  the  criticisms  of  systems  opposed  to  Eealism,  Chaps.  XXIX.- 
XXXVIII.;  also  Chaps.  I.,  II.,  and  III. 


212  INTRODUCTORY 

that  the  facts  which  are  therewith  known  are  not  causally  de- 
pendent upon  being  known,  either  by  himself  or  any  one  else. 
Every  such  philosopher  thus  really  solves.the  ego-centric  predica- 
ment for  himself.  Indeed,  he  solves  it,  even  though  in  the 
particular  solution  which  he  advances,  he  may  make  use  of  this 
predicament  in  order  to  demonstrate  its  insolubility,  and  the 
consequences  that  result  from  this. 

However,  with  the  ego-centric  predicament  quite  soluble  in 
this  way,  it  should  no  longer  be  regarded  as  serious,  or  as  having 
important  consequences.  For  if  in  one  typical  instance,  know- 
ing can  be  related  to,  and  yet  not  cause,  alter,  or  modify,  that 
which  is  known,  so  that  in  this  one  case  knowing  is  ideally 
eliminated,  then  the  presumption  is,  that  in  all  cases  of  knowing 
the  same  state  of  affairs  subsists.  To  advance  any  other  posi- 
tion means,  that  at  a  certain  point  an  exception  is  met  with  that 
contradicts  such  a  position.  Indeed,  that  knowing  makes  a 
difference  to  its  object,  is  a  position  that  is  self -contradictory, 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  that  knowing  is  not  causally  related 
to  and  makes  no  difference  to  the  object  knoivn,  is  a  position 
that  can  be  advanced  and  maintained  quite  consistently  with 
itself  as  a  true  position. 

This  position  is  self-consistent,  because  the  proposition,  that 
knowing  does  not  make  a  difference  to  its  object,  itself  logically 
allows  one  in  this  very  instance  to  advance  this  as  the  real 
state  of  affairs  concerning  all  knowing,  including,  therefore,  the 
specific  knowing,  that  this  is  the  state  of  affairs  concerning  all 
knowing. 

This  self-consistent  position  is  an  instance  of  the  validity  of 
the  theory  of  external  relations  which  formulates  the  fact  that 
terms  can  be  both  related  and  independent.  One  interesting 
and  important  implication  of  this  position,  which  is  presupposed 
by  its  own  denial,  is,  that  knowing  or  knower  cannot  be  a  thing 
or  substance.^  For,  if  it  were,  then  it  would  affect  other  things. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  understand  the  real  nature  of  knowing, 
we  must  not  use  the  traditional  logic  of  substance  and  attribute, 
but  the  71CIV  logic  of  relations.''  We  must  use  this  logic,  because 
it  is  empirically  discovered  to  be  that  logic  which  is  involved 
in  any  situation  of  genuine  knowing.     For  knowing  turns  out 

•  Cf.  Chaps.  III.,  XIII.,  and  XXVII.  '  Chap.  XXVII. 


THE  PROBLEM  ABOUT  PROBLEMS      213 

to  be,  not  a  thing  or  substance^  but  an  event,  a  relation,  a  dimen- 
sion, or  even  a  disembodied  quality,  with  the  object  known 
entering  into  and  getting  out  of  relation  to  the  knowing,  while 
still  maintaining  its  relations  to  other  objects.^ 

The  critical  study  of  the  opposed  position,  that  knowing  is  in 
some  way  related  causally  and  constitutively  to  its  object,  shows 
that  this  is  a  conclusion  which  is  derived  (1)  from  the  arbitrary, 
though  unconscious,  application  of  the  modification  theory  of 
relations^  to  the  specific  relational  complex,  knowing  and  known 
object,  and  (2)  from  the  somewhat  surreptitious  postulation  of 
the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations  to  the  knowing,  or  to 
the  knower,  whereby  the  knower  is  regarded,  tacitly  at  least, 
as  a  psychical  substance  (ego,  self,  spirit),  and,  therefore,  as  a 
sort  of  thing  with  attributes  (the  knowing  states  or  processes). 
Either  of  these  two  postulates  has  carried  with  it  the  other 
postulate,  and  the  reason  why  one  or  the  other  postulate  has 
been  made,  is,  that  the  model  of  the  particular  physical  thing, 
with  the  two  derivative  concepts  of  substance  and  of  cause, 
has  for  the  most  part  dominated  philosophical  and  even  some 
scientific  thinking  from  the  time  of  Aristotle  to  the  present." 

For  in  this  tradition  "things"  are  regarded  not  only  as 
groups  of  qualities  that  inhere  in  a  substance,  but  also  as 
entities  that  causally  act  on,  influence,  and  modify  one  another, 
with  the  effect  dependent  not  only  on  the  thing  acting,  but  also 
on  the  thing  acted  upon.  Thus  the  effect  cf  melting  produced 
by  a  red-hot  cannon  ball  an  inch  from  a  candle  is  as  much 
dependent  on  the  candle  as  upon  the  cannon  ball.  Substitute 
an  iron  bar  for  the  candle,  and  the  effect  is  different.  It  is  clear, 
then,  that,  if  the  principle  thus  illustrated  is  generalized  and 
applied  to  certain  problems  or  situations,  certain  specific  con- 
clusions by  way  of  solutions  to  these  problems  are  deducible. 
But  it  is  precisely  this  generalization  and  this  application  that 
have  been  made,  at  least  tacitly,  in  the  reasoning  out  of  a 
number  of  the  great  philosophical  systems  of  history,  especially 
those  that  are  based  on  a  prior  solution  of  the  problem  of 
knowledge.  The  generalization  and  the  application  have  taken 
place  pari  passu.  The  generalization  has  been  made  on  the  tacit 
or  unconscious  assumption  (1)  that  the  type  or  model  for  all, 

"  See  Chaps.  XLIII.,  iii.  and  xi.      '  Chap.  XXVI.,  ii.,  2.       '"  Chap.  III. 


214  INTRODUCTORY 

or  for  most  entities,  is  that  of  a  thing  and  its  qualities,  with  the 
qualities  inhering  in  the  substance  of  the  thing;  and  (2)  that 
the  most  important  relation  between  "things"  is  the  causal. 
Thus,  in  philosophy  such  entities  as  matter,  soul,  God,  per- 
sonality, the  universe,  ideas,  concepts,  and  percepts,  and,  in 
science,  atom,  force,  energy,  have  been  made  things  with  attri- 
butes, while  in  logic  the  result  has  been,  that  reasoning  has 
concerned  itself  (1)  with  substance-like  individual  things  and 
their  identity  with  themselves,  (2)  with  kinds  or  classes  of 
things,  and  the  relationship  of  inclusion,  complete,  partial,  or 
negative,  of  these  kinds,  (3)  with  the  causal  relationship  between 
things,  and  (4)  with  the  kinds  of  causation. 

Aristotle,  with  substance  as  his  leading  category,  illustrates 
one  phase  of  this  influence,  as  does  Descartes  with  his  two 
substances,  mind  and  matter,  and  Spinoza,  with  his  one  sub- 
stance, God,  of  which  mind  and  matter  are  attributes.  Modern 
Objective  Idealism,  or  Psychism,  with  its  doctrine  of  one  spirit- 
ual substance,  of  which  everything  else  is  manifestation  or 
attribute,  exemplifies  the  same  controlling  influence,"  as  do 
also  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Kant  in  their  respective  doctrines  of 
a  mind,  a  perceiving  spirit,  and  a  transcendental  ego}-  Science 
also  shows  the  same  influence  in  its  older  mechanistic  theory, 
that  all  matter  and  all  physical  events  consist  of  the  motion  of 
minute  extended  things  or  particles. 

On  the  other  hand,  as  illustrating  the  other  main  phase  of 
the  influence  of  this  great  dominating  tendency  and  tradition, 
we  have,  e.g.,  the  Phenomenalism  of  Kant,  and  the  Idealism  of 
Berkeley,  with  their  common  position,  that  we  can  know  only 
the  (causal)  effects  of  "something"  that  acts  on  our  "minds." 
But  also  Naturalism  (developing  out  of  Hume's  Positivism), 
Materialism,  Pragmatism,  and  Komanticism  are  examples  of 
positions  that  are  developed  from  the  postulate  of  universal 
causal  interaction. 

The  two  principles  which  have  thus  been  used  as  postulates 
from  which  such  specific  philosophies  have  been  deduced  as 
derivative  results  are  respectively,  as  logically  formulated,  the 
underlying-reality  theory  of  relations,  for  the  substance  phi- 

^^  E.g.,  Bradley,  Appearance  and  Reality,  pp.  141,  143. 
»*  Chaps.  XXIX.  and  XXX. 


THE  PROBLEM  ABOUT  PROBLEMS      215 

losophies,  and  the  modification  theory  of  relations,  for  the 
causation  philosophies.  Both  theories,  however,  can  be  present, 
in  any  one  philosophy,  as  applying  to  different  situations. 

These  two  theories  together  form  what  we  have  previously 
called  the  two  aspects  of  the  theory  of  internal  relations.  Ac- 
cordingly, with  the  problem  of  knowing  the  pivotal  point  for 
most  modern  philosophical  systems,  it  is  this  theory  of  relations, 
with  its  two  aspects,  that  has  been  applied  to  the  several  phases 
of  the  relational  complex,  knowing  and  known  object. 

From  such  an  application,  or  postulation,  specific  philo- 
sophical systems  have  been  derived.  This  postulation  as  made 
historically,  has  been,  in  most  cases,  unconscious  and  uncritical, 
since  it  has  been  due  to  the  influence  of  the  tradition  of  which 
the  two  aspects  of  the  theory  of  internal  relations  form  the 
logical  core.  However,  at  the  present  time,  with  the  logical 
character  of  the  tradition  itself  come  to  consciousness,  and  with 
the  opposed  theory  of  external  relations,  as  instanced  in  science, 
also  known,  it  is  possible  to  derive  the  several  chief  systems  of 
philosophy  in  a  purely  logical  manner  by  freely  postulating  one 
or  another  of  the  three  theories  of  relations  as  applying  to  the 
complex,  knowing  and  known  object,  in  its  several  aspects,  and 
by  then  deducing  the  logical  consequences  of  these  postulates 
as  so  applied. 

This  method  will  be  pursued  in  the  sections  that  follow. 
Solutions  of  the  other  major  problems  of  philosophy  will  then 
be  derived  logically  from  these  same  postulates,  or  from  those 
solutions  to  the  epistemological  problems  which  are  derived  from 
such  postulates,  in  a  manner  that  in  general  corresponds  to  the 
historical  dependence  of  the  solution  of  these  other  problems  on 
the  prior  solution  of  the  problem  of  knowing. 


SECTION  II 

CAUSATION   PHILOSOPHIES 

CHAPTER  XXIX 

PHENOMENALISM 

Phenomenalism  may  be  defined  briefly  as  that  philosophical 
position  which  maintains,  that,  by  the  very  nature  of  the  know- 
ing situation,  it  is  possible  to  know  only  phenomena  or  appear- 
ances, but  not  "things"  as  they  really  are;  or,  more  briefly  still, 
that  "things"  as  they  really  are,  are  unknoivahle,  and  not 
merely  unknown.  This  position  is  identified  historically  with 
the  name  of  Immanuel  Kant  (1724-1804). 

We  shall  present  this  position,  not  as  it  was  consciously 
developed,  temporally  and  historically,  by  Kant  and  other  phe- 
nomenalists,  but  logically,  according  to  those  principles  that 
were  unconsciously  and  uncritically  assumed  by  Kant,  and  that, 
as  postulates,  form  a  sufficient  basis  from  which  to  deduce  the 
phenomenalistic  philosophy.  Thus  we  shall  examine  this  position 
much  as  a  modern  geometer  examines  the  geometry  of  Euclid, 
namely,  not  in  the  sequence  in  which  Euclid  developed  it,  but 
critically  in  regard  to  the  postulates  upon  which  it  depends,  and 
the  logical  sequence  of  propositions  that  result  from  such  postu- 
lates. 

I.   THE  LOGICAL  DERIVATION   OP  PHENOMENALISM 

In  order  to  make  such  a  logical  derivation  of  Phenomenalism, 
let  us  assume,  as  Kant  really  did  under  the  influence  of  the 
Aristotelian  tradition,  (1)  that  the  knoiving  self  is  a  psychical 
"thing"  with  attributes  (categories,  percepts,  concepts,  and  the 
like),  i.e.,  an  absolutely  unitary  being  (ego)  in  which  there  'in- 
here," or  which  holds  together,  certain  specific  mental  attri- 
butes *  called  categories,  concepts,  percepts,  and  the  like.  Let  us 
symbolize  such  a  self  by  K8  (knowing  self). 

'  Although  in  his  discussion  of  the  Paralogisms  (see,  e.g.,  Watson's 
Selections  from  Kant,  pp.   145-155)    Kant  denies  that  the  concept  of  suh- 

216 


PHENOMENALISM  217 

Let  us  also  assume  (2)  that,  as  numerically  distinct  from  such 
a  self,  there  is  a  "thing"  or  entity,  X,'  that  is  to  be  known,  if 
possible. 

In  thus  assuming  both  KS  and  X  to  be  thing-like  entities,  it 
may  be  that  the  modificatmi  theory  of  relations  is  also  already 
assumed  for  the  relational  situation  ES  R  X  (object-to-be- 
known-related-to-the-self-that-knows-that-object),  for,  in  accord- 
ance with  the  traditional  logic,  things  interact;  but,  if  this 
assumption  is  not  therewith  made,  then  (3)  let  it  be  made 
explicitly. 

From  these  three  assumptions  the  consequence  can  be  de- 
duced, that  KS  and  X,  as  in  relation  to  each  other,  interact,  so 
that  a  twofold  effect  is  produced.  X  acting  on  KS  produces  an 
effect  called  sensation,  which  we  will  express  by  KS^,^  while 

stance  is  applicable  to  the  transcendental  ego,  nevertheless  it  can  be  shown 
that  throughout  his  entire  philosophy  Lie  regards  the  knowing  self,  not 
as  a  process,  quality,  or  relation,  but  as  a  substratum-like  entity  in  which 
both  a  priori  concepts  (categories)  and  empirical  experiences  (sensations 
and  ideas)    inhere. 

^  Kant's  "  thing-in-itself,"  all  through  his  Critique  of  Pure  Reason. 

'  See  Miiller's  translation,  Transcendental  Esthetic,  ed.  1896,  pp.  16-17. 
As  here  translated,  Kant  says:  — 

"  Whatever  the  process  and  the  means  may  be  by  which  knowledge 
reaches  its  objects,  there  is  one  that  reaches  them  directly,  and  forma 
the  ultimate  material  of  all  thought,  viz.,  intuition  (Anschauung) .  This 
is  possible  only  when  the  object  is  given,  and  the  object  can  be  given  only 
(to  human  beings  at  least)  through  a  certain  affection  of  the  mind 
( Gemiith ) ." 

"  This  faculty  (receptivity)  of  receiving  representations  (Vorstellungen), 
according  to  the  manner  in  which  we  are  affected  by  objects,  is  called 
sensibility   (Sinnlichkeit) ." 

"  Objects  therefore  are  given  to  us  through  our  sensibility.  Sensibility 
alone  supplies  us  with  intuitions  ( Anschauungen) .  These  intuitions  be- 
come thought  through  the  understanding  (Verstand),  and  hence  arise 
conceptions  (Begriffe).  AH  thought  therefore  must,  directly  or  indirectly, 
go  back  to  intuitions  (Anschauungen),  i.e.,  to  our  sensibility,  because  in 
no  other  way  can  objects  he  given  to  us." 

"  The  effect  produced  by  an  object  upon  the  faculty  of  representation 
( Vorstellungsfahigkeit),  so  far  as  we  are  affected  by  it,  is  called  sensation 
(Empfindung).  An  intuition  (Anschauung)  of  an  object,  by  means  of 
sensation,  is  called  empirical.  The  imdefined  object  of  such  an  empirical 
intuition  is  called  phenomenon   (Erscheinung) ." 

"  In  a  phenomenon  I  call  that  which  corresponds  to  the  sensation  its 
matter;  but  that  which  causes  the  manifold  matter  of  the  phenomenon 
to  be  perceived  as  arranged  in  a  certain  order,  I  call  its  form." 

"  Now  it  is  clear  that  it  cannot  be  sensation  again  through  which 
sensations  are  arranged  and  placed  in  certain  forms.  The  matter  only 
of  all  phenomena  is  given  us  a  posteriori ;  but  their  form,  must  be  ready 
for  them  in  the  mind  (Gemiith)  a  priori,  and  must  therefore  be  capable 
of  being  considered  as  separate  from  all  sensations."     (Italics  mine.) 


$18  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

K8  acting  on  X  produces  an  effect,  X^^,  the  known  object 
"over  against"  the  sensation  as  psychical  "attribute."*  In 
other  words,  with  it  necessary,  in  order  to  know,  that  K8 
should  be  related  to  X,  it  follows,  on  the  assumption  or  postu- 
late, that  relatedness  means  dependence,  and  dependence,  modi- 
fication, that  both  KS^  and  X^^  are  of  necessity  produced  in 
the  act  of  knowing.  Neither  is  produced  without  the  other, 
and  each  is  produced  with  the  other.  If  there  were  no  K8  to 
be  in  relation  to  X,  there  would  be  only  X,  but  no  X^^^;  so, 
likewise,  with  no  X  in  relation  to  KS,  there  would  be  no  E8^. 
But,  KS  and  X  are,  or,  at  least,  knowing  and  object  known  are. 
For  knowing,  as  Descartes  showed,  seems  to  be  implied  by  its 
own  attempted  denial.  Doubt  knowing,  and  there  still  is 
cogitans.  Also,  to  know  without  knowing  something  (an  object), 
seems  to  be  impossible.  Indeed,  to  think  of  a  knowing  without 
an  object  known  is  again  to  reinstate  an  object.  If,  then,  both 
K8  and  X  are,  and  if,  being,  they  are  related,  and  also  if,  being 
related,  they  interact,  then  there  are,  also,  K8^  and  X^^.  K8^ 
and  X^^  as  effects  imply  K8  and  X  as  causes.^  Not  only 
is  X^^  different  from  X,  but,  since  KS^  is  the  effect  of  X 
acting  on  KS,  it  is  also  different  from  KS.  KS  is  the  original 
thing-self,  while  KS^  is  the  stream  of  sensations,  and  the  like, 
which  constitute  the  "empirical  self"  and  which  we  get  at  by 
introspection  and  memory.  X,  on  the  other  hand,  is  the  original 
thing -in-it self ,  the  "thing"  as  it  really  is,  while  X^^  is  the 
thing  of  the  material  or  physical  world,  known  in  sensation, 
and  in  all  that  knowledge  which  depends  on  and  is  derived  from 
sensation. 

With  X  and  Z^«,  and  KS  and  K8^,  respectively,  dif- 
fering and,  in  some  respects,  distinct  from  each  other, 
it  is  important  to  ask.  How  different  are  they  in  each 
case,  i.e.,  how  does  KS  differ  from  KS^,  and  X  from 
X^^f  In  order  to  determine  this,  it  is  evident  that  one  must, 
if  possible,  get  at  or  know  X  by  itself,  i.e.,  as  X  is  unrelated 
to  and  unmodified  by  KS,  in  order  to  contrast  X  with  X^^, 
and  also  get  at  or  know  KS,  in  order  to  contrast  it  with  KS-^. 

*  Cf.  C.  N.  Broad.  Perception,  Phpsics,  and  Reality,  1014,  Chap.  V.  on 
the  Causal  Theory  of  Perception,  especially  pp.  18()-187  and  204-206. 

•  Pointed  out,  e.g.,  by  G.  E.  Schulze  in  his  JEnesidemus,  1792. 


PHENOMENALISM  219 

Otherwise  one  must  rest  content  with  KS^  and  X^^,  knowing 
only  that  they  are  different  from  KS  and  X,  but  not  how  dif- 
ferent. 

However,  to  succeed  in  such  an  attempt  to  know  X  by  itself 
is  impossible  for  the  reason,  that  success  would  mean  again  to 
relate  X  to  KS,  and,  therefore,  to  make  it  X^^.  Thus  it  results 
that  it  is  only  X^^  that  we  can  know.  In  other  words,  the  very 
attempt  to  know  what  "the  world"  would  be  like  if  it  were  not 
known,  only  again  brings  in  the  knowing,  and  so  defeats  itself, 
since,  by  assumption,  knowing  makes  a  difference  to  that  which 
is  known. 

Here,  it  is  evident,  the  ego-centric  predicament  *  appears,  but 
it  is  also  evident  that  certain  specific  consequences  result  from 
this,  because  it  is  also  assumed,  that  knowing  makes  a  difference 
to  the  object  known.  Accordingly,  with  this  assumption  actu- 
ally made,  as  it  was,  e.g.,  by  Kant,  because  of  the  influence  of 
tradition,  it  follows,  that,  unless  the  knowing  can  be  eliminated 
in  some  way,  such  as  by  the  method  of  analyzing  in  situ,  then 
that  difference  which  knowing  makes  cannot  he  eliminated  from 
the  known  world — which  is  the  only  world  that  we  know.  Such 
an  outcome  means,  however,  that  our  world  is  one  that  is  made, 
at  least  in  part,  by  knowing,  and  that  it  is  in  just  this  sense  a 
world  of  phenomena  or  appearances.''  Another  world — of  things- 
in-themselves — of  X's  is,  of  course,  implied,  as  standing  in  con- 
trast with  these  phenomena,  but  such  a  world  can  never  be 
known — unless  to  discover  that  which  is  implied  is  to  know. 
But,  if  this  should  be  the  case,  then  it  must  be  granted  either 
that  such  knowing  modifies  its  object,  thereby  making  that 
object  mere  appearance;  or  that  the  object  that  is  known — hy 
heing  found  to  he  implied — is  known  as  it  really  is.  But,  if 
this  last  be  the  case,  then  the  proposition — basic  for  Phenomenal- 
ism— that  ttvo  related  terms  (in  this  instance,  knowing  and 
object  known  hy  implication)  causally  influence  each  other,  ia 
contradicted,  and  Phenomenalism  as  a  position  becomes  self- 
contradictory. 

The  position  that  is  derived  logically  in  this  relatively  simple 

'  The  writer  assumes  that  this  predicament  is  now  understood  by  the 
reader.    See  Chaps.  X.,  XXVIII.,  XXXIX.,  XLI. 
^  Terms  also  used  all  through  the  Critique. 


220  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

manner  is  tlie  essence  of  the  phenomenalistic  philosophy.  The 
presuppositions  or  postulates  from  which  the  position  is  derived 
are  (1)  the  modification  theory  of  relations,  namely,  that  related 
terms  as  related  modify  or  influence  one  another;  (2)  that  the 
known  object  and  the  knowing  are  (of  course)  an  instance  of 
related  terms;  and  (3)  the  ego-centric  "situation,"  to  the  effect, 
that  knowing  is  always  present  to  the  (only)  world  that  we 
know,  and  cannot  be  eliminated  in  any  way — even  by  an 
analysis  in  situ. 

The  further  development  of  the  position  results  from  the 
making  of  further  postulates,  one  of  the  important  details  of 
such  a  development  being  the  conclusion  or  result,  that,  although 
things-in-themselves,  X's,  cannot  be  known  (except  by  implica- 
tion), nevertheless  the  "original"  self,  K8,  can  be  known  in  its 
real  and  genuine  character.^ 

To  present  the  logical  development  of  such  an  outcome,  let 
us  examine  the  postulates  already  made,  and,  if  necessary,  also 

^Critique,  Milller's  translation,  ed.  1896,  p.  41;  here  Kant  says: 
"  We  call  sensibility  the  receptivity  of  our  soul,  or  its  power  of  receiving 
representations  whenever  it  is  in  any  wise  afl'ected,  while  the  understand- 
ing, on  the  contrary,  is  with  us  the  power  of  producing  representations, 
or  the  spontaneity  of  knowledge.  We  are  so  constituted  that  our  intuition 
must  always  be  sensuous,  and  consist  of  the  mode  in  which  we  are 
affected  by  objects.  What  enables  us  to  think  the  objects  of  our  sensuous 
intuition  is  the  understanding.  Neither  of  these  qualities  or  faculties  is 
preferable  to  the  other.  Without  sensibility  objects  would  not  be  given 
to  us,  without  understanding  they  would  not  be  thought  by  us.  '  Thoughts 
without  contents  are  empty,  intuitions  without  concepts  are  blind.*  There- 
fore it  is  equally  necessary  to  make  our  concepts  sensuous,  i.e.,  to  add 
to  them  their  object  in  intuition,  as  to  make  out  intuitions  intelligible, 
i.e.,  to  bring  them  under  concepts.  These  two  powers  or  faculties  cannot 
exchange  their  functions.  The  understanding  cannot  see,  the  senses  cannot 
think.  By  their  union  only  can  knowledge  be  produced.  But  this  is  no 
reason  for  confounding  the  share  which  belongs  to  each  in  the  production 
of  knowledge.  On  the  contrary,  they  should  always  be  carefully  separated 
and  distinguished." 

Also,  Kant  says  (Miiller'a  trans.,  ed.  1896,  pp.  4-5-46)  : 
"  On  the  supposition  therefore  that  there  may  be  concepts,  having  an 
a  priori  reference  to  objects,  not  as  pure  or  sensuous  intuitions,  but  as 
acts  of  pure  thought,  being  concepts  in  fact,  but  neither  of  empirical  nor 
aesthetic  origin,  we  form  by  anticipation  an  idea  of  a  science  of  that 
knowledge  trhich  belongs  to  the  pure  understanding  and  reason,  and  bp 
which  ice  may  think  objects  entirely  a  priori.  Such  a  science,  which  has 
to  determine  the  origin,  the  extent,  and  the  objective  validity  of  such 
knowledge,  might  be  called  Transcendental  Logic,  having  to  deal  with 
the  laws  of  the  understanding  and  reason  in  so  far  only  as  they  refer  to 
objects  a  prion,  and  not,  as  general  logic,  in  so  far  iis  they  refer  promiscu- 
ously to  the  empirical  as  well  as  to  the  pure  knowledge  of  reason." 
(Italics  mine.) 


PHENOMENALISM  221 

make  other  postulates.  Proceeding  in  this  way  we  find,  that 
the  postulates  already  made  mean  not  only  that  KS  and  X  are 
distinct,  but  also  that  they  are  each  active.  Let  us  next  set  up 
the  two  further  postulates,  (4)  that  that  which  is  self-evident 
is  true,  and  (5)  that  that  whose  opposite  is  inconceivable  is 
true.  We  then  find  hy  hoth  these  tests  that  it  is  true  (6)  that 
any  active  thing,  or,  that  a  thing,  if  it  acts,  must  act  in  accord- 
ance with  its  own  nature. 

From  this  last  proposition,  as  conjoined  with  postulate  (1), 
it  follows  that  KS,  the  knowing  self,  must,  whenever  there  is 
knowing,  act  in  accordance  with  its  own  nature — whatever  this 
nature  may  be.  Accordingly,  the  problem  becomes  one  of  find- 
ing, if  possible,  i.e.,  of  knowing  what  the  nature  of  KS  is.  But 
this  problem  is  solved  by  finding  and  enumerating  all  those 
most  generic  ways  in  or  by  which  we  must  think  or  know.  For, 
on  the  one  hand,  if  a  "thing"  must  act  in  accordance  with  its 
own  nature,  and  cannot  act  in  contradiction  to  this  nature, 
then,  on  the  other  hand,  and  conversely,  those  ways  in  which 
KS  must  act  or  think  or  know  will  constitute  its  nature,  and 
to  discover  what  those  ways  are  will  be  to  discover  and  to  know 
what  the  nature  of  KS  is.  But  what  those  ways  are  in  accord- 
ance with  which  KS  must  act,  is  shown  by  finding  what  princi- 
ples are  such  that  they  are  either  (7)  self-evident,  or  (8)  are 
presupposed  by  the  very  attempt  not  to  use  them,  or  (9)  are 
of  such  a  character  that  their  opposite  is  inconceivable.'*  For, 
if  there  is  revealed  in  this  way  a  specific  compulsion  on  KS  to 
use  certain  principles  when  it  acts  or  thinks,  then  by  postulate 
(6)  this  compulsion  is  explainable  by  the  hypothesis,  that  such 
principles  make  up  the  nature  of  KS,  so  that  to  know  these 
principles  is  to  know  KS. 

With  this  the  method  by  which  there  are  ascertained  those 
principles  which  are  apodictic  or  necessary  for  thinking  and  for 

*  Cf.  Chap.  XI.,  v.-vii. ;  see  the  Critique,  Miiller's  translation,  p.  24, 
for  this  principle.     Here  Kant  says:  — 

"  Space  is  a  necessary  representation  a  priori,  forming  the  very  founda- 
tion of  all  external  intuitions.  It  is  impossible  to  imagine  that  there 
should  be  no  space,  though  one  might  very  well  imagine  that  there  should 
be  space  without  objects  to  fill  it.  Space  is  therefore  regarded  as  a 
condition  of  the  possibility  of  phenomena,  not  as  a  determination  produced 
by  them;  it  is  a  representation  a  priori  which  necessarily  precedes  all 
external  phenomena." 


222  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

knowing,  and  which  constitute  the  nature  of  the  '' transcendental 
self,"  K8,  it  is  evident  that  the  particular  list  of  principles  that 
one  may  find,  is  dependent  upon  the  outcome  of  applying  the 
criteria  by  which  one  determines  what  one  must  think.  These 
criteria  are,  respectively,  as  we  have  seen,  self-evidence,  the 
inconceivability  of  the  opposite,  and  presupposition  hy  denial. 
But  since  the  first  two  of  these  criteria  are,  as  we  have  previ- 
ously discovered,  distinctly  psychological  tests,  and  the  third, 
although  logical  in  character,  is  open  to  error  in  its  application, 
the  results  obtained  by  using  these  criteria  vary  from  individual 
to  individual,  differing  with  differences  in  temperament,  train- 
ing, and  intellectual  environment  and  influences.  Indeed,  only 
a  meager  inquiry  shows  that  what  is  self-evident  to  one  person 
is  not  self-evident  to  another,  and  that  that  which  cannot  be 
conceived  by  one  is  readily  conceivable  by  another.  We  should, 
therefore,  expect  to  find  a  considerable  variation  in  the  lists  of 
those  principles  which  the  several  adherents  of  Phenomenalism 
present  as  categories,  or  laws  of  thinking,  and  such  a  variation 
is  found. 

For  Kant,  however,  the  list  of  such  principles  included  space, 
time,  unity,  plurality,  totality,  substance  and  attribute,  cause 
and  effect,  actuality,  possibility,  necessity,  quantity,  quality, 
relation,  modality. 

If,  now,  there  are  such  "laws  of  thinking,"  as  the  attributes 
of  a  thing-like  transcendental  self,  certain  interesting  conse- 
quences follow.  First,  it  follows,  that  these  principles  are  not 
derived  from  the  residts  of  the  seeming  action  of  ordinary 
things,  X^^'s,  on  our  sense  organs  (which  are  also  X^^'s)  ;  i.e., 
they  are  not  derived  from  our  sensations,  K8^,  but,  rather,  they 
are  in  some  manner  "in"  the  self,  KS,  and  so  are  prior  to 
ordinary  "things"  and  sensations.  Ordinary  "things"  and 
sensations  are  constituted  by  the  interaction  of  KS  and  X.  But 
these  laws  are  already  in  K8  prior  to  this  interaction.  Accord- 
ingly there  can  be  certain  sciences  such  as  those  of  number,  of 
space,  of  time,  of  space  related  to  time,  i.e.,  of  motion,  and  these 
sciences  (1)  are  independent  of  sense  experience,  so  that  (2) 
they  cannot  be  contradicted  by  sense  experience,  and  (3)  are 
necessarily  true. 

Secondly,  the  interesting  consequence  follows,  that  these  prin- 


PHENOMENALISM  228 

ciples  and  all  that  is  rigorously  derivable  from  them  are  con- 
stitutive of  the  world  that  we  live  in  and  know  through  our 
sensations.  For,  if  that  world  is  the  partial  effect  of  the  know- 
ing self,  KS,  as  it  acts  on  unknowable  X's,  then  the  effects  so 
produced  are  dependent  on  that  self's  nature  or  attributes.  But 
some  of  the  more  important  of  these  attributes  were  (for  Kant) 
space,  time,  cause,  and  substance.  Therefore  the  world  which 
we  know  is  spatial,  temporal,  causal,  and  substantial,  because 
it  is  made  so  by  being  known.  In  contrast  with  this  world,  how- 
ever, the  unknowable  world  of  X's  does  not  of  necessity  possess 
these  characteristics,  although  it  may  possess  them. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  Phenomenalism  allows  not  only 
for  two  distinct  kinds  of  objects,  namely,  for  things-in-them- 
selves,  X's,  and  for  phj^sical  objects,  X^^'s,  but  also  for  two 
distinct  kinds  of  selves,  both  of  which  are,  however,  known. 
Thus,  on  the  one  hand,  there  is  the  original  transcendental 
thing-self,  KS,  with  its  attributes,  namely,  tJie  principles  of 
knowing.  The  traditional  definition  of  a  thing,  as  a  unitary 
substance  in  which  attributes  inhere,  is,  however,  the  model  for 
this  conception.  This  self  is  sometimes  called  by  Kant  the 
"transcendental  unity  of  apperception,"  meaning  by  this  that 
knowing  in  its  several  forms  and  in  its  manifoldness  belongs  to 
a  numerically  single  knower.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is 
the  empirical  psychological  self,  KS^,  that  consists  of  the  stream 
of  sensations,  memories,  concepts,  emotions,  and  the  like,  and 
that  is  the  effect  of  things-in-themselves,  X's,  acting  on  tran- 
scendental selves,  KS's. 

Kant  in  developing  his  Phenomenalism  explicitly  stated  that 
the  laws  of  the  transcendental  self,  the  categories,  were  applica- 
ble only  to  phenomena,  meaning  by  this,  that  phenomena  must 
bear  their  impress,  i.e.,  that  phenomena  must  be  causal,  spatial, 
temporal,  substance-like,  etc.,  because  of  the  effect  which  knowing 
produces  on  the  thing  (to  be)  known. 

What,  then,  about  the  psychological  phenomena  of  the  em- 
pirical self  that  are  given  by  introspection,  memory,  and  the 
like?  Do  the  categories  apply  to  them  also?  Or,  just  as  know- 
ing imposes  its  laws  on  things-in-themselves  to  produce  physical 
phenomena,  do,  conversely,  things-in-themselves,  X's,  impose 
their  nature  on  the  transcendental  selves  in  producing  the  KS^'s, 


224  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

so  that  KS^'s  are  different  from  X^^'s,  and  have  different  cate- 
gories applying  to  them?  Yet  again  it  may  be  asked,  whether, 
as  known — by  a  knower — the  empirical  self  should  not  bear  the 
impress  of  all  the  knowing  principles  that  reside  in  the  tran- 
scendental knower,  and,  therefore,  be  spatial,  causal,  temporal, 
substance-like,  etc.? 

Such  questions  indicate  certain  inconsistencies  in  the  phe- 
nomenalistic  philosophy — and  Kant  himself  did  not  remove  them. 
But  the  reason  why  he  did  not  do  so  may  well  be,  that  they 
are  inherent  in  the  position  and,  indeed,  irremovable,  even  as 
irremovable  as  the  inconsistency  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason 
itself,  in,  on  the  one  hand,  portraying  and  maintaining  it  to  be 
the  real  and  quite  knowahle  state  of  affairs  concerning  the  know- 
ing situation  that,  on  the  other  hand,  the  reality  of  '^ things"  is 
unknowable  and  that  our  knowledge  is  limited  to  appearances. 

II.  phenomenalism's  solution  of  problems 

It  is  not  our  purpose,  however,  to  present  the  m<iny  incon- 
sistencies that  infect  the  phenomenalistic  position.  Rather,  we 
shall  state  or  derive  those  solutions  of  other  problems  which  the 
position  involves  as  itself  a  solution  of  the  problem  of  knowing. 

Foremost  among  such  consequences  is  the  opportunity  that  is 
given  for  putting  "all  sorts  of  things"  into  the  realms  of 
things-in-themselves,  the  X's,  and  also  of  the  transcendental 
selves,  the  KS's.  Phenomena,  both  physical  and  psychological, 
i.e.,  both  X^^'s  and  KS^'s,  are  causal  in  character,  i.e.,  are 
determined.  Therefore  in  these  realms  there  is  no  freedom  to 
do  the  right,  to  attain  to  ideals,  and,  in  reasoyiing,  to  follow  im- 
plications rather  than  mere  associations.  Psychologically  and 
physically  "man  is  a  machine."  But,  in  the  realm  of  "things" 
that  are  unaffected  by  knowing,  and  that  are,  therefore,  perhaps 
not  causal,  not  temporal,  not  spatial, — indeed,  not  determined 
in  any  way,  there  may  be  freedom,  with  this  including  the 
freedom  both  of  the  will  and  of  the  reason. 

This  is  the  beginning  of  Phenomenalism's  solution  of  the 
value  problem.  Man  is  a  member  of  two  "worlds";  in  one,  as 
a  transcendental  self,  a  KS,  he  may  be  free,  responsible, 
righteous,  and  immortal,  and  in  this  "world"  there  are  values, 
and  these  are  attainable.    In  the  other  world,  the  phenomenal, 


PHENOMENALISM  225 

in  which  man  is  psychological  and  biological,  chemical  and 
physical,  he  is  but  the  product  of  circumstances,  hereditary  and 
environmental,  as  the  completely  determining  causes  of  all  that 
he  is  and  does.  But,  further,  the  Deity  may  also  be  a  member 
of  the  transcendental  "world,"  thus  having  to  do  with,  and 
perhaps  even  Himself  being.  The  principle  of  worths  and  values, 
and,  therefore,  not  in  the  least  belonging  to  the  realm  of  the 
"things"  of  common  sense  and  science. 

Yet  what  the  Deity's  nature  is,  we  cannot  know,  since  hy 
knowledge  we  cannot  enter  this  realm.  Only  by  faith  is  there 
entrance,  and  by  faith  there  may  be  revealed  a  theistic  or  even 
a  pantheistic  God,  who  works  with  a  purpose,  which,  since  KS 
and  X  underlie  KS^  and  X^^,  itself  underlies  or  is  immanent 
in  the  world  of  phenomena.  In  this  way  does  Phenomenalism 
solve  and  connect  the  axiological  (value-),  the  cosmological,  the 
teleological,  and  the  theological  problems. ^° 

In  its  ethics,  therefore,  Phenomenalism  is  opposed  to  all  those 
ethical  positions  that  consider  only  the  realm  of  phenomena,  and 
accordingly  it  is  opposed  to  the  ethics  of  pleasure  in  any  form, 
be  this  egoistic  or  altruistic.  Rather,  its  ethics  is  absolutistic 
and  formalistic.  Man  is  both  a  transcendental  and  an  empirical 
self.  Part  of  his  transcendental  self  is  his  conscience,  and  this 
commands  him  unconditionally  to  act  out  of  regard  for  and  in 
accordance  with  the  right,  and  not  to  condition  his  motives  and 
deeds  by  seeking  pleasure  or  well-being,  either  for  himself  or 
for  others.  What  the  morally  right  act  is  in  specific  circum- 
stances, may  be  difficult  to  determine,  but  Phenomenalism  holds, 
that  in  any  case  there  is  an  absolute  right,  which  is  to  be  dis- 
covered if  possible.  As  a  psychological  person,  i.e.,  as  a  mem- 
ber of  the  world  of  phenomena,  man  is  subject  to  motives  of 
pleasure  and  cannot  escape  them.  But  it  is  inconceivable  that 
conscience  should  approve  any  act  or  motive  that  does  not 
appear  to  be  right  irrespective  of  pleasurable  or  useful  con- 
sequences. This  is  Phenomenalism's  ethical  absolutism  and 
formalism.^^ 

'"  These  aspects  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  have  been,  perhaps,  more 
responsible  for  the  dominating  influence  of  Kant  than  have  the  more 
strictly  epistemological  features  of  his  philosophy. 

'*  Kant's  ethical  position  has  received  more  discussion  than  perhaps  any 
Other  phase  of  hia  philosophy. 


226  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

In  its  solution  of  the  ontological  problem,  Phenomenalism  is 
clearly  pluralistic,  both  "quantitatively"  and  qualitatively,  and 
in  respect,  also,  to  both  its  initial  postulates,  and  the  results 
that  are  derived  from  these.  Thus  there  is  initially  postulated 
a  qualitative  dualism  of  two  manifolds,  the  one  of  many  tran- 
scendental selves,  the  other  of  7nany  "opposed"  things-in-them- 
selves;  secondly,  there  results,  as  qualitatively  different  from 
these  two  realms,  the  realm  of  phenomena,  X^^'s  and  KS-^'s, 
and  these  two  are  in  turn  each  a  manifold,  as  well  as  qualita- 
tively different  from  each  other.  In  a  number  of  respects, 
therefore,  Phenomenalism  is  pluralistic,  both  qualitatively  and 
numerically,  in  its  solution  of  the  ontological  problem. 

The  ontology  of  the  position  is,  however,  not  one  that  is  wholly 
derived,  but  one  that  is  in  part  assumed,  even  as  is  part  of  its 
cosmology.  Such  ontological  and  cosmological  assumptions  are 
made,  as  we  have  seen,  in  order  to  solve  the  epistemological 
problem.  Thus,  e.g.,  there  is  assumed  an  ontological  pluralism 
of  psychical  selves  and  of  opposed  things-in-themselves  in  inter- 
action. But  besides  such  assumptions,  certain  other  postulates 
are  also  made.  For  Phenomenalism  assumes,  and  does  not  prove, 
consciousness  to  be,  or  to  imply,  a  thing-like  self  with  qualities 
or  attributes.  This  basic  assumption  really  conditions  the  whole 
phenomenalistic  position.  It  is  tacitly  assumed,  further,  that 
all  transcendental  selves  are  alike.  This  assumption  makes  it 
possible  also  to  derive  the  conclusion,  that  there  is  but  one 
system  of  truths,  and,  in  this  sense,  but  one  Truth  which  all 
transcendental  selves  are  capable  of  getting  at,  especially  in 
the  case  of  those  sciences,  such  as  mathematics,  geometry,  that 
are  derived  only  by  thinking.  Emotions  and  the  like  may 
differ  from  man  to  man,  but  pure  reason  is  the  same  in  all, 
and,  for  this,  there  is  only  one  Truth.  Phenomenalism  is,  there- 
fore, absolutistic  and  anti-individualistic  in  its  philosophy  of 
Truth.  There  is  but  one  standard,  not  many.  Phenomenalism 
maintains  this  conclusion  not  only  for  the  a  priori  sciences  of 
mathematics  and  geometry,  but  also  for  all  the  empirical  sciences, 
such  as  physics.  But,  since  the  "things"  with  which  the  em- 
pirical sciences  deal  are  made  in  part  by  knowing,  and  since  the 
transcendental  selves  are  all  alike,  therefore,  in  order  to  have 
one  Truth  in  these  sciences,  things-in-themselves  also  must  all 


PHENOMENALISM  227 

be  alike.  Accordingly,  you  and  I  can  know  "one  thing"  in  the 
same  way,  and  so  have  a  basis  for  agreement  in  our  empirical 
sciences. 

As  regards  the  problem  of  the  origin  of  knowledge,  Phe- 
nomenalism clearly  holds,  both  by  initial  assumption  and  by 
derivation,  that  some  knowledge  does  not  come  from  sensation, 
but  from  the  self-activity  of  the  transcendental  ego.  In  this 
respect,  therefore,  the  position  is  rationalistic.  Other  knowledge, 
however,  comes  from  sensation,  so  that  Phenomenalism  is  also 
sensationalistic. 

Given  its  premises,  Phenomenalism  is  bound  to  take  the  posi- 
tion, that  knowing  helps  to  make  facts,  or  "things."  But 
knowing,  strictly  interpreted,  connotes  the  presence  of  truth. 
Therefore,  with  the  knowing  self  interacting  with  things-in- 
themselves,  something  is  produced  that  is  ioth  fact  and  truth. 
Indeed,  every  fact  is  a  truth,  and,  conversely,  every  truth 
should  be  a  fact,  i.e.,  a  phenomenal  fact,  either  a  KS^  or  an 

But  it  is  at  this  point  that  Phenomenalism  contradicts  itself. 
For,  while  this  doctrine  is  its  explicit  teaching,  Phenomenalism 
offers  itself  as  so  much  genuine  (true)  knowledge  about  the 
knowing  situation,  thus  tacitly  to  presuppose  that  knowing  does 
not  make  this  situation,  hut  discovers  it. 

Here,  therefore,  are  facts  that  are  not  made,  "colored,"  or 
"constituted,"  even  in  part,  by  being  known,  but  that  are  pre- 
supposed to  be  known  as  if  the  knowing  were  not  taking  place, 
with  truth  subsisting  as  just  this  specific  relation  between  the 
facts  known  and  the  knoiving.  Those  presuppositions  on  which 
the  phenomenalistic  position  itself  rests,  as  a  whole,  are  con- 
tradicted, therefore,  by  its  own  explicitly  stated  conclusion,  that 
facts  and  truth  are  made  by  knowing.  Consistently  with  this 
conclusion,  the  so-called  facts  about  knowing  cannot  be  facts, 
since  they  are  not  made  by  knowing.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand, 
with  Phenomenalism  advanced  as  the  true  position  concerning 
knowing,  they  are  presupposed  to  be  facts. 

Phenomenalism  is  in  this  respect  clearly  self-contradictory. 
It  involves  two  definitions  of  fact,  and  two  of  truth.  By  the 
implicit  presuppositions  and  definitions  on  which  the  position 
as  a  whole  rests,  facts — the  facts  about  knowing — can  be  known 


228  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

as  they  really  are.  These  facts  are  presupposed  to  be  related 
to  the  knowing,  but  not  to  he  constituted  by  it.  Therefore, 
although  the  knowing  cannot  be  eliminated  existentially ,  it  is 
eliminated  ideally,  and  is  presupposed  to  be  related  externally 
to  that  state  of  affairs  which  holds  of  knowing  and  its  object. 

As  the  only  condition  on  which  Phenomenalism  can  be  a  true 
theory,  there  is  presupposed,  therefore,  a  perfect  solution  of  the 
ego-centric  predicament.  Also,  the  definition  of  truth  which  the 
position  presupposes  is,  that  truth  is  that  relation  which  holds 
between  knowing  and  fact,  when  the  latter  is  known  as  it  really 
is,  i.e.,  as  unmodified  by,  and,  in  this  sense,  as  quite  independent 
of  knowing.  When  this  specific  state  of  affairs  does  not  exist, 
and  yet  knowing  is  taking  place,  there  is,  accordingly,  error. 
Such  is  the  definition  of  error  that,  seemingly,  Phenomenalism 
presupposes. 

This  definition  of  error  is,  however,  contradicted  by  the  defini- 
tions, or  by  the  implications  of  the  definitions  that  are  ex- 
plicitly advanced  by  Phenomenalism.  For,  by  those  definitions, 
fact  and  truth  are  made  in  the  knowing  process,  and  where 
there  is  one,  there,  also,  is  the  other.  Indeed,  where  there  is 
knowing,  and,  therefore,  the  relation  of  the  knowing  self,  KS, 
to  the  thing-in-itself,  X,  there,  also,  are  hoth  facts  and  truth  in 
the  resulting  phenomenal  realms,  K8^  and  X^^,  but  there  cannot 
he  error.  Phenomenalism,  therefore,  in  its  explicit  position, 
that  knowing  makes  fact,  can  find  no  place  for  error,  and  thereby 
contradicts  the  presupposition  on  which  at  least  the  theory  as 
a  whole  is  based,  namely,  the  presupposition  that  there  are  both 
truth  and  error. 

In  summary,  then,  it  may  be  said,  that  Phenomenalism,  in  its 
explicit  development,  maintains  that  truth  is  not  constituted  by 
a  "copy"  relationship  between  knowing  and  fact  known,  but 
that  in  its  foundations,  it  presupposes  just  this  definition  of 
truth;  in  other  words,  in  its  explicit  development  Phenomenal- 
ism is  pragmatic,  i.e.,  it  maintains  that  whatever  is  known  is, 
a  fortiori,  fact  and  truth,  while  in  its  foundations  it  is  ahso- 
lutistic,  i.e.,  it  presupposes  that  there  are  facts  to  be  known,  if 
possible,  as  they  really  are.  Such  knowledge  is  true  knowledge, 
and  one  instance  of  such  knowledge  is  supposed  to  he  the  phe- 
nomenalistic  theory  aiout  knowledge. 


PHENOMENALISM  229 

The  statement  of  the  other  epistemological  positions  that  are 
involved  in  Phenomenalism  can  be  made  briefly.  First,  it  is 
quite  evident  that  the  position  accepts  the  validity  of  intel- 
lectual analysis  as  a  means  of  getting  at  fact  and  truth.  Phe- 
nomenalism is,  therefore,  intellectualistic.  An  opportunity  for 
non-intellectualism  is  found,  however,  in  the  necessity  of  satis- 
fying the  demand,  that  there  should  be  some  method  of  approach 
to  the  non-phenomenal  realm.  The  immediate  revelation,  by 
introspection,  of  the  dictates  of  conscience  and,  perhaps,  of  the 
axiomatic  principles  of  logic  and  of  mathematics,  and  the  like, 
is  held  to  characterize  such  an  approach  to  the  transcendental 
self,  while  faith  and  esthetic  appreciation  are  advanced  as  non- 
intellectual  methods  of  approach  to  things-in-themselves. 

With  reference  to  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  consciousness, 
Phenomenalism  takes  the  position,  in  its  basic  assumptions,  that 
consciousness  in  every  form  is  of  the  nature  of  a  psychical,  thing- 
like and  suhstance-like  ego  with  attributes,  rather  than  a  process 
or  a  relation.  Even  the  empirical  psychological  consciousness, 
as  the  combined  and  total  effect  of  the  action  of  things-in-them- 
selves on  the  transcendental  self,  is  of  the  character  only  of 
a  complex  of  derived  attributes  that  inhere  in  an  ultimate  thing- 
like self  or  soul. 

This  completes  the  presentation  of  the  main  points  that  are 
involved  in  the  logical  and  the  metaphysical  "structure"  of 
Phenomenalism.  The  position  is  clearly  a  product  of  the  Aris- 
totelian formal  logic  as  this  is  applied,  as  a  method,  to  the 
development  of  a  specific  philosophy  that  is  involved  in  the 
concepts  of  substance  and  cause.  The  more  important  details 
of  the  position  result  from  tacitly  assuming,  historically,  be- 
cause of  the  influence  of  the  Aristotelian  tradition, — (1)  that 
both  the  knowing  self  and  the  object  known  are  thing-like 
entities,  each  with  a  structure  of  attributes  inhering  in  a  sub- 
stratum, and  (2)  that,  by  virtue  of  being  related,  each  of  these 
entities  causally  affects  the  other.  The  position  is,  therefore, 
very  distinctly  a  causation-substance  philosophy. 

We  have  given  this  relatively  long  account  of  Phenomenalism, 
because  of  its  pivotal  position  among  a  number  of  philosophies 
that  rest  on  essentially  the  same  foundation,  but  that  differ  in 


230  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

certain  details.  Those  other  philosophies,  for  which  Phenom- 
enalism is  logically  the  center,  are  Subjective  Idealism,  Posi- 
tivism, Naturalism,  Pragmatism,  and,  perhaps  somewhat  para- 
doxically, Materialism.  Some  of  these,  notably  the  first  two, 
historically  preceded  and  culminated  in  Phenomenalism.  Ac- 
cordingly their  logical  structure  becomes  clearer  in  the  light  of 
that  position,  Phenomenalism,  which,  historically,  was  their 
culmination. 

in.    CRITICISM   OP  PHENOMENALISM  ^2 

However,  before  we  examine  these  other  positions,  to  state 
their  postulates  and  derive  other  propositions  from  these,  we 
must  present  our  fundamental  criticism  of  Phenomenalism, 
since  it  is  upon  the  basis  of  this  criticism,  as  holding  not  only 
of  Phenomenalism,  but  also  of  other  systems,  that  our  gradual, 
inductive,  and  yet  rationalistic  development  of  Rationalism  and 
Realism  depends.  Also,  since  our  criticism  has  this  specific 
outcome,  as  identical  with  our  final  empirical  generalization, 
the  frequent  restatement  of  the  same  criticism  under  varying 
circumstances  {i.e.,  the  repeated  criticism  of  the  several  phi- 
losophies that  are  opposed  to  Realism  and  Rationalism)  will 
be  pardonable,  if  such  criticism  is  regarded  as  the  citing  of 
such  typical  instances  as  are  necessary  for  the  establishment  of 
any  inductive  generalization.^^ 

As  is  well  known,  much,  and  perhaps  most  modern  philosophy 
centers  around  the  epistemological  problem.  This  is  especially 
true  of  the  positions  just  named.  For  especially  since  Kant, 
but  also  since  Descartes,  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Hume,  most 
philosophers  have  deemed  it  necessary  to  solve  the  problem  of 
knowledge,  in  order  subsequently  to  define  the  status  of  that 
which  is  known.  In  other  words,  philosophers  have  set  out  to 
discover  the  facts,  or  the  states  of  affairs  concerning  knowing 
and  the  relation  of  knowing  to  the  object  known,  as  a  pre- 
requisite for  solving  the  other  problems  of  philosophy,  and,  as 
a  result,  they  have  issued  with  those  definite  solutions  which 
have  received  such  names  as  Phenomenalism,  Subjective  Ideal- 
ism, Positivism,  Pragmatism,  and  even  Materialism.     But  this 

"  See  the  writer's  "  Logical  Structure  of  Self -refuting  Systems,"  Phil. 
Review,  Vol.  XIX.,  1910,  pp.  276-301. 
"  See  Chap.  XV.,  m. 


PHENOMENALISM  231 

means  that,  whatever  has  been  presupposed  as  to  methods,  and 
the  like,  it  has  at  least  been  presupposed  (by  the  philosophers) 
that  there  are  some  facts,  or  state  of  affairs,  (1)  that  are  known 
as  they  really  are,  (2)  that  can  he  known  hy  others,  and  (3) 
that,  though  related  to  knowing,  are  not  caused,  altered,  modi- 
fied, affected,  or  constituted  by  virtue  of  that  relation.  These 
facts  or  states  of  affairs,  in  the  instance  of  the  epistemological 
problem,  concern  the  knowing  situation. 

As  regards  this  situation,  however,  if  one  endeavors  to  think 
or  conceive  these  facts  as  they  would  be,  were  they  not  known, 
one  does  not  succeed,  since  thereby  is  the  knowing  reinstated. 
Clearly,  one  cannot  know  entities,  either  simple  or  complex, 
except  as  they  are  known.  So  much  of  truth  is  there  in  the 
ego-centric  predicament.  But  this  predicament  is  itself  forth- 
with solved  in  the  very  presuppositions  that  are  made  in  any 
solution  of  the  problem  of  knowledge,  namely,  in  the  presup- 
positions, (1)  that,  although  the  facts  about  knowing  are  known 
facts,  the  specific  knowing  {e.g.,  of  the  philosopher  who  knows 
them)  does  not  causally  affect  these  facts;  (2)  that  this  know- 
ing is  externally  related  to  these  facts,  so  that  (3)  the  knowing 
is  ideally  eliminated  from  the  (known)  facts  by  an  analysis 
in  situ. 

These  presuppositions  are,  however,  the  main  principles  of  that 
position  which  is  called  Realism.  Other  philosophies,  therefore, 
ultimately  rest  on  this  realistic  hasis,^^  and  differ  from  Realism 
in  not  carrying  through  consistently  the  very  principles  which 
they  presuppose  and  on  which  they  are  based.  Realism,  discov- 
ering that  these  principles  are  presupposed  in  any  system  that 
even  pretends  to  portray  the  facts  concerning  knowing,  extends 
these  same  principles  to  all  cases  of  knowing.  It  does  this  on 
the  ground  of  the  principle  of  consistency,  which  demands  that, 
if  these  principles  hold  for  the  knowing  of  the  facts  concerning 
knowing,  they  must  be  presumed  also  to  hold  for  the  knowing 
of  all  other  facts,  until  good  reasons  to  the  contrary  can  be 
advanced.  Realism  in  taking  this  position  is  self -consistent  in 
its  epistemology,  while  any  other  philosophy  which,  like  Phe- 
nomenalism, takes  one  position  with  reference  to  the  knowing 

**  Cf.  Chaps.  I.,  II.,  and  III.,  and  also  the  later  chapters,  XXXIX.  to 
XLV.,  on  Realism. 


232  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

of  "other  facts,"  and  another  position  as  regards  the  knowing 
of  the  facts  concerning  knowing,  is  self -contradictory. 

For  this  reason  Realism  has  a  marked  advantage  over  other 
positions :  it  is  self-consistent,  whereas  they  are  self-contradictory 
in  that  while  they  are  all  realistic  at  a  certain  point,  they  depart 
from  this  realism  by  making  arbitrary  and  sometimes  hidden 
assumptions,  thus  to  build  up  reinterpretations  that  completely 
transform  and  transmute  the  facts  of  both  common  sense  and 
science.  For  example,  that  which  to  common  sense  and  science 
is  a  physical  object,  is  transformed  into  mere  appearance,  or 
into  spiritual  object  or  "manifestation,"  or  into  "human  inven- 
tion." Realism  objects  not  so  much  to  these  conclusions  as 
such  as  to  the  methods  by  which  they  are  arrived  at,  for  it  finds 
these  methods  to  be  artificial,  invalid,  and  self-contradictory. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  same  principles,  logic,  and  general 
methods  that  are  presupposed  by  any  philosophy  in  getting  at 
the  facts  ahout  knowing,  were  used  in  order  to  know  other  fads, 
and  if  these  facts  should  thus  be  found  to  be  qualitatively  dif- 
ferent from  what  common  sense  and  science  accept  them  to  be, 
then  would  Realism  be  quite  compatible  with  at  least  some  of 
the  conclusions  of  some  of  the  positions  that  are  opposed  to  it. 
For  example,  it  could  accept  the  position,  that  the  whole  uni- 
verse is  ultimately  psychical  in  character.  But  Realism  finds 
that,  up  to  the  present  time,  opposed  systems  have  not  thus 
been  consistently  derived,  but  that,  in  the  method  of  arriving 
at  their  transforming  conclusions,  such  systems  depart  from 
and  contradict  the  very  presuppositions  on  which,  as  philoso- 
phies, they  depend." 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

'°  The  Kantian  bibliography  is  very  extensive,  and  need  not  be  given 
here.  Thilly,  History  of  Philosophy,  pp.  395-396,  gives  the  complete  list 
of  Kant's  own  works,  and  the  more  important  volumes  on  the  Kantian 
philosophy.  The  writer  recommends  Watson's  Selections  (from  the  three 
Critiques)  for  the  beginner,  and,  for  the  more  advanced  student,  Miiller'a 
translation.  Kant's  Criticfve  of  Pure  Reason  was  first  published  in  1781, 
and  a  second,  revised  edition  appeared  in  1787.  His  ethical  works  are, 
Griindlage  zur  Metaphysik  der  Sitten,  1785,  and  Kritik  der  praktischen 
Vernunft,  1788;  his  chief  aesthetic  work,  Kritik  der  Urteilskraft,  1790. 

The  most  thorough-going  contemporaneous  Kantians  are:  H.  Cohen, 
Logik  der  reinen  Erkenntniss,  1902,  and  P.  Natorp,  Die  logischen  Orund- 
lagen  der  Exakten  Wissenschaften,  1910.  Other  philosophers  who  are 
more  Kantian  than  anything  else  are:  Sir  William  Hamilton,  E.  Zeller, 
K.  Fischer,  F.  A.  Lange,  H.  Vaihinger,  B.  Erdmann,  E.  Adickes,  A. 
Kitschl,  K.  Lipsius,  F.  Paulsen,  C.  Kenouvier. 


SUBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  233 


CHAPTER  XXX 

SUBJECTIVE  IDEALISM 

I.   LOGICAL  DERIVATION 

Subjective  Idealism  is  derived  by  a  proof  very  similar  to 
that  for  Phenomenalism.  The  central  prohlem  is  once  more 
that  of  knowing,  and  the  solution  of  this  problem  concerns 
chiefly  the  nature  of  known  objects.  All  objects  prove  ultimately 
to  be  psychical — except,  perhaps,  time.  To  establish  this  con- 
clusion was  the  purpose  of  George  Berkeley,  the  founder  of  the 
system,  in  order  thereby  to  do  away  with  matter  completely, 
thus  to  find  room  for  the  omnipotence  of  the  Deity. 

To  deduce  this  position,  not  in  its  historical,  but  in  its  logical 
order,  let  us  assume : — 

1.  That  there  are  conscious  selves  ^  that  are  spirits,  or  souls, 
with,  perhaps,  their  own  laws  and  qualities;  in  other  words, 
that  there  are  psychical  "things,"  which  are  substance-like 
substrata  with  attributes  called  ideas.^ 

2.  That  a  spirit  is  one,  simple,  undivided,  active  being.* 

3.  That  whatever  a  spirit  or  soul  directly  perceives  and 
knoivs  is  an  idea.^ 

4.  That  there  are  7io  abstract  ideas.^ 

5.  That  whatever  is  "given"  to  a  spirit  either  without  or 
against  its  will  is  caused.^ 

6.  That  there  is  something  that  acts  on  (these  thing-like), 
spirits,  and  produces  in  them  effects  called  (sensations  and)' 
ideas.  Let  us  (with  Berkeley)  call  this  "something"  God, 
defining  this  Being  as  an  Infinite  Spirit,^  and  denying  all  (im- 
portant) action  of  finite  spirits  on  this  Infinite  Spirit. 

Comment:  This  Infinite  Spirit  takes  the  place,  logically,  of 

*  Cf.  Berkeley,  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  ed.  Fraser,  §§1,  2,  7, 
27,  89. 

'  Ibid.,  §§  1,  86,  89.  '  Ibid.,  §§  7-10,  25. 

'  Ibid.,  §  27.  •  Ibid.,  §§  26,  29,  30,  33. 

*Ibid.,  §  1.  'Ibid.,  §§  26-30,  51,  67,  60-63,  106,  147. 


234.  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

the  things-in-themselves  of  Phenomenalism,  only,  unlike  these, 
it  is  not  unknowable,  since  it  can  produce  in  us  a  true  idea  of 
itself. 

7.  That  time  is  not  a  mere  idea,  but  is  a  "condition"  for  the 
occurrence  of  ideas,  and  for  the  existence  of  spirits  both  finite 
and  infinite.^ 

8.  That  so-called  physical  or  material  things  are  (unlike 
spirits)  only  the  collection  or  union  of  (their)  qualities,  and 
that  there  is  no  underlying  material  substratum  or  substance  in 
which  these  qualities  inhere." 

9.  That  certain  qualities,  such  as  color,  which  we  perceive  (in 
so-called  physical  objects)  are  the  effects,  in  finite  spirits,  of 
something  acting  on  these,  and  that  accordingly  these  qualities 
are  like  spirits  in  nature,  i.e.,  are  psychical  or  conscious.^^ 

10.  That  all  so-called  physical  qualities  and  attributes,  even 
hardness,  solidity,  extension,  figure,  and  motion,  are,  like  color, 
perceived.^^ 

11.  That  only  those  ''parts'^  of  the  so-called  physical  world 
that  are  (concretely)  perceived  are  real.^- 

12.  That  God  is,  and  that  His  nature  is  (among  other 
"things")  that  of  being  an  eternal  perceiver.^^ 

13.  That  the  reahn  of  physical  things  is  law-abiding,  regular, 
and  uniform.^^ 

14.  That  spirits  are  distinct  and  different  from  ideas,  even  as 
attributes  are  distinct  and  different  from  substance.^^ 

15.  That  spirits  are  in  communication.^^ 

From  these  assumptions  or  postulates  the  following  proposi- 
tions are  derivable : — 

1.  All  so-called  physical  qualities  such  as  extension,  solidity, 
figure,  and  motion  are,  like  color,  psychical  or  subjective,  i.e., 
are  identical  with  (sensations  or)  ideas  in  some  spirit. 

2.  A  physical  thing  is  the  collection  or  union  of  these  ideas 

*  Cf.  Berkeley,  Principles  of  Human  Knowledge,  ed.  Fraser,  §  26, 
^  Ibid.,  §§  1, '30-35,  37,  38. 
"  Ibid.,  §§  9-12. 

"  Ibid.,  §§  1,  2,  38,  42-44,  67;  cf.  references  for  2;  also  Theory  of  Vision, 
§87. 

''  Ibid.,  §§  3-6. 

"  Ibid.,  §  26. 

^*  Ibid.,  §S  30-32,  45. 

"  Ibid.,  §§  2,  7,  89,  142. 

*'  Ibid.,  §  1,  and  all  through  the  Principles  as  a  tacit  assumption. 


SUBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  235 

that  some  spirit  has,  and  that  are  held  together  by  the  spirit 
which  has  them. 

3.  The  physical  '^ world"  is  the  totality  of  such  things, — each 
as  a  group  of  sensations  that  belong  to  some  spirit,  with  perhaps 
many  spirits  having  similar  sensations. 

4.  If  a  finite  spirit  does  not  perceive,  nevertheless  God,  as 
the  infinite  and  eternal  perceiver,  is  perceiving,  so  that  physical 
things  continue  to  exist  as  identical  with  His  percepts.  There 
is,  therefore,  an  order,  regularity,  and  uniformity,  a  persistence 
and  constancy  in  the  universe,  that  are  independent  of  all  finite 
spirits  and  of  their  percepts,  but  that  are  dependent  upon  the 
eternal  perception  of  the  Deity. 

This  eternal  perception  follows  from  the  iheistic  definition  of 
the  Deity  as  an  all-knowing,  all-perceiving,  as  well  as  all- 
powerful  being,  and  from  the  fact  that  time  is  "made"  inde- 
pendent of  ideas,  even  as  are  spirits.  The  postulation  of  the 
order,  regularity,  and  uniformity  of  nature,  together  with  the 
assumption,  that  finite  beings  might  not  exist,  or  might  not  per- 
ceive, demands  the  conclusion,  that  the  Deity  is  this  eternally 
perceiving  being,  while,  conversely,  this  conclusion,  as  an 
hypothesis,  accounts  for  that  order  and  uniformity. 

All  these  conclusions  may  be  stated  together  briefly  in  the 
form,  that  the  "world"  consists  of  many  finite  spirits  and  one 
Infinite  Spirit,  and  of  their  ideas — time  alone  being  the  ex- 
ception. 

The  order  of  the  assumptions  and  deductions  as  they  are 
above  stated  is  not  the  order  of  the  original  argument  for  Sub- 
jective Idealism,  as  it  occurred  psychologically  in  the  mind  of 
Berkeley,  and  as  it  was  presented  in  The  Principles  of  Human 
Knowledge, — but  it  is,  in  fact,  almost  the  inverse  of  the  order 
of  that  historical  argument.  Berkeley's  argument  proceeded 
from  the  traditional  assumption  of  the  times,  as  stated  in 
Locke's  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  that  certain 
qualities  of  things  such  as  color  were  subjective  or  psychical,  so 
that  their  esse  was  their  percipi,  although  they  were,  in  common 
sense,  "projected"  into  the  object.  For  Locke,  in  accordance 
with  the  mechanistic  philosophy  of  his  time,  these  secondary 
qualities  or  sensations  were  caused  by  the  objective  motions,  in. 
space,  of  solid,  figured  particles.    But  Berkeley  argued  that  alt 


286  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

qualities  were  perceived,  and,  therefore,  that  to  be  consistent, 
one  must  hold  either  that  all  were  objective  or  that  all  were  sub- 
jective, and  of  the  two  possibilities,  he  chose  the  second.  Fur- 
ther, both  Berkeley  and  Locke  held  the  position,  although  they 
did  not  adhere  to  it  consistently,  that  only  that  was  a  fact  or 
an  existent  which  was  directly  perceived,  or  the  idea  of  which 
could  be  traced  back  to  sense-perception.  But  neither  Locke 
nor  Berkeley  could  discover  any  perception  of  that  substance 
which,  in  accordance  with  the  traditional  definition,  was  held 
to  be  the  core  or  substratum  in  which  physical  qualities  inhere. 
Locke,  nevertheless,  retained  this  substance-doctrine,  while 
Berkeley  gave  it  up.  For  Berkeley,  then,  a  physical  thing  ivas 
only  a  group  of  qualities.  It  followed — since  any  physical 
quality  was  identical  with  a  sensation — that  a  physical  thing 
was  identical  merely  with  a  group  of  sensations,  and  that  na 
matter  in  the  sense  of  a  material  substratum  was  existent. 

But  Berkeley  could  not  escape  the  influence  of  the  traditional 
view  that  ideas  were  known  by,  or  belonged  to,  some  soul  or 
spirit.  Faced  by  the  consequence,  therefore,  that  the  world  of 
physical  things  would  be  non-existent,  if  finite  spirits  should 
cease  to  perceive,  he  saved  that  world  in  its  order  and  uni- 
formity by  assuming  the  perception  of  an  infinite  and  eternal 
spirit,  God.  Thus  he  made  his  system  comply  Avith  the  demands 
of  both  common  sense  and  science. 

However,  it  is  not  our  purpose  to  examine  Subjective  Idealism 
in  its  historical  setting,  but  to  consider  it  as  a  position  which 
today,  independently  of  its  history,  might  lay  some  claim  to 
acceptance. 

The  position  postulates,  in  its  foundation,  the  modification 
theory  of  relations  as  holding  for  the  relation  between  each 
finite  spirit,  KS,  and  the  infinite  spirit,  God.  It  postulates  also 
the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations  as  holding  for  each 
spirit,  whether  finite  or  infinite.  Thus  a  spirit,  as  distinct  from 
sensations  and  ideas,  is  maintained  to  be  an  underlying  psychical 
substratum  in  which  sensations  and  ideas  inhere,  and  which 
holds  these  together  as  so  many  attributes.  This  means  that 
both  kinds  of  spirits  are  really  postulated  as  psychical  things, 
while  the  infinite  spirit  is  assumed  to  act  on  finite  spirits  so  as 
to  cause  in  them  certain  effects,  just  as  in  Phenomenalism  things- 


SUBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  237 

tn-themselves  are  assumed  to  act  on  transcendental  selves. 
These  effects  are  sensations  and  ideas,  even  as  they  are  in 
Phenomenalism.  But,  whereas  in  the  latter  position,  there  is 
"something"  to  he  known,  if  possible,  namely,  an  X  or  thing- 
in-itself,  which  is  modified  by  being  known,  in  Subjective  Ideal- 
ism this  is  not  the  case.  Rather,  in  this  last  theory,  it  is  held 
that  only  the  effects  or  sensations,  and  that  which  is  derived 
from  them,  namely,  ideas,  are  known.  For  Subjectivism,  also, 
specific  sensations  are  identical  with  the  specific  qualities  of 
things,  and  specific  groups  of  sensations  are  identical  with 
specific  things.  In  contrast  with  this,  in  Phenomenalism  a 
sensation  and  a  physical  quality  are  numerically  distinct  and 
yet  between  the  two  there  is  a  correspondence  which  results  from 
the  action  of  the  knowing  self  on  thing s-in-themselves  to  produce 
X^^,  and  of  things-in-themselves  on  knowing  selves  to  produce 
K8^.  It  is,  therefore,  indifferent  whether  we  say  that  we  know 
the  modified  things-in-themselves  and  the  sensations,  or  only 
the  latter. 

Subjective  Idealism  is  derived,  then,  in  much  the  same  way 
as  is  Phenomenalism,  but  there  is  the  difference,  that  for  Sub- 
jectivism knowing  makes  or  creates  its  object  completely, 
whereas  for  Phenomenalism  there  is  an  object  or  thing-in-itself 
which  is  only  modified  in  being  known.  But  this  difference  is, 
perhaps,  not  essential,  since,  if  things-in-themselves  did  not  exist 
at  all  (and  how,  in  Phenomenalism,  they  can  be  known  to  exist,  is 
a  question),  the  result  would  be  the  same,  for  we  could  still 
have  our  sensations  and  ideas,  with  these  playing  quite  the 
same  role  as  do  the  physical  things  of  Subjective  Idealism.  It 
is  only  provided  one  wishes  to  account  for  the  occurence  of 
sensations  and  ideas,  that  he  must  assume  some  cause,  but  this 
cause  might  as  well  be  a  Deity,  as  it  is  maintained  to  be  in 
Subjective  Idealism,  as  a  group  of  things-in-themselves,  as  it 
is  held  to  be  in  Phenomenalism. 

n.  subjectivism's  solution  of  problems;  criticism 

With  these  the  main  outlines  of  Subjective  Idealism  as  a 
philosophy  that  gives  a  specific  solution  to  the  epistemological 
problem,  we  may  next  consider  those  solutions  of  other  problems 
which  it  either  derives  or  presupposes. 


238  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

First,  we  find  that  the  position  rests  upon  certain  assump- 
tions, both  C'pistcmological  and  ontological,  which  it  presup- 
poses hut  does  not  prove.  Thus,  e.g.,  it  takes  a  distinctly  realistic 
position  as  regards  that  complex  object  or  state  of  affairs  con- 
cerning which  it  lays  claim  to  present  true  knowledge.  For  it 
presupposes  that  it  is  quite  possible  to  know  the  real  state  of 
affairs  concerning  spirits  and  their  ideas.  Accordingly  it  pre- 
supposes that  the  knowing  processes  of  the  investigator,  although 
they  are  related  to  this  state  of  affairs,  do  not  in  the  least  create, 
alter,  or  affect  either  it  or  the  spirits  and  ideas  of  which  it 
holds.  The  ego-centric  predicament  is  thus  presupposed  to  be 
solved  for  these  specific  knowings,  and,  accordingly,  for  the 
relation  between  them  and  their  objects,  the  theory  of  external 
relations  is  presupposed. 

The  state  of  affairs  which  is  thus  known  concerns,  however, 
not  only  finite  spirits  and  their  ideas,  but  also  the  Infinite  Spirit 
and  His  ideas.  Toward  these  entities,  and  their  relationships 
to  one  another.  Subjectivism  thus  assumes  a  distinctly  realistic 
position.  But  this  epistemological  or  logical  assumption  is  itself 
the  basic  ontology  of  Subjectivism. 

This  basic  ontology  is  extended  by  certain  cosmological  and 
further  logical  doctrines.  Thus,  as  regards  the  so-called  physical 
world,  Subjectivism  maintains  that  only  that  which  is  concretely 
perceived  is  real.  For  example,  the  specific  color  and  hardness 
of  my  pen  are  real,  but  color  and  hardness  in  general  are  not. 
Universal  and  abstract  terms  concerning  the  physical  world, 
are,  for  Subjectivism,  mere  words.  They  are  not  even  ideas. 
This  is  its  Nominalism.  It  follows  from  this,  that  there  is  no 
such  "thing"  as  a  physical  substance  or  substratum  in  general. 
But,  on  the  other  hand,  one  does  not  perceive  any  particidar, 
concrete  substratum,  but  only  qualities,  and  so  it  follows,  that 
a  substratum  does  not  exist  at  all. 

This  ontology  is  completed  by  the  further  assumption,  in 
accordance  with  certain  scientific  theories  that  were  current  in 
the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries,  that  certain  qualities, 
such  as  color  (and  temperature),  though  sensed  as  belonging 
to  things,  are  really  only  psychical  and  subjective,  i.e.,  it  is 
assumed  that  the  sensation  and  the  specific  color  sensed  are 
numerically  identical — although  they  are  distinguished. 


SUBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  239 

The  remaining  ontology  of  Subjectivism  is  inferred  from 
this  assumed  basis.  Thus  from  the  assumptions,  (1)  that 
some  qualities  are  subjective,  and  (2)  that  all  qualities  are 
perceived,  it  is  concluded  (3)  that  all  qualities  are  sub- 
jective. From  this  conclusion  together  with  the  postulates 
(4)  that  only  that  which  is  perceived  is  real,  and  (5)  that 
there  is  no  perception  of  material  substance,  it  is  concluded 
that  a  physical  thing  is  only  a  group  of  sensations  or 
qualities,  and  also  that  there  is  no  material  substance  in  the 
world. 

That  which  is  regarded  as  the  usual  objective  cause  of  sensa- 
tions being  thus  done  away  with,  causation  is  nevertheless 
assumed  in  order  to  comply  with  the  fact,  that  sensations  come 
to  us  against  our  will.  This  means  that  some  cause  for  sensa- 
tions is  postulated,  and  this  cause  is  identified  with  God,  the 
Infinite  Spirit. 

The  completed  ontology  of  Subjectivism,  is,  therefore,  that  all 
existence  is  psychical,  mental,  conscious,  or  spiritual.  This  is 
the  position's  Qualitative  Monism.  Yet  there  are  many  finite 
spirits,  and  One  Infinite  Spirit,  each  spirit  having  many  ideas. 
This  is  the  position's  Pluralism. 

In  its  cosmology  Subjectivism  grants  the  usual  order,  regu- 
larity, and  constancy  of  the  universe,  as  accepted,  e.g.,  by 
science.  To  account  for  this,  God's  eternal  perception  is  postu- 
lated. Yet  with  God  as  both  the  eternal  perceiver  and  the  cause 
of  our  ideas,  there  is  opportunity  for  exceptions  to  the  order  of 
nature,  with  these  exceptions  identical,  perhaps,  with  miracles. 
Also,  with  God  thus  distinct  from  finite  spirits,  and,  as  cause, 
in  control  of  ideas,  and  therefore  of  qualities  and  of  things 
(since  a  thing  is  only  a  group  of  sensations),  there  is  oppor- 
tunity for  God  to  work  His  purposes  and  accomplish  His  aims. 
This  is  Subjectivism's  Theism  and  its  Transcendent  or  External 
Teleology,  and  therewith,  also,  is  the  value-problem  given  a 
specific  solution. 

The  solution  of  the  psychological  problem  which  Subjectivism 
offers  is  mostly  contained  in  its  basic  ontologj\  Specific  sensa- 
tions and  ideas  are  the  possessions  or  attributes  of  souls  or 
spirits.  The  soul  or  spirit  is  the  true  inward  self  that  underlies, 
as  a  psychical  substance,  the  changing  stream  of  sensations, 


240  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

memory,  ideas,  and  the  like,  which  in  turn  constitute  the  em- 
pirical self. 

In  its  epistemology  Subjectivism  is  absolutistic  and  realistic. 
It  claims  absolute  truth  for  its  own  specific  account  of  the 
universe  as  given  in  its  solution  of  the  several  philosophical 
problems.  That  account  is  offered  as  presenting  the  states  of 
affairs  of  the  universe  as  they  really  are,  and  not  as  they  merely 
appear,  or  as  we  make  them,  or  as  they  merely  satisfy  us 
and  "tvork"  successfully.  Subjectivism,  therefore,  in  that 
epistemological  position  which  it  takes  toward  itself,  will 
have  nothing  to  do  with  Phenomenalism,  Subjectivism,  or 
Pragmatism.  Indeed,  just  as  each  of  these  positions  inter- 
prets itself  absolutistically  and  realistically,  so  also  does 
Subjectivism. 

But  Subjectivism  clearly  involves  certain  inconsistencies. 
Thus  it  fails  to  observe  consistently  its  main  position,  that  the 
existence  of  (some)  things  is  identical  with  their  being  perceived 
or  known,  for,  as  is  evident,  it  does  not  apply  this  position  to 
the  knowledge  of  other  spirits  and  of  their  ideas.  If  it  did  this 
it  would  mean,  that  all  other  spirits, — even  God  himself — would 
be  merely  one  spirit's  ideas,  so  that  the  whole  universe  would 
be  identical  with  one  spirit's  consciousness,  cr  with  the  psychical 
attributes  of  a  single  spiritual  substance  which  is  a  self.  This 
consistent  development  of  Subjectivism  is  called  Solipsism.  It 
is  evident,  however,  that  Solipsism  does  not  solve  any  important 
philosophical  or  scientific  problems,  since,  by  bringing  every- 
thing within  one  consciousness,  it  leaves  all  the  problems  as  to 
the  further  character  and  relations  of  "things"  still  remaining 
within  that  one  consciousness. 

The  other  consistent  development  of  Subjectivism  makes  the 
position  self-defeating.  For,  since  it  is  presupposed  or  main- 
tained by  Subjectivism  that  other  spirits  are  not  identical  with 
their  percipi  (or  with  their  concipi)  by  any  one  spirit,  the  only 
consistent  conclusion  is,  that  other  "things,"  such  as  physical 
qualities,  may  also  be  not  so  identical,  but  that  they  may  be 
quite  as  independent  of  being  known  and  quite  as  numerically 
distinct  from  ideas  as  are  spirits.  In  other  words,  with  the  ego- 
centric predicament  presupposed  as  solved  for  the  knowledge  of 
spirits,  it  cannot,  without  good  reasons  therefor,  be  supposed 


POSITIVISM  241 

to  imply  special  difficulties  as  regards  the  knowledge  of  other 
entities. 

Similar  and  closely  allied  inconsistencies  affect  Subjectivism 
in  a  number  of  other  respects.  Thus  concerning  the  knowledge  of 
spirits  and  of  their  ideas,  Subjectivism  accepts  the  position  that 
true  knowledge  is  a  copy  of  its  object,  while,  as  regards  the 
knowledge  of  physical  qualities,  it  makes  knowing  creative.  But 
the  inconsistencies  which  have  been  indicated  suffice  to  show  that 
the  position  is  not  one  that  can  lay  very  strong  claim  to  accept- 
ance, although  it  is  a  position  that,  granted  its  premises,  seems 
plausible  up  to  a  certain  point.  Accordingly  we  turn  to  the 
examination  of  other  philosophies. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

POSITIVISM  1 

I.    DERIVATION 

Positivism  is  that  position  which,  historically,  was  arrived  at 
by  avoiding  some  of  the  inconsistencies  of  Subjectivism,  and, 
although  it  can,  like  other  positions,  be  derived  logically  from 
certain  assumptions  or  postulates,  nevertheless,  to  present  the 
historical  derivation  is,  at  this  point,  advantageous.  The  logical 
derivation  will  be  given  subsequently. 

The  Subjective  Idealism  or  Psychism  of  Berkeley  was  derived 

'  Positivism  has  attracted  a  large  number  of  philosophers  and  scientists, 
chief  among  whom  are  the  following:  Hume  (1711-1776),  Treatise  Up^n 
Human  Nature,  1739-40;  five  volumes  of  Essays  that  include  the  Enquiry 
Concerning  Human  Understanding,  1748;  Works,  ed.  by  Green  and  Grose, 
4  vols.,  1874,  new  ed.  1909;  J.  S.  Mill  (1806-73),  Logic,  1843;  Principles 
of  Political  Economy,  1848;  Utilitarianism,  1861;  Examination  of  Sir 
William  Hamilton  s  Philosophy,  18C5;  new  ed.  of  Mill's  works  in  the  New 
Universal  Library;  Auguste  Comte  ( 1789-18r>7 ) ,  Coiirs  de  Philosophie 
positive,  6  vols.,  1830-42;  abridged  trans,  by  H.  Martineau;  cf.  J.  S.  Mill, 
Comte  and  Positivism;  R.  Avenarius,  Kritik  d.  reinen  Erfahrung,  1888; 
Der  Menschliche  Welthebriff,  1891;  Karl  Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science, 
1892,  2nd  ed.,  1900;  E.  Mach,  Analysis  of  Sensations,  1886,  5th  ed.,  1906, 
trans,  by  C.  M.  Williams;  also,  Popular  Scientific  Lectures,  4th  ed,,  1910 j 
Kenan,  Taine,  Eibot,  Tarde,  are  positivistic. 


242  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

from  the  partial  Realism  and  partial  Phenomenalism  of  John 
Locke  (1632-1704).-  Locke  accepted  the  dominant  scientific 
view  of  his  time  as  to  the  real  nature  of  the  external  world, 
namely,  that  this  consisted  only  of  solid  or  impenetrable,  ex- 
tended, figured  articles  in  motion.^  Groups  of  these  particles 
were  held  to  act  causally  on  our  sense  organs,  whatever  these 
organs  might  be.''  The  result  was,  that  in  some  cases  sensations 
were  like,'^  in  other  cases  ®  unlike  objective  qualities.  Thus 
sensations  of  solidity,  extension,  figure,  and  motion  were  like 
their  causes.  Therefore  in  these  cases  "things"  were  known 
as  they  really  are,  and  the  known  "thing"  was  distinct  from 
and  independent  of  the  knowing.  This  is  part  of  Locke's 
Realism — a  Realism  tliat  has,  indeed,  persisted  in  science  in 
perhaps  only  slightly  modified  form  even  to  the  present.  In 
other  cases,  however,  there  was  a  transformation  of  quality. 
For  example,  the  motion  of  solid,  extended  particles  produced 
(the  sensation  of)  color,  but  color  was  very  unlike  such  particles 
in  motion.     This  is  Locke's  Phenomenalism. 

Subjectivism,  with  Berkeley,  insists,  as  we  have  seen,  (1)  that 
only  that  which  is  perceived  is  real,  (2)  that  material  substance 
is  not  perceived,  (3)  that  in  the  physical  world  only  the  quali- 
ties are  perceived,  and  (4)  that  all  qualities  are,  like  color,  sub- 
jective or  psychical. 

Historically,  therefore,  Berkeley's  Subjectivism  was  derived 
from  Locke's  Realism  and  Phenomenalism,  although  from  the 
standpoint  of  modern  logical  theory,  it  can,  as  we  have  seen, 
be  derived  in  a  manner  that  is  independent  of  its  historical 
development.  This  is  done  by  assuming  God,  instead  of  moving 
particles,  to  be  the  cause  of  all  sensations^ 

However,  both  logically  and  historically,  Subjectivism  rests 

^  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  ed.  by  Fraser,  2  vols. 

^  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  Bk.  II.,  Chap.  VIII.,  9,  12, 
13,  17,  23,  and  Chap.  XXIII.,  26. 

*  Op.  cit.,  especially,  Bk.  II.,  Chap.  VIII.,  5,  23,  24,  25. 

"  Op.  cit.,  Bk.  II.,  Chap.  VIII.,  7,  9,  14,  24. 

'  Op.  cit.,  Bk.  II.,  Chap.  VIII.,  7,  n,  10,  13,  14,  24. 

'  Locke,  Berkeley,  and  Kant  each  clearly  assume  such  a  cause.  It  is 
moving  particles  for  Locke,  Ood  for  Berkeley,  things-in-themselves  for 
Kant.  However,  if  all  that  we  can  know  directly  are  ideas,  then  it  is  clear 
that  it  is  only  from  the  assumption  or  postitlation  of  the  principle  of 
causation  that  wo  can  infer  that  ideas  {as  effects)  have  a  cause.  And 
what  difference  docs  it  make  hy  what  name  we  call  this  cause? 


POSITIVISM  243 

upon  the  assumption  that  there  are  thing-like  spirits  that  have 
sensations  and  ideas, ^  and  that  these  last  inhere  in  the  spirit, 
as  qualities  in  an  underlying  substratum.  Indeed,  under  the 
influence  of  the  Aristotelian  tradition,  Subjectivism  rests  on 
the  assumption, — as  a  tacit  application  of  the  underlying- 
reality  theory  of  relations, — that  the  soul  or  spirit  is  a  psychical 
substance.^  And  yet,  with  it  also  a  basic  assumption  of  Sub- 
jectivism, that  only  that  which  is  perceived  is  real,  this  assump- 
tion of  a  spiritual  substance  cannot  consistenily  he  maintained, 
since  of  such  a  substance  there  is  no  perception. 

The  dilemma  is  clear.  On  the  one  hand,  if  there  is  a  spiritual 
substance  that  is  independent  of  and  not  numerically  identical 
with  the  perception  of  it,  then  there  may  also  be  a  physical 
substance  and  physical  qualities,  one  or  both,  that  are  inde- 
pendent of  perception.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  there  is  no 
physical  substance,  because  it  is  not  perceived,  and  if  physical 
qualities  are  identical  with  sensations,  then,  seemingly,  one 
should  conclude  that  there  is  no  spiritual  substance,  if  there  is 
no  perception  of  it,  and  that  there  are  only  sensations  and  ideas. 

Positivism  in  its  historical  origin  takes  the  second  horn  of 
this  dilemma.    Discovering  the  inconsistency  between  the  basic 
postulates  of  Subjectivism,  (1)  that  there  are  spirits,  and  (2) 
that  only  that  which  is  perceived  is  real,^*'  Positivism  gives  up, 
the  first  assumption,   and  maintains  that  there   are  only  im-j 
pressions  (sensations)  and  ideas. ^^    Only  of  these  are  we  abso-\ 
lutely  and  positively  certain.     Only  sensations  and  ideas  and 
the   mere   proximities,   sequences,    similarities,    and   differences 
among  these,  are  given  as  facts?^    All  else  is  only  inferred,  and 
is,  therefore,  not  certain,  but  doubtful,  and,  perhaps,  not  fact  at 
all,  but  only  belief  and  superstition  and  human  invention. 

Positivism  thus  puts  into  the  limbo  of  only  the  probable  and 
the  possible  the  many  entities  which  other  philosophical  posi- 
tions either  assume  as  fundamental  and  as  absolutely  and  neces- 
sarily true,  or  which  they  reach  by  inference.  Material  and 
spiritual   substances,    causes  and  effects,    a   numerically   single 

*  Bee  the  previous  chapter. 

«Cf.  Locke,  Bk.  II.,  Chap.  XXIII.  ff. 

^o  Berkeley,  Principles,  §§  3-6. 

*^  Hume,  Treatise,  Bk.  I.,  Part  I.,  section  vi. 

**  Hume,  Treatise,  Bk.  I.,  Part  I.,  sections  i.-vii. 


244  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

underlying  reality  in  the  universe,  categories  of  thought,  a 
deity,^^  logical  laws,  and  many  other  "things,"  all  sutfer  this 
fate,^*  and  only  that  flow  of  sensations  and  ideas  which  is  cen- 
tered around  the  idea  of  a  self  remains  certain  and  undeniable. 
All  else  takes  its  place  in  the  realm  of  non-fact  and  error. 

But  with  it  thus  once  demonstrated  that  sensations  and  ideas 
are  the  only  faets,^^  so  that  there  are  no  other  facts  with  which  to 
contrast  them,  the  important  and  interesting  question  arises, 
whether  one  is  logically  justified  in  regarding  these  entities  as 
sensations  in  the  sense  in  which  this  term  is  used  in  Subjectivism 
and  Phenomenalism,  namely,  as  something  psychical  or  77iental. 
For,  by  the  traditionally  accepted  definition,  the  psychical  or 
the  mental  is  that  which  is  the  manifestation  of  a  spirit,  or 
that  which  is  not  material,  or  both.  But  with  both  spirits  and 
matter  done  away  with.  Positivism  can  no  longer  use  this 
definition.  Its  sensations  and  ideas  become,  therefore,  only 
imspecifiahle  '^elements"  or  X's — entities  that  are  undefinable 
in  their  essence,  that  are  neither  physical  nor  mental,  and  that 
are  contrastahle  only  as  regards  their  own  kinds.  Possibly  the 
excellent  opportunity  is  thereby  furnished  of  getting  away  from 
the  necessity  of  finding  what  they  are,  and  so  of  being  free  to 
ascertain  tvhat  they  do,  in  terms  of  one  another. 

If  we  thus  confine  and  correct  Positivism,  we  have  a  very 
interesting,  but  a  very  unusual  philosophy.  In  the  historical 
development  of  the  position,  physical  or  material  substance  was 
first  eliminated,  and  next,  all  physical  qualities  were,  like  color, 
"made"  subjective.  There  remained  only  spirits  and  their  sen- 
sations and  ideas.  Then  spiritual  substance  was  eliminated. 
As  a  result  only  sensations  and  ideas  were  left,  with  sensation  and 
existence   defined  as  identical.     The   further   results   followed 

(1)  that  there  is  nothing  with  which  to  contrast  sensations; 

(2)  that  existents  are  X's,  neither  psychical  nor  physical;  and 

(3)  that,  if  there  were  no  X's,  there  would  be  no  existents.  Ex- 
istents or  facts  are  reduced,  therefore,  to  the  mere  X's  of  the 
present  moment,  or,  if  there  is  only  one  X,  to  this  X, — whatever 
it  may  be.     Thus   developed   consistently,   Positivism   outdoes 

"Hume,  Treatise,  Bk.  I.,  Part  IV.,  section  v. 

"Hume,  Treatise,  Bk.  I.,  Part  I.,  section  vi;  also  Bk.  I.,  Part  III.,  in 
a  number  of  sections. 

"  Hume,  Treatise,  Bk.  I.,  Part  II.,  section  vi. 


POSITIVISM  245 

Solipsism,  since,  for  Positivism,  everything  is  not  even  my  or 
your  ideas, — within  my  or  your  consciousness,  but  is  only  an 
X,  now,  and  not  even  past  or  future  nor — consistently — even 
present. 

It  becomes  evident,  then,  that  it  is  impossible  consistently  to 
derive  such  a  position  from  certain  postulates;  for  the  very 
character  of  the  position  itself  precludes  any  general  proposi- 
tion, and,  therefore,  any  logical  derivation.  Indeed,  even  such 
a  formulatio7i  of  the  position  as  has  just  been  given  is  precluded, 
since  this  formulation  would,  by  the  position's  own  intent,  con- 
cern only  that  which  now  is,  but  nothing  more. 

The  character  of  this  intent  can  be  further  made  clear  by 
asking  the  Cartesian  question :  Of  what  am  I  most  certain,  my 
conscious  processes,  or  other  '* things,"  my  past  conscious  states, 
or  my  present  ones?  If  one  give  the  answer  "my  present  ones," 
and  calls  these,  not  conscious  processes,  but  X's,  one  has  the 
meaning  of  the  philosophy  of  Positivism  as  this  is  carried  to 
the  extreme  of  its  consistent  logical  (?)  outcome.  But  it  is 
clear  that,  if  /  ask  this  question,  the  answer  refers  to  my  X's, 
and  if  you  ask  it,  it  refers  to  yours,  with  "I"  and  "you," 
however,  each  a  mere  X.  Still,  if  /  ask  it,  and  yet  feel  that  you 
also  could  do  so,  and  get  tlie  same  answer,  then,  am  I  not  in 
some  way  going  beyond  my  X's  to  yours,  and  am  I  not  dealing 
with  concrete  "things"  by  generic  methods,  and  ascribing 
validity  and  f actuality  to  what  is  thus  dealt  with?  Many 
"things"  may  be  identical  with  my  X's,  or  sensations,  but  if  / 
endeavor  to  convince  you,  that  what  holds  of  me  also  holds  of 
you,  then  am  I  not  presupposing  that  the  existence  of  your  X's 
is  not  identical  with  that  of  mine?  And  am  I  not  also  presup- 
posing, that  not  only  that  which  is  concretely  experienced,  but 
also  that  whatever  can  be  treated  generically  is  fact  as  well? 

There  seems  to  be  no  other  answer  to  these  questions  than 
"yes."  Positivism  at  a  certain  point  begins  to  break  down. 
By  its  own  intent  it  would  preclude  even  its  own  formulation. 
But  it  is  formulated,  and  offered  for  acceptance.  I,  if  I  am  a 
Positivist,  offer  the  doctrine  to  you.  Therefore  I  assume  your 
X's  not  to  be  mine,  and  also  formulate  the  position  in  generic 
terms. 

However,  that  modern  development  of  Positivism  which  has 


gi6  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

been  accepted  by  many  philosophers  and  well-known  scientists — 
among  them,  Huxley  and  Mach — is  not  of  the  extreme  form 
that  has  just  been  depicted,  but  is  one  that  allows  of  formula- 
tion, of  propositions,  of  inference,  and  the  like.  Such  a  Posi- 
tivism may  be  stated  and  developed  logically  from  the  following 
assumptions : —  '^^ 

I.  There  are  numerically  distinct  personalities,  each  consist- 
ing of  a  succession  of  occurrences  usually  called  sensations  and 
ideas,  or  experiences,  but  better  called  undefined  and  inde- 
terminate elements  or  X's.  For  each  personality  these  elements 
are  direct  facts,  certain  and  undeniable. 

II.  These  elements  occur  or  happen  in  conformity  with  a 
certain  demerit  called  order,  and  of  order  there  are  different 
instances,  such  as  those  which  are  usually  called  the  relations 
(1)  of  cause  and  effect,  (2)  of  implication,  (3)  of  similarity 
and  difference,  (4)  of  reference  to  the  past  and  future,  (5)  of 
inherence,  and  (6)  of  "belonging  to."  These  "elements"  occur 
in  the  midst  of  other  "elements,"  and  organize  and  relate  these. 
Thus,  e.g.,  "similarity"  relates  many  "elements"  called  "heat," 
and  also  many  called  "candles,"  and  "inherence"  connects 
"solidity"  with  "candle";  in  turn,  "cause  and  effect"  relates 
"heat"  to  "candle"  and  "melting";  while  "similarity"  con- 
nects other  things  with  "candle"  and  "melting,"  with  reference 
to  past,  present,  and  future;  and  finally  "similarity"  connects 
that  series  of  elements  which  is  "me"  with  that  numerically  dis- 
tinct series  which  is  "you."  Thus,  out  of  certain  elements,  there 
is  organized,  hy  other  elements,  that  which  we  usually  call  the 
world  of  qualitatively  distinct  "things,"  such  as  tables  and 
pens,  and  kinds  of  "things"  such  as  plant  and  aniinal,  and  very 
different  kinds  such  as  mind  and  matter.  But  the  organization 
in  each  case  is  merely  one  that  itself  happens  when  certain  ele- 
ments occur  around,  as  it  were,  certain  other  elements  as  organ- 
izing centers.  All  is  really  mere  fact,  coming  higgledy-piggledy, 
here  cause,  but  there  none,  here  similarity,  but  there  difference, 
now  belonging  to  a  "you,"  and  then  to  a  "me." 

The  final  result,  however,  is  not  different  from  the  world  of 
common  sense  and  science,  since  everything  is  called  by  its  usual 
name,  although  all  names  are  really  only  designations  of  "ele- 

"  Mach,  Analysis  of  Sensations,  pp.  10,  11,  12,  14,  17,  19,  and  151  ff. 


POSITIVISM  247 

ments,"  or  of  specific  groups  of  elements.  "Element"  itself, 
therefore,  is  either  only  an  element,  or  a  group,  while  "implies" 
is  still  another  "element,"  or  group  of  "elements."  But  these 
two  "elements"  are  connected,  so  that  we  have  the  proposition, 
that  "element"  implies  that  which  is  neither  existent  nor  suh- 
sistent,  neither  physical  nor  psychical,  neither  inorganic  nor 
organic,  neither  term  nor  relation.  For  the  genus  is  never 
identical  with  the  species.  Color  is  never  this  red  nor  this  blue. 
Therefore,  if  "element"  is  the  summum  genus  it  is  not  one  of 
those  groups  into  which  certain  "elements"  organize  others. 
Everything  can  be  called  "element,"  just  as  red,  blue,  green, 
and  yellow  can  be  called  colors,  and  different  "things"  can  be 
called  different  "elements,"  just  as  red  and  green  can  be  called 
different  colors.  But  there  is  something  in  "things"  over  and 
above  the  mere  "element"  aspect,  just  as  a  red  is  something 
more  than  7nere  color,  and  this  "something  more"  persists. 

The  chief  difference  made  by  Positivism  concerns  the  problem, 
therefore,  as  to  what  shall  be  selected  as  the  summum  genus  of — 
what  shall  we  say? — "things,"  entities,  or  neutral  entities — 
for  each  of  these  is  itself  a  summum  genus.  Materialism  makes 
this  genus  matter,  Psychism  makes  it  mind ;  but  each,  therefore, 
makes  it  like  one  of  the  S2:)ecies,  so  that,  if  Materialism  were  true, 
there  would  be  two  kinds  of  matter,  one  called  mind,  the  other, 
matter;  while,  if  Psychism  were  true,  there  would  be  two  kinds 
of  consciousness. 

Positivism,  in  Hume,  Mill,  Comte,  Spencer,  Mach,  James, 
and  Bergson,  really  makes  this  summum  genus  "element,"  and 
thus  avoids  identifying  the  genus  with  the  species.  Sensation, 
and  the  psychical  in  general,  not  only  are  non-material,  or, 
perhaps,  non-physical,  but,  with  nothing  to  he  opposed  to  them, 
are  also  non-psychical  "elements"  or  X's.  Yet,  starting  with 
a  plurality  of  X's,  Positivism  must  reinstate  much  of  that  which 
it  has  previously  ruled  out.  Physical  things  and  human  per- 
sonalities that  know  physical  things  reappear  in  some  form, 
though  they  be  but  different  collocations  of  (similar)  elements. 
But  there  may  be  as  much  difference  between  two  such  colloca- 
tions as  there  is  between  the  material  rose  that  "by  any  other 
name  would  smell  as  sweet,"  and  the  spiritual  hope  "that 
springs  eternal  in  the  human  breast." 


248  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

The  material  and  psychical  worlds  reappear,  therefore,  m 
Positivism.  That  is  to  be  admitted  as  a  point  against  the  posi- 
tion. Yet,  in  agreement  with  its  contentions,  it  is  also  to  be 
admitted,  that  neither  things  nor  personalities  are  what  much 
traditional  philosophy,  science,  and  religion  have  made  them. 
Indeed,  the  real  intent  of  Positivism  is  to  protest  against  those 
traditional  views  that  put  a  core  of  material  substance  into 
physical  things,  and  a  core  of  spiritual  substance  into  person- 
alities. "Things"  and  personalities  are,  for  Positivism,  groups 
of  "elements,"  either  those  which  physiology  and  psychology 
study,  or  those  with  which  the  physical  sciences  are  concerned. 
These  "elements"  are  not  related  additively,  but  are  organized 
by  some  of  the  many  non-additive  relations  of  the  types  that 
have  been  considered.  The  wholes  that  result  may  therefore 
have  qualities  that  are  radically  different  from  those  of  the 
parts. 

Only  of  such  "elements"  and  relations,  qualities  and  wholes, 
have  we  positive  knowledge.  There  may  be  a  core-like  substance 
in  "things,"  in  personalities,  and  perhaps  in  the  whole  uni- 
verse, but  of  such  a  substance  we  have  no  knowledge.  Yet 
around  the  traditional  assumption  of  such  a  substance  there 
center  many  beliefs,  superstitions,  and  great  historical  human 
errors, — errors  that  have  a  practical  outcome,  undeniably,  but 
that  are  nevertheless  regarded  by  Positivism  as  detrimental, 
since  it  emphasizes  the  identity  of  the  progress  of  the  human 
race  with  the  throwing  off  of  all  that  is  not  certain,  and  with 
the  acceptance  of  only  that  which  is  undeniable  fact. 

This  indicates  how  Positivism  solves  the  great  majority  of 
philosophical  problems.  It  puts  them  into  the  limbo  of  the 
uncertain,  the  unknown,  and  even  the  unknowable,  or  regards 
them  as  false  problems.  Indeed,  for  Positivism,  philosophy  is 
itself  not  positive  knowledge — except  that  particular  philosophy 
which  is  identical  with  Positivism's  own  cpistcmology,  and  that 
ontology  on  which  this  epistemology  rests. 

Positivism's  epistemology  rests  logically  (though  not  his- 
torically) on  an  ontology  that  is  assumed,  and  not  proved, 
namely,  on  an  ontology  that  is  monistic  in  its  postulation  of 
mere  "elements"  which,  as  such,  are  all  qualitatively  alike,  but 
that  is  pluralistic  in  its  results,  since  it  is  compelled  to  grant  that 


POSITIVISM  249 

there  are  not  only  many  nmnerically  distinct  ''elements,"  but 
also  many  qualitatively  different  collocations  of  these  "ele- 
ments. ' ' 

Positivism's  cosmology  is  that  of  critical  natural  science.  This 
means,  among  other  things,  that  the  "idea"  of  a  universal  regu- 
larity, uniformity,  and  following-of-law  is  mere  hypothesis,  and 
not  certain  knowledge.  Events  do  seem,  indeed,  in  some  cases 
at  least,  to  occur  with  a  certain  uniformity  and  regularity,  and 
the  experience  of  repeated  i-equences  of  specific  events  undoubt- 
edly does  give  rise  to  the  belief  in  causes.  Given  the  same 
cause,  under  the  same  conditions,  and  the  same  effect  does  seem 
to  occur.  From  this  we  generalize,  passing  beyond  the  imme- 
diately given  facts  to  the  hypothesis  of  the  unequivocalness  of 
the  connection  of  specific  causes,  conditions,  and  effects.  In  this 
way,  both  as  individuals  and  as  a  race,  we  come  to  believe  in 
the  principle  of  the  uniformity  of  nature  so  strongly,  that,  per- 
haps, we  cannot  conceive  the  opposite  to  he  a  fact,  and  that 
the  principle  of  the  unequivocal  connection  of  cause  and  effect 
is  regarded  even  as  a  law  of  thought. 

But  Positivism  is  critical.  It  warns  us  not  to  go  beyond  the 
facts.  We  should  not  let  the  expectation  that  is  generated  by 
past  causal  regularities  deceive  us  into  accepting  the  past  as 
the  guarantor  of  the  future.  The  past  may  be  one  thing,  but 
the  future  quite  another.    Only  by  waiting  can  one  tell. 

Positivism  is  thus  indeterministic  and  tychistic.  There  may 
be  determinism,  but,  if  there  is,  it  is  limited,  for  there  certainly 
is  indeterminism.  There  are  events  that  are  not  causally  con- 
nected. There  is  no  universal  and  unequivocal  causal  connec- 
tion or  world  order.  Indeed,  there  may  he  no  causes  and  no 
effects.    " Things''  may  just  happen. 

Little  opportunity  is  there  in  Positivism,  therefore,  for  pur- 
pose or  even  for  a  single  direction  of  all  things  in  the  universe. 
Positivism,  then,  has  no  teleology.  You  and  I  may  have  pur- 
poses, and  may  plan  and  build.  But  in  the  universe  there  is 
no  guaranty  of  order,  much  less  of  universal  order  and  purpose. 
At  least  there  is  no  positive  knowledge  of  these.  Indeed,  the 
universe  is  not  even  a  machine,  beautifully  and  delicately  ad- 
justed; neither  is  there  God,  nor  underlyiug  unity,  as  matters 
of  certain  knowledge.     In  fact,  ivith  chaos  as  much  a  fact  as 


250  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

cosmos,  and  with  cosmos  at  best  only  here  and  there  in  the  midst 
of  chaos,  the  opportunity  is  small  for  plan,  for  order,  for  unity, 
for  a  working  toward  ends,  and  even  much  smaller  for  a  pur- 
poser,  an  architect,  a  designer,  or  a  mechanician.  It  is  thus 
that  Positivism  deals  with  theology  and  the  great  religious  be- 
liefs of  mankind.  It  relegates  them  to  the  scrap-heap  of  super- 
stitions, together  with  other  cherished  beliefs  and  theories  that 
are  dear  to  common  sense,  religion,  science,  and  philosophy. 

With  the  teleological  and  theological  problems  thus  dismissed, 
certain  aspects  of  the  value  problem  do  not  present  themselves 
to  Positivism  at  all.  Ethics  and  assthetics,  so  far  as  they  are 
based  on  undeniably  immediate  experiences  of  course  remain. 
But  in  these  fields  the  solution  of  problems  is  only  that  which 
is  to  be  expected.  (For  Positivism  the  so-called  abstract  and 
general  is  always  resolvable  into  concrete  fact.  \  Therefore  ivhat 
one  ought  to  do  is  traceable  back  to  what  men  have  done. 

For  Positivism,  races,  nations,  and  sects  are  facts  in  the  sense 
that  there  are  many  human  personalities  who  are  7nade  up  in 
part  of  similar  ideas,  motives,  and  aspirations.  In  this  sense 
society,  as  a  group  of  individuals,  may  demand  that  one  ought, 
first  of  all,  to  act  out  of  regard  for  general  welfare.  Positivism 
accepts  this  demand  as  a  fact,  and  accordingly  becomes  Utili- 
tarianism. But  it  also  allows  one  so  to  act  as  to  contribute  to 
one's  own  pleasure,  or  to  reach  as  perfect  development  as  possi- 
ble, provided  this  does  not,  in  either  case,  interfere  with  the 
general  welfare.  Positivism  thus,  also,  is  hedonistic  and  per- 
fectionistic.  Likewise,  in  art,  one  cannot  say  that  one  "school" 
is  correct,  another  incorrect,  by  reference  to  a  standard, — since, 
for  Positivism,  there  are  many  standards.  Each  standard  in 
its  own  setting  is  correct,  and  no  standard  can  be  forced  upon 
him  who  will  not  acknowledge  it.  In  fact,  as  regards  all  values, 
all  standards  in  ethics  and  art,  Positivism  closely  approaches 
both  Naturalism  and  Pragmatism,  into  which,  as  we  shall  shortly 
see,  it  is  very  easily  transformed. 

The  solution  which  Positivism  gives  to  the  psychological  and 
epistemological  problems  has  already  been  presented  at  length, 
so  that  only  a  few  more  details  need  be  mentioned.  For  Posi- 
tivism there  is  no  soul  or  spirit,  single,  simple,  and  numerically 
one.    There  are  only  conscious  ''happenings."     Some  of  these, 


POSITIVISM  251 

called  memory-images,  refer  to  previous  conscious  happenings, 
and  thus  organized,  conscious  "happenings"  become  person- 
alities. But  even  so,  these  "happenings"  are  conscious  only  by 
virtue  of  being  in  a  certain  specific  group.  By  themselves  they 
are  only  "elements,"  and  in  another  group  they  would  be 
physical.  Thus  it  is  only  a  difference  in  the  grouping  that  dis^ 
tinguishes  the  physical  and  the  psychical. 

Truth,  for  Positivism,  very  evidently  cannot  be  defined  in 
the  traditional  way,  namely,  that  true  knowledge  copies  reality. 
Rather,  for  Positivism,  both  truth  and  fact  are  made  by  know- 
ing. Indeed  it  is  here,  even  as  it  is  with  the  difference  between 
the  physical  and  the  psychical,  only  a  question  of  a  difference  in 
the  grouping.  An  "element"  in  one  collocation  (of  elements) 
is  "impression"  or  "idea";  in  another,  it  is  physical  fact;  and 
in  still  another  it  is  truth.  All  knowledge  is  held  to  have  its 
origin  in  impressions, — when  it  is  forgotten  that  these  ulti- 
mately are  only  indeterminate  "elements."  This  is  Sensation- 
alism. Further,  there  is  no  absolute  standard  by  which  true 
knowledge  can  be  determined.  Fact  is  fact,  and,  if  one  experi- 
ences it,  no  one  can  say  him  nay.  Thus  does  Positivism  ap- 
proach Radical  Empiricism  and  Pragmatism,  and  thus  is  it 
anti-adsolutistic.  But  it  is  also  intellectualistic.  It  holds  that 
things  must  be  accepted  as  they  are  found,  and  this  means,  e.g., 
that  not  only  the  motion  which  is  immediately  experienced  as 
a  whole,  hut  also  the  parts  into  which  intellectual  analysis  re- 
solves motion,  are  facts.  Yet  Positivism  excludes,  or  tends  to 
exclude,  from  the  realm  of  fact  that  which  is  given  immedi- 
ately, e.g.,  in  the  religious  consciousness,  but  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  or  not,  by  its  own  premises,  Positivism  is  justified  in 
doing  this.  However,  such  an  exclusion  it  nevertheless  makes, 
at  the  same  time  that  it  prefers  and  uses  intellectual  analysis. 
In  this  respect,  therefore,  Positivism  is  frankly  intellectualistic. 

II.   CRITICISM 

The  criticisms  that  can  be  made  of  Positivism  are  closely 
similar  to  those  that  already  have  been  made  of  both  Phe- 
nomenalism and  Subjectivism.  At  certain  points  Positivism 
shows  striking  inconsistencies  and  self-contradictions. 

First,  the  positivist  who  contends  for  his  position,  offering 


252  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

arguments  for  it,  and  presenting  it  as  a  true  philosophy,  espe- 
cially with  reference  to  the  problem  of  knowledge,  tacitly  pre- 
supposes that  he  is  portraying  a  state  of  affairs  which,  though 
it  is  related  to  his  own  knowing,  is  neither  dependent  on  nor 
constituted  by  this.  In  this  case,  therefore,  knowing  and  the 
known  are  not  identical,  and  are  not  to  be  called  mere  "ele- 
ments," with  these  elements  becoming  knowing  or  object  accord- 
ing as  they  are  in  one  group  or  another.  Kather,  it  is  here 
presupposed,  that  there  is  at  least  an  absolute  numerical  dis- 
tinctness between  the  knowing  and  the  known,  so  that,  were  the 
former  done  away  with,  the  latter  would  still  persist  as  unal- 
tered fact. 

But,  secondly,  such  a  numerical  distinctness  between  entities 
is  also  presupposed  in  the  detailed  theory  of  Positivism.  It 
may  be,  that  color  and  my  sensation  of  color  are  identical,  so 
that  it  is  justified  to  call  color  a  mere  "element,"  which  is 
neither  physical  nor  psychical.  But  if  I,  playing  the  role  of 
a  positivist,  set  up  the  claim  really  to  know  about  your  sensa- 
tions, ideas,  experiences,  or  "elements,"  then,  although  my 
knowing  and  yours  may  be  like  in  kind,  I  presuppose  that  they 
are  numerically  distinct.  They  are  presupposed  to  be  so  dis- 
tinct, in  fact,  that,  were  my  knowing  no  longer  occurring,  yours 
still  would  be,  even  as  I  have  described  it  in  my  presumably 
true  positivistic  theory.  Here  is  something,  therefore,  namely, 
your  experiences,  which  /  presuppose  not  to  be  shifting  as  "ele- 
ments" from  one  group  to  another,  but  to  be  fixed  in  that 
collocation  which  is  you.  In  these  two  cases  the  ego-centric 
predicament  is  solved  by  the  principle  of  ideal  elimination,  and 
the  theory  of  external  relations  is  presupposed  as  valid  for  the 
knowing  situation. 

But  further,  if  entities,  or  groups  of  "elements,"  can,  as  in 
these  instances,  be  related,  and  yet  be  numerically  distinct  and 
independent,  then  other  entities,  both  simple  and  complex,  also 
may  be,  even  such  entities  as  sensation  and  physical  qualities. 
Thus,  by  this  principle,  an  entity,  e.g.,  the  brown  of  my  pen- 
holder, does  not  cease  either  to  be  a  physical  brown  or  to  be 
distinct  from  the  sensation  of  it,  because  I  now  sense  it.  Rather, 
there  is  a  specific  brown,  or,  if  one  prefer,  an  A',  that  is  physical. 
It  is  in  a  group  of  other  physical  qualities  to  which  it  is  related. 


POSITIVISM  253 

The  complex  of  these  qualities  is  the  penholder.  But  now,  under 
certain  conditions,  this  specific  brown  can  get  into  still  other 
relations,  without  losing  the  relations  to  the  other  qualities.  It 
can,  e.g.,  get  into  relation  with  an  organism  and  to  the  knowing 
of  or  by  an  organism,  and  yet  be  quite  as  distinct  from  and 
independent  of  this  knowing,  as  my  knowing  is  (presupposed 
to  be)  independent  of  your  sensations  and  the  like,  when  I,  as 
the  positivist,  advance  my  theory  as  a  true  account  of  your  and 
others'  knowing.  But  if  this  is  the  case,  then  the  main  conten- 
tion of  Positivism  must  be  given  up,  even  as  must  that  of 
Subjectivism. 

Both  Positivism  and  Subjectivism  presuppose,  therefore,  as 
the  very  condition  of  their  being  advanced  as  true  theories,  that 
an  entity  can,  without  detriment  to  itself  in  any  way,  first  be 
out  of  relation  to  a  knowing,  then  enter  into  a  relation 
with  a  knowing,  and  again  lose  this  relation.  This  pre- 
supposition is  made  by  the  subjectivist  concerning  the  rela- 
tion between,  on  the  one  hand,  spirits  and  their  ideas,  and,  on 
the  other  hand,  his  knowing  about  spirits.  It  is  made  by  the 
positivist  concerning  the  relation  between  those  "elements," 
impressions,  or  ideas  which  are  you,  and  his  ideas  or  "elements" 
that  "refer  to  you." 

Consistency  demands,  then,  that  the  same  presupposition  be 
recognized  and  accepted  for  the  knowing  of  other  "things." 
This  means  (1)  that  in  the  knowing  situation  there  is  a  numerical 
distinctness  betw^een  the  knowing  and  the  "thing"  known;  (2) 
that,  although  these  two  distinct  entities  may  be  similar  in  cer- 
tain respects,  they  may  also  be  dissimilar  in  others;  (3)  that 
Subjectivism  may  be  forced  to  admit  physical  qualities  to  be 
both  qualitatively  and  numerically  distinct  from  the  knowing; 
(4)  that  Positivism  is  compelled  to  acknowledge  that,  although 
sensation  and  physical  quality  are  called  "elements,"  they  not 
only  are  numerically  distinct,  but  also  are  different  ki7ids  of 
"elements,"  even  quite  as  diiferent  as  common  sense  usually 
regards  them  to  be;  and  finally,  (5)  that  both  Subjectivism 
and  Positivism  must  give  up  their  common  doctrine  that  only 
the  concrete  is  known;  for,  if  both  subjectivist  and  positivist 
can  know  the  general  state  of  affairs  about  knowing,  and  its  rela- 
tion to  objects  known,  then,  with  the  knowing  in  this  case  con- 


254  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

Crete,  but  the  ''thing"  known  general,  it  is  presupposed,  not 
only  that  the  concrete,  but  also  that  the  general  and  abstract  is 
knowahle,  and  is  distinct  from  the  knowing;  and  also,  that 
there  are  not  only  concrete  facts,  but  also  general  ones.  For 
example,  length  is  as  much  a  fact  as  are  long  things,  and  neither 
is  numerically  identical  with  the  knoiving  of  them,  or  with  the 
ivord  for  them,  although  each  is  identical  with  the  content  of 
knowing,  when  each  is  known. 

But  to  be  forced  to  yield  this  much,  is,  for  both  Subjectivism 
and  Positivism,  suicidal.  Yielding  what  each  is  forced  to  in  the 
instances  just  considered,  Subjectivism  and  Positivism  refute 
themselves.  The  subjectivist  cannot  consistently  apply  his  own 
theory  to  that  situation  which  is  the  complex  of  his  own  knowing 
and  the  state  of  affairs  which  he  knows,  and  still  retain  his  Sub- 
jectivism, nor  can  the  positivist  do  any  better.  Neither  can 
build  his  own  particular  philosophic  house  upon  the  sands  of 
his  own  detailed  doctrines. 

The  particular  situation,  therefore,  in  which,  for  both  the  sub- 
jectivist and  the  positivist,  there  is  a  knowing  of  those  states  of 
affairs  which  are  presented  in  their  own  (supposedly  true) 
theories,  is  an  instance  of  the  validity  of  the  theory  of  external 
relations.  They  are  both  bound  to  presuppose  the  validity  of 
this  theory  in  this  connection,  and,  therefore,  in  order  to  be 
consistent,  for  the  knowing  situation  in  general.  And  yet,  with 
few  exceptions,  they  reject  this  theory  of  relations  for  other 
cases  of  knowing.  Thus,  e.g.,  the  subjectivist  applies  tlie  modifi- 
cation theory  of  relations  to  the  relation  between  finite  spirits 
and  the  infinite  spirit,  making  the  latter  act  causally  on  the 
former  so  as  to  produce  effects  called  ideas.  And  the  positivist 
applies  the  same  theory  to  his  doctrine,  that  an  "element,"  X, 
changes  its  character  with  its  change  of  membership  in  colloca- 
tions, this  change  being  due  to  the  influence  of  the  other  elements 
of  the  complex.  Both  subjectivist  and  positivist,  furthermore, 
in  advancing  their  theories  as  holding  good  for  the  knowing 
situation  in  general,  present  a  general  state  of  affairs,  and  so 
contradict  their  other  explicit  statements,  that  only  the  par- 
ticular and  the  concrete  is  fact  and  that  only  such  fact  can  be 
known. 

Consistency  would  seem  to  demand,  therefore,  that,  in  con- 


POSITIVISM  255 

structing  a  philosophical  position,  candid  recognition  be  made 
of  the  two  principles  which  our  criticism  brings  out.  The  first 
of  these  is,  that  some  terms  can  gain  and  lose  certain  relations 
to  other  terms  without  being  changed  or  affected  thereby.  One 
such  relation  would  seem  to  be  the  knowing  relation,  so  that  it 
may  well  be,  that  all  terms  or  'things"  can  gain  or  lose  this 
relation,  without  being  affected  thereby.  The  second  principle 
is,  that  among  the  terms  that  can  be  known,  and  that  are  both 
numerically  distinct  from  and  independent  of  the  knowing,  are 
general  and  abstract  terms.  These  are  as  objective  as  are  par- 
ticular, concrete  things.  This  position  is,  historically,  first  ad- 
vanced clearly  by  Plato  in  his  doctrine  of  the  reality  of  uni- 
versals,  or  of  ideas  (  iSitxi  ),  as  he  called  them.  Indeed, 
Plato  made  universals  even  more  real  than  concrete  things,  for 
they  are  timeless,  whereas  concrete  "things"  appear,  and,  after 
a  time,  perish. 

Severe  as  some  of  these  criticisms  of  Positivism  may  be,  the 
position  has,  nevertheless,  many  points  of  merit.  Chief  among 
these  is  the  fact,  that  it  gets  away  from  the  domination  of  the 
''substance"  concept,  and  emphasizes  relations  between  what 
may  be  called  mere  "elements."  In  doing  this.  Positivism  is 
in  line  with  the  most  important  developments  in  modern  logic 
and  science.  Modern  science  has  made  its  advances  and  won  its 
victories  by  finding  what  happens  and  is  done,  rather  than  hy 
finding,  what  "things"  arc.  Relations,  events,  and  unattached 
and  disembodied  qualities  concern  it  more  than  do  substance  and 
things. 

The  new  logic,  which  forms  a  large  part  of  the  principles  of 
modern  science,  follows  the  same  course.  By  breaking  away 
from  the  model  of  things  ivith  a  core  of  substance  in  which 
attributes  inhere,  and  by  distinguishing  and  emphasizing  dif- 
ferent types  of  relations  between  terms,  this  logic  is  able  to 
solve  problems  that,  since  they  baffled  the  Aristotelian  logic, 
finally  led  to  the  discovery  of  the  very  narrow  limitations  of 
this  logic.  For  example,  the  old  logic,  if  strictly  adhered  to, 
cannot  give  an  analysis  of  motion,  or  of  change  in  general,  that 
is  free  from  contradiction.  But  the  new  logic  easily  solves  this 
problem,  as  we  have  seen,  by  its  discovery  that  series  are  ana- 
lyzable  into  terms  that  are  related  in  a  non-additive  way.    Mo- 


256  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

Hon  is  such  a  series,  whether  it  be  continuous,  or  discontinuous, 
each  term  of  the  series  being  itself  a  complex  of  "an  instant 
related  to  a  specific  point  in  a  one-one  m^anner." 

In  the  broad  general  manner  just  indicated  all  modern  science 
has  become  positivistic,  and  some  of  the  results  of  such  a  posi- 
tivism will  be  portrayed  in  a  later  section.  They  constitute  the 
contribution  of  a  method  that  may  be  called  The  New  Ration- 
alism, the  positive  content  of  which  is  a  philosophy  that  is  called 
the  New  Realism.  Of  this  method  and  position  it  may  be  said, 
at  this  point,  that  in  them  reason  is  accepted  as  being  as  certain 
a  revealer  of  fact  as  sensation.  But  the  facts  thus  revealed  are 
not  all  of  one  kind.  All  are  7iot  mere  "elements,"  and  nothing 
more;  neither  are  all  psychical,  nor  all  material.  Rather,  they 
are  of  the  7nost  various  kinds.  For  example,  there  are  generic 
facts  or  states  of  affairs,  and  there  are  concrete,  particular  facts 
that  are  correlated  with  specific  places  and  times.  There  are  also 
subsistents,  which  are  timeless  and  spaceless,  and  there  are 
existents  which  are  "in"  time  and  space.  Existents  are  of 
two  kinds,  mental  and  physical,  and  among  these  there  are  as 
many  different  kinds  as  such  special  sciences  as  physics,  chem- 
istry, physiology,  and  psychology  discover.  Also,  among  sub- 
sistents there  are  both  classes  and  individuals,  and  as  many  kinds 
as  such  sciences  as  ethics,  logic,  mathematics,  and  aesthetics 
recognize. 

For  the  New  Rationalism  and  the  New  Realism,  then,  the 
verdict  of  the  special  sciences  is  to  be  accepted  mostly  at  its 
face  value,  though  always  with  the  condition,  of  course,  that 
the  future  may  bring  the  discovery  of  errors  and  of  new 
facts.  But,  in  general,  all  these  kinds  of  facts  receive  no  uni- 
versal reinterpretation  and  transformation  as  they  do  when 
they  are  made  "phenomena"  for  Phenomenalism,  "ideas"  for 
Subjectivism,  "elements"  for  Positivism,  matter  for  Material- 
ism, and  mere  "racial  inventions"  for  Pragmatism.  Each  of 
these  reinterpretations  is  found  to  be  quite  unjustified  and 
invalid,  and  the  criticism  which  is  thus  developed  is  found  to 
lead  to  Rationalism  and  to  Realism. 


NATURALISM  257 

CHAPTER  XXXII 
NATURALISM 

Positivism,  under  the  widespread  influence  of  the  natural 
sciences  during  the  last  century,  developed  into  Naturalism  as 
that  philosophy  which  contends  that  only  that  is  fact  which 
conforms  to  the  most  general  laws  of  a  certain  limited  group  of 
sciences,  namely,  physics,  chemistry,  biology,  and,  perhaps,  psy- 
chology. Accordingly,  one  of  the  chief  characteristics  of  Nat- 
uralism, as  it  is  worked  out  in  detail,  is,  that  the  principles  of 
conservation  and  of  evolution  are  used  to  apply  in  some  manner 
to  everything.  However,  the  position  is,  almost  without  excep- 
tion, not  only  vague  but  also  neglectful  of  many  problems. 
Indeed,  very  frequently,  some  of  the  most  important  philo- 
sophical problems  either  are  ruled  out  of  court  with  a  high  hand, 
or  are  not  recognized  at  all  because  of  sheer  ignorance.  Not- 
withstanding this.  Naturalism  is  more  widely  accepted  among 
philosophically-minded  scientists  than  any  other  philosophy. 

Naturalism  is  chiefly  characterized  by  its  insistence  that  all  * 
fact  is  either  physical  or  mental,  i.e.,  that  all  fact  is  existent.. 
Inconsistently  also  with  its  own  presuppositions  Naturalism  con- 
tends that  all  fact  is  only  concrete  and  particular,  maintaining,' 
in  its  explicit  theory,  that  there  is  no  such  "thing"  as  a  general 
state  of  affairs  even  of  a  group  of  concrete  "things."     Also,  , 
there  is  no  such  "thing,"  for  it,  as  a  subsistent.    Thus,  e.g.,  it  1 
contends  that  there  is  no  such  "thing"  as  a  number  that  is  not 
the  number  of  something,  or  a  circle  that  is  not  the  property 
of  a  physical  circular  object. 

With  everything  thus  regarded  as  either  physical  or  mental, 
Naturalism  is,  nevertheless,  frequently  most  vague  and  indefinite 
in  its  treatment  of  the  mental.  The  position  tends  to  be  dualistic 
in  its  solution  of  this  problem,  but  it  is  not  clearly  so.  It 
accepts  the  physical  world  at  its  face  value,  as  this  is  presented 
by  astronomy,  physics,  chemistry,  and  other  natural  sciences. 
For  this  realm  it  usually  accepts  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
energy  and  of  matter  as  the  leading  principle,  while  from  the 


258  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

biological  sciences  it  gets  the  notion,  that  everything  develops    I 
and  evolves,  with  consciousness,  perhaps,  no  exception  to  this,    l 
But  just  what  consciousness  is.  Naturalism  does  not  make  clear,    » 
— indeed  it  does  not  seem  to  recognize  that  consciousness  presents   I 
a  serious  problem.     Sensations,  memory  images,  ideas,  and  the 
like,  are  spoken  about  and  written  of,  but  little  attempt  is  made 
to  study  these  entities.    Sometimes  they  are  placed  in  clear  con- 
trast with  physical  entities  by  the  negative  characterization,  that 
they  are  non-spatial,  weightless,  and  the  like.    And  yet,  hy  the 
argument,  that  conscious  entities  are  sometJiing,  and  therefore 
cannot  come  from  nothing,  nor  yet  from  physical  energy,  so  that 
they  can  come  only  out  of  a  preceding  consciousness  of  some 
kind,  the  principle  of  conservation  is  applied  to  them  even  as 
it  is  to  the  physical  world.     The   result  is,   that  Naturalism 
develops   into   a   complete   dualism   of   two   energies,    the    one 
physical  and  the  other  mental,  with  each  "wherever"  the  other 
is,  like  the  inside  and  the  outside  of  a  sphere. 

However,  Naturalism  does  not  always  take  even  this  fairly 
definite  position.  Sometimes  it  quite  neglects  the  problem  as 
to  the  nature  of  those  processes  that  are  called  mental,  and, 
though  it  regards  them  as  subject  to  the  law  of  evolution,  omits 
to  develop  the  consequences  of  this  assumption.  The  tendency 
thus  manifested  brings  Naturalism  to  the  verge  of  Materialism — 
to  the  position,  namely,  that  all  fact  without  exception  is  of  the 
nature  of  physical  or  material  "things" — either  matter,  or 
energy,  or,  as  the  more  sophisticated  physicists  of  the  day  would 
claim,  electricity. 

As  examples  of  problems  that  Naturalism  quite  overlooks, 
or  is  ignorant  of,  one  may  cite  the  questions  that  concern  the 
nature  of  space,  time,  and  number.  Naturalism  either  sees 
no  problems  regarding  these  entities,  or,  if  it  sees  problems, 
solves  them  dogmatically  and  with  the  maximum  of  vagueness 
and  inaccuracy  by  regarding  space,  time,  and  number  as  attri- 
hutes  of  physical  'things,"  claiming  that,  did  the  latter  not 
exist,  then  were  the  former  in  no  sense  fact.  In  this  respect 
Naturalism  departs  widely  from  the  conclusions  of  science,  if 
science  includes  not  alone  physics,  chemistry,  biology,  and  the 
like,  but  also  geometry  and  pure  mathematics. 

Naturalism,   as  has  been  said,   has  an  historical  and,  to  a 


NATURALISM  250 

certain  extent,  a  logical  development  out  of  Positivism.  Posi- 
tivism was  first  definitely  presented  by  Hume,  but  has  been 
maintained  very  recently  by  such  writers  as  Mach.  If,  now,  we 
take  the  "elements"  of  Positivism  and  make  definite  entities 
of  these,  after  the  manner  of  the  natural  sciences  in  their  insist- 
ence upon  the  different  kinds  of  atoms,  molecules,  cells,  etc., 
and  if  we  then  further  insist,  that  all  'things"  causally  interact 
and  evolve,  we  have  Naturalism. 

Thus,  from  the  standpoint  of  modern  logic,  Naturalism  is 
derived  by  assuming  the  modification  theory  of  relations  to  hold 
good  for  everything  without  exception.  Naturalism  makes  this 
assumption  in  its  dogmatic  insistence  that  all  "things,"  even 
space,  time,  and  numbers  causally  affect  one  another,  thereby 
producing  some  "things,"  and  eliminating  others.  This  means, 
that,  from  the  standpoint  of  natural  science,  everything  is  either 
adapted  to  or  eliminated  by  its  environment,  and  that  some 
scheme  of  evolution,  Darwinian,  Lamarckian,  de  Vriesian,  or 
Bergsonian,  is  always  incorporated  in  Naturalism.^ 

On  this  general  naturalistic  foundation,  five  more  detailed  \ 
positions  are  developed.    These  are  (1)  Naturalism  in  its  more 
detailed  form,  (2)  Materialism,  (3)  Psychism,  (4)  Dualism  or  ( 
Parallelism,  and  finally,    (5)    Pragmatism.     Accordingly,  each 
of  these  positions  is  naturalistic. 

I.   DETAILED   NATURALISM  ^ 

Detailed  Naturalism  merely  develops  this  general  naturalistic 
foundation  by  incorporating  within  itself  all  the  natural 
sciences,    especially    Astronomy,    Geology,    Mechanics,    Physics, 

'Among  the  philosophers  who  maintain  this  generic  naturalism  are: 
J.  S.  Mill,  op.  cit.;  Huxley  in  his  Evolution  and  Other  Essays,  and  Brooks 
in  The  Foundations  of  Zoology.  It  is  the  position  that  is  also  taken  by 
most  biologists,  especially  by  those  who  are  of  the  mechanistic,  and  not 
of  the  vitalistic  school.  Philosophers  who  are  naturalistic,  are,  e.g., 
Helvetius,  Condorcet.  Montesquieu.  Cf.  Lange,  History  of  Materialism, 
3  vols.,  translation  by  Thomas,  1892. 

''Herbert  Spencer  (1820-1903)  is  the  great  exponent  of  this  detailed 
naturalism.  Spencer's  leading  concept  is  evolution,  and  this  he  applies 
to  almost  everything,  including  consciousness  in  all  its  aspects.  Yet 
Spencer  is  not  a  parallelist,  as  are  many  biologists  and  psychologists,  nor 
is  he  a  materialist  or  a  psychist  (see  the  discussion  following).  Spencer's 
works  that  show  this  detailed  naturalism  arc:  Principles  of  Psychology, 
1855;  First  Principles,  1860-62;  Principles  of  Biology,  186-4-67;  Principles 
of  Ethics,  1879-93;  Principles  of  Sociology,  1876-96. 


260  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

Chemistry,  Biology,  and  Psychology.  It  results  that  such  human 
''institutions"  as  the  family,  government  and  law,  language, 
religion,  art  and  literature,  and  even  science  itself,  are  inter- 
preted in  strict  conformity  with  the  evolution  of  living  forms, 
while  the  cosmic  evolution  of  suns  and  of  planets,  of  atoms 
and  of  chemical  compounds,  is  accepted  quite  uncritically. 
Thus  it  is,  that  the  ontology,  cosmology,  teleology,  and 
ethics  of  Naturalism  are  essentially  those  of  the  natural 
sciences.  Such  sciences  as  Mathematics  are  either  ignored 
completely,  or  are  transformed  into  applied  sciences  in  every 
instance. 

Toward  all  theology  Naturalism  takes  a  skeptical,  or  at  least 
an  agnostic  position.  For,  with  its  emphasis  upon  the  senses 
as  the  only  revealers  of  fact.  Naturalism  finds  little  evidence  of 
a  God  of  any  kind — not  even  as  an  objective  entity  that  is 
identical  with  an  effective  worth-  and  value-principle  in  the 
general  make-up  of  the  universe.  Since  God  cannot  be  seen  or 
touched  or  heard,  and  the  like,  Naturalism  concludes  that  there 
is  no  God,  or  at  least  holds  its  judgment  in  suspense.  And 
toward  such  worths  and  values  as  it  does  accept,  Naturalism 
takes  the  position  of  a  thorough-going  Evolutionism.  Good- 
ness and  beauty,  right  and  wrong  are  in  each  case  what  they 
are,  only  because  they  have  evolved  and  survived. 

It  is  toward  truth  alone  that  this  detailed  yet  uncritical  Nat- 
uralism takes  an  absolutistic,  as  opposed  to  a  relativistic  and 
evolutionistic  position.  For,  although  the  results  of  the  em- 
pirical, natural  sciences  are  allowed  always  to  be  open  to 
revision,  and  to  be,  in  this  sense,  tentative,  nevertheless  Nat- 
uralism holds  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  knowing  situation  \ 
to  prevent  our  getting  at  facts  essentially  as  they  are,  and  that,  '. 
if  facts  are  thus  known,  there  is  truth.  For  Naturalism,  there- 
fore, knowing  is  7iot  constitutive,  as  it  is  in  Phenomenalism; 
nor  are  all  facts  psychical  in  nature,  as  in  Subjectivism;  nor 
are  they  mere  ''elements,"  as  in  Positivism.  Rather,  facts  are 
held  to  be  what  they  are  found  to  be  in  the  natural  sciences, 
and  it  is  ahso  maintained  that  facts  would  be  quite  unaltered, 
should  all  knowing  disappear.  Naturalism  thus  accepts  the 
theory  that  there  is  an  absolute  truth  to  be  attained,  and  that 
true  knowledge  is  a  sort  of  copy  of  fact. 


NATURALISM  261 

However,  in  this  respect  Naturalism  is  inconsistent  with  its 
ov/n  explicit  doctrine,  that  everything  causally  interacts  with 
other  things,  evolves,  and  is  an  adaptation.  For,  if  this  ''causal 
doctrine"  be  of  universal  validity,  then,  of  course,  knowing 
must  also  causally  interact  with  that  which  is  known,  and,  there- 
fore, hotJi  modify,  and  he  modified.  The  consistent  development 
of  this  universal  "causal"  doctrine  therefore  leads  to  Phe- 
nomenalism, so  that,  not  to  accept  this  conclusion,  is  to  gloss 
over  a  glaring  inconsistency  and  contradiction  that  invalidates 
the  main  naturalistic  contention. 

While  in  its  explicit  epistemology,  therefore,  detailed  Nat- 
uralism aligns  itself,  though  somewhat  confusedly,  with  the 
traditional  "copy-theory"  of  truth,  it  does  this  at  the  cost  of 
being  inconsistent  with  its  own  basic  doctrines  of  a  universal 
interaction,  evolution,  and  adaptation.  The  only  excuse  for  its 
committing  this  inconsistency,  and  yet  for  not  noticing  it,  is, 
that  the  adherents  of  Naturalism  are  carried  off  their  feet  by 
the  methods  and  results  of  the  natural  sciences,  and  are  not 
aware  either  of  those  delicate  questions  which  are  involved  in 
the  problem  of  knowledge,  or  of  the  precise  logical  principles 
whether  of  the  old  or  of  the  new  logic. 

Toward  the  psychological  problem  detailed  Naturalism  main- 
tains the  negative  attitude  of  ignoring  the  issue.  It  rests  con- 
tent with  the  vague  and  uncritical  view,  that  cognitive,  emo- 
tional, and  volitional  processes  lack  such  characteristics  as  ex- 
tension and  weight,  and  is  satisfied  to  use  the  mere  names  "per- 
cept," "idea,"  "concept,"  emotion,"  etc.,  without  further 
inquiry,  merely  insisting  that  the  entities  denoted  by  these 
names  are  "natural  things" — whatever  that  term  may  mean — 
and  are,  therefore,  subject  to  all  those  main  principles,  such  as 
evolution,  to  which  other  "natural  things"  are  subject.  How- 
ever, Naturalism  does  not  develop  the  consequences  of  this  posi- 
tion, but  leaves  this  to  other  naturalistic  philosophies,  such  as. 
Materialism,  Psychism,  Parallelism,  and  Pragmatism.  Natural- 
ism, like  Positivism,  also  gives  up  the  doctrine  of  an  ego,  or  a 
soul,  but  offers  no  substitute  for  these,  other  than  what  it 
vaguely  calls  ideas,  percepts,  and  the  like.  But  what  these 
entities  are,  or  what  consciousness  is.  Naturalism  leaves  largely 
undetermined. 


262  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

n.   MATERIALISM,    DUALISM,   AND   PSYCHISM : 
MATERIALISM  ® 

These  three  positions  have  the  advantage  over  Naturalism, 
that  they  are  the  results  of  recognizing  the  problem  of  con- 
sciousness, and  of  attempting  to  solve  it.  All  three  positions 
are  naturalistic,  yet  each  is  a  definite  and  distinct  doctrine. 

In  regard  to  the  other  philosophical  problems  these  positions 
accept  essentially  the  same  solutions  as  does  Naturalism.  Thus 
their  explicit  epistemology,  ethics,  esthetics,  theology,  teleology, 
cosmology,  and  ontology  are  essentially  those  of  that  theory. 
For  each  the  specific  position,  in  each  of  these  several  branches, 
is  one  that  is  derived  somewhat  uncritically  and  vaguely  by 
putting  together  into  one  doctrine  the  results  of  the  natural 
sciences.  Thus,  in  each,  evolution  plays  a  leading  role ;  in  each 
it  is  contended  that  everything  interacts,  evolves,  and  adapts. 
For  each,  also,  there  is  a  conservation  of  "something" — 
something  that,  in  its  total  quantity,  is  neither  increased 
nor  decreased,  neither  created  nor  destroyed,  and  that  in 
the  midst  of  change,  only  alters,  or  seems  to  alter,  its  form  or 
qualities. 

For  modern  Materialism  this  "something"  that  underlies 
everything  else,  and  that  both  evolves  and  changes,  and  yet  is 
conserved,  is  physical  energy.  Accordingly,  consciousness  is 
regarded  as  only  a  special  kind  of  this  energy,  analogous  to 
electrical  or  kinetic  or  potential  energy,  or  else  it  is  regarded 
as  a  factor  of  some  specific  physical  energy,  even  as  electrical 
potential  or  intensity  is  an  aspect  or  factor  of  electrical  energy. 
Percepts,  ideas,  emotions,  and  the  like,  thus  become  physical 
facts  that  interact  with  other  physical  facts,  and  that  are  brought 
into  existence,  in  agreement  with  the  principle  of  evolution,  by 

'  Materialism  has  appeared  many  times  in  the  history  of  philosophy. 
Among  the  ancients  Leucippus,  Domoeritns,  and  Lueretiiis  were  material- 
ists. In  the  seventeenth  century  Thomas  Hobbes  ( L'iSS-lfi?!)) ,  and,  in  the 
eighteenth,  Condillac,  d'Holbach,  Jjamettrie,  and  Diderot  were  adherents  of 
the  position.  In  the  nineteenth  century,  in  Germany,  Biichner,  Kraft  iind 
moff,  1st  ed.,  185.5,  Moleschott,  Karl  Vogt,  and  later,  Haeckel,  The  Riddle 
of  the  Universe,  trans,  by  McCalje,  have  been  widely  read,  and  have  been 
of  much  influence.  In  recent  years  Ostwald.  Naturphilosophie.  1902,  trans, 
by  Seltzer,  and  J.  Loeb,  Physiology  of  the  Brain  an^  the  Mechanistic  Con- 
ception of  Life,  are  supporters  of  this  position. 


NATURALISM  26S 

a  transformation  out  of  some  other  kind  of  physical  energy, 
or  factor  thereof.  When  the  specific  conditions  for  this 
transformation  first  occurred  in  the  evolution  of  life  on  this 
planet,  then  some  specific  instance  of  some  specific  kind  of 
consciousness  first  arose.  Also,  when  similar  specific  conditions 
occur  in  any  individual,  as  e.g.,  in  the  transition  from  dreamless 
sleep  to  wakening,  then  again  some  specific  energy-transforma- 
tion occurs. 

Only  in  its  ontology,  then,  does  Materialism  differ  from  Nat- 
uralism, for,  while  the  latter  position  maintains  insistently, 
though  vaguely,  that  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between 
mind  and  matter.  Materialism,  using  evidence  from  such  sciences 
as  geology,  biology,  and  physiology,  concludes  that  consciousness 
is  only  matter  or  energy.  For  it  there  is  no  more  difference 
between  mind  and  matter  than  there  is  between  heat  and 
electricity. 

One  characteristic  of  Materialism,  however,  that  is  usually 
overlooked,  even  by  the  materialist  himself,  is  that,  consistently 
with  its  own  main  explicit  principles,  it  is  a  thorough-going 
phenomenalistic  philosophy.  This  is  the  case,  notwithstanding 
the  fact,  that  the  materialist,  like  all  other  philosophers,  tacitly 
grants,  in  presenting  his  position  for  others  to  accept,  that  his 
own  knowing  does  not  causally  affect  the  state  of  affairs  of  which 
his  materialistic  philosophy  is  an  account,  and  that  those  know- 
ing processes  in  which  he  and  others  know  concrete  physical 
facts,  do  not  affect  or  constitute  these  fact^  Nevertheless,  by 
the  foundation  principles  of  Materialism,  namely,  that  all  so- 
called  conscious  processes  are  really  physical,  and  that  all 
physical  ''things"  causally  interact  and  affect  one  another,  it  is 
implied  that  every  specific  knowing  process  must  affect,  modify, 
and  alter  the  thing  knoivn.  This  position,  however,  is  none 
other  than  Phenomenalism.  But  this  consequence  of  the  ex- 
plicit teachings  of  Materialism  is  in  direct  contradiction  with 
that  tacit  presupposition  which  the  materialist  makes  with  refer- 
ence to  the  relation  between  his  own  knowing  processes  and  the 
"things"  known.  For,  when  the  materialist  accepts  the  results 
of  the  natural  sciences  to  incorporate  them  in  his  Materialism, 
he  tacitly  assumes  that  all  knowing  could  be  eliminated  and  yet 
material  (known)  entities  be  quite  unaffected  thereby. 


264  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

m.   UNIVERSAL  DUALISM   OR  PARALLELISM* 

The  main  contention  of  this  position  is,  that  that  "some- 
thing" which  underlies  all  evolution  and  yet  is  conserved  in 
quantity,  is  not  physical  energy  alone,  but  also  psychical  energy. 
The  tacit  or  explicit  postulates  or  assumptions  from  which  this 
'^ psycho-physical  parallelism"  is  derived  may  be  stated  as 
follows : — 

I.  Introspection  is  reliable  and  valid,  i.e.,  its  deliverances 
•with  reference  to  the  nature  of  consciousness  are  to  be  accepted. 
This  means  that  consciousness  is  revealed  as  fundamentally  and 
essentially  different  from  physical  ''things";  i.e.,  the  former 
is  given  as  at  least  lacking  certain  characteristics  that  the 
latter  have,  particularly  the  characteristics  of  extension  and 
mass. 

II.  All  physical  "things"  are  subject  to  the  principle  of  the 
conservation  of  energy,  in  accordance  with  which,  in  all  change, 
there  is  as  much  energy  in  the  effect  as  in  the  cause.  Energy 
is  only  transformed.  No  energy  is  lost  either  in  specific  iso- 
lated systems,  or  in  the  whole  universe.  In  this  respect  the 
physical  universe  is  a  closed  series. 

The  conclusion  that  is  derived  from  these  premises  is,  that 
consciousness  can  in  no  case,  either  in  the  development  of  the 
individual  or  in  its  historical  origin,  come  from  physical  energy, 
since  such  a  transformntion  would  mean,  that  some  physical 
energy  disappears  as  energy,  so  that  the  principle  of  conserva- 
tion would  be  violated.  Consciousness  is,  therefore,  left  hanging 
in  the  air,  unless  some  way  can  be  found  to  give  it  firmer  sup- 
port.   This  is  accomplished  by  assuming  that 

III.  In  all  change  it  is  impossible  that  something  should 
come  from   nothing,   and   disappear  into   nothing.    Ex  nihilo 

*  This  position  was  first  given  definite  formulation  by  Descartes  in 
both  his  Discourse  and  his  Meditations;  the  majority  of  contemporaneous 
psychologists  previous  to  the  recent  behavioristic  school  have  taken  this 
position  in  their  tcxt-liooks;  J.  R.  Angell  is  a  good  e\anij>le.  A  good  state- 
ment of  the  position  is  given  by  G.  K.  Miiller,  "  Zur  Psychophysik  der 
Gesichtsempfindung,"  Zcitsch.  f.  Psych.,  1890  (cf.  Mach,  Analysis  of  Sensa- 
tions, trans.,  pp.  '2(i-40);  by  Ward,  Naturalism  avd  Agnosticism,  Lecture 
Xll.;  by  James,  Principles  of  Psycholocry,  Vol.  I.,  Chap.  V.;  by  McDougall, 
Body  and  Mind,  Chaps.  VII. -XV. ;  by  11.  R.  Marshall,  Consciousness,  1909. 
The  last  mentioned  volume  well  illustrates  the  position  as  it  is  formulated 
and  developed  as  a  current  philosophy,  but  as  a  philosophy,  also,  that 
almost  completely  ignores  really  basic  problems. 


NATURALISM  265 

7iihil  fit,  nihil  ad  nihilimi  fieri,  the  scholastics  put  it.  But  con- 
scious processes  are  facts.  They  appear  and  disappear  in  the 
individual,  and  they  certainly  appeared  in  the  evolution  of 
living  beings. 

By  all  three  premises  together,  now,  the  conclusion  is  implied, 
that  each  conscious  process  comes  from  a  preceding  conscious- 
ness, each  quantum  of  consciousness  from  a  preceding  quantum; 
in  other  words,  that  there  is  a  conservation  of  consciousness 
quite  analogous  to  the  conservation  of  physical  energy.  And 
just  as  all  physical  energy  is  in  a  process  of  universal  evolution, 
cosmic  and  biological,  so  also  has  all  evolution  another  aspect, 
namely,  the  conscious  aspect.  Living  organisms  arose  from 
so-called  non-living  complexes  of  energies  and  forces,  but  in 
reality  not  only  were  these  earliest  living  forms  conscious,  but 
so  also  were  their  components  and  predecessors.  Physiological 
processes  of  the  nervous  system,  especially  of  the  brain,  seem  to 
be  the  condition  for  conscious  processes.  Really,  however,  the 
latter  are  only  parallel  to  the  former.  The  constituents  of  the 
nervous  system  change  and  are  replaced  by  others  in  processes 
of  repair.  Therefore  these  replacing  constituents  must  have 
their  "conscious  side"  also.  In  general,  then,  wherever  there 
is  matter  or  physical  energy,  there,  also,  is  conscious  energy. 
Every  cell,  every  molecule,  every  atom  and  electron  is  not  only 
physical,  but  also  conscious.  The  whole  universe  is  double  and 
twofold.  It  is  physical,  and  it  is  conscious.  There  are  tivo 
energies,  two  conservations,  and  two  evolutions.  Neither  energy 
acts  causally  on  the  other,  for  such  action  would  violate  (1)  the 
postulate,  derived  from  introspection,  that  each  is  funda- 
mentally different  from  the  other,  and  (2)  that  only  physical 
energy  can  produce  and  affect,  and  be  produced  and  affected  by, 
physical  energy.  Accordingly,  by  these  postulates,  only  like  can 
act  on  like,  only  like  produce  or  be  transformed  into  like, — 
physical  into  physical,  conscious  into  conscious — but  no  inter- 
action between  consciousness  and  physical  energy  is  logically 
possible. 

This  position  has,  in  its  general  form,  occupied  a  prominent 
place  in  modern  philosophy  from  the  time  of  Descartes  to  the 
present,  but  especially  during  the  last  thirty  or  forty  years, — 
the  period  of  the  development  of  experimental  psychology — 


266  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

when  it  has  received  much  discussion  under  the  name  of 
Psycho-physical  Parallelism, 

Modern  psychology  with  its  use  of  experiment,  and  of  observa- 
tion of  others  as  well  as  of  introspection,  is  emphatic  in  its 
claim  to  be  a  natural  and  empirical  science,  so  that  this  more 
definite  Naturalism  has  appealed  to  it.  For  Psycho-physical 
Parallelism  accepts  the  facts  and  results  of  the  physical  natural 
sciences  at  their  face  value,  adding  to  these  the  detailed  facts 
of  and  about  consciousness.  These,  too,  are  held  to  be  "nat- 
ural" and  to  form  the  peculiar  subject-matter  of  psychology. 
Modern  psychology,  therefore,  by  adopting  Parallelism,  seems 
to  justify  its  claim  to  be  a  science  that  is  on  a  par  with  the 
physical  sciences,  and  that  at  the  same  time  fits  into  a  definite 
and  consistent  philosophical  position. 

The  main  characteristics  of  this  position  clearly  form  a  solu- 
tion to  the  ontological  problem.  For  Parallelism,  there  are  two 
kinds  of  energy, — two  kinds  of  "something"  that  is  in  each 
case  conserved.  In  its  solution  of  the  other  philosophical  prob- 
lems the  position  follows  closely  the  main  outlines  of  Natural- 
ism. Thus  its  cosmology  and  its  doctrine  of  values  are  those 
of  the  sum  total  of  the  physical  sciences,  including  biology. 
The  position  is,  therefore,  definitely  evolutionistic.  Every 
physical  object,  indeed  every  part  of  every  physical  object,  has, 
however,  a  conscious  side  or  aspect.  This  feature  of  the  position 
is  sometimes  taken  advantage  of,  however,  to  introduce  a  definite 
purpose  fulness  into  all  "things,"  and  so  into  the  whole  course 
of  a  universal  evolution.  Thus,  to  do  this,  one  has  only  dog- 
matically to  insist,  that  the  fundamental  kind  of  consciousness 
in  all  "things"  is  Will,  in  order  subsequently  to  deduce  a  fore- 
sight, a  planning,  a  choosing,  and  an  adapting  of  means  to  ends 
in  all  "things." 

It  is  clear,  however,  if  one  thus  introduces  a  teleology,  either 
that  the  physical  side  of  the  universe  does  not  pursue  the  same 
course  as  it  would  pursue,  if  consciousness  were  not  present, 
but  that  it  is  influenced  by  the  "conscious  side,"  contrary  to 
the  fundamental  postulates  of  the  position;  or,  that  physical 
occurrences  do  take  place  just  as  they  would  if  no  conscious  side 
were  present.  But  in  this  second  case  the  "conscious  side"  be- 
comes   quite    superfluous,    since,    without    consciousness,    there 


NATURALISM  267 

would  be  exactly  the  same  course  of  events,  past,  present,  and 
future,  as  there  would  be  with  it.  This  would  also  be  the  case 
if  the  "material  side"  were  absent.  Two  lines  parallel  to  each 
other  and  pointing  in  a  certain  direction  indicate  that  direction 
no  better  than  does  one.  The  duplication  is  quite  superfluous. 
In  quite  a  similar  manner,  if  the  universe  were  double  in  every 
detail,  and  if  all  its  events,  both  as  a  whole  and  as  individuals, 
have  a  certain  direction,  then,  whether  this  direction  be  inter- 
preted to  mean  purpose  or  its  lack,  it  would  still  be  the  same 
direction,  were  either  one  of  the  two  "sides"  done  away  with, 
or  were  either  absent. 

This  is  a  severe  criticism  of  Parallelism.  For  it  means  that 
the  position,  by  endeavoring  to  introduce  a  teleology  through 
its  "double  energy"  theory,  either  violates  its  own  foundation 
by  introducing  interaction,  or  accepts  07ie  energy  that  is  super- 
fluous. This  may  be  either  physical  energy  or  consciousness. 
But  the  universe  does  not  need  both,  if  each  parallels  the  other 
in  that  way  which  is  alone  consistent  with  the  foundations  of 
the  parallelistic  position. 

From  this  criticism  it  is  evident  that  in  its  epistemology 
Parallelism  avoids  that  very  damaging  inconsistency  of  which 
Materialism  is  guilty  in  respect  to  the  relation  between  the 
knowing  process  and  the  object  known.  Materialism  should 
admit  that  these  interact  and  so  affect  each  other  even  as  do 
other  physical  processes  and  objects,  but,  inconsistently,  it  does 
not  admit  this  for  any  kind  of  knowing  of  any  kind  of  object. 
Parallelism,  however,  by  its  doctrine  of  the  total  absence  of 
interaction  between  any  kind  of  knowing  process  and  the 
physical  world,  is  not  guilty  of  this  inconsistency.  At  most, 
between  the  physical  and  the  mental  there  is  a  relation  that 
can  be  interpreted  only  as  external.  For  each  minutest  differ- 
ence in  the  one  realm  there  is  a  corresponding  difference  in  the 
other,  and  yet  each  would  be  the  same  without  as  ivith  the  other. 
Certain  difficulties,  however,  arise  in  connection  with  this  doc- 
trine when  it  is  applied.  For  example,  it  may  be  asked.  What 
are  the  specific  correlates  of  those  conscious  processes  of  which 
there  is  introspective  knowledge?  Are  not  these  correlates 
specific  brain  processes?  But,  in  that  case,  is  it  not  these  proc- 
esses that  are  known,  and  not  outside  objects?     Yet,  have  not 


268  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

"outside  objects"  their  correlative  conscious  processes  also? 
But  into  these  difficulties  we  need  not  go,  since  they  are  arti- 
ficial, arising  only  as  consequences  of  a  position  that  itself  does 
not  stand  the  test  of  criticism. 

IV.   PSYCHISM  ;  ^    CRITICISM   OP   NATURALISTIC   THEORIES 

That  a  specific  type  of  Psychism  develops  out  of  Naturalism 
is  quite  evident  from  the  preceding  discussion.  Subjectivism, 
with  its  doctrine  that  all  so-called  physical  "things"  are  but 
the  collection  of  the  percepts  and  ideas  of  individual  spirits, 
is  one  kind  of  Psychism,  but  it  is  one  that  retains  the  finite 
ego  or  soul  as  a  simple,  indivisible  substance,  with  God  as  an 
infinite  spirit.  The  Psychism  that  is  derivable  out  of  Natural- 
ism, however,  recognizes  no  irreducible  and  ultimate  egos,  souls, 
spirits,  or  personalities,  and  only  that  kind  of  a  God  who  is  the 
sum  total  of  that  consciousness,  or  conscious  energy,  which  is 
all,  and  which  all  ultimately  is.  This  modern  Psychism  main- 
tains, as  its  chief  tenet,  that  ultimate  reality  is  consciousness, 
or  conscious  energy. 

The  possibility  of  this  doctrine  has  already  been  indicated  in 
discussing  Parallelism.  //  there  are  two  substances  or  energies 
in  all  "things,"  side  by  side  in  the  evolution  of  the  universe, 
it  is  implied,  that  the  course  of  events  would  be  quite  the  same, 
were  either  energy  non-existent.  With  psychical  energy  absent, 
all  would  be  matter;  were  there  no  matter,  then  would  only 
conscious  energy  exist. 

To  develop  such  a  possible  position,  let  us  assume  that  only 
conscious  energy  exists,  and  then  raise  the  question,  How  shall 
what  seem  to  be  physical  "things"  be  accounted  for?  The 
answer  given  to  this  question  is  ingenious,  though  not  con- 
vincing, while  it  also  meets  with  many  difficulties  when  it  is 
applied  to  specific  problems.  The  answer  is,  that  the  difference 
between  the  (so-called)  physical  and  the  conscious  is  only  one 
of  point  of  view,  or  of  approach.  Thus  the  appearance  of  one 
consciousness  to  another,  say,  of  yours  to  mine,  is  held  to  be 
the  physical,  while  a  consciousness  that  appears  to  itself  is  the 
mental.    Accordingly,  you  can  know  me  only  as  a  physical  body, 

"  This  position  is  developed  in  C.  A.  Strong's  Why  the  Mind  has  a  Body, 
1903;   MaJebranche   (1638-1715)   was  an  earlier  psychist  of  this  type. 


NATURALISM  26d 

but  /  know  myself  as  conscious.  One  and  the  same  entity,  e.g., 
my  consciousness  is,  then,  approached  in  two  ways:  known  by 
you,  it  appears,  or  is  physical ;  known  by  myself  it  is  psychical. 

This  theory  of  a  universal  psychism, — of  one  psychical  sub- 
stance or  energy,  of  which  specific  instances  are  individuals,  or 
human  personalities,  welling-up  like  the  crests  of  waves  upon 
the  deeper  fundament  of  continuity, — is  certainly  plausible, 
and,  perhaps,  inspiring.  But  it  is  open  to  the  same  criticism 
as  Materialism.  Thus,  if,  as  Materialism  contends,  conscious- 
ness is  matter  or  energy,  and,  therefore,  is  not  what  it  seems  to 
introspection  to  be,  the  question  may  be  asked  in  criticism, 
whether  there  is  not  a  form  of  matter  or  of  energy  that  does 
what  consciousness  is  found  empirically  to  do.  Likewise,  as  con- 
cerns Psychism,  Avith  its  position  that  physical  "things"  are 
ultimately  not  what  they  seem,  but  are  really  consciousness,  it 
may  be  asked,  whether  there  is  not  a  form  of  consciousness  that 
does  what  physical  "things''  do,  and  whether  there  is  not  as 
much  difference  between  this  kind  and  other  kinds  of  conscious- 
ness, as  there  is  between  ivhat  in  common  sense  and  science  are 
distinguished  as  the  physical  and  the  conscious?  The  difference 
that  is  introduced  by  "proving"  in  some  w^ay,  either  that  what 
appears  to  be  mental  is  really  physical,  or  that  what  appears 
to  be  physical  is  really  conscious,  is  only  one  of  name,  provided 
the  character  and  behavior  of  "things"  is  ascertained  em- 
pirically and  not  artificially  by  an  a  priori  argument.  On  the 
other  hand,  if,  by  "making"  the  apparently  physical  really 
psychical  in  character,  something  is  introduced  into  the  physical 
world  that  is  in  conflict  with  empirically  ascertained  physical 
principles,  then  one  can  no  longer  maintain  the  major  premise 
of  Psychism,  that  the  detailed  results  of  empirical  investigation 
are  to  be  accepted  at  their  face  value,  and  that  the  apparently 
fundamental  difference  between  the  physical  and  the  psychical 
is  due  only  to  a  difference  in  the  point  of  view. 

An  analogous  criticism  can  be  made  of  Materialism.  If  by 
"proving"  and  calling  consciousness  a  kind  of  matter  or  energy, 
no  specific  difference  is  introduced  into  the  details  of  conscious 
behavior  and  action,  then  nothing  is  gained,  since  nothing  is 
done  by  matter  that  is  not  done  by  consciousness,  and  con- 
versely.   On  the  other  hand,  if  a  specific  difference  is  thus  intro- 


270  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

duced,  then  it  should  be  a  difference  that  can  be  confirmed 
empirically,  and  then  there  is  the  possibility  of  discovering  a 
conflict  between  this  new  specific,  "difference-making"  element 
and  other  empirically  ascertainable  differences,  so  that  conscious- 
ness can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  something  that  is  to  be  studied 
only  by  a  priori  methods,  and  not  empirically,  as  regards  its 
details. 

This  criticism  is  much  the  same  as  that  made  of  Parallelism, 
namely,  that,  if  the  physical  and  the  psychical  are  two  energies 
that  are  quite  parallel  and  in  a  one-one  correspondence  in  every 
detail,  then  with  reference  to  what  "things"  do,  this  double- 
ness  is  quite  superfluous.  One  or  the  other  energy  is  a  mere 
epi-phenomenon.  Do  away  with  either,  and  the  course  of  all 
events  would  be  the  same.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  doubleness 
does  make  a  difference,  it  can  do  so  provided  only  one  energy 
influences  the  other.  But  this  means  to  give  up  Parallelism 
and  to  accept  Interactionism. 

The  fact  is,  however,  that  the  three  positions  under  discus- 
sion are  the  products  of  the  influence  of  the  old  Aristotelian 
logic  and  philosophy,  and  represent  the  effect  of  the  continued 
domination  of  the  concept  of  substance.^  That  logic,  we  have 
found,  is  a  logic  of  things, — of  attributes  that  inhere  in  an 
underlying  substratum.  Also,  it  is  a  logic  that  is  interested 
in  what  "things"  are,  rather  than  in  what  they  do.  Accord- 
ingly, it  is  a  logic  that  is  metaphysical  in  that  derogatory  mean- 
ing of  the  term  which  is  sometimes  so  extended  by  certain 
scientists  as  to  include  all  metaphj^sics  and  philosophy.  This 
meaning  is  derived  to  a  large  extent  from  that  mediseval  science 
and  philosophy  vv^hieh  sought  to  ascertain  the  essence  rather 
than  the  behavior  of  "things."  The  effects  which  "things"  had, 
were  explained  by  their  essence.  For  example,  opium  was  held 
to  produce  sleep,  because  it  was  a  soporific  siibstance.  Certain 
bodies  fell,  because  they  were  essentially  ponderable;  others  rose, 
because  they  were  essentially  buoyant.  Indeed,  as  late  as  the 
eighteenth  century,  heat  was  held  to  be  caloric  substance.  The 
general  result  was,  in  all  lines  of  so-called  scientific  investiga- 
tion, that  that  which  was  sought  for,  was  the  recondite  sub- 
stratum, or  essence  of  "things,"  even  though  this  was  "found" 
in  some  instances  by  a  circular  definition. 


NATURALISM  271 

Modern  logic  and  scientific  method  are  characterized  by  a 
strong  reaction  against  this  entire  ''substance  point  of  view." 
It  is  to  be  granted,  of  course,  that  in  certain  sciences,  notably 
in  chemistry,  search  is  made  to  find  what  "things"  are,  with 
the  result  that  a  number  of  different  elements  and  a  great  many 
different  compounds  are  discovered.  But  even  in  this  case,  what 
these  elements  and  compounds  are,  is  largely  identical  with  what 
they  do.  Thus  hydrogen  is  that  substance  which  acts  in  such 
a  way  on  oxygen  as  to  produce  water  and  other  compounds ; 
it  is  also  that  substance  which,  under  certain  conditions,  exerts 
a  certain  definite  pressure.  So,  also,  certain  modern  mathe- 
matical equations  that  describe  electricity  show  what  electricity 
does,  rather  than  what  it  is.  These  examples  illustrate  in  gen- 
eral the  point  of  view,  and  the  results  of  modern  science.  In 
science  little  remains  of  the  substance  concept. 

In  philosophy,  however,  the  influence  of  the  concept  of  sub- 
stance still  persists.  Indeed,  most  philosophical  systems  are 
derived  through  the  postulation  and  use  of  this  concept  in  one 
way  or  another.  Phenomenalism  and  Subjectivism  are  two 
such  systems,  and  now  there  appear  also  Naturalism,  Material- 
ism, Parallelism,  and  Psychism  as  systems  with  a  similar  founda- 
tion. Each  of  these  asks,  and  answers  the  question,  e.g.,  What 
kind  of  a  thing  or  substance  is  the  universe?  Each  is  content 
to  accept  the  detailed  results  of  the  natural  sciences  in  answer 
to  the  other  question.  What  things  do?  but  is  not  so  content 
with  regard  to  this  "larger"  question.  All  four  positions  make 
the  universe,  both  as  a  whole  and  a  part,  evolve,  but  they  differ 
as  to  what  kind  of  a  "thing"  an  evolving  universe  is.  Nat- 
uralism "makes"  one  part  of  it  physical  energy,  but  remains 
non-committal  in  regard  to  the  other  part.  Materialism 
"makes"  the  whole  a  purely  physical  complex  or  "thing,"  while 
Psychism  "makes"  the  whole  ultimately  conscious  in  character, 
a  sort  of  psychical  thing,  a  huge  world-soul,  sometimes  identi- 
fying this  with  God.  Both  of  these  last  two  positions  are 
monistic  ontologies,  since  ultimately,  for  them,  there  is  only 
one  kind  of  substance,  broken  up  though  this  may  be  into  many 
parts.  On  the  other  hand.  Parallelism  makes  the  universe  two- 
fold. It  is  dualistic.  This  dualism  is  overcome,  and  the  equal 
status  of  both  the  physical  and  the  psychical  is  kept,  only  by 


272  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

maintaining,  in  further  accordance  with  the  concept  of  thing, 
that  both  are  but  aspects  or  attributes  of  one  universal  sub- 
stratum, which  is  substance  par  excellence.  This  is  Spinoza's 
(1632-77)  doctrine,  which  was  revived,  with  certain  modifica- 
tions, in  nineteenth  century  German  Idealism,  or  Transcen- 
dentalism. 

Finally,  in  closing  this  discussion,  we  may  point  out  that  the 
four  philosophies  under  consideration  are  each  completely  real- 
istic as  regards  that  epistemology  which  is  tacitly  accepted  by 
each  in  advancing  a  specific  doctrine  as  true.  Not  one  of  them 
denies  that  it  is  possible  for  "things"  to  be  known  as  they  really 
are.  Not  one  of  them  is  either  founded  on  or  itself  develops 
the  position,  that  knowing  affects,  alters,  or  constitutes  its 
object.  Accordingly,  not  one  of  them  is  either  phenomenalistic 
or  subjectivistic  as  regards  itself.  Yet,  as  we  have  seen.  Ma- 
terialism should  be  phenomenalistic,  in  order  to  be  consistent 
with  its  doctrine  of  a  universal  interaction  of  all  "things,"  but 
it  does  not  explicitly  recognize  this  characteristic.  Psychism 
also  should  recognize  itself  as  phenomenalistic,  since,  although 
for  it  all  "things"  are  psychical  in  nature,  it  contends  that 
there  is  a  modification  of  psychical  "things,"  so  that  they 
appear  to  be  physical  under  certain  conditions.  But  Psychism, 
like  Materialism,  does  not  develop  this  phenomenalism.  Paral- 
lelism alone,  in  its  doctrine  of  the  absence  of  interaction  between 
the  physical  and  the  psychical,  and  of  the  presence  of  only  an 
external  relation  between  these  in  regard  to  their  correlation 
and  correspondence,  is  consistent  with  the  presupposition  which 
it  itself  makes  in  regard  to  the  knowing  of  that  state  of  affairs 
u'hich,  described  by  Parallelism,  is  the  object  known.  But 
Parallelism  is  also  a  position  that  presents  a  worthless  and  func- 
tionless  duplication  of  the  universe. 

All  these  theories,  then,  if  we  omit  their  inconsistencies,  are 
not  opposed  to  Realism  in  their  fundamental  epistemology. 
Eealism  would  be  compatible  with  Psychism,  with  Materialism, 
or  with  any  other  ontology,  provided  these  positions  could  be 
established  empirically,  and  provided  they  could  at  the  same 
time  give  up  the  doctrine  of  universal  causal  interaction  so  far, 
at  least,  as  to  make  an  exception  for  the  relation  between  know- 
ing and  the  object  known.    For  it  is  onhi  on  this  last  condition 


PRAGMATISM  273 

that  any  of  these  theories  can  be  true,  or  that  the  complex 
objects  described  in  any  of  them  can  be  genuinely  known. 
Finally,  it  is  provided  only  that  this  condition  is  recognized 
and  observed,  that  any  of  these  theories  can,  in  its  details,  be 
consistent  with  its  own  presuppositions.  However,  it  is  by 
virtue  of  the  contradiction  between  their  own  presuppositions 
a7id  their  explicit  doctrines,  that  Materialism  and  Psychism  are 
self -refuting,  and  may,  therefore,  be  dismissed  from  further 
serious  consideration. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII 
PRAGMATISM 

Pragmatism  is  that  more  specific  development  of  generic  Nat- 
uralism which  endeavors  to  avoid  some  of  the  errors  and  incon- 
sistencies that  are  implied  in  detailed  Naturalism,  Materialism, 
Parallelism  and  Psychism.  The  name  has  been  characterized  by 
William  James  as  a  new  name  for  an  old  way  of  thinking.  The 
justification  for  this  characterization  lies,  among  other  things,  in 
the  endeavor  of  the  pragmatist  to  glean  the  grain  from  the  chaff 
in  the  methods  and  results  of  modern  scientific  knowledge.  In 
other  words.  Pragmatism  is  that  generalization,  in  regard  to  the 
epistemological  problem,  which  results  from  endeavoring  to 
distinguish  wliat  is  essential  to  genuine  knowing  from  what  is 
artificial  and  superfluous.  As  a  result  of  this  endeavor.  Prag- 
matism is  made  up  of  a  number  of  doctrines,  which  may  be 
advantageously  examined  under  three  headings,  namely,  Prag- 
matism's Anti-siih stance  doctrine,  Pragmatism's  Anti-intellectu- 
alism,  and  Pragmatism's  Evolutionism. 

I.  pragmatism's  anti-substance  doctrine 

Pragmatism's  anti-substance  doctrine  is  a  protest  against  the 
domination  of  the  traditional  substance  concept.^  In  making 
this  protest,  Pragmatism  aligns  itself  with  Positivism.-     Not 

*  See,  e.g.,  James,  Pragmatism,  p.  85  flf.,  and  p.  184  f. 
'  See  Chaps.  XXXI.-XXXII. 


274  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

what  "tilings"  are,  but  what  happens,  what  is  done,  what  worTcs, 
is  regarded  as  the  important  question;  not  essences,  but  acts 
and  occurrences,  should  be  the  aim  of  scientific  discovery. 
Pragmatism  thus  senses  the  true  tendency  of  modern  scientific 
research.  It  replaces  a  statical  with  a  dynamical  point  of  view, 
and  aims,  with  Positivism,  to  discover  what  specific  relationships 
hold  between  terms,  rather  than  to  find  their  substance-like 
character  or  essence.  It  thus  conforms  to  the  method  of  much 
of  modern  exact  science  in  which  laws  are  expressed  by  equa- 
tions that  symbolize  relationships  between  variables  and  other 
complex  terms.^ 

iL  pragmatism's  antmntellectualism 

A  second  constituent  doctrine  of  Pragmatism  is  its  anti- 
intellectualism, — a  doctrine  that  in  turn  has  three  phases.  The 
fi7'st  of  these  is  determined  by  the  reaction  against  that  specific 
type  of  intellectualism  which  preceded  the  Renaissance  and 
modern  scientific  development,  and  which  attempted  to  solve 
problems  by  an  appeal  to  tradition,  to  authority,  and  to  argu- 
mentation, rather  than  to  nature,  experiment,  and  observation. 
This  intellectualism  was  largely  identical  with  the  use  of  the 
traditional  Aristotelian  substance-logic,  and  with  the  resulting, 
perpetual  endeavor  to  find  the  essences  of  "things."  A  phi- 
losophy that  is  directed  against  such  an  intellectualism  is  quite 
justified,  as  the  development  of  science  itself  shows.  But  this 
does  not  warrant  a  universal  anti-intellectualism,  to  the  effect, 
that  intellect  and  reason  can  in  7io  instance  reveal  fact  and 
deliver  truth. 

A  second  feature  of  Pragmatism's  anti-intellectualism  is 
the  result  of  generalizing  the  rather  limited  procedure  of  the 
experimental  and  natural  sciences}  The  method  of  these 
sciences  is  (a)  to  observe,  sometimes  unaided,  but  more  fre- 
quently by  means  of  experiment  and  measurement;  (b)  to  gen- 
eralize from  typical  cases,  and  to  form  hypotheses,  subsequently 

*  8ee  Poincare,  Foundations  of  f^cience. 

*  See,  e.g.,  Jamea,  Pragmatism,  Chap.  VI.,  and  the  whole  of  The  Meaning 
of  Truth.  I  should  say  that  this  is  a  position  in  which  all  the  prag- 
matists  agree,  althoii,';h  some  emjjhaaize  more  than  does  James  the  pur- 
posefulnesa  and  the  intention,  and  the  functional  and  adaptative  character 
of  that  which  issues  in  the  concrete,  verifying  experience. 


PRAGMATISM  275 

to  test  these  and  deductions  from  them  by  an  appeal  to  observa- 
ble fact;  (c)  to  ascertain  what  terms  cannot  be  removed  without 
"disturbing"  others,  and  also  what  terms  cannot  be  varied 
without  varying  others,  thus  to  discover  relations  of  dependence 
as  well  as  of  independence;  (d)  to  discover,  by  measurement 
and  otherwise,  what  specific  functional  relations  hold  good 
between  terms;  and  finally  (e)  upon  the  basis  both  of  general- 
izations as  to  the  presence  and  action  of  causes,  and  of  the 
discovery  of  functional  relations,  to  predict  and  construct  the 
specific  instance,  then  to  await  its  confirmation  by  sense 
experience. 

Now  the  intellect  plays  a  prominent  part  in  all  this  procedure 
in  forming  hypotheses  to  guide  observations,  experimentation 
and  measurement,  in  making  generalizations  and  deductions, 
and  in  forming  systems  by  the  interweaving  of  many  generaliza- 
tions. But  if,  through  such  intellectual  methods,  there  are  not 
formed  generalizations,  hypotheses,  and  systems  that  lead  to 
direct  confirmation  by  the  sense  experience  of  concrete  fact, 
then.  Pragmatism  holds,  so  much  the  worse  for  intellect.  For 
sense  experience  is,  in  the  natural  sciences  at  least,  regarded  as 
the  ultimate  test  as  to  what  is  fact  and  knowledge.  And  it  is 
by  rigidly  adhering  to  this  test  that  science  has  won  that  insight 
into  nature's  processes  and  secrets,  which  so  conspicuously  dis- 
tinguishes modern  knowledge  from  mediaeval  and  ancient  belief 
and  surmise. 

This  feature  of  the  subservience  of  intellect  to  sense,  of  reason 
to  concrete  experience.  Pragmatism  generalizes  into  a  universal, 
though  definite  anti-intellectualism,  and  into  a  definition  of 
truth.  However,  this  anti-intellectualism  does  not  take  the 
extreme  form,  that  intellect  plays  no  reliable  part  in  revealing 
fact  and  in  delivering  truth,  but  that  it  can  perform  this  func- 
tion provided  only  that  it  cooperates  with  and  is  checked  up  by 
sense  experience.  Intellect  is  thus  made,  not  coequal  with,  but 
subordinate  to,  sense  experience.  For  example,  should  such  con- 
crete things  as  points  be  dealt  with  by  intellect,  not  as  indi- 
viduals, but  as  classes, — which  is  the  only  way  they  can  be 
dealt  with, — then,  since  we  are  unable  to  see,  touch,  or  in  any 
way  sen^e  a  geometric  point.  Pragmatism  doubts  the  reality 
of  these  entities,  and  characterizes  them  as  being  only  inven- 


276  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

tions  of  intellect  for  the  practical  purpose  of  dealing  with 
space. 

The  peculiar  definition  of  truth  which  Pragmatism  thus  de- 
rives, by  generalizing  from  its  review  of  the  natural  sciences, 
is,  that  truth  is  confirmation  by  concrete  fact,  or  experience.^ 
No  longer,  however, — in  this  generalization — are  the  facts  of 
sense  experience  alone  insisted  upon,  but,  rather,  any  concrete 
facts,  as  these  are  experienced  after  the  manner  of  the  sense 
experience  of  this  particular  "thing,"  or  that.  The  develop- 
ment of  implications  by  reasoning,  the  observation  of  the  demand 
for  consistency  and  freedom  from  contradiction,  and  the  like, 
are  all  very  well,  provided  they  lead  to  the  experience,  in  some 
way,  of  a  concrete,  particular  something.  But  methods,  the- 
ories, and  hypotheses  that  do  not  have  such  alternate  practical 
outcomes  are  left  hanging  in  mid-air,  as  neither  true  nor  false. 

The  result  is,  that  intellect  is  displaced  from  any  position  of 
equality  with  other  "revealers"  of  fact  and  of  truth.  For 
intellect  seems  to  be  able  to  deal  only  with  classes  and  types, 
while  such  experiences  as  sense  perception  and  emotion  reveal 
the  singular  particular  "individual."  Intellect  can  deal  with 
individuals  only  conceptually,  or  by  the  method  of  intension, 
namely,  with  any  individual  of  a  class  or  type  defined  in  a 
certain  way.  But  sensation  and  emotion  reveal  a  this  or  a  that, 
a  here  or  a  there,  a  now  or  a  then.  Pragmatism,  accordingly,  in 
that  definition  of  truth  Avhich  is  under  discussion,  accepts  emo- 
tional experience  and  feeling  as  well  as  sensation  as  "revealers" 
of  those  particular  facts  or  workings  which  constitute  the  truth 
of  ideas. 

The  further  result  is,  that  Pragmatism  becomes  in  its  anti- 
inteilectualism  a  mixture  of  sensationalism,  emotionalism,  and 
immediatism.^  Let  an  idea  or  belief,  e.g.,  the  belief  in  immor- 
tality, lead  to  a  definite  emotional  satisfaction,  thus  working 
successfully,  and  then,  hy  definition,  that  idea  is  true.  It  follows, 
e.g.,  that  different  religions,  various  philosophies,  different  sys- 
tems of  ethics  and  of  aesthetics,  and  the  like,  are  all  equally  true 
just  so  long  and  as  frequently  as  a  specific  and  satisfactory 
emotional  result  to  some  one  is  their  outcome.  For — for  Prag- 
matism— the  ouicome  makes  the  truth,  or  is  the  truth — and  not 

'  James,  Pragmatism,  Chap.  VI.       °  Especially  in  James  and  Bergson. 


PRAGMATISM  277 

the  mere  test.  Pragmatism,  therefore,  does  not  hold  the  abso 
lutistie  position,  that  there  is  only  one  truth,  or  one  system  of 
truths,  but,  for  it,  there  are  many  truths,  and  many  systems, — 
as  many,  in  fact,  as  in  some  instances  there  are  individuals/ 
For,  so  far  as  in  many  individuals  satisfactory  workings  result 
that  do  not  conflict,  although  they  may  differ,  to  that  same 
extent  are  there  many  individual  truths.  It  is  thus  that,  in  its 
anti-intellectualism  and  emotionalism.  Pragmatism  becomes  dis- 
tinctly individualistic. 

But  Pragmatism  is  also  immediaiism.  For  example,  not 
points,  not  lines,  not  volumes,  but  space  as  this  is  perceived 
directly  and  without  any  definite  outlines,  is  regarded  as  the 
reality;  the  parts,  such  as  points,  cannot  be  sensed,  and  there- 
fore are  held  to  be  only  inventions  of  the  intellect  that  serve 
the  practical  purpose  of  dealing  with  the  intuited  whole,  space. 
But  perhaps  not  even  space,  as  thus  intuited,  is  the  reality. 
For  it  is  sensed,  not  as  pure  space,  but  as  a  space  with  "things" 
in  it,  here  and  there,  and  moving, — in  time.  This  whole,  then, 
may  be  the  reality,  a  world  of  vaguely  continuous  and  mutually 
interpenetrating  "things"  and  qualities,  happenings,  and  rela- 
tions,— matter,  energy,  time,  space,  ideas,  volitions,  feelings! 
Perception  directly  distinguishes  some  of  these  from  others,  for 
even  to  it  certain  lines  of  separation  are  evident.  But  these 
lines  are  not  so  sharp  as  intellect  in  its  analysis  would  find 
them.  Rather,  all  "things"  are  much  more  alike  than  science 
and  intellect  would  admit  them  to  be.  They  are  even  so  alike 
as  to  be  continuous.  Even  human  personality,  the  human  self, 
the  knower,  may  not  be  different  from  other  "things,"  but 
may  be  one  with  them,  so  that,  as  thas  united,  a  whole  of  self 
and  not-self  may  be  experienced  in  great  throbs  of  emotion  and 
ecstasy. 

Thus  it  is,  that  Pragmatism,  as  founded  on  a  generalization 
from  natural  science,  and  as  developing  on  this  basis  an  anti- 
intellectualism  and  immediatism,  becomes  in  its  extreme  form 
anti-scientific,  anti-analytical,  and,  in  a  very  positive  manner, 
mystical.^  But,  thus  transformed,  for  it,  all  truth  is  lost; 
there  is  only  fad,  and,  at  that,  only  one  great  fact  or  experi- 

'  JamcB,  Pragmatism,  p.  78. 

*  In  Bergson,  especiahy  in  Creative  Evolution. 


278  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

ence,  which  deserves  not  even  this  name,  since  it  is  the  work 
of  intellect. 

The  third  feature  of  Pragmatism's  anti-intellectualism  is  de- 
rived by  a  dialectical  and  analytical  attack  on  the  intellectual- 
istic  method  in  general  and  the  analysis  with  which  this 
method  is  identical.**  The  means  of  logically  establishing 
this  aspect  of  Pragmatism  is  radically  different  from  that  which 
is  used  in  behalf  of  the  anti-intellectualism  just  considered. 

First, — such  is  the  irony — the  intellectualistic  assumption  is 
made,  tacitly,  and  not  explicitly,  that  only  that  which  is  free 
from  contradiction  can  be  fact,  and  can  he  true}^  Secondly,  it 
is  assumed,  also  tacitly,  that  to  intellectualize,  rationalize,  and 
analyze  is  identical  with  using  the  old  Aristotelian  logic  ^^  with 
its  acceptance  of  the  law  of  identity  as  the  chief  logical  principle, 
with  its  subjection  to  the  concepts  of  substance  and  thing  as  the 
universal  type-phenomena,  with  the  additive  relation  as  holding 
exclusively  for  the  composition  of  parts  into  wholes,  and  with 
the  modification  theory  of  relations  as  applying  to  all  relations 
between  terms.  Finally,  to  support  this  second  assumption,  this 
anti-intellectualism  draws  upon  the  results  of  the  natural 
sciences,  especially  upon  the  theory  of  evolution,  although  ^^  it 
ignores  that  real  logic  which  both  underlies  much  of  modern 
science,  and  also  is  so  radically  different  from  the  traditional 
Aristotelian  doctrine."  Accordingly,  the  method  of  rationaliz- 
ing is,  in  both  its  analytical  and  synthetical  aspects,  implicitly 
and  arbitrarily  limited  to  and  identified  with  the  use  of  the 
principles  of  the  latter  doctrine. 

However,  as  regards  such  a  procedure,  it  is  clear  that  no 
attempt  to  invalidate  reason  as  such  gains  its  point  unless  all 
of  reason's  aspects  and  methods  are  considered;  and  that  to 
identify  rationalization  with  one  specific  procedure,  and  then  on 
this  basis  to  derive  an  anti-intellectualism,  is  an  attempt  to 
invalidate  reason  which  fails,  if  there  are  alternative  methods 

•  Especially  Bergson  in  Time  and  Free  Will  and  Creative  Evolution; 
cf.  in  the  present  volume,  Chaps.  III.;  XXI.-XXV.;  XXVI.,  II.,  2;  XL., 
VII.;  XLIII.,  VII. -XI. 

'"  Bergson's  major  assumption. 

"  This  is  shown  by  penetrating  beneath  the  superficial  plausibility  of 
Bergson's  arguments. 

"  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution. 

"  Cf.  Chaps.  XXI.-XXV. 


PRAGMATISM  279 

for  reason  to  pursue.  But  one  such  alternative,  in  the  ease 
under  consideration,  reason  has  at  its  command  in  the  principles 
of  the  new  logic. 

Reasoning  was  identified  with,  and  limited  to,  the  use  of 
certain  logical  methods  by  Aristotle.  It  was  still  more  inti- 
mately identified  with  and  limited  to  these  methods  in  mediasval 
and  scholastic  times,  as  it  is  even  yet  in  the  minds  and  teachings 
of  many  philosophers,  in  the  writings  of  many  logicians,  and 
even  in  the  opinions,  though  not  in  the  thinking  and  procedure 
of  many  scientists  of  the  present  day.  But  this  identification 
and  limitation  need  not  be  made.  Indeed  they  cannot  be,  pro- 
vided one  takes,  as  one  must  take,  the  same  position  toward 
logic  that  is  maintained  toward  other  branches  of  investiga- 
tion, namely,  the  position,  that  advance  and  new  discovery  is 
possible. 

Nevertheless,  by  first  inconsistently  ignoring  this  justified, 
empirical,  and  pragmatic  demand,  and  then  by  identifying  reason 
with  the  use  of  only  the  one  method.  Pragmatism  seems  to 
emerge  victorious  in  its  propaganda  against  intellect.  Such  a 
fallacious  and  yet  plausible  procedure  is,  however,  not  difficult ! 
To  illustrate  such  a  procedure,  let  us  make  the  two  assumptions 
previously  stated,  especially  the  assumption,  that  parts  are 
related  additively  to  form  a  whole,  and  then  attempt  on  such  a 
basis  to  make  a  valid  analysis  of  space.^*  Now,  according  to 
orthodox  geometrical  science,  space  is  made  up  of  points  that 
are  unextended.  But  such  points  are  the  contradictory  of  ex- 
tension. Then  analysis  here  leads  to  the  contradictory  of  the 
"thing"  analyzed,  while  the  inverse  process  of  synthesis  cannot 
derive  extension  from  the  unextended  (since  it  is  assumed  that 
points  can  be  "put  together,"  or  are  related  only  additively) . 
Accordingly  the  dilemma  results:  Either  the  immediate  experi- 
ence or  intuition  of  space  as  a  whole  is  reliable,  or  the  analysis 
into  points  is.  Choose  either  alternative  and  the  other  must  be 
rejected  as  false.  The  older  intellectualism  chose  the  second 
alternative.  Pragmatism  in  its  anti-intellectualism  chooses  the 
first. 

Quite   similarly  Pragmatism  contends   that   the   analysis  of 
motion  leads  to  rests,  so  that,  inversely,  synthesis  "makes"  mo- 

>*  Cf.  Chaps.  XXII.-XXIV.,  and  XLIII. 


280  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

tion  consist  of  the  sum  of  its  contradictories.  Accordingly, 
motion  is  chosen  as  the  ' '  real  thing, ' '  and  the  rests  are  regarded 
as  only  an  invention  of  intellect  that  serves  the  purpose,  per- 
haps, of  prediction,  and  the  like. 

This  argument  is  generalized,  since  motion  is  regarded  as 
typical  of  all  changed  The  sciences  are  then  drawn  upon  to 
show  that  all  is  change  and  evolution,  as  typified  by  motion. 
Accordingly  the  conclusion  is  reached  that,  since  change  and 
evolution  cannot  be  analyzed  without  the  introduction  of  con- 
tradictions, they  must  be  taken  at  their  face  value. ^"^  Thus  to 
the  Mysticism  that  is  derived  from  Immediatism  there  is  now 
added  that  Evolutionism  which  is  derived  from  the  acceptance 
of  the  results  of  the  natural,  especially  the  biological  sciences, 
and  from  a  specious  argument  against  intellect. 

The  argument  is  specious,  because  those  analytical  and  syn- 
thetical results  which  are  accepted  as  the  outcome  of  intellectu- 
alizing,  are,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  not  those  which  nfiodern  science 
really  obtains}"^  Accordingly,  if  one  but  accept  the  alternative, 
which  is  ready  at  hand,  of  identifying  reasoning  with  the  method 
of  obtaining  these  genuine  scientific  results,  it  will  be  seen,  that 
the  whole  argument  against  intellect  falls  to  the  ground,  and 
that  the  supposed  contradiction  between  the  immediately  given 
"thing"  and  the  entities  revealed  by  analysis  entirely  dis- 
appears. 

One  can,  therefore,  accept  hoth  ivhole  and  part  as  equally  real, 
especially  if  that  which  is  given  directly  as  a  whole,  e.g.,  mo- 
tion, stands  the  test,  by  correct  methods,  both  of  analysis  into 
parts  and  of  synthesis  into  a  rational  whole.  Indeed  it  is  clear, 
that,  if  rational  methods  are  used  in  order  to  attack  reason,  the 
validity  of  at  least  some  rational  methods  is  presupposed  and 
accepted.  But  the  further  correct  use  of  these  same  methods 
limits  Immediatism,  and  shows  that  not  all  "things"  are  ex- 
clusively a7id  completely  as  they  are  directly  experienced. 

This  is  made  clear  by  examining  that  correct  intellectual 
analysis  of  motion  which  began  with  the  experimental  work  of 

'°  This  is  why  Bergson  selects  motion  and  its  analysis  for  examination 
in  the  first  cliapters  of  Creative  Evolution  and  in  Time  and  Free  Will. 

"  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution. 

"  Cf.  Chap.  XLIII.,  and  the  writer's  "Defense  of  Analysis"  in  The 
New  Realism. 


PRAGMATISM  281 

Galileo,  and  which  was  completed  by  Newton's  application  of 
the  Calculus  to  all  cases  of  motion.  The  details  of  this  analysis 
constitute  the  science  of  Mechanics.  This  science,  in  turn,  falls 
within  the  new  rather  than  within  the  old  logic. 

This  modern  analysis  of  motion  shows,  that  that  state  of 
affairs  which  holds  at  each  instant  of  the  motion  of  a  body  is 
neither  rest  nor  motion-:  Rest  is  the  occupation  of  a  point  for 
at  least  two,  and  therefore  for  an  infinite  number  of  instants. 
Then  that  complex  which  is  constituted  by  the  correlation  of 
one  specific  point  with  one  specific  instant,  in  the  case  of  a  body 
moving  along  a  specific  path  in  a  definite  time,  is  not  rest.  But, 
also,  it  is  not  motion,  for  motion  is  the  series  of  such  complexes. 
Motion,  therefore,  is  a  whole  that  consists  of  two  kinds  of  parts, 
the  one,  smaller  motions,  the  other,  relational  complexes  ("ele- 
ments" as  regards  motion)  that  are  neither  rests  nor  motions. 
These  "elements"  are  complexes  in  that  each  is  composed  of  a 
point  correlated  with  an  instant. ^^ 

Pragmatism's  anti-intellectualistic  attack  on  the  analysis  of 
motion  is,  therefore,  invalid.  For  correct  modern  analysis  shows 
that  motion  is  not  made  up  of  its  contradictories,  rests,  but  of 
parts  which  are  neither  like  the  whole,  nor  as  unlike  it  as  are 
rests.  Quite  similarly,  in  the  modern  rationalization  of  motion 
and  of  that  of  which  motion  is  typical,  namely,  change  in  gen- 
eral, the  synthesis  of  wholes  out  of  parts  is  not  that  which  the 
attack  on  intellect  would  have  it.  Clearly,  if  rests  were  the 
"elements"  of  motion,  and  the  rests  could  form  a  whole  only 
by  being  related  additivcly,  then  only  a  whole  that  is  like  the 
parts  could  be  obtained  from  the  parts.  For  the  addition  of 
parts  gives  only  wholes  that  are  like  the  parts.  Dollars  related 
additivcly  give  a  s\im  of  dollars,  and  not  a  cash  book.  For, 
the  order  of  "things"  makes  no  difference  to  addition. 
2  +  3  =  3  +  2,  or,  more  generally,  a -\-h  =  h  -\-  a.  This  is 
called  the  commutative  law  of  addition.  Accordingly,  if  the 
"elements"  of  motion  were  related  additivcly,  then,  e.g.,  in  the 
ease  of  a  falling  body,  the  order  of  the  varying  velocities  at 
different  instants  would  make  no  difference.  In  any  order,  they 
would  be  a  whole  accelerated  motion.  But  the  scientific  fact  is, 
that  there  is  a  very  definite  order  among  these  velocities  by 

"  Cf.  Chap.  XLIII.,  X. 


282  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

virtue  of  which  they  form  a  uniformly  accderated  motion.  At 
every  instant  there  is  a  different  velocity,  and  between  any  two 
velocities  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  others,  with  some  of 
these  velocities  in  correlation  with  rational  numbers,  and  others 
in  correlation  with  irrational  numbers,  but  all  in  a  very  definite 
order,  namely,  that  of  magnitude. 

The  relation  between  velocities  whereby  they  form  accelerated 
motion,  is,  therefore,  not  additive,  but  a  relation  that  generates 
or  determines  an  order  which  is  fixed,  irreversible,  and  non- 
commutative.  It  is  an  order  that  has  the  same  logical  char- 
acteristics as  has  the  order  of  the  instants  of  time,  or  as  have 
the  positive  integers  in  order  of  magnitude.  It  is  clear,  there- 
fore, as  concerns  the  character  of  loholes  in  contrast  with  that 
of  their  parts,  that  a  whole  which  is  made  up  of  parts  related 
additively  can  only  be  similar  in  character  to  these  parts,  but 
that  if  a  non-additive  relation  holds  between  the  parts,  a  ivhole 
unlike  the  parts  results. 

This  last  principle  is  the  secret  that  underlies  both  the  experi- 
mental and  the  intellectual  synthesis  of  modern  science}^  For 
example,  genuine  synthesis  in  the  case  of  all  chemical  elements, 
compounds,  and  "radicals,"  brings  about  new  characteristics 
in  the  resulting  wholes,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  hydrogen 
and  oxygen  thus  form  water,  and  that  carbon,  hydrogen,  nitro- 
gen, oxygen,  sulphur,  magnesium,  and  some  other  elements  thus 
form  that  chemical  and  physical  whole,  protoplasm,  which  is 
found  in  all  living  cells. 

In  accordance  with  quite  the  same  principle,  motion  is  "gen- 
erated" by  non-additive  relations  between  "elements"  that  are 
neither  motions  nor  rests ;  space,  by  non-additive  relations  be- 
tween points  that  are  neither  extended,  nor,  strictly  speaking, 
unextended ;  and  time,  by  non-additive  relations  between  instants 
that  are  neither  durations  nor  their  contradictory.  Indeed,  it 
is  in  accordance  with  this  principle  of  non-additive  synthesis 
that  all  those  wholes  are  formed  which  are  treated  in  the  appli- 
cation of  the  calculus  as  integrals.  In  fact,  were  all  wholes 
only  additive,  then  would  the  method  and  the  logical  doctrines 
of  the  calculus  not  form  a  science  at  all.  Additive  synthesis 
alone  would  suffice.     But  were  all  wholes  only  additively  com- 

'•Cf.  Chap.  XLUl.,  iv.-vi. 


PRAGMATISM  28S 

posed,  then  would  everything  be  only  a  mixture,  and  there 
would  be  "nothing  new  under  the  sun."^° 

III.  pragmatism's  evolutionism 

"We  now  reach  the  third  main  constituent  doctrine  of  Prag- 
matism. If  Positivism  with  its  reaction  against  the  substance 
concept  is  the  first  constituent  of  this  philosophy,  and  anti- 
intellectualism,  in  its  three  aspects,  is  the  second,  then  evolu- 
tionism is  the  third  component  of  the  pragmatic  mixture. 

The  acceptance  of  the  general  doctrine  of  the  modern  scien- 
tific concept  of  evolution  together  with  other  scientific  results 
and  theories  as  the  foundation  on  which  to  develop  a  philo- 
sophical position  is  again  witness  to  the  close  allegiance  between 
Pragmatism  and  Naturalism,  Naturalism  in  its  earliest  days, 
as  found,  e.g.,  in  the  works  of  J.  S.  Mill  and  Herbert  Spencer, 
was  evolutionistic.  But  this  Naturalism  also  gave  its  alle- 
giance to  the  substance  concept  as  this  developed  into  some  one 
of  the  three  doctrines  of  Materialism,  Parallelism,  and  Psychism. 
In  Pragmatism,  however,  as  has  been  already  shown,  the  sub- 
stance concept  is  dropped,  but  evolution  remains, — to  play  a 
most  important,  if  not  a  dominant  role.  As  a  result,  sometimes, 
as  in  the  anti-intellectualism  just  discussed.  Evolutionism 
emerges  as  the  grand  peroration  of  the  pragmatist,  but  in  a 
form  no  longer  recognizable  as  the  sober  theory  of  the  scientist. 
Rather  it  becomes,  as,  e.g.,  with  Bergson,  the  mystical  doctrine 
of  an  all-inclusive  flux,  with  even  the  knowing  process  absorbed 
in  this,  and  with  intellect  and  reason  only  crystallizing  out  here 
and  there  to  serve  purely  practical  purposes,  but  not  to  reveal 
fact.  Sometimes,  however,  evolutionism  appears  in  fairly 
definite  and  accurate  form  as  the  very  basis  of  Pragmatism. 
This  is  the  Pragmatism  that  is  advanced  by  such  American 
writers  as  Dewey  and  James,  and,  among  English  philosophers, 
by  Schiller. 

That  which  specifically  characterizes  the  position  of  these 
evolutionists,  is,  that  with  them,  as  with  the  anti-intellectu- 
alists,  the  problem  of  prime  interest  is  the  epistemologieal  prob- 
lem,  and,   secondly,   that  the  solution  which  is  given  to  this 

*"  Cf.  with  this  examination  of  Bergson,  James,  A  Pluralistic  Universe, 
Ghape.  VI.  and  VII. 


284  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

problem  is  derived  from  a  very  specific  cosmology  that  is  ac- 
cepted and  postulated  as  a  broad  generalization  from  the  nat- 
ural sciences,  namely,  the  cosmology  of  a  universal  evolution. 
However,  the  Pragmatism  of  these  writers  is  not  completely 
anti-intellectualistic,  although  it  is  explicitly  anti  any  a  priori 
philosophy,  such  as  the  Kantian,  that  lays  claim  to  the  possi- 
bility of  arriving  at  knowledge  by  pure  deduction  from  "truths 
of  the  reason."    In  this  sense  it  is  radical  Empiricism. 

This  evolutionistic  Pragmatism  aims  to  demonstrate  that 
intellect,  reason,  perception,  memory,  emotion,  will,  and  the 
psychic  processes  generally,  have  all  evolved  in  correlation  with 
nervous  systems  and  sense  organs,  and  a  general  complexity  of 
structure,  and  the  like,  in  biological  evolution.  Accordingly, 
all  these  "entities"  have  only  a  relative  and  not  an  absolute 
function.  Indeed  it  is  conceivable  that,  had  the  environment 
been  different,  something  quite  different  from  intellect,  percep- 
tion, and  the  rest  of  the  mental  processes,  or  at  least  something 
different  by  way  of  specific  rational  principles  and  specific  modes 
of  perception,  should  have  evolved.  That  which  has  de  facto 
developed  and  now  persists,  enjoys  this  good  fortune  only 
because  it  is  an  adaptation  and  serves  the  organism  some  definite 
purpose  either  directly,  or  indirectly  by  correlation  with  some 
directly  useful  organ  or  function.^^ 

The  general  cosmological  position  upon  which  this  theory  is 
founded  is,  as  has  just  been  stated,  that  everything,  or  that 
almost  everything  evolves.  With  this  the  case,  it  may  be  ad- 
mitted, perhaps,  that  the  laws  of  evolution  are  themselves  ex- 
ceptions to  evolution,  although  the  knowledge  of  them  is  not. 
Such  an  admission,  however,  proves  to  be  extremely  dangerous 
to  the  theory.  Nevertheless,  under  the  influence  of  those  natural 
sciences  which  do  find  the  principle  of  evolution  valid  for  many 
"things,"  such  as  chemical  elements,  planets,  stars,  continents, 
seas,  mountains,  plants  and  animals,  races  and  nations,  lan- 
guage and  religion,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  hypothesis 
should  be  formed,  that  perception,  reason,  truth,  agsthetic 
standards,  and  the  like,  should  be  added  to  the  list. 

A  critical  review  of  that  pragmatism  which  is  founded  upon 

"  Tliis  ia  the  pragmatism  of  James,  Dewey,  Baldwin,  Schiller,  Moore, 
Mead,  Ames,  Boodin,  Bawden,  and  many  others. 


PRAGMATISM  285 

the  general  doctrine  of  an  evolution  of  all  "things"  shows, 
Ijowever,  that  the  theory  is  not  based  upon  any  one  of  the 
•specific  biological  theories  of  evolution.  The  general  principle 
of  evolution  is,  perhaps,  as  old  as  Empedocles.  It  was  accepted 
by  Aristotle  and  developed  by  him  into  a  definite  and  detailed 
philosophy — one  of  the  most  influential  that  human  culture  has 
enjoyed.  In  modern  times  the  Hegelian  philosophy  also  is 
distinctly  a  philosophy  of  evolution."  But  it  is  due  to  Darwin's 
influence  that  the  theory  has  become  the  capstone  in  the  edifice 
of  biological  science,  and  that  the  general  principle  has  been 
accepted  and  applied  in  one  way  or  another  in  nearly  every 
field  of  inquir3^^^  Lamarck  came  earlier  than  Darwin,  but  it 
was  largely  due  to  Darwin's  specific  theory  of  the  origin  of 
species  that  interest  was  aroused  in  Lamarck's  teachings. 

Aristotle's  philosophy  of  evolution  and  progressive  develop- 
ment was  primarily  a  theory  of  universal  change,  or  of  uni- 
versal motion,  although,  as  such,  it  was  a  philosophy  that  was 
inconsistent  with  his  logic.  Ilegel  developed  a  general  doctrine 
of  evolution  that  was  a  direct  consequence  of  the  Aristotelian 
logic.  He  showed  that,  by  the  Aristotelian  logic,  any  specific 
change  meant,  that  at  some  specific  instant  there  both  is  and 
is  not  a  certain  quality.  This  is  the  only  way  that  the  change 
of  a  into  h,  e.g.,  hard  into  soft,  can  be  rationalized  by  the  old 
logic.  At  a  certain  instant,  then,  something  is,  by  this  Hegelian 
doctrine,  both  a  and  b,  i.e.,  both  a  and  non-a.  It  is  both  itself 
and  its  contradictory.  By  showing  further,  now,  that  there  is 
no  entity  for  which  the  contradictory  cannot,  indeed,  must  not 
be  thought,  i.e.,  which  does  not  imply  its  contradictory,  Ilegel 
identified  change  with  logical  necessity,  and  showed  that  change 
is,  in  every  instance,  logically  implied  and  necessitated. 

The  scientific  and  positivistic  theories  of  evolution  differ 
widely  from  these  philosophical  theories.  Most  of  them  are 
based  largely  upon  empirical  observation.  Darwin's  well- 
known  theory  is,  that  out  of  the  wide  range  of  variations  of 
structure  and  of  function  presented  by  the  individuals  of  any 

"  Cf.  Chaps.  XXXV.-XXXVIII. 

^''  See  Dewey,  Influence  of  Daricin  on  Philosophy  and  other  Essays;  cf. 
Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies  (an  excellent  analysis  of  Evolu- 
tionism in  Chap.  IX.),  and  Bawden,  Principles  of  Pragmatiam,  Chaps. 
I.-V.,  VIII. 


286  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

species,  those  individuals  survive  which  present  the  variations 
that  are  the  best  adapted  to  the  environment.  The  "sifting" 
by  the  environment  is  called  natural  selection.  By  means  of 
this  selection,  as  it  takes  place  through  successively  appearing 
generations,  a  specific  line  of  development  is  determined,  and 
organs  and  functions  are  formed  that  are  specific  adaptations. 
As  a  corrollary,  the  principle  is  laid  down,  that  only  that  which 
is  useful  will  persist  and  develop,  and,  conversely,  that  that 
ivhich  persists  and  develops  must  he  characterized  hy  useful- 
ness,— past,  present,  or  future. 

Lamarck's  specific  evolutionism  is  somewhat  different.  La- 
marck held,  that  if  an  organism  lacks  a  certain  adaptation  to 
its  environment,  it  ''feels"  this  lack,  and  also  the  need  of  over- 
coming it,  and  that,  accordingly,  in  response  to  this  felt  need, 
the  effort  is  made  to  overcome  the  lack.  Thus,  e.g.,  a  giraffe 
would  stretch  its  neck  for  food,  and  a  snake  endeavor  to  squeeze 
through  a  small  opening.  Such  efforts  have  their  effect  on  the 
organism,  which  is  thereby  changed  in  an  advantageous  direc- 
tion. Those  organisms  which  thus  succeed  in  adapting  them- 
selves to  their  environment  survive  and  are  the  ones  to  repro- 
duce their  kind,  and  the  next  generation  inherits  the  slight 
adaptations  gained  by  its  parents.  Lamarck's  doctrine  thus 
accepts  the  principle  of  tJie  inheritance  of  acquired  characters. 

The  principle  which  appears  as  a  corollary  of  this  Lamarckian 
theory  is,  that  not  only  the  useful  persists,  and  that  the  persist- 
ing is  useful,  but  also  that  whatever  is  useful  and  persists  was 
felt  hy  the  organism  to  he  a  need  hefore  the  adaptation  ap- 
peared, and  that  it  was  even  aimed  at  and  purposed  hy  the 
organism.  Darwinism  does  not  accept  this  last  doctrine,  but 
finds  it  sufficient  to  posit  in  most  cases  a  scheme  of  a  rigorous 
causal  selection  from  those  variations  in  structure  and  function 
that  the  individuals  of  any  species  present.  The  inheritance  of 
acquired  characters  is  appealed  to  only  in  exceptional  instances. 
Lamarckism  therefore  accepts  original  variations,  but  bases  gen- 
uine advance  in  usefulness  of  structure  and  function  upon  "a 
felt  lack  and  need,"  and  the  changing  accommodations  of  the 
individual  in  response  thereto.  Clearly  it  thus  allows  for  a  very 
distinct  immanent  teleology,  i.e.,  for  an  inherent  and  somewhat 
mystical   subconscious,   or,   perhaps,   even   conscious  purposing 


PRAGMATISM  287 

faculty  or  process  in  every  individual  organism,  possibly  in 
every  part  of  every  organism. 

Most  of  the  contemporaneous  scientific  theories  of  evolution 
are  the  result  of  attempts  to  purify  Darwinism  and  Lamarckism 
of  their  inconsistencies.  Such  attempts  issue  in  Neo-Darwinism 
and  Neo-Lamarckism.  The  one  modern  theory  of  note  that  is 
not  of  this  character  is  the  mutation  theory  of  de  Vries.  Dar- 
winism and  Lamarckism  are  essentially  theories  of  the  origin 
of  species,  of  functions,  and  of  organs,  by  the  gradual  accumu- 
lation, through  successive  generations,  of  minute  favorahle  dif- 
ferences and  adaptations.  This  process  is  sometimes  called  con- 
tinuous, although  it  is  never  this  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the 
term.  The  de  Vriesian  theory  of  mutations  is,  in  contrast,  that 
of  the  appearance  of  sudden  and  fairly  large  definite  differences 
in  the  quantity  or  quality  (one  or  both)  of  structure  and  func- 
tion, of  the  individuals  of  one  generation  in  contrast  with  those 
of  the  preceding  generations.  De  Vries  observed  the  produc- 
tion, by  certain  individual  primroses,  of  new  species  of  prim- 
rose in  the  next  generation.  The  test  applied  was  that  the  new 
species  reproduces  true  to  type.  Others  have  observed  similar 
mutations  or  saltations  in  several  species  of  plants  and  animals. 
This  theory  is  frequently  called  one  of  discontinuous  origin  as 
opposed  to  the  two  previous  theories  of  continuity.  By  it, 
definite  opportunity  is  left,  however,  for  a  selection  by  the 
environment,  since  only  those  mutants  which  possess  favorable 
definite  variations  will  survive  and  reproduce,  thus  to  continue 
the  species.  Accordingly,  there  is  no  opportunity  for  the  La- 
marckian  theory  of  response  to  a  felt  need,  and  the  inheritance 
of  the  resulting  acquired  characteristics.  Indeed  de  Vries  as- 
serts that  no  permanent  new  characters  are  ever  formed  in  this 
way.  The  corollary  of  the  de  Vriesian  theory  is,  therefore, 
similar  to  that  corollary  which  is  derived  from  the  Darwinian 
theory,  yet  with  the  difference,  that  in  some  cases  the  appear- 
ance and  persistence  of  characters  does  not  mean  their  usefid- 
ness.  Characters  that  are  indifferent  in  this  respect,  or  that  are 
even  harmful,  may  arise  and  persist  for  a  time. 

Pragmatism  develops  its  evolutionism  almost  entirely  by 
using  either  the  Darwinian  or  the  Lamarckian  scheme.  The 
de  Vriesian  theory  is  neglected,  although  it  might  furnish  some 


288  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

interesting  possibilities.  However,  that  which  Pragmatism  em- 
phasizes in  these  theories  is  the  corollaries  rather  than  the  main 
principles.  From  the  corollary,  that  that  which  has  developed 
and  persists  is,  a  fortiori,  useful,  or  has  been,  or  ivill  he,  useful, 
the  inference  is  drawn  as  regards  the  chief  problem  with  which 
Pragmatism  is  concerned,  that  consciousness  in  all  of  its  specific 
forms,  such  as  knowing,  reasoning,  the  formation  of  hypotheses, 
theories,  standards,  ideals,  and  finally  even  the  concept  of  truth 
itself,  is  merely  an  adaptation  or  a  useful  function  and  process. 
Sometimes  there  is  added  to  this  conclusion  the  further  La- 
marckian  principle,  that  all  of  these  entities  arise  because  of  a 
felt  lack  and  need  in  certain  environmental  circumstances,  and 
also  because  of  the  ability  of  the  organism  to  foresee,  to  purpose, 
to  try  this  means  and  that,  and  finally  to  succeed  in  producing 
what  is  demanded.  The  entire  cognitive  function  in  all  of  its 
aspects  is,  accordingly,  treated  as  a  planning  or  purposing,  with 
ultimate  success  as  the  only  acceptable  outcome.^* 

1.  Criticism;  Truth  and  Falsity,  for  Pragmatism 

Of  this  main  conclusion,  however,  the  criticism  is  to  be  made, 
that,  from  the  fact  that  a  function  or  an  organ  has  persisted 
and  developed,  it  does  not  follow,  that  such  a  function  or  organ 
is  only  useful,  and  nothing  more.  Indeed,  as  an  even  more 
extreme  position  than  this,  it  can  be  shown,  that  persistence  and 
further  development  are  not  even  universally  applicable  criteria 
for  usefulness,  since  useless  and,  in  some  cases,  positively  injuri- 
ous organs  sometimes  persist.^^  However,  as  against  this  criti- 
cism Pragmatism  claims  that  everything  must  find  its  place  in 
the  general  scheme  of  usefulness,  even  all  that  we  usually  call 
evil,  false,  and  detrimental.  For,  if  everything  evolves,  then 
have  not  alone  the  true,  the  good,  and  the  beautiful,  but  also  the 
false,  the  evil,  and  the  ugly  played  their  usefid  part,  at  least  as  a 
means  to  useful  ends.-*'  Indeed,  if  standards  and  ideals  also 
evolve,  and  if  the  anti-intellcctualistic  and  immediatistic  con- 
tention is  accepted,  that  the  outcome  is  the  sole  test,  then  may 

**  This  seems  to  me  to  be  the  type  of  pragmatism  that  is  upheld  by 
Dewey  and  his  followers. 

"'^  Cf.  V.  L.  Kellogg,  Darwinism  Today. 

*'  That  they  have,  is  frankly  admitted  by  the  pragmatistB. 


PRAGMATISM  289 

not  what  some  call  evil  be  to  others  the  good,  the  false  at  one 
period  be  the  true  at  another,  the  beautiful  to  some  be  the  ugly 
to  others,  and,  conversely  in  each  case  ? 

Pragmatism  answers  all  such  questions  with  "yes,"  as,  per- 
haps, it  is  bound  to  do  by  its  major  postulate  that  all  "things" 
evolve.  For,  if  everything  evolves  and  changes,  then,  seem- 
ingly, nothing  is  permanent,  there  is  no  standard,  all  is  relative, 
and  anything  may  be  a  means  to  something  else. 

The  result  is,  in  that  realm  where  the  standard  is  usually  j 
referred  to  as  truth,  and  where  truth  is  identified  by  Prag-  { 
matism  with  the  satisfactory,  the  successful,  and,  especially,  the 
useful,  that  everything  is  true  and  that  there  is  no  such  thing 
as  the  false.  Thus  that  very  basis  of  difference  hy  which  truth 
might  he  distinguished  from  falsity  is  done  away  with,  and 
Pragmatism  is  not  logically  entitled  to  use  either  term.  There- 
fore it  cannot  even  claim  itself  to  be  a  true  theory  as  opposed 
to  other  theories  as  false.  It  can  only  maintain  that  it  itself, 
like  other  theories,  is  useful  in  some  way,  or  that  it  is  satisfactory 
to  some  philosophers  though  not  to  others,  or  that  it  is  valuable 
as  a  means  to  the  development  of  further  philosophical  theories 
as  ends. 

The  pragmatic  or  utilitarian  interpretation  of  ethical  and 
EBsthetic  standards  is  also  open  to  this  same  interpretation.  In 
reality,  in  order  to  have  the  distinction  between  the  true  and 
the  false,  the  right  and  the  wrong,  good  and  evil,  more  than 
a  merely  verbal  one,  something  more  than  persistence  and  use- 
fulness must  be  recognized.  Indeed,  there  is  no  other  solution 
to  this  problem  of  error  than  the  candid  admission  that  to 
make  a  mistake  is  a  possibility,  often  enough,  indeed,  an  actu- 
ality, that  is  characteristic  of  each  kind  of  human  cognition. 

The  implications  of  this  admission  are,  however,  interesting. 
They  are,  that  cognition  is  a  process,  or  a  relatio7i,  or  a  group 
of  terms  in  specific  relations,  that,  in  any  case,  is  independent 
of  that  which  is  known,  and  that  sometimes  corresponds  to  the 
reality  known,  revealing  it  as  it  is,  and  sometimes  does  not  so 
correspond."  This  implication  is  not  compatible  with  that  funda- 
mental assumption  which  underlies  the  evolutionism  of  Prag- 

*'  Chaps.  XL.,  I.  and  v.;  XLI.,  vii.-xi.,  also  xvi.;  also  Chaps.  XLIV.  and 
XLV. 


290  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

matism,  namely,  that  all  things  interact.^^  For,  if  everything 
interacts,  so  that  there  are  causally  produced  variations,  "lacks" 
and  "needs,"  and  the  strivings  to  remove  and  to  meet  these, 
and  a  causal  selection  of  some  effects  and  elimination  of  others, 
resulting  in  adaptations,  then  there  must  he,  in  some  sense  at 
least,  a  universal  correspondence  between  adaptation  and  the 
entity  to  which  the  adaptation  is  made.  For  every  effect  must 
correspond  to  its  causes,  every  cause  to  its  effects,  with  the  result 
that  mistakes  and  errors,  as  absences  of  correspondence,  cannot 
exist. 

Pragmatism  is  thus  prohibited,  not  only  from  accepting  the 
implication  of  that  definition  of  error  which  makes  it  identical 
with  the  lack  of  correspondence  between  the  cognitive  process 
and  the  "thing"  known,  but  also  from  accepting  error  at  all. 
And  yet,  it  does  maintain  that  error  exists, — most  notably  in 
the  instance  of  those  systems  that  are  opposed  to  Pragmatism. 

The  only  condition  on  which  such  acceptance  of  error  can 
be  justified  is,  that  there  is  some  other  than  a  causal  relation 
between  the  knowing  process  and  that  which  is  known.  But 
the  implications  of  this  condition  are,  on  the  one  hand,  those 
which  correspond  closely  to  the  traditional  definition  of  truth, 
namely,  that  it  is  of  the  nature  of  a  correspondence  between 
the  knowing  and  the  known,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  know- 
ing is  a  process,  a  relational  complex  {e.g.,  a  dimension),  or  a 
relation,  that,  in  each  case,  is  independent  of  that  which  is 
known.  For  only  provided  that  there  is  independence  in  the 
situation  can  there  sometimes  be  a  lack  of  correspondence,  or 
error,  and  sometimes  its  presence,  or  truth. 

The  necessity  of  this  same  hypothesis  is  to  be  recognized  also 
in  the  instance  of  the  knowing  of  such  non-existential  and  non- 
causal  entities  as  numbers,  space,  and  time,  and  all  consistent 
possihilities.  Such  entities  are,  but  they  do  not  exist.  There- 
fore between  them  and  knowing  there  cannot  be  a  causal  rela- 
tion.    Yet  they   are   known!      In   general,   therefore,   we   are 

*'  Found  explicitly,  e.g.,  in  James  and  Borgaon.  (Soe  references  to 
Chap.  XXVI.,  II.,  2.)  This  position  of  a  universal  interaction  is  derived, 
as  we  have  seen,  from  the  traditional  Aristotelian  logic  of  things.  Prag- 
matism, therefore,  in  its  hnsic  postulate  of  ivfrraction  and  of  a  derivative 
universal  usefulness  and  identification  of  this  loith  truth,  is  the  product 
of  the  continued  influence  of  this  Aristotelian  tradition. 


PRAGMATISM  291 

forced  to  the  conclusion,  that,  if  the  endeavor  is  made  to  account 
for  the  presence  of  that  correspondence  which  subsists  in  the 
case  of  genuine  knowledge  and  truth,  we  must  grant  that  there 
is  some  other  than  a  causal  relation  between  the  knowing  process 
and  the  known  entity.^'' 

But,  of  other  relations  than  the  causal  there  are  many, — 
some  of  which  we  have  already  examined  in  detail.  One  of 
the  most  important  of  these  non-causal  relations  is  found  in 
functional  relationships,  in  which  two  variables  are  related  and 
yet  are  independent.  One  variable  is  called  independent,  the 
other  dependent,  but  this  is  not  a  causal  dependence.  It  is, 
rather,  only  the  logical  dependence  of  the  logically  subsequent 
upon  the  logically  prior.  The  relation  between  accelerated  mo- 
tion and  time  is  a  good  illustration  of  such  a  relationship. 
Consciousness,  or  cognition,  would  seem,  therefore,  to  be  some- 
thing closely  similar  to  such  a  dependent  variable,  with  the 
known  object  the  independent  variable.  In  the  (genuine) 
knowing  of  existing  ''things"  and  processes,  there  would  be, 
then,  a  correspondence  between  the  knowing  and  the  known; 
the  latter  would  be  logically  prior  to  the  former,  the  former 
logically  subsequent  to  the  latter.  In  other  words,  know- 
ing implies  something  known,  and  would  not  exist  as  this 
or  that  specific  knoiving,  did  not  something  (to  be  known) 
exist  or  subsist;  but  the  ''thing"  (known)  does  not  imply 
the  knowing,  nor  would  it  cease  to  be,  should  the  knowing 
disappear. 

This  hypothesis  as  to  the  nature  of  knowing,  of  the  relation 
between  it  and  the  entity  known,  and  of  truth  and  of  error, 
satisfies  many  of  the  demands  that  are  met  with  in  analyzing 
these  problems.  Some  of  the  further  implications  of  this  solu- 
tion of  these  problems  are  as  follows: — 

I.  In  addition  to  the  subsistence  of  a  functional  relation 
between  the  knowing  and  the  known,  other  relations,  such  as 
those  of  similarity  and  dissimilarity,  asymmetry,  and  the  like, 
may  also  subsist.  Such  an  asymmetrical  relation  always  holds 
between  the  two  variables  in  a  functional  relationship,  and  in 
all  instances  of  logical  priority.  Also,  if  the  object  known 
exists,  then  are  the  knowing  and  the  object  similar  in  just  this 

'*  Cf.  the  section  on  Eealism. 


29i  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

respect,  namely,  that  they  both  exist;  while,  if  the  object  does 
not  exist,  but  subsists,  then  are  the  two  dissimilaf',  in  that  the 
knowing  is  existential,  and  not  merely  subsistential. 

II.  Knowing  is  not  a  substance  nor  an  essence,  even  as  motion 
is  not,  but  is  a  relational  complex  that  existentially  is  a  function 
of  time.  Thus  the  opportunity  is  given  for  escape  from  the 
trammels  of  the  old  logic  and  the  concepts  of  thing  and  sub- 
stance, and  for  the  interpretation  of  the  nature  of  knowing  and 
perhaps  of  consciousness  in  general,  by  means  of  the  concepts 
and  principles  of  the  new  logic,  especially  by  the  concept  of 
relation. 

III,  Specific  instances  of  cognition,  such  as  perception,  mem- 
ory, and  reasoning,  may  arise  under  certain  specific  conditions, 
such  as  specific  causal  and  functional  relationships  of  a  nervous 
system  and  sense  organs  to  the  environment,  and  yet  these  con- 
ditions need  not  be  in  the  relation  of  cause  to  the  knowing 
process.  Yet  between  or  among  existing  knowing  processes 
themselves,  there  may  be  causal  relations.  This  is  analogous 
to  the  situation  that  subsists,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  motion.  A 
specific  motion  is  not  caused  by  time,  yet  one  specific  motion 
may  cause  another. 

TV.  If  causation  and  interaction  are  not  universal — and  there 
is  not  only  no  proof  that  they  are,  but  there  is  proof  that  they 
are  not — then  there  may  be  independent  causal  series.  Knowing 
processes  might  be  one  such  independent  series,  and  other  ex- 
istent objects  another,  and  the  two  be  in  relation.  Accordingly, 
whatever  this  relation  might  be,  i.e.,  whether  it  be  one  of  cor- 
respondence or  some  other  relation,  its  subsistence  between 
series  that  are  independent  would  be  a  matter  of  the  lack  of 
causal  determination,  and,  in  this  respect,  a  matter  of  mere 
chance. 

V.  Such  an  hypothesis  accounts  for  the  necessity  of  an 
inductive  procedure  in  gaining  knowledge,  a  method,  namely, 
that  is  identical  with  the  lack  of  absolute  certainty,  and  with 
the  necessity  of  experimentation,  guesses,  trials,  errors,  and  the 
testing  by  subsequent  working.  But  the  test  by  successful 
working  is  only  an  indication  of  the  presence  of  the  relation  of 
correspondence  and  of  truth,  and  is  not  this  relation  itself. 
Truth  conditions  success,  but  success  and  usefulness  are  not 


A 


PRAGMATISM  29S 

identical  with  truth,  although  they  may  indicate  its  presence.^" 
We  must  be  careful,  however,  to  guard  against  a  misinter- 
pretation of  the  admission,  made  some  pages  back,  that  "to 
make  a  mistake"  and  "to  be  in  error"  is  a  possibility,  often 
become  actual,  for  every  kind  of  cognition.  For  many  phi- 
losophers are  prone  to  infer  from  this  admission  (1)  that  con- 
sciousness in  general,  or  that  the  knowing  process  in  particular, 
is  alone  co7istitutive  of  error;  in  other  words,  that  all  error, 
including  illusions,  hallucinations,  v^Tong  judgments,  is  either 
percipi  or  concipi  in  its  esse;  and  (2)  that,  accordingly,  since 
some  entities  are  thus  subjective  in  their  being,  the  existence 
and  the  subsistence  of  all  "things"  is  identical  with  their 
percipi  or  their  concipi. 

However,  neither  of  these  conclusions  is  implied  by  the  ad- 
mission of  error.  For,  in  the  first  place,  if  some  things,  e.g., 
the  seeming  convergence  of  the  rails  of  the  railroad,  were  sub- 
jective in  their  being,  this  would  imply  other  entities  that  are 
not  subjective,  but  objective.  Even  Subjectivism  cannot  make 
everything  subjective,  as  we  have  seen.^^  For  example,  the 
existence  of  a  spirit  is  not  identical  with  the  idea  or  notion  of 
it  that  is  possessed  by  another  spirit.  And,  in  the  second  place, 
one  is  not  obliged  to  admit  even  that  all  errors  or  error-objects 
are  subjective  in  character.  Indeed,  other  hypotheses  account 
for  them  far  better.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  perceptual  errors  of 
the  type  of  the  apparently  bent,  but  actually  straight  stick  in 
the  water,  the  bentness  is  as  ohjective  as  the  straightness.  The 
bentness  is  a  characteristic  of  the  complex,  the  stick  and  the 
light  as  this  is  refracted  by  the  water;  the  straightness  is  the 
quality  of  the  stick  by  itself.    Different  relational  complexes  may 

**  For  the  development  of  these  hj-potheses,  see  the  section  on  Realism; 
also  cf.  with  the  discussion  of  error  just  given,  Chaps.  XLI.  and  XLIII., 
II.,  and  the  references  there  given;  also  see  Poincare,  Value  of  Science, 
Science  and  Hypothesis,  Foundations  of  Science,  trans,  by  Halsted  (the 
last  inclusive  of  the  two  above  and  of  Science  and  Method)  ;  Bawden, 
op.  cit.,  Chap.  VI.;  Dewey,  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy  and  otheii 
Essays,  Chap.  IV.,  especially  p.  95;  also  Chaps.  V.-XI.  On  pragmatism's 
doctrine  of  Truth  and  Error,  see  James,  Pragmatism,  lectures  II.,  VI., 
and  VII.,  and  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  1909;  also  Dewey,  Essays  in  Experi- 
mental Logic,  1916;  C.  S.  Pierce,  Popular  Science  Monthly,  December 
1877,  and  January,  1878,  and  Hihhert  Journal,  II.,  1908;  Russell,  Philo- 
sophical Essays,  IV.,  on  Pragmatism  (one  of  the  best  criticisms),  and  V. 
and  VII.  on  the  Nature  of  Truth. 

*'  Chap.  XXX. 


S9*  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

have  different  characteristics,  even  when  one  complex  is  a  con- 
stituent of  another  complex,  as  in  this  case.  In  this  situation 
the  only  error  that  is  inherently  irremovable  from  consciousness 
seems  to  be  that  of  "taking,"  in  the  absence  of  knowledge  of 
refraction,  what  is  really  a  straight  stick  to  be  a  bent  one.  But 
if  knowledge  of  refraction  is  present,  then  two  knowing  processes 
may  occur,  in  each  case  with  that  correspondence  between  the 
knowing  and  its  object  which  constitutes  truth.  The  one  process 
has  the  straight  stick  by  itself  as  its  content ;  the  other,  the  line 
of  the  stick  as  refracted  by  the  water,  i.e.,  the  bentness. 

In  the  case  of  another  class  of  errors,  namely,  those  of  judg- 
ments, of  false  hypotheses,  and  the  like,  the  situation  is  somewhat 
different.  We  have  previously  presented  the  evidence  for  the 
philosophical  and  logical  position,  that  not  all  entities  exist,  but 
that  some  only  subsist.  Numbers,  space,  and  time,  and  all  states 
of  affairs,  are  examples  of  such  mere  subsistents.  An  existent 
is  singular,  particular,  and  concrete,  and  as  such  is  correlated 
with  a  specific  time  and  place,  or  at  least  with  a  specific  time. 
A  subsistent  is  not  so  correlated.  The  position  that  there  are 
entities  that  are  only  subsistents  results  from  the  fact,  that  some 
specific  status  must  be  found  for  those  entities  to  which  we  are 
led  by  following  out  implications,  but  which  do  not  exist,  as, 
e.g.,  the  geometrical  relations  of  a  perfectly  spherical  object. 
Scientific  investigation  shows  that  such  entities  are  implied  to 
be   neither  physical  nor  mental  existents,    and  yet   to   be  facts. 

As  concerns  our  specific  discussion,  therefore,  we  must  ask 
the  question.  What  status  have  hypotheses  that  are  m  error,  and 
yet  are  internally  consistent,  examples  being  some  of  the  great 
historical  scientific  hypotheses  such  as  the  Ptolemaic  theory  that 
the  earth  is  the  center  of  the  universe  with  the  planets,  the 
sun  and  the  stars  rotating  around  it.  This  is,  indeed,  the 
apparent  motion.  Therefore,  the  inherent  error  in  the  knowing 
processes  of  all  those  who  preceded  Copernicus  (1473-1543)  may 
be  said  to  have  consisted  in  "taking"  the  apparent  to  be  the 
real  or  existential  situation.  However,  there  must  be  something 
by  virtue  of  which  the  apparent  is  the  apparent  and  the  "real," 
the  real. 

In  solution  of  the  inquiry  which  is  thus  suggested,  it  is  to 
be  said,  that,  if  a  theory  is  internally  consistent,  then  between 


PRAGMATISM  295 

the  knowing  of  that  state  of  affairs  which  the  theory  describes 
and  the  (subsistential)  entities  of  which  this  state  of  affairs 
holds,  there  is  a  relation  of  correspondence.  If,  now,  one  takes 
these  entities  to  be  also  existential,  and  they  are  not,  one  is  in 
error.  On  the  other  hand,  if  they  are  existential,  then  there  is 
not  only  a  correspondence  between  the  knowing  process  and 
the  subsistents,  but  also  between  the  subsistents  and  the  ex- 
istents,  as  well  as  between  the  existents  and  the  knowing.  But, 
because  that  which  one  takes  to  exist  does  not  exist,  is  no  ground 
for  making  it  subjective.  Rather,  if  such  an  entity  finds  its 
place  in  a  consistent  and  implicative  theory,  then,  although  not 
existential,  it  is  subsistential,  and  as  objective  as  any  existential 
entity. 

By  this  rather  complicated  theory,  error  may  be  defined  as 
the  "regarding"  of  something  as  existential  that  is  only  sub- 
sistential. Only  "the  regarding,"  however,  is  subjective  in 
character,  i.e.,  conscious,  and  it  is  this,  also,  only  to  him  who  is 
immediately  "making"  the  wrong  identification  of  the  merely 
subsistential  with  the  existential.  The  "regarding"  is,  there- 
fore, the  only  psychical  feature  in  the  whole  error  situation. 
That  which  is  "regarded  as"  is  neither  psychical  nor  physical; 
yet  it  is  objective.    It  subsists. 

From  the  further  discussion  and  development  of  this  theory 
of  error  we  refrain,  although  there  are  many  remaining  points 
of  interest  and  of  difficulty.  But  the  discussion  that  has  been 
presented  may  have  sufficed  to  show  (1)  that  Pragmatism  does 
not  give  a  satisfactory  theory  of  error  is  distinction  from  truth; 
and  (2)  that  if,  quite  independently  of  pragraatistic  doctrines, 
the  endeavor  is  made  to  find  a  real  difference  between  truth  and 
error,  we  are  not  forced  to  grant  that  the  esse  of  error  is  either 
its  percipi  or  its  concipi — in  other  words,  that  all  errors  are 
constituted  by  consciousness,  or  are  conscious  in  nature.  So 
much  the  less,  therefore,  is  it  justified  to  infer,  as  do  some 
idealistically  and  subjectivistically  minded  philosophers,  that  the 
esse  of  all  objects  consists  in  their  being  known, — i.e.,  that  their 
esse  is  their  percipi  or  their  concipi. 

2.  The  Degrees  of  Pragmatism's  Evolutionism 
From  this  discussion  of  the  pragmatic  doctrines  of  truth  and 


296  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

error  we  must  now  return  to  the  consideration  of  other  phases 
of  Pragmatism's  evolutionism.  This  Evolutionism  is  advanced 
in  different  degrees  by  the  various  adherents  of  the  pragmatic 
philosophy. 

One  "degree"  of  this  evolutionism  consists  of  the  teachings 
just  presented  and  criticized.  Pragmatism  takes  over  the  point 
of  view  of  the  natural,  especially  the  biological  sciences,  and, 
generalizing,  maintains  that  not  only  organisms,  but  also  ideas, 
hypotheses,  and  theories  evolve.  But  at  this  stage  of  its  de- 
velopment, Pragmatism  also  accepts  unconsciously  the  realistic 
point  of  view  of  the  sciences,  namely,  that  within  the  usual 
limits  of  empirical  error,  organisms,  inorganic  elements  and 
compounds,  suns  and  stars,  and  mental  processes,  are  known 
(in  these  sciences)  essentially  as  they  are,  unmodified  and  un- 
created by  being  known.  Also,  although  these  sciences  are  them- 
selves regarded  as  evolving,  nevertheless,  in  this  "degree"  of 
Pragmatism's  development,  it  is  never  doubted  that  there  is 
a  standard  of  absolute  truth  which  is  approached  nearer  and 
nearer.  Thus  the  possibility  that,  although  knowing  processes 
themselves  evolve,  they  should,  in  the  sciences  and  especially  in 
the  pragmatic  theory  itself,  reveal  "things"  as  they  are,  is 
never  questioned.  Indeed,  in  Pragmatism  of  this  degree  it  is 
held  that  there  is  a  genuine  objective  evolution,  that  is  known  by 
the  pragmatist,  and  that  "holds"  of  all,  or,  at  least,  of  most 
"things."  In  all  this.  Pragmatism  very  evidently  accepts  the 
positions,  (1)  that  there  is  an  absolute  truth  as  a  standard  or 
ideal;  (2)  that  knowing,  although  related  to  the  "things" 
known,  neither  modifies  nor  constitutes  those  things;  and  (3)  that 
the  relation  between  knowing  and  the  known  by  which  truth  is 
constituted  is  one  of  correspondence^^^  These  propositions  are, 
however,  all  markedly  inconsistent  with  Pragmatism's  own  im- 
plications, namely,  (1)  that  truth  is  identical  with  usefulness 
and  success;  (2)  that  whatever,  by  way  of  ideas,  theories,  and 
the  like,  is  useful  and  succeeds,  is,  therefore,  true  in  just  this 
sense  of  the  identity  of  the  trite  with  the  useful;  (3)  that  all 
"things"  interact,  producing  adaptations,  and  that  knowing  is 
itself  an  adaptation;  and  (4)   that,  accordingly,  knowing  must 

"  Cf.    for    these    three    points    Chap.    XL.,    iii.    and    vii. ;    XLI;    and 
XLIII. 


PRAGMATISM  297 

not  only  be  produced  or  caused,  but  must  itself  causally  bring 
about  effects. 

In  a  further  or  second  degree  of  the  development  of  its  evo- 
lutionism, Pragmatism  aims  to  correct  some  of  these  incon- 
sistencies. It  still  retains  its  realistic  doctrine,  derived  from  the 
natural  sciences,  that  the  "real  nature"  of  "things"  can  be 
known,  and  can,  therefore,  be  related  to  the  knowing  without 
being  affected  thereby.  But  it  now  maintains  that,  also,  all  the 
principles  of  proof,  all  tests  and  criteria,  as  well  as  all  specific 
theories,  have  evolved,  and  have  persisted  and  been  accepted 
only  because  of  their  usefulness.  However,  the  standard  of  an 
absolute  truth  is  still  tacitly  accepted,  both  for  Pragmatism  itself 
as  a  theory,  and  for  the  sciences  that  it  accepts.  Yet  the  dif- 
ficulty is  recognized  of  finding  an  absolute  criterion  and  test 
by  which  to  make  certain  that  such  a  truth  has  been  attained. 
The  position  is  taken,  not  that  this  truth  cannot  be  won,  but 
that,  possibly,  it  may  not  have  been,  except  by  the  merest  chance, 
as  it  were,  so  that,  in  these  circumstances,  the  only  feasible  test 
is  empirical  confirmation  by  immediate  experience,  success,  and 
usefulness.  At  this  stage,  however,  there  still  remains  the  incon- 
sistency of  a  presupposed  absolutism  side  by  side  with  an  implied 
relativism  as  regards  the  nature  of  truth.^^ 

In  the  third  degree  of  Pragmatism's  development  the  attempt 
is  made  to  remove  the  ground  for  this  last  criticism,  by  maintain- 
ing, that  even  standards  and  ideals,  in  fact,  that  the  very  "ideas" 
or  principles  of  truth,  of  right  and  goodness,  of  correctness,  and, 
indeed,  of  all  tests  and  criteria  have  evolved,  and  that  these 
ideas  and  principles  have  persisted,  because  of  their  useful  and 
satisfactory  character.  But  the  thought  of  a  realm  of  facts  that 
are  independent  of  being  known,  and  that,  if  known,  are  not 
infiuenced  by  the  knowing,  still  lurks  in  the  minds  of  the  ad- 
herents of  this  degree  of  evolutionism,  as  is  shown  by  the  attitude 
that  is  still  taken  toward  their  own  theory.  For  it  is  main- 
tained that  this,  at  least,  portrays  "things"  as  they  are,  and 

'•  These  three  degrees  of  Pragmatism's  Evolutionism  will  not  be  found 
to  be  as  sharply  distinguished  in  pragmatic  literature  as  they  are  here. 
They  are  degrees  in  the  growth  of  the  pragmatic  viewpoint  until  it  reaches 
the  extreme  development  that  is  found,  e.g  ,  in  Schiller's  Humanism  and 
Bergson's  Creative  Evolution.  On  the  whole,  Dewey  and  James  and  their 
followers  represent  the  first  two  stages,  Schiller  and  Bergson,  the  third. 


298  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

the  natural  sciences  are  still  drawn  upon  to  furnish  many  of  the 
details.     Thus  the  Realism  in  the  position  still  persists. 

Finally  a  desperate  attempt  is  made  to  remove  this  last  incon- 
sistency by  applying  the  concept  of  evolution  to  the  very  idea 
of  a  real  "ivorld"  and  to  the  knowledge  of  all  those  details  in 
terms  of  which,  because  of  the  development  of  language,  of 
beliefs,  of  conventions,  and  the  like,  this  "world"  is  thought  of 
by  human  beings.  All  that  we  regard  the  "world"  to  be,  either 
en  masse  or  in  detail,  is  here  interpreted  as  man-made.  This  is 
Pragmatism's  humanism.  If  man  were  a  lion,  then  were  God 
also  a  lion,  said  Xenophanes.  "But  man  is  man,"  says  Human 
ism,  and,  therefore,  is  everything  after  the  image  of  man.^'^ 

But  whether  even  this  advanced  degree  of  Pragmatism's  evo- 
lutionism is  sufficiently  consistent  is  still  a  question.  For,  it 
is  still  important  to  ask,  whether  man  himself  is  thus  known 
as  he  really  is,  or  only  as  a  mere  invention,  a  growth,  a  "working 
point  of  view,"  an  hypothesis?  But,  if  he  is  this,  then  it  may 
be  asked,  Where  is  the  leverage,  the  resting  point,  the  nov  ffrco 
of  the  position?  Must  there  not  be  "somewhere"  a  reality  that 
is  not  man-made,  that  is  7iot  relative,  and  that  is  not  dependent, 
in  any  way  whatsoever,  on  being  known  ?  Does  not  the  position 
presuppose  this,  and,  also,  that  this  reality  is  correctly  known, 
even  though  it  be  (known)  only  as  a  pliable,  plastic  "some- 
thing" that,  as  knowing  processes  appear  in  the  evolutionary 
series,  may  be  modified,  altered,  and,  in  short,  "made"  in  the 
form  in  ivhich  it  is  now  known  hy  virtue  of  its  causal  relation 
to  the  knowing  process?  Finally,  is  this  radical  evolutionism 
itself  man-made  and  humanistic,  and  relativistic  in  the  sense, 
that  another  theory  might  have  become  man-made?  Or  does  it 
present  the  real  state  of  affairs? 

To  these  inquiries  the  reply  must  be,  that  Humanism  presup- 
poses a  definite  ontology,  and  that  it  accepts  this  ontology  on 
the  basis  of  a  realistic  epistemology.  In  this  respect  it  is  quite 
like,  e.g.,  Phenomenalism.  In  fact  it  is  a  modern  recrudescence 
of  this  position,  adapted  to  the  demands  or  influences  of  the 

**  Schiller  in  Humanism,  Axioms  as  Postulates;  cf.  Schiller  in  Personal 
Idealism,  Bergson  in  Creative  Evnintinn.  and  .lamca  in  I'ragmatism,  Lec- 
tures II.,  VI.,  and  especially  VII.,  p.  242,  "Schiller  on  Humanism"; 
also,  The  Meaning  of  Truth,  Lectures  III.  and  V.,  and  Essays  in  Radical 
Empiricism,  Chaps.  VII.  and  IX. 


PRAGMATISM  299 

general  theory  of  evolution.  No  longer,  in  contrast  with  the 
earlier  pragmatisms,  does  it  preach  the  doctrine,  that  it  may 
be,  that  we  do  7wt  know;  but,  rather,  like  Phenomenalism,  it 
explicitly  concludes  that  we  cayinot  know  "things"  as  they  are, 
but  only  as  ive  make  them,  and,  therefore,  as  thej^  appear  to  us. 
Also,  like  Phenomenalism,  it  implicitly  presupposes,  as  a  basis 
for  this  conclusion,  a  genuine  knowledge  of  some  'things" 
as  they  are,  and  finally  concludes  with  a  theory  which, 
as  a  whole,  presents  a  states  of  affairs  that  is  presumed  to  be 
real,  and  not  ** manufactured"  in  any  sense.  Thus  it  is,  that 
a  realistic  epistemology  emerges  both  at  the  heginning  and  at 
the  end  of  Humanism.^^ 

rV.    GENERAL   CRITICISM   OF  PRAGMATISM 

Every  degree  of  the  development  of  the  pragmatic  position, 
except  perhaps  the  first,  is  open  to  the  charge  of  the  same  incon- 
sistency of  which,  in  this  final  degree,  Humanism  is  guilty, 
namely,  that  a  non-pragmatic  position  is  tacitly  presupposed  as 
a  basis  upon  which  both  to  develop  the  pragmatic  theory  of 
knowledge  and  also  to  accept  the  resulting  detailed  theory  as 
true.  The  first  degree  of  Pragmatism  seems  to  escape  this  incon- 
sistency, but  this  is  only  because  the  implications  of  such  an 
elementary  Pragmatism  are  not  made  explicit. 

The   crucial   question   is,   therefore,   whether   the   pragmatic 
theory  in  its  complete  development  is  to  be  accepted  and  inter- 
preted pragmatically,  or  not  ?  "^     Consistency  demands  that  it 
shall  be  so  accepted,  and  yet,  if  it  is  so  accepted, — on  the  ground,    . 
namely,  that  it  is  a  theory  that  works  well,  and  is  useful  and 
satisfactory — then  one  must  infer  that  it  is  a  theory  that  is  true    j 
only  relatively,  and  not  absohitely.     But,  on  the  other  hand,    ,« 
Pragmatism  is  a  theory  that  is  advanced  as  true  in  the  latter,   ' 
and  not  in  the  former  sense.     Also,  if  Pragmatism   is  itself '( 
interpreted  pragmatically  on  the  ground  of  consistency,  yet  not 
because  consistency  is  useful,  but  because  it  is  consistency,  then,   i 
again,  not  a  pragmatic,  but  an  absolutistic  criterion  and  char-  \ 
acteristic  of  truth  is  accepted.     The  only  escape  from  this  is 

="  Cf.  Section  4,  Chaps.  XXXIX.  and  XL. 

^*  The  question  raised,  e.g.,  by  Royco  in  his  presidential  address,  "The 
Eternal  and  the  Practical,"  Phil.  Review,  Vol.  XIIL,  No.  2,  March,  1904. 


300  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

to  accept  consistency  as  being  merely  useful,  but  this  is  at  the 
cost  of  introducing  relativism  once  more  as  characterizing,  not 
only  other  truth,  hut  also  the  triith  of  Pragmatism  itself.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  the  pragmatic  position,  either  in  its  partial  or 
its  complete  development,  be  interpreted  frankly  as  not  relative, 
as  not  pragmatic,  but  as  portraying  ahsolutely  the  real  state  of 
of  affairs  concerning  the  "things"  it  investigates,  then  it  is 
disloyal  to  its  own  theory  of  truth  and  of  knowledge,  and  is 
open  to  the  charge  of  inconsistency,  even  as  this  is  defined  by 
the  very  absolutism  which  is  therewith  tacitly  accepted.^'' 

This  is  the  dilemma  in  which  Pragmatism  finds  itself.  It 
would  choose  to  be  relativistic  toward  everything — except  the 
pragmatic  theory;  but  toward  this  it  must,  seemingly,  be  abso- 
lutistic,  though  to  be  this  is  to  incur  new  difficulties  in  order  to 
avoid  others.  It  would  hold  that  all  ''things,"  including  all 
knowing  processes,  interact  with  other  "things,"  with  the  result 
that  all  "things"  are  modified  by  one  another,  constituted  by 
one  another,  and  adapted  to  one  another.  But  Pragmatism 
does  not  take  this  position  as  regards  those  "things"  or  states 
of  affairs  that  are  known  in  the  pragmatic  theory,  and  that 
are  related  to  the  knowing  that  takes  place  in  the  mind  of  the 
pragmatist.  Indeed,  it  cannot  take  this  position  toward  itself, 
without  making  itself  relativistic,  and  not  absolute ;  yet  it  must 
take  this  position  toward  itself  in  order  to  be  consistent. 

Which  horn  of  the  dilemma  does  Pragmatism  "really" 
accept?  The  answer  to  this  inquiry  depends  psychologically 
upon  the  attitude  which  one  takes  toward  the  character  and 
use  of  logical  principles.  Can  such  principles  be  used  uncon- 
sciously and  without  having  received  formulation,  or  not?  Can 
one  thus  unconsciously  have  his  thinking  conform  to  and  pre- 
suppose certain  principles;  e.g.,  can  one  in  asserting  and  deny- 
ing, thus  use  and  presuppose  the  principle  of  contradiction? 
If  these  "things"  can  be  done,  then  the  answer  to  our  first 
inquiry  is  quite  evident — and  it  is  an  answer  that  is  quite  in 
accordance  with  that  standpoint  which  is  accepted  and  pre- 
sented in  our  introductory  chapters.  That  answer  is,  that  Prag- 
matism itself  logically — no  matter  what  attitude  the  prag- 
matist may  will  explicitly  to  express  in  indignant  denial  of 
•'  Royce's  criticism,  ihid. 


PRAGMATISM  SOI 

this — contradicts  itself  iy  explicitly  developing  the  definition  of 
all  truth  as  relative,  and  hy  then  making  a  tacit  exception  to 
this  definition  as  regards  the  truth  of  itself  as  a  theory. 

To  the  writer  the  fact  of  this  self-contradiction  in  Prag- 
matism makes  the  theory  impossible  of  acceptance,  while  it  also 
furnishes  further  empirical  evidence  for  Realism.  For  it  is  upon 
a  realistic  basis  that  Pragmatism  rests  as  regards  the  epi- 
stemological  interpretation  of  the  knowing  of  those  states  of 
affairs  that  form  the  "content"  of  the  theory  itself,  or  that 
are  "the  objects  known"  and  described  in  that  theory. 

The  crucial  question  for  Pragmatism  therefore  is,  Shall  this 
realistic  basis  be  observed  and  developed  further?  But,  if  it 
is,  what  becomes  of  Pragmatism?  And  if  it  is  not,  what  becomes 
of  Pragmatism's  consistency? 

V.    CONCLUSION 

This  discussion  of  Pragmatism  has  been  so  long  that  it  may 
be  well  to  give  a  summary.  The  theory  represents  the  most 
modern  development  of  the  positivistic  and  naturalistic  tend- 
encies in  philosophy,  as  these  have  been  influenced  by  the  nat- 
ural and  empirical  sciences,  and  especially  by  the  general 
doctrine  of  evolution.  The  theory  is,  however,  full  of  incon- 
sistencies, some  of  which  are  most  damaging.  If  these  be  dis- 
missed by  Pragmatism  with  the  claim,  that  consistency  is  one 
kind  of  usefulness,  but  not  the  only  kind,  and  that,  therefore, 
it  need  not  trouble  itself  over  these  internal  difficulties,  and 
that  it  itself  may  be  useful  and  satisfactory  and  therefore  true 
notwithstanding  them,  then,  in  accepting  usefulness  and  satis- 
factoriness  as  the  ultimate  characteristic  of  itself  as  a  theory, 
Pragmatism  must  grant  the  right  of  other  opposed  theories  to 
maintain  this  same  status,  as  well  as  whatever  follows  from  it. 
But,  one  will  readily  appreciate,  that  to  some  philosophers 
other  theories  may  be  quite  as  satisfactory  and  useful  as  Prag- 
matism is  to  its  adherents,  and,  therefore,  by  Pragmatism's  own 
doctrine,  be  quite  as  true.  Then  ivhy — one  naturally  asks — 
advocate  Pragmatism  as  against  these  other  theories  ? 

The  fact  is,  however,  that  Pragmatism's  identification  of 
truth  with  usefulness  and  resulting  satisfaction,  and  the  like, 
does  not  stand  the  test  of  criticism.    Indeed,  Pragmatism  does 


802  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

not  accept  this  identification  in  regard  to  the  presumed  truth  of 
its  own  theory.  Toward  itself,  it  takes  the  position  that,  al- 
though it  is  a  useful  and  satisfactory  theory  to  the  pragmatist, 
it  is  not  for  these  reasons  true.  Rather,  its  truth  is  tacitly  held 
to  "rest"  on  another  relation,  namely,  that  of  correspondence 
between  the  known  state  of  affairs  described  by  Pragmatism  and 
the  knowing  of  this,  and  it  is  because  the  theory  is  true  in  this 
sense,  that  it  is  also  useful  and  satisfactory.  Usefulness  and 
resulting  satisfaction  are  thus  tacitly  held  by  Pragmatism  to  be, 
at  most,  only  indications  of  or  tests  for  its  own  truth, — a  truth 
that  conditions  them,  but  with  which  they  are  not  identical. 

However,  Pragmatism  does  not  consistently  stand  by  even 
this  last  tacitly  presupposed  position,  namely,  that  the  useful- 
ness and  satisfaction  of  an  idea,  a  theory,  a  belief  are  indications, 
or  tests  of  truth.  For,  toward  other  theories  which  are  directly 
opposed  to  the  pragmatic,  and  which  are  satisfactory  to  their 
adherents.  Pragmatism  takes  the  position,  that,  although  useful, 
these  theories  are  not  true;^^  indeed,  in  their  case.  Pragmatism 
maintains  that  the  very  fact,  that  the  idea,  or  "the  holding  of 
them  to  be  true,"  itself  generates  or  conditions  the  effect  of 
satisfaction,  makes  against  their  being  true.  In  these  circum- 
stances it  is  quite  evident  that  Pragmatism  cannot  consistently 
advance  the  doctrine,  implied  by  its  evolutionism,  that  mere  use- 
fulness and  satisfaction  are  not  only  "marks"  of,  but  also  are 
identical  with,  truth.  This  identification  makes  it  impossible, 
as  we  have  seen,  for  Pragmatism  to  recognize  as  false  anything 
that  has  persisted  and  is  still  extant.  Yet,  inconsistently  there- 
with. Pragmatism  regards  those  theories  that  are  opposed  to  it 
&.  thoroughly  in  error. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  one  considers,  not  the  consequences,  but 
the  suppositions  upon  which  the  pragmatic  theory  rests,  and  the 
positions  which  it  takes  toward  itself,  and  compares  these  with 
its  explicit  teachings,  one  again  discovers  many  inconsistencies. 
Explicitly,  in  its  epistemology.  Pragmatism  is  relativistic  and 
individualistic.  But,  for  itself,  it  presupposes  Absolutism  and 
a  universal  standard.  Further,  explicitly,  in  its  most  advanced 
degree  of  development,  it  is  phenomenalistic,  with  a  strong  tend< 

'"E.g.,  .Tamos,  Pragmatism,  Lectures  III.  and  IV.;  Pluralistic  Universe, 
Lectures  I.,  II.,  III. 


PRAGMATISM  SOS 

ency  towards  Subjectivism.  But,  toward  itself  and  in  respect 
to  the  ontology  upon  which  it  rests,  it  is  frankly  realistic.  Its 
cosmology  and  teleology  are  those  largely  of  the  generalized 
theory  of  evolution  which  it  obtains  from  the  natural  sciences, 
and  which  it  both  rests  upon  and  further  develops.  Also,  its 
ethics  and  entire  theory  of  values,  as  explicitly  developed,  are 
evolutionistic  and  relativistic,  while,  by  its  explicit  teachings, 
the  theological  problem  is  as  capable  of  as  many  solutions  as 
are  satisfactory  and  useful  to  different  races,  nations,  and  even 
individuals. 

Toward  the  problem  of  the  nature  of  consciousness,  Prag-J 
matism  offers  no  positive  contribution,  except  by  elimination.! 
It  does,  however,  get  away  from  any  explicit  teaching,  that  there 
is  an  ego  or  siibstance-like  and  indivisible,  simple  soul,  or  that 
consciousness  in  its  several  phases  is  a  substance  or  energy. 
Rather,  it  approaches  the  realistic  position,  that  consciousness 
is  either  a  specific  relation  or  a  dimension,^"  and  the  dynamic 
view  of  modern  psychology,  that  consciousness  appears  and  dis- 
appears on  certain  conditions,  so  that  it  is  the  generic  name  for 
a  specific  set  of  processes. 

For  its  reaction  and  protestations  against  the  domination  of 
the  ''thing"  and  substance  concepts  in  our  thinking,  Prag- 
matism deserves  only  credit.  Yet,  since  these  concepts  have 
been  and  still  are  satisfactory  to  some  thinkers  in  the  develop- 
ment of  science  and  philosophy,  Pragmatism  must  admit,  by 
its  explicit  teachings  as  to  the  nature  of  truth,  the  truth  of  these 
concepts. 

Like  other  philosophies.  Pragmatism  is  the  result  of  intel- 
lectual endeavor.  It  therefore  presupposes  the  correctness  and 
trustworthiness  of  at  least  some  intellectual  methods.*"  Yet, 
in  its  extreme  form  of  evolutionism  and  anti-intellectualism,  it 
denies  to  intellect  all  power  to  reveal  the  absolute  truth,  ascrib-  , 
ing  to  it  only  the  ability  to  produce  falsifications  that  are 
nevertheless  useful.*^  In  this  attack,  however,  intellect  is  un- 
justifiably limited  to  the  use  of  only  one  set  of  rational  princi- 
ples, namely,  those  of  the  old  logic  of  "things,"     The  attack 

'"  James,  Pluralistic  Universe,  Lecture  V. 
*"  Cf.  Chap.  XL.,  IX.,  XLL,  xii.  and  xiv. 
*'  Bergson's  position  in  Creative  Evolution. 


804  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

fails,  however,  because  in  the  solution  of  certain  problems,  such 
as  those  of  motion  and  change  in  general,  other  methods  of 
analysis  and  synthesis  are  at  hand  for  intellect  to  use.  The 
attack  also  fails,  if  that  presupposition  which  Pragmatism  itself 
makes  as  regards  its  oivn  argument  be  recognized,  namely,  that 
the  old  logic  is  valid  for  the  field  of  ordinary  discourse.  One 
can  readily  show,  therefore,  that  both  intellect  and  perception 
reveal  fact,  and  that  truth  is  obtained  by  checking  each  of  these 
processes  by  the  other. 

This,  indeed,  is  the  method  that  has  been  used  by  practically 
all  modern  sciences,  especially  by  those  natural  sciences  upon 
which  Pragmatism  in  particular  is  based.  Therefore  Prag- 
matism's anti-intellectualism  is  acceptable  and  stands  the  test 
of  criticism  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  protest  against  the  exclusive 
use  of  the  old  logic  of  "things."  This  was  the  method  of 
scholastic  science  and  philosophy,  and  it  has  been  the  method 
also  of  much  modern  philosophy.  But  it  is  not  the  method  and 
the  iyitellectualism  of  modern  times. 

Just  as  one  finds  both  acceptable  and  unacceptable  doctrines 
in  Pragmatism's  anti-intellectualism,  so  also  does  one  find  them 
in  its  evolutionism.  Pragmatism  as  a  philosophical  position  is 
based  on  the  general  doctrine  of  evolution  more  than  upon  any 
other  scientific  principle.  For,  even  in  that  phase  of  Prag- 
matism's anti-intellectualism  in  which  all  intellectualizing  is 
held  to  be  a  process  of  falsifying,  and  it  is  concluded,  that  only 
"the  evolving"  is  real,  it  is  only  the  order  of  argumentation  for 
evolutionism,  namely,  the  ratio  cognoscendi  that  is  different. 
The  ratio  essendi,  the  real  logic  of  the  order  of  its  argument,  is 
still  the  same,  namely,  that  Pragmatism  is  derived  from  the  con- 
cept of  evolution  as  applied  to  everything. 

In  its  use  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution.  Pragmatism,  however, 
goes  to  extremes.  It  is,  undeniably,  a  fact  of  science,  that  many 
"things"  evolve.  The  list  of  "things"  that  do,  includes  stars, 
and  suns  and  planets,  perhaps,  also,  the  chemical  elements,  cer- 
tainly plants  and  animals,  and,  finally,  such  human  institutions 
as  language,  religion,  literature,  art,  science,  and  philosophy. 
But,  just  as  the  principles  of  biological  evolution  do  not  hold  for 
all  these  evolving  "things,"  so,  also,  is  it  a  question  whether 
the  general  principle  of  evolution  applies  to  all  "things"  without 


PRAGMATISM  305 

exception.  Pragmatism,  somewhat  uncritically  and  vaguely, 
maintains  that  it  does.  But,  it  may  be  asked,  whether,  e.g.,  the 
principle  of  evolution,  as  distinct  from  the  knowledge  of  this 
principle,  itself  evolves?  Certainly  the  knowledge  of  it  may, 
but  does  it,  even  if  all  other  "things"  do?  But  further,  do 
space  and  time  evolve,  or  does  only  the  knowledge  of  them?  Do 
numerical  relations,  although  the  evolution  of  other  "things" 
may  take  place  in  accordance  with  these?  Do  those  general 
logical  principles  that  underlie  the  very  principle  of  evolution 
itself?  Finally,  do  all  those  states  of  affairs  that  hold  of  those 
entities  to  which  we  are  led  by  consistent  thinking,  namely,  the 
realm  of  subsistents?  Or  those  ultimate  elements, — whatever 
these  may  be,  electrons,  or  something  else, — out  of  which  the 
existential  physical  world  is  "made"? 

If  the  answer  to  these  questions,  some  or  all  of  them,  is 
negative,  as  it  must  be,  then  the  position  that  must  be  taken 
toward  the  principle  of  evolution  is,  that  its  field  is  limited. 
Not  all  "things"  evolve!  Some  do,  hut  some  do  not.  Those 
which  do,  are  those  existents,  physical  and  mental,  which  are 
complex,  and  not  simple.  But  no  subsistents  evolve,  and  some 
existents  do  not,  namely,  those  existents  that  are  absolutely 
simple.  Only  complex  existents,  correlated  as  they  are  with 
specific  times  or  places,  one  or  both,  are  subject  to  the  general 
principle  of  evolution,  and  that,  perhaps,  in  only  the  most 
general  sense  of  this  term  as  meaning  change  in  composition, 
usually  from  the  less  to  the  more  complex. 

The  logical  and  philosophical  position  that  Pragmatism  pre- 
supposes or  takes  toward  itself  both  in  its  foundation  and  as  a 
fully  developed,  reasoned  theory,  confirms  this  criticism  of  evo- 
lutionism. For  example,  it  may  be  asked:  Is  the  pragmatist 
ever  found  presenting  his  Pragmatism  as  a  theory  that  is  true 
(useful)  only  today,  but  that  would  not  have  been  true  a 
hundred  years  ago,  or  that  would  not  be  true  a  hundred  years 
hence  ?  Does  he  not,  rather,  offer  it  for  acceptance  as  a  position 
which  presents  a  state  of  affairs  regarding  knowledge,  truth,  and 
the  like,  that  was  a  fact  before  it  was  known  to  be  a  fact,  but 
that  has  become  known  in  recent  years  and  that  will  remain  a 
fact  indefinitely  in  the  future,  even  though  it  be  for  gotten  f 
Also,  does  not  the  pragmatist  take  the  position  toward  bis  own 


806  CAUSATION  PHILOSOPHIES 

theory,  that,  although  the  knowledge  of  it  has  evolved,  the  com- 
plex state  of  affairs  which  it  presents  has  not? 

Seemingly,  if  we  can  judge  by  the  character  of  the  prag- 
matist's  own  propaganda,  only  ''yes"  can  be  answered  to  these 
inquiries.  But,  if  a  distinction  is  presupposed  between,  on  the 
one  hand,  that  state  of  affairs  which  has  been  fact  ''all  the 
time,"  and  has  not  evolved,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  knowing, 
which  has  evolved,  then  is  it  not  also  presupposed  that,  although 
the  knowing  of  the  pragmatic  theory  may  be  both  satisfying 
and  useful,  nevertheless,  these  characteristics  do  not  constitute 
the  truth  of  the  theory  ?  And  is  it  not  also  presupposed  that  the 
theory  is  true,  because  the  knowing  that  has  evolved  reveals 
the  real  nature  of  "things,"  so  that  there  is  a  relation  of  cor- 
respondence between  the  knowing  and  the  known  ? 

Again  must  our  inquiries  be  answered  affirmatively.  The 
same  general  position  that  Pragmatism  takes  for  itself  must  be 
adhered  to  in  the  philosophical  interpretation  of  the  character 
of  other  attempts  to  know.  There  are  two  realms  of  entities  to 
become  known  when  the  conditions  for  knowing  have  themselves 
evolved.  These  two  realms  are  those  of  existents  and  of  suh- 
sistents.*-  Jome  existents  evolve,  and,  among  these,  are  specific 
knowing  processes,  which  can  themselves  become  known  as  well 
as  can  other  e  istents.  The  evidence  is,  however,  that  knowing, 
once  it  exists,  is  not  subject  to  the  same  principle  of  causal 
interaction  as  are  other  evolving  "things."  For,  although  the 
knowing  is,  of  course,  related  to  the  "thing"  known,  the  two  are 
independent  of  each  other.  The  knowing  takes  place,  and  knowl- 
edge arises,  yet  in  no  case  with  absolute  certainty,  but  only 
with  tentativeness.  Among  ideas  and  beliefs,  theories  and 
hypotheses,  there  are  variations,  survivals,  and  deaths,  in  fact 
a  genuine  evolution.  The  useful  ideas  and  theories  survive,  their 
usefulness  being  conditioned  by  their  truth,  a7id  not  conversely, 
until  finally  a  state  of  affairs  is  revealed  concerning  both 
"things"  that  exist  and  "things"  that  do  not,  which  knowledge 
has  a  high  degree  of  probable,  though,  perhaps,  never  of  abso- 
lute truth. 

Pragmatism  in  its  evolutionism  presents  much  that  is  true  in 
this  sense.    But,  just  as  the  theory  itself  has  had  a  history,  and 

**Cf.  the  classification  given  in  Chap.  XLIV. 


PRAGMATISM  307 

has  evolved,  without  that  state  of  affairs  which  it  describes  hav- 
ing enjoyed  the  same  fate,  so  Evolutionism  may  hold  of  many 
"things"  without  holding  of  all.  This,  rather  than  that  uni- 
versal evolutionism  which  Pragmatism  maintains,  is  the  verdict 
of  that  modern  criticism  which  is  so  fortunate  as  to  be  free  from 
the  naturalistic  bias  that  is  engendered  by  the  undue  emphasis 
of  the  natural  sciences  in  respect  of  their  data,  their  methods, 
and  their  dominant  concepts  and  generalizations. 

GENERAL    BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  literature  on  Pragmatism  has  been  very  extensive  in  recent  years 
in  respect  to  both  volumes  and  articles.  The  following  are  some  of  the 
more  important  volumes  by  the  leading  American  and  English  pragmatists: 
H.  H.  Bawden,  The  Principles  of  Pragmatism,  1910;  J.  E.  Boodin,  Truth 
and  Reality,  1912;  J.  Dewey  (with  his  pupils),  Studies  in  Logical  Theory, 
1903,  2nd  ed.,  1909,  (cf.  Empirical  Logic,  1916)  ;  Ethics  (with  J.  H.  Tufts), 
1909;  Influence  of  Darwin  on  Philosophy  and  other  Essays;  Education  and 
Democracy,  1916;  and  many  articles  in  the  philosophical  journals;  Wm. 
James,  Meaning  of  Truth,  1909,  Pragmatism,  1907,  A  Pluralistic  Universe, 
1909,  Some  Problems  of  Philosophy,  1910,  Memories  and  Studies,  1911, 
Essays  in  Radical  Empiricism,  1912;  A.  W.  Moore,  Pragmatism  and  Its 
Critics,  1910;  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  Humanism,  1912,  and  an  Essay  in  Personal 
Idealism,  ed.  by  H.  Sturt,  1902. 

The  leading  French  pragmatist  is  Bergson,  Creative  Evolution,  trans,  by 
Mitchell,  1911;  Titne  and  Free  Will,  trans,  by  F.  L.  Pogson,  1910;  Matter 
and  Memory,  trans,  by  Paul  and  Palmer,  1911. 

Among  German  pragmatists  there  are:  W.  Jerusalem,  Introduction  to 
Philosophy,  trans.,  5th  ed.,  1910;  H.  Vaihinger,  Die  Philosophic  als  Ob, 
1911:  Nietzsche  was  one  of  the  earliest  pragmatists,  especially  in  his 
"  Darwinian  Period," — a  fact  that  is  generally  overlooked.  Works,  Eng. 
trans.,  ed.  by  Tille;  cf.  monographs  on  Nietzsche  by  A.  Riehl,  Vaihinger, 
Eisler,  Wolf,  and  Menchen. 

Closely  allied  with  Pragmatism  and  regarded  by  some  as  pragmatists 
are:  Poincare,  Science  and  Hypothesis,  Value  of  Science,  Science  and 
Method;  Mach,  Science  of  Mechanics,  and  Wdrmelehre  (last  part)  ;  LeRoy, 
in  many  articles;  Karl  Pearson,  Grammar  of  Science;  Eucken,  Main  Cur- 
rents of  Modern  Thought,  and  a  number  of  other  volumes. 

For  a  discussion  and  criticism  of  Pragmatism  see:  Wm.  Caldwell,  Prag- 
matism and  Idealism;  C.  S.  Peirce,  Popular  Science  Monthly,  December, 
1877,  and  January,  1878;  G.  Tyrell,  Christianity  at  the  Crossroads,  1909, 
Lex  Orandi,  1903,  Lex  Credendi,  1906;  A.  O.  Lovejoy,  "  The  Thirteen  Prag- 
matisms," Journ.  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  V.,  p.  5; 
Royce,  Presidential  Address  on  "  The  Eternal  and  the  Practical,"  PhiL 
Review,  March,  1904. 


SECTION  III 

SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 
OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM 

CHAPTER  XXXIV 
INTRODUCTORY 

I.   OBJECTIVE,   SUBJECTIVE,   AND  PLATONIC   IDEALISM 

Objective  Idealism  is  the  name  for  that  philosophy  which 
maintains  that,  while  so-called  physical  entities  are  not,  as 
Subjective  Idealism  holds,  either  the  sensations  or  the  ideas  of 
finite  spirits,  they  (physical  entities)  and,  also,  all  other  entities 
are,  nevertheless,  in  some  way  psychical  or  mental  in  nature, 
especially  as  identical  with  the  mental  "contents"  of  some  Abso- 
lute Mind,  Self,  or  Spirit.  Of  all  modern  philosophical  systems 
this  position  has  received,  perhaps,  the  fullest  development,  and 
exerted  the  widest  influence  in  philosophical  and  especially  in 
religious  circles.  Phenomenalism  is  the  only  position  to  dispute 
these  claims,  but  Objective  Idealism  probably  far  exceeds  Phe- 
nomenalism in  the  number  both  of  its  adherents  and  of  the 
pages  offered  in  its  behalf  in  the  classical  tomes  of  such  phi- 
losophers as  Spinoza,  Fichte,  Schelling,  Hegel,  Schopenhauer, 
Bradley,  and  Royce. 

Historically  Objective  Idealism  grew  out  of  Phenomenalism 
in  the  efforts  of  the  critics  ^  of  this  latter  theory  to  remove  its 
difficulties  and  to  present  a  coherent  and  consistent  system. 
Therefore,  thus  regarded.  Phenomenalism,  with  its  emphasis  of 
the  epistemological  problem  and  of  the  ego-centric  predicament, 
becomes  the  most  completely  developed  and  the  most  influential 
of  all  modern  systems.  However,  while  the  study  of  historical 
development  might  reveal  a  certain   continuity  between  Phe- 

•  E.g.,  Fichte. 
308 


INTRODUCTORY  S09 

nomenalism  and  Objective  Idealism,  criticism  from  the  stand- 
points of  modern  logic  shows  that  the  two  positions  are  quite 
different  in  their  logical  structure.  For  Phenomenalism  is  based 
on  the  modification  theory  of  relations,  and  Objective  Idealism 
on  the  underlying-  or  transcendent-reality  theory. 

Sometimes  Objective  Idealism  is  called  Transcendental  Ideal- 
ism, and,  as  well,  also,  Absolute,  Epistemological,  and  On- 
tological  Idealism.  The  theory  differs  (as  has  just  been  stated) 
from  Subjective  Idealism,  since,  whereas  this  latter  theory 
makes  at  least  the  whole  so-called  physical  world  subjective  in 
its  being,  Objective  Idealism  grants  the  objectivity  of  that 
world  with  reference  to  finite  conscious  individuals,  such  as 
human  beings.  For  Objective  Idealism,  this  "world,"  with  all 
its  relations,  events,  objects,  and  qualities,  may  be  the  mani- 
festation of  One  Infinite  Spirit,  but  it  is  not  the  mere  sensa- 
tions or  ideas  of  finite  spirits.  Indeed,  for  Objective  Idealism, 
finite  spirits  may  themselves,  like  physical  "things,"  be  "ab- 
sorbed," in  some  manner,  into  a  single  great  all-inclusive  spirit. 
Objective  Idealism  may,  therefore,  very  properly  be  called  a 
psychism,  though  it  is  not  one  that  develops  out  of  Naturalism.^ 
Indeed,  it  is  a  psychism  that  is  extremely  critical  toward  all 
those  naturalistic  tendencies  that  have  been  discussed  under 
the  captions  of  Pragmatism,  Parallelism,  Positivism,  and  the 
like. 

It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that,  together  with  Sub- 
jectivism, which  is  also  a  psychism,  Objective  Idealism  differs 
very  radically  from  that  other  great  historical  Idealism,  the 
Platonic.  Indeed,  this  last  theory  is,  strictly  speaking,  not  a 
psychism  at  all,  but  a  Realism  of  Ideals.^  For  it,  ideas,  per- 
cepts, acts  of  will,  and  the  like,  are,  as  psychical  entities,  real, 
as,  also,  are  physical  objects ;  and  both  of  these  types  of  entities 
can  be  known  "as  they  really  are,"  unmodified  and  uncon- 
stituted  by  the  act  of  knowing,  and  although  there  is  error  and 
opinion  in  the  midst  of  truth  and  genuine  knowledge.  But, 
also,  in  Platonic  Idealism,  ''ideals"  are  maintained  to  be  quite 
as  real,  and  quite  as  genuinely  known,  as  are  other  entities. 
Such  ideals  are,  e.g.,  those  of  absolute  and  perfect  truth,  of 
goodness,  and  of  beauty,  and  also  those  of  the  perfect  man,  the 

»  See  Chap.  XXXII.  '  Chaps.  XLIV.,  XLV.,  and  XLVI. 


SIO  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

perfect  circle,  the  perfect  rose.  In  fact,  for  each  realm  of 
existing  "things"  there  is  the  ideal,  the  standard,  the  pattern, 
the  archetype,  which  may  be  approached,  but  never  reached. 
Indeed,  concrete,  particular  "things"  come  and  go,  appearing 
at  certain  times  and,  perhaps,  also  places,  but  the  ideals  are 
neither  here  nor  there,  neither  now  nor  then.  They  are  time- 
less, and,  in  that  sense,  eternal ;  spaceless,  and,  in  that  sense, 
omnipresent;  subsisting,  but  not  existing. 

These  distinctions  between  ancient  and  modern  Idealism  are 
most  essential.  Clearly,  ancient  Idealism  is  not  a  psychism, 
since,  for  it,  all  "things"  are  not  ultimately  mental  in  nature, 
and  there  is  no  insuperable  difficulty  in  the  way  of  knowing 
"things"  as  thej'-  are;  also,  "things"  are  neither  altered  by 
being  known,  as  in  Phenomenalism,  nor  wholly  constituted  by 
knowing,  as  in  Subjective  and  Objective  Idealism.  Ancient 
Idealism  is,  therefore,  a  Realism  not  only  as  regards  physical 
and  mental  entities,  but  also  as  regards  entities  that  are  neither 
physical  nor  mental. 

Objective  Idealism  also,  while  it  is  ontologically,  in  respect  to 
its  conclusions,  a  psychism,  is  epistemologically ,  as  regards  its 
basis,  a  Realism.  Its  psychism  consists  in  its  final  position  that 
the  ultimate  nature  of  all  "things"  without  exception  is  mental; 
its  Realism  is  identical  with  its  position, — taken,  perhaps,  as  a 
result  of  criticism  of  other  philosophies, — that  there  are  no 
difficulties  inherent  in  the  knowing  situation  to  prevent  our 
getting  at  this  ultimately  psychical  character  of  all  "things."* 
Yet  there  are  difficulties.  For,  that  all  "things"  are  ultimately 
psychical,  is  a  proposition  that  is  not  only  not  evident  to  direct 
experience,  but  that  is  difficult  to  establish.  Yet,  with  this 
demonstration  once  made,  Realism  again  appears,  though  not 
a  Realism  of  the  senses  and  of  ordinary  experience,  but  of 
rational  and  also,  perhaps,  of  emotional  processes.  For  by 
rather  devious  rationalizing,  the  objective  idealist  finally  comes 
to  know  that  all  "things"  are  psychical,  and,  knowing  this, 
finds  this  knowledge  to  be  confirmed  by  an  emotional  experi- 
ence, oftentimes  ecstatic  in  character,  in  which  it  is  felt,  that 
all  is  spirit,  and  indeed  that  he  himself  is  one  with  that  spirit 
which  is  all. 

*  Chaps.  XL.,  in. ;  XLIII. 


INTRODUCTORY  811 

II.  THE  HISTORICAL  DEVELOPMENT  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  OUT  OP 
PHENOMENALISM 

The  question  has  already  been  discussed,  whether  the  prob- 
lems of  philosophy  are  problems  because  they  have  appeared  in 
a  specific  historical  development,  or  because  they  concern  facts 
that  present  difficulties  which  are  quite  independent  of  history.^ 
It  has  also  been  found,  in  answer  to  this  question,  that,  if  there 
are  historical  facts — and,  of  course,  there  are — there  may  be 
other  facts — facts  that  are  not  historical  or  genetic.  One  can 
distinguish,  therefore,  facts  that  are  not  historical,  and  facts 
that  are  historical.  In  turn,  within  the  realm  of  facts  that  are 
genetic  in  character,  there  are  those  specific  facts  that  are 
identical  with  the  attempts  and  endeavors  to  know — to  get 
knowledge,  and,  within  this  field,  there  is,  again,  the  still  nar- 
rower group  of  facts  that  are  identical  with  the  awareness  of 
problems. 

The  fact  of  the  awareness  of  problems  does  not  imply,  how- 
ever, that  the  problems  of  which  there  is  an  awareness  are  in 
every  case  real  problems.  Indeed,  the  mere  development  of 
knowledge  and  of  attempts  to  know  oftentimes  produces  arti- 
ficial problems.  On  the  other  hand,  if  all  problems  were  pro- 
duced by  the  very  development  of  the  attempt  to  know  and  to 
solve  them,  then  would  there  be  no  distinction  between  real  and 
artificial  problems.  If  there  are  real  problems,  therefore,  it  is 
because  they  concern  facts  and  not  because  tbey  have  had,  as 
problems,  a  history  or  development. 

Objective  Idealism  historically  became  aware  of  its  problems 
in  reactive  criticism  of  Phenomenalism  and  in  the  development 
of  the  monistic,  substance  doctrine  of  Spinoza  (1632-77).  The 
historical  fact  constituted  by  this  reaction  against  Phenomenal- 
ism was  the  observation  of  the  contradictions  that  are  involved 
in  this  philosophy. 

Phenomenalism  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  position,  that  the 
ultimate  nature  of  "things"  is  unhnowahle,  and  not  merely 
unknown,  and  that  only  appearances,  or  phenomena,  come  within 
our  ken.  The  position  implies,  however,  that  the  unknowable 
things-in-themselves  are,  nevertheless,  known  to  be  things,  each 
of  which  is  identical  with  itself,  all  of  which  subsist  as  m^awy, 
»  Chapa.  I.,  XIV.,  and  XXVIII. 


312  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

and  at  least  some  of  which  act  causally  on  a  thing-like  ego  to 
produce  sensations.^  Further,  and  inconsistently  with  the  com- 
pleted form  in  which  the  theory  is  offered  for  acceptance,  Phe- 
nomenalism is  assumed  to  present  a  state  of  affairs  that  is  reality 
and  not  mere  appearance,  and  that  is  neither  constituted  nor 
altered  by  the  knowing  process  to  which  it  is  related. 

This  specific  problem  as  to  the  character  of  the  relation  be- 
tween knowing  and  that  which  is  known,  is  a  real  problem,  and 
Phenomenalism  is  one  result  of  the  attempt  to  solve  it.  How- 
ever, in  the  working  out  of  the  phenomenalistic  solution  to  this 
problem,  artificial  problems  arise,  because  of  the  presuppositions 
that  are  made,  and  because  of  the  logic  that  is  used.  For  exam- 
ple, the  problem  as  to  what  "forms"  or  principles  are  inherent 
in  the  mind,  or  in  reason,  is  an  artificial  problem  which  arises 
out  of  the  assumption,  that  knowing  involves  a  thing-like, 
substance-like,  spiritual  self  or  ego.  So  also  the  problem  as 
to  the  continuity  and  discontinuity  of  space  and  time,  which 
constitutes  an  antinomy,  is  artificially  produced  by  ignoring 
the  modern  principle  of  order,  and,  accordingly,  by  assuming 
the  specific  principle  of  the  old  logic,  that  the  07ily  way  in  which 
parts  form  a  whole  is  by  being  related  additively. 

One  stimulus  to  the  development  of  Objective  Idealism  out 
of  Phenomenalism  came  from  the  observation  of  those  contra- 
dictions that  have  just  been  mentioned  as  concerning  the  problem 
of  knowing.  This  problem  still  persists.  As  involved  in  this 
problem  there  was  for  Idealism  the  further  problem,  as  to 
whether  the  knowing  could  in  any  way, — either  experimentally 
or  by  an  analysis  in  situ — be  removed  from  that  which  is  known, 
so  that,  indirectly,  perhaps,  the  world  could  be  known  as  if  it 
ivere  not  known.  Also  there  is  the  problem,  as  to  what  the 
character  of  this  "world"  is,  e.g.,  whether  it  is  one  or  many, 
and,  if  one,  what  the  nature  of  this  oneness  is. 

These  problems  are  real,  the  attempts  to  solve  them  constitut- 
ing a  good  part  of  the  development  of  philosophical  thinking 
during  the  last  hundred  and  fifty  years.  Yet  these  same  prob- 
lems can  be  reopened  today  as  if  they  had  never  been  examined 
before,  and  the  solutions  to  them  compared  with  those  solutions 

*  Schulze  in  Mnesidermts,  1792,  ed.  by  Liebert,  1911;  J.  S.  Beck  in  a 
volume  published  in  1796;  and  Fichte  in  his  Wiasenschaftslehre. 


INTRODUCTORY  313 

which  were  given  in  the  past.  In  other  words,  the  solutions 
of  the  past,  and  the  logic  that  underlies  these  solutions,  can 
now  be  reviewed  from  the  standpoint  of  that  more  thorough 
understanding  of  logic  which  we  now  possess. 

If  we  proceed  from  this  standpoint,  and  in  this  way,  we 
discover  that  Objective  Idealism  is  correct  in  its  fundamental 
criticism,  that  Phenomenalism,  although  it  explicitly  developed 
the  contradictory  position,  nevertheless  tacitly  presupposes  that 
certain  "things,"  namely,  the  state  of  affairs  concerning  know- 
ing, could  be  known  as  they  really  are.  It  accordingly  follows, 
for  Idealism,  that  other  "things,"  even  the  general  character  of 
the  whole  universe,  may  also  be  so  known.''  But,  if  this  is  the 
case,  then  we  have  a  certain  "something"  both  known  and 
related  to  the  knowing,  and  yet  independent  of  the  knowing, 
and  conversely.  This  state  of  affairs  is,  however,  a  special  case 
of  the  validity  of  the  theory  of  external  relations,  namely,  that 
two  terms  can  be  related,  and  yet  be  independent  of  each  other 
in  the  sense,  at  least,  that  neither  modifies  or  constitutes  the 
other. 

This  theory  of  relations  is,  in  general,  applicable — as  we  have 
already  found — to  all  those  cases  of  related  terms  in  which  any 
term  can  be  removed  experimentally,  and  the  other  terms  remain 
unaltered,  or  in  which  an  analysis  in  situ  reveals  this  same  inde- 
pendence. Such  an  analysis  is  illustrated  by  all  strictly  func- 
tional relations,  as,  e.g.,  the  functional  relation  between  time  and 
motion.  Motion  and  time  are  related ;  but  they  are  independent 
in  the  sense  that  motion  does  not  "make"  time,  nor  time  in 
any  way  act  causally  on  motion.  Yet  motion  presupposes,  and 
is  logically  subsequent  to  time,  since  there  would  be  time,  were 
there  no  motion.  The  one  is  the  independent  variable,  the  other 
the  dependent.  Specific  existential  motions  are  correlated  with 
specific  periods  of  time,  and  not  with  other  periods,  and  these 
other  time  periods  are  not  correlated  with  those  specific  motions. 
Yet  their  correlation  with  motions  that  can  he  imagined  is  im- 
plied. In  fact,  there  is  no  time  period  for  which  there  is  not 
implied  the  possibility  of  specific  motions,  imagined,  though  not 
existential.    But  in  the  case  of  all  such  motions,  as  well  as  for 

^  Hegel,  Logic,  Bk.  I.,  i.,  Chaps.  I.  and  II.,  and  Bk.  II.;  also  Pha- 
nomonologie,  Chap.  III. 


314  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

existential  ones,  the  two  terms,  the  motion  mid  the  time,  are 
independent,  though  related.  This  is  the  logical  doctrine  that 
underlies  the  modern  scientific  concept  of  a  functional  relation- 
ship as  different  from  the  causal  one. 

It  is  a  further  fact,  that  the  actual  course  of  events  experi- 
mentally removes  a  specific,  particular  motion  from  correlation 
with  certain  specific  times;  e.g.,  present  motions  are  not  cor- 
related with  past  time  periods.  Thus,  even  in  the  case  where 
the  motion  is  not  existential,  but  imagined,  the  method  of 
analysis  in  situ  shows  the  character  of  tlie  relation  between 
motion  and  time  to  be  one  qf  logical  priority  and  of  inde- 
pendence. This  means  that,  although  the  motion  con  always  he 
imagined  to  he  present,  it  can,  nevertheless,  be  ideally  eliminated, 
50  that  we  can  study  time  and  space  without  studying  motion. 

The  logical  situation  concerning  knowing  and  the  "thing" 
known  is  quite  similar  to  that  which  concerns  motion  and  time, — 
as  it  is  to  the  credit  of  Objective  Idealism,  in  reaction  against 
Phenomenalism,  to  have  discovered.  That  a  specific  knotving, 
either  existential  or  subsistential,  is  correlated  with  every  object 
that  is  known  or  thought  of,  is  to  be  admitted.  This  means  that, 
although  this  or  that  knowing  is  eliminated  by  the  natural 
course  of  events,  nevertheless  all  knowing  cannot  he  eliminated 
from  known  objects.  But  this  is,  of  course,  a  truism.  For,  first, 
one  can  argue,  that,  just  as  anything  that  we  do  actually  know 
is  related  to  the  knowing,  so  also  would  anything  be  that  we 
might  know.  Secondly,  one  can  argue  that  the  very  attempt 
to  "get  at"  an  object  as  unknown  only  again  brings  in  the 
knowing — in  other  words,  that  knowing  is  presupposed  by  the 
very  attempt  to  eliminate  it.  Thirdly,  it  can  be  argued,  that, 
even  if  the  attempt  to  think  away  all  finite  knowing  were  suc- 
cessful, nevertheless  the  knowing  of  an  infinite  being  must  be 
regarded  either  as  possible,  or  as  imaginable,  or  even  as  neces- 
sary. Fourthly,  one  may  argue,  that  object  implies  subject,  and 
conversely,  and  then  interpret  subject  as  the  equivalent  of  the 
knowing  process. 

One,  some,  or  all  of  these  arguments  are  advanced  by  those 
who  are  inclined  to  accept  an  idealistic  (psyehistic)  solution 
of  the  epistemological  problem.  Indeed,  one  may  put  them  all 
together,  and  call  the  situation  which  they  emphasize  the  ego- 


INTRODUCTORY  315 

centric  predicament.  For  they  all  find  that,  for  one  reason  or 
another,  we  are  always  in  the  difficulty  of  being  unable  to  know 
any  entity  that  is  not  known,  in  order,  if  this  be  desired,  to 
compare  it  as  unknown  with  it  as  known.  Or  the  predicament 
is,  that  we  cannot  escape  the  fact  that  the  known  world, — the 
only  world  that  we  know — is,  in  every  instance,  related  to  some 
kind  of  knowing. 

It  is  very  evident,  however,  that  this  predicament  is  not  a 
serious  one,  if,  while  the  presence  of  knowing  in  relation  to  every 
known  object  is  not  to  be  denied,  it  can  nevertheless  be  shown 
that  knowing  makes  no  difference  to,  and  neither  constitutes 
nor  alters,  that  which  is  known.  Such  a  demonstration  is  iden- 
tical with  the  ideal  elimination  of  knowing  by  an  analysis  in 
situ.  But  that  knowing  neither  constitutes  nor  modifies  its 
object,  at  least  in  so  far  as  it  is  finite  knowing,  is  precisely  the 
presupposition  that  is  made  with  regard  to  the  knowing  of  any 
state  of  affairs  that  is  advanced  as  true  by  any  theory. 

It  is  this  presupposition  that  Objective  Idealism  recognizes 
in  its  criticism  of  Phenomenalism.  As  in  the  instance  of  any 
functional  or  external  relation  between  two  terms,  when  neither 
can  be  actually  eliminated,  but  each  is  related  to  the  other  as 
if  that  other  were  not  present,  so  it  is  with  the  relation  between 
knowing  and  the  known.  The  object  is  related  to  the  knowing 
as  if  the  latter  were  not  present. 

It  is  in  this  way,  by  means  of  modern  logic,  that  the  ego-centric 
predicament  is  solved.  Indeed,  the  predicament  is  thus  shown 
not  to  be  serious,  or  in  fact  not  to  be  a  predicament  at  all,  but 
only  a  problem,  which,  though  real,  and  not  artificial,  is  never- 
theless solved  in  the  presuppositions  which  are  made  in  present- 
ing any  specific  theory  or  philosophy  as  true,  or  any  specific 
state  of  affairs  as  real. 

It  is,  now,  this  specific  logical  doctrine  or  principle  that  was 
discovered  by  Objective  Idealism,  in  its  criticism  of  Phenomenal- 
ism, to  underlie  the  knowing  situation.  But  since  the  principle 
is  also  a  logical  doctrine  that  underlies  the  functional  relation- 
ship, its  presence  in  the  knowing  situation  means,  that  the  relar- 
tion  between  knowing  and  the  entity  known  is  not  causal. 

This  discovery  marked  a  genuine  advance  in  philosophical 
thought,  quite  analogous  to  the  advance,  in  science,  from  the 


316  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

domination  of  the  concepts  of  suistance  and  cause  to  the  use  of 
the  concept  of  function.  It  is  also  a  discovery  which  carries 
with  it  the  acceptance  of  the  realistic  principle  in  epistemology, 
and  means  that  Objective  Idealism,  as  the  doctrine  that  every- 
thing is  ultimately  psychical,  is  quite  consistent  with  Realism, 
providing  conclusive  evidence,  or  correct  arguments,  could  be 
found  for  accepting  this  conclusion  as  the  final  verdict  con- 
cerning the  nature  of  reality.  However,  it  is  just  this  evidence 
and  these  arguments  that  are  lacking,  or  that  have,  at  least,  not 
been  found  up  to  the  present  time. 

In  summary,  we  may  say,  that  the  ego-centric  predicament 
is  the  name,  therefore,  for  the  specific  state  of  affairs,  that  the 
knoivn  object  is  always  related  to  knowing,  and  that  it  is  some- 
what difficult  to  find  a  way  by  which  the  knowing  can  be  elimi- 
nated. The  proposition,  however,  that  the  knowing  and  the 
known  object  are  related,  has  important  consequences  provided 
only  that  it  is  combined  with  some  other  general  principle  which 
is  also  used  as  a  premise  for  deduction.  Thus,  that  the  object 
known,  thought  of,  mentioned,  and  the  like,  is  related  to  know- 
ing, thinking,  mentioning,  is  of  consequence  only  provided  such 
related  terms  either  affect  one  another,  or  demand  an  under- 
lying or  transcendent  reality  to  mediate  the  relationship.  The 
former  assumption  is  made  by  Phenomenalism ;  the  latter  by 
Objective  Idealism.  Therefore,  although  the  two  systems  are 
historically  continuous  with  each  other,  they  are  also  logically 
distinct.  Each  system  is  based  upon  or  is  logically  derived  from 
a  different  theory  of  relations. 


DERIVATION  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  317 


CHAPTER  XXXV 

THE  LOGICAL  DERIVATION  OF  OBJECTIVE 
IDEALISxM:  CRITICISM 

The  problem  of  the  unity  of  the  universe  is  a  real  and  not 
an  artificial  problem,  although  it  is  open  to  question,  whether 
or  not  the  specific  solution  which  Objective  Idealism  gives  to 
this  problem  is  valid  or  not.  The  universe  is,  undoubtedly,  a 
unity  of  some  kind.  It»is,  e.g.,  at  least  one  totality.  But  whether 
or  not  it  is  more  than  this,  e.g.,  whether  it  is  one  continuum, 
or  one  organic  whole,  is  very  distinctly  a  further  question  that 
demands  the  most  patient  and  careful  investigation. 

However,  it  is  a  distinguishing  characteristic  of  Objective 
Idealism  that  it  contends  that  the  universe  is  not  merely  a 
totality,  or  an  organic  whole,  or  a  causal  system,  but,  in  some 
way,  an  Absolute  Unity.  In  this  respect  Idealism  is  Numerical 
Monism. 

This  specific  solution  to  the  problem  of  the  unity  of  the  uni- 
verse, Objective  Idealism  derives,  however,  not  by  an  empirical 
and  inductive  procedure,  but  by  an  a  priori  and  deductive 
method,  in  which  specific  consequences  are  inferred  from  specific 
assumptions.  These  assumptions  are  identical  with  the  postula- 
tion  of  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations  as  holding  for 
the  manifold  and  the  totality  of  the  related  terms  of  the  uni- 
verse. And  as  we  have  already  seen,  this  theory  of  relations 
is  in  turn  the  result,  historically,  of  the  domination  of  the 
concept  of  substance  in  the  traditional  logic  and  philosophy — a 
concept  which  entered  this  tradition  because  of  the  influence  of 
the  concrete,  particular  physical  thing  as  the  model  for  thinking. 
For,  to  naive  thought,  the  physical  thing  does,  indeed,  appear 
to  be  one  suhstance  in  which  many  qualities  inhere.^  Objective 
Idealism,  therefore,  represents  the  continued  effect,  on  phi- 
losophy, of  the  influence  of  this  model. 

Such  an  historical  development  is,  however,  now  subject  fo 

'  Fiehte,  Wifssenschaftslehre,  trans,  by  Kroeger,  II.,  ii.,  p.  160  f.;  also 
pp.  113,  134-139. 


318  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

\,       logical  formulation,  with  the  result,  that  a  purely  logical  devel- 

s^        opment  of  Objective  Idealism  is  quite  possible. 

^  In  order  to  make  such  a  logical  presentation  and  development, 

let  us,  then,  assume : — 
j/'  I.    There  are  many  diverse  'HJiings"  or  entities  revealed  to 

\       our  experience. 

II.  These  "things"  or  entities  are  experienced  as  existing  or 
subsisting  as  particular,  individual  entities,  i.e.,  with  each  entity 
itself,  and  not  another — in  other  ivords,  with  each  entity  dif- 
ferent and  distinct  in  its  individuality  from  every  other  entity. 

Comment.  This  is  one  phase  of  the  principle  of  identity.  In 
reference  to  each  entity,  other  entities  are  experienced,  but  are 
not  it.^ 

As  a  generalization  from  this  experience,  let  us  assume 

III.  //  there  is  one  "thing''  A,  there  is  another  "thing"  B 
that  is  not  A,  i.e.,  that  is  non-A  in  its  individuality — in  other 

■  ^-     words,  let  us  assume  that,  as  we  think  and  know  A,  ive  can  also 

%       think  and  know  non-A. 

^  Comment.    This  is  the  way  in  which  the  principle  of  contra- 

diction is  derived  empirically,  although  it  has  come  to  be  re- 
garded, in  the  traditional  logic,  as  a  law  that  is  resident  in  the 
mind,  or  in  the  thinking  process  itself,   and,   therefore,   as  a 

A-^'  law  in  accordance  with  which  we  must  think  on  the  ground 
that  an  active  entity  must  act  in  accordance  with  its  own  nature.' 
Accordingly,  let  us  assume,  further,  that 

IV.  The  many  "things"  that  we  experience  are  related  in 
many  specific  ivays,  and,  among  these  ways,  by  the  relation  of 
implication,  whereby  any  entity  A  necessitates  {the  being  of) 

'        its  contradictory  non-A,  so  that,  for  any  entity,  A,  its  contra- 
^^y^  dictory,  non-A,  must  be  thought.^ 
^/^     Finally  let  us  assume  that 

V.  //  one  entity  necessitates  the  being  of  another  entity,  the 
two  entities  are  inseparable,  and 

'  I.  and  II.  are  admitted  by  Fichto,  Sohplling,  Hegel,  Schopenhauer,  and 
in  fact  by  all  their  followers  and  predecessors  among  objective  idealists. 
I.  and  li.  merely  postulate  the  "  world "  to  be  explained.  See  Hegel, 
Logic,  I.  and  II.,  pp.  120-177. 

'  Fichte,  Wissenschaftslehre,  trans.,  pp.  159  and  275;  Hegel,  Logic,  II., 
pp.  57-fi2. 

*  Fichte  and  Hegel,  ibid.  On  Hegel's  Principle  of  Contradiction,  see 
J.  B.  Baillie,  Hegel's  Logic,  1901. 


DERIVATION  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  31£h 

VI.  //  any  two  entities  are  inseparable,  they  in  some  way 
form  a  unity. 

From  these  assumptions  we  can  now  draw  certain  conclu- 
sions : — 

Experience  gives  as  a  datum  the  manifoldness  of  the  "things" 
experienced,  and  therewith,  also,  the  individuality  of  each 
entity  in  its  distinctness  from  others ;  i.e.,  as  regards  the  indi- 
viduality of  any  entity  A,  any  and  all  other  entities  are  experi- 
enced as  non-A.  From  this  experience  there  is  derived  not  only 
the  generalization,  that,  if  A  is,  non-A  also  is,  but  also  the 
principle  (whether  justifiably  or  not,  is  a  question)  that,  if  A 
is,  71071-A  must  also  he.  But  many  entities  are  experienced — in 
many  relations.  Yet,  whatever  the  specific  character  of  the 
relation  may  be,  nevertheless,  since  a  relation  by  its  very  nature 
holds  between  at  least  two  terms,  each  of  which  is  that  par- 
ticular individual  term,  and  not  the  other,  or  another  term,  all 
other  relations  rest  on  the  specific  relation  of  contradiction, 
A  R  non-A.  But  this  relation  is  one  of  necessity,  i.e.,  it  is  one 
whereby  if  A  is,  also  non-A  must  he,  or,  if  non-A  is,  also  A  must 
he.  But  this  means,  that,  since  A  and  non-A  are  inseparable  and 
therefore  form  a  unity,  any  and  all  related  terms  are  also  in- 
separable and  form  a  unity — whatever  the  specific  character  of  ^ 
either  the  terms  or  the  relations  may  be. 

This  is  the  key  to  the  logical  derivation  of  Objective  Idealism. 
There  are  many  "things"  and  many  relations.  But,  whatever 
the  relations  and  whatever  the  "things"  may  be,  all  other  rela- 
tions and  all  other  "things"  can  be  "translated"  into  the 
"form"  of,  and  are  based  on,  the  relational  complex,  A  B  non-A. 
In  this  complex,  each  term  necessitates  the  other,  the  two  terms 
are  inseparable,  and  "somewhere"  in  the  complex  there  is  ahso- 
lute  unity. 

The  question  next  arises,  *' Where"  is  this  unity — or,  what  is 
its  locus  f  And  the  answer  is,  that  the  unity  cannot  be  at  the 
''level"  of  A  and  non-A,  since  they  are  two,  i.e.,  many,  and  not 
one.  Therefore  the  unity  must  be  at  a  "level"  that  is  distinct 
from  the  "level"  of  the  manifoldness,  A  R  non-A,  and  that  may 
be  figuratively  described  as  either  "underlying"  or  "transcend- 
ing" such  a  level. 

In  critical  comment  on  this  argument  it  should  be  remarked 


S20  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

\      that  that  particular  phase  of  the  principle  of  contradiction  which 
.  f.         the  argument  employs  is  one  that  is  only  formal,  and,  therefore, 
^^'      ^  one  that  involves  no  overwhelming  diiificulties  or  damaging  con- 
^A  ^f  sequences.    "Contradiction"  has  been  previously  examined,^  with 
the  result  that  it  has  been  found  to  mean,  or  to  be  identical 
with,  exclusion.    In  the  case  of  terms  this  "condition"  or  relation 
**  obtains,  if  the  terms  are  the  correlative  species  (or  individuals) 

of  a  (common)  genus;  i.e.,  it  is  such  species  (or  individuals)  that 
exclude  one  another  into  some  kind  of  distinct  loci,  and  that  are, 
therefore,  contradictions.  For  example,  while  in  reference  to 
red,  not-red  denotes  everything  else  than  red,  nevertheless, 
among  these  other  "things,"  it  is  only  other  colors  that  are 
excluded  from  coexistence  with  a  particular  specific  red  that 
exists  at  a  particular  time  and  place.  A  particular  red  can, 
however,  coexist  with  a  particular  specific  extension,  solidity, 
smoothness,  and  the  like.  None  of  these  characteristics  excludes 
the  others,  and  yet  each  in  its  individuality  is  different  from 
each  of  the  others,  and  these  others  in  relation  to  any  specific 
one  are  not  that  one,  and  are,  thus,  its  negative.  Accordingly, 
if  this  negative  is  interpreted  as  a  contradictory,  it  is  merely 
a  formal  contradictory,  and  as  such  a  contradictory  that  is  quite 
harmless. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  Objective  Idealism,  in  deriving 
a  theory  of  relations  hy  ivhich  to  interpret  all  relations,  especially 
that  between  the  knowing  and  the  known,  employs  a  special 
phase  of  the  principle  of  contradiction,  namely,  one  that  is  only 
formal.  The  plurality  of  the  "things"  of  the  universe  is  a  fact, 
and  all  other  "things"  in  reference  to  any  one  positive  "thing" 
can  be  characterized  negatively.  But  the  experience  of  the  posi- 
tive ''thing"  precedes  its  negative  characterization,  and  this 
latter  step  really  takes  us  no  further  than  does  that  upon  which 
it  depends,  namely,  upon  the  empirical,  matter-of-fact  experi- 
ence of  a  plurality  of  different  "things." 

Nevertheless,  the  negative  characterization  is  made  to  go  much 
further  by  this  Hegelian  development  of  the  traditional  logic, 
and  by  the  Idealism  that  is  based  upon  this.  That  which  is 
a  positive  "thing"  is  made  a  negative  one  that  is  to  be  necessi- 
tated or  implied  by,  and  that  is  also  to  be  inseparable  from,  that 

'  Chap.  XVI. 


DERIVATION  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  321 

which  is  another  positive  "thing."  Therefore,  any  term  with 
its  negative  is  held  to  form  an  unimpeachable  unity,  so  that,  if 
there  are  two  terms  which  are  inclusive  of  all  positive  fact,  an 
all-inclusive  unity  is  easily  derivable. 

To  attain  to  such  a  unity  is,  however,  the  chief  motive  of 
Objective  Idealism,  and,  by  the  argument  thus  far  offered,  one 
seems  to  be  far  on  the  high  road  to  success.  Indeed,  the  pres- 
entation of  the  next  step  in  the  argument  will  make  it  seem 
that  the  goal  has  been  reached,  and  that,  finally,  there  stretches 
out  before  the  eye  of  the  intellect  the  panorama  of  a  universe 
that  in  the  midst  of  its  manifoldness  is  Absolute  One. 

To  obtain  this  view  it  suffices,  if  possible,  to  find  a  pair  of 
terms  which  not  only  necessitate  each  other's  being  and  form 
a  unity,  but  which  also  are  all-inclusive,  i.e.,  are  inclusive  of 
all  that  is  fact.  At  first  sight  any  pair  of  contradictory  terms, 
as,  e.g.,  A  and  no7i-A,  or  this  pen  and  not-this-pen,  might  seem 
to  be  and  may  in  fact  be  such  a  pair.  Yet  there  is  the  objection 
to  this  possibility,  that,  over  and  above  the  two  contradictory 
terms  of  such  a  pair,  there  is  always  a  third  "something," 
namely,  a  knowing  or  cognition  (of  the  pair)  that  is  not  included 
by  those  terms.  Accordingly,  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  pair  of 
terms  that  is  absolutely  all-inclusive,  it  would  seem  to  be  neces- 
sary to  take,  not  any  pair  of  contradictories,  such  as  the  pair, 
this  pen  and  not-this-pen,  but  only  such  a  pair  as  will  also  include 
knowing  or  cognition. 

However,  knowing  or  cognition  may  itself,  in  any  specific 
instance,  stand  in  the  relation  of  object,  or  "thing"  known,  in 
or  to  a  specific  knowing,  as  is  illustrated  by  the  series,  I  know 
that  I  know  that  I  know  that,  e.g.,  A  necessitates  non-A.  Seem- 
ingly, therefore,  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  pair  of  contradictories 
that  is  absolutely  all-inclusive,  one  of  the  terms  of  the  pair  must 
be,  not  merely  any  knowing  or  cognition,  but  only  a  knowing 
or  cognition  that  is  never  object,  and  thus  always  only  subject. 
Such  an  entity  would,  however,  seem  to  be  the  term  knower, 
since,  in  any  specific  act  of  knowing,  the  knower  would  seem 
never  to  be  the  known,  the  subject  never  the  object. 

This  recognition  that  there  is  in  the  case  of  the  series,  I  know 
that  I  know,  and  so  on,  a  knower  that  is  not  "at  the  same  time" 
a  known,  is  very  evidently  only  a  special  phase,  again,  of  that 


322  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

ego-centric  predicament  which  is  always  so  basic  for  all  Idealism. 
Evidently  knowing  is  itself  no  exception  to  the  rule,  that  known 
objects  are  in  relation  to  a  knowing.  However,  that  very  special 
phase  of  the  predicament  which  is  emphasized  and  used  by  Ob- 
jective Idealism  in  its  basic  argument  is,  that  in  the  knowing 
situation  there  is  always  present  one  term,  namely,  the  knower, 
which,  since  it  as  such  is  never  the  known,  forms,  together  with; 
the  known,  an  all-inclusive  pair  of  terms.  This  pair  is,  knower  [ 
and  known,  or,  negatively,  knower  and  not-knower,  self  and 
not-self,  and  the  like.  Accordingly  that  special  phase  of  the 
ego-centric  predicament  which  is  thus  emphasized  may  be  stated 
in  the  form  of  a  postulate,  that 

VII.  The  specific  relational  complex  which  is  identical  with 
the  pair  of  contradictory  terms,  subject  and  not-suhject  (object), 
or  knower  and  known,  or  self  and  not-self,  or  ego  and  non-ego, 
is  inclusive  of  all  that  is  reality. 

From  this  postulate,  together  with  the  other  postulates,  the 
demonstration,  that  the  universe  is  One  as  well  as  many,  is  quite 
without  difficulty. 

Contradictory  terms  necessitate  each  other's  being, — are, 
therefore,  inseparable, — and,  therefore,  form  a  unity.  But  the 
unity  must  be  at  a  different  level  from  that  of  the  terms,  since 
these  are  two.  But,  also,  self  and  not-self  (and  the  like)  are 
a  pair  of  contradictories  that  "include"  the  universe.  There- 
fore, for  this  pair,  and  so  for  the  universe  there  is  a  unity, — an 
Absolute  Unity — that  is  implied  in  the  very  "essence"  of 
the  relationship  between  the  terms,  and  that  mediates  that 
relationship. 

Such  a  demonstration  ^  is  identical,  briefly,  with  deriving  con- 

•  This  demonstration  is  found  in  Fichte  all  through  his  Wissenschafts- 
lehre,  Werke,  Vols.  I.  and  II.  It  is  repeated  in  many  forms  and  ways, 
and  one  reference  is  as  good  as  another.  It  is  also  found  in  Schelling, 
System  des  transc.  Idealismus,  Werke,  III.,  I.,  p.  600,  but  especially  in 
"  Vom  Ich,"  Werke,  I.,  i.,  §  10,  p.  100;  in  Hegel,  Encyclop.,  §  194  et  seq., 
Werke,  Vol.  VI.,  and  in  the  first  two  books  of  the  Logic;  in  Schopen- 
hauer, trans.,  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  pp.  142-140. 

As  further  confirming  the  writer's  position  that  this  derivation  is  the 
essence  of  Objective  Idealism,  the  following  quotations  are  given:  — 

The  first  quotation  is  from  the  English  philosopher,  T.  H.  Green,  Works, 
Vol.  111.,  p.  4r).     Green  says: — 

"  To  assume,  because  all  reality  requires  thought  to  conceive  it,  that 
therefore  thought  is  the  condition  of  its  existence,  is,  indeed,  unwarrantable. 
But  it  is  another  matter,  if,  when  we  come  to  examine  the  constituents 


DERIVATION  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  328 

elusions  from  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations  as  ap- 
plied to  such  specific  complexes  as  knowing  and  known,  self  and 
not-self,  which  are  inclusive  of  all  that  the  universe  is,  not 
excepting  the  knoiver  to  whom  that  universe  is  related  in  the 
situation  of  its  being  a  known  universe.  Accordingly,  it  is 
either  from  those  postulates  which  have  thus  far  been  made,  or 
from  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations  which  those 
postulates  form,  or  to  which  they  lead,  that,  together  with  the 
all-inclusive  pair  of  related  terms,  knoiver  and  known  (not-the- 
knower),  it  seems  to  be  possible  to  demonstrate  with  absolute 
logical  rigor  that  the  whole  universe  is  Absolute  One. 

This  conclusion  is  identical  with  one  result  which  it  is  the 
dominant  motive  of  Objective  Idealism  to  obtain,  and  forms  one 
necessary  step  in  the  demonstration,  which  Idealism  would  make, 
that  the  universe  is  ultimately  spiritual  in  character.  Never- 
theless, it  is  a  conclusion  that  is  itself  not  sufficient  to  establish 
this  position,  since  the  proposition  that  the  universe  is  Absolute 
One  does  not  imply  that  it  is  also  spiritual. 

Accordingly,  in  order  to  demonstrate  that  the  universe  is  of 
this  specific  character,  it  must  be  shown,  if  possible,  that  the 
only  instance  of  a  oneness  which  holds  together  a  manifold  of 
related  terms  (themselves  possible  manifestations  of  such  a 
one)  is  a  self,  a  knower,  or  a  spiritual  being.  If  this  demonstra- 
tion can  be  made,  then,  by  stating  this  sole  condition  in  the  form 
of  a  specific  postulate,  it  is  possible  logically  to  develop  Nu- 
merical Monism  into  Objective  Idealism.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand, 
if  this  demonstration  cannot  be  made,  i.e.,  if  one  can  find  other 
instances  of  an  absolute  oneness  in  the  midst  of  a  plurality,  e.g., 
a  material  substratum  in  the  midst  of  physical  properties,  then 

of  that  which  we  account  real,  we  find  that  they  all  imply  some  synthetic 
action  which  we  only  know  as  exorcised  by  our  own  spirit.  Is  it  not 
true  of  all  of  them  that  they  have  their  being  in  relations;  and  what 
other  medium  do  we  know  of  but  a  thinking  consciousness  in  and  through 
which  the  separate  can  be  united  in  that  way  which  constitutes  relation? 
We  believe  that  these  questions  cannot  be  worked  out  without  leading 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  real  world  is  essentially  a  spiritual  Morld,  which 
forms  one  interrelated  whole  because  related  throughout  to  a  single 
subject." 

The  second  quotation  is  from  the  English  philosopher,  Edward  Caird, 
who  says,  in  his  Evolution  of  Religion,  p.  67:  — 

"  Subject  and  object  are  the  extreme  terms  in  the  diflference  which  is 
essential  to  our  rational  life.  Each  of  them  presupposes  the  other,  and 
therefore  neither  can  be  regarded  as  producing  the  other.     Hence,  we  are 


324,  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

some  other  form  of  Monism  is  as  readily  derivable  as  is  Objective 
Idealism. 

From  this  it  becomes  clear  that  whatever  more  specific  phi- 
losophies are  developed  from  the  postulates  and  conclusions  thus 
far  presented,  depends,  not  upon  discovering  the  further  im- 
plications of  those  postulates  and  conclusions,  but  upon  making 
further  specific,  independent  postulates.  Such  postulates  con- 
cern either  the  nature  of  Absolute  Oneness  as  such,  or,  if  this 
Oneness  is  assumed  to  be  spiritual  in  character,  because  the  ego 
or  self  is  regarded  as  the  best  example  of  it,  they  concern  and 
must  assert  some  specific  characteristic  as  the  dominant  phase 
of  that  which  is  spiritual.  Accordingly,  just  as  Idealism  is 
derivable  from  generic  Monism  on  the  assumption  that  an  Abso- 
lute One  can  be  only  spiritual,  so  also  are  such  specific  phi- 
losophies as  Theism,  Pan-logism,  and  Ethical  and  Romantic 
Idealism  derivable  by  assuming  the  dominant  character  of  the 

compelled  to  think  of  them  both  as  rooted  in  a  still  higher  principle, 
which  is  at  once  the  source  of  their  relatively  independent  existence  and 
the  all-eml3racing  unity  that  limits  their  independence.  To  put  it  more 
directly,  the  idea  of  an  absolute  unity,  which  transcends  all  the  oppositions 
of  finitude,  and  especially  the  last  opposition  which  includes  all  others — 
the  opposition  of  the  subject  and  object — is  the  ultimate  presupposition 
of  our  consciousness." 

A  still  more  striking  statement  is  made  by  Professor  Mary  W.  Calkins 
in  her  Persistent  Problems  of  Philosophy,  p.  418  f.;  Professor  Calkins' 
formulation  of  the  argument  for  Absolute  Idealism  is: — 

"I.  Ultimate  reality  is  no  absolute  plurality;  it  does  not  consist  in 
a  plurality  of  utterly  disconnected  units.  For  we  directly  experience 
relations  and  connections;  every  one  of  these  supposedly  discrete,  distinct 
'units'  is  both  comparable  with  and  dependent  on  other  units:  it  implies 
others  in  being  itself  distinct,  and  it  is  connected  with  others  by  virtue 
of  their  all  existing." 

"  11.  But  ultima'  reality  is,  therefore,  no  mere  manifold  of  units  which 
are  both  distinct  and  yet  related.  For  absolute  distinctness  and  related- 
ness  are  mutually  exclusive  predicates.  If  the  units  remain  entirely 
distinct,  they  are,  then,  distinct  from  the  relations  as  well  as  from  each 
other;  in  other  words,  the  relations  themselves  become  mere  unrelated 
units.  So  long  as  the  units  are,  by  hypothesis,  distinct,  so  long  the 
supposed  relations  fail  to  relate.  But  relation  is  experienced,  it  is  immedi- 
ately known  to  exist.  Hence  the  alternative,  entire  distinctness,  must 
be  abandoned.  There  results  the  conception  of  ultimate  reality,  not  as 
mere  including  system,  but  as  relater  of  its  parts,  not  as  mere  one-of- 
many,  hut  as  uni(iue  Individual.  Each  one  of  us  has  in  his  consciousness 
of  self  the  example  of  a  unicjue  being  which  is  a  one-of-many." 

"  III  The  conclusion  that  ultimate  reality  is  an  Absolute, — that  the 
irreducible  nature  of  the  universe  is  self, — gives,  as  the  final  outcome  of 
philosophy,  the  conception  of  ultimate  reality  as  absolute  self." 

Another  example,  making  practically  the  same  explicit  presentation  of 
points  as  does  the  [ireceding  (juotation,  and  again  illustrating  the  fallacious 
procedure  just  discussed,  is  found  in  Taylor's  Elements  of  Metaphjsics: — 


DERIVATION  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  325 

Spiritual  One  that  underlies  the  universe  to  be  God,  or  Intellect, 
or  Conscience,  or  Life. 

It  is,  then,  to  the  examination  of  these  more  specific  Monisms 
that  we  now  proceed. 

One  specific  Monism  is  derived  by  finding,  among  the  many- 
entities  that  experience  reveals,  a  specific  and  certain  concrete 
instance  of  an  entity  that  is  an  absolute  one — simple,  undivided, 
and  indivisible — and  that  is  not  merely  an  organic  whole,  which, 
while  it  is  one,  is  also  many.  Such  an  entity,  it  is  maintained, 
is  given  in  the  instance  of  the  unity  of  the  personality,  of  the 
ego  or  self,''  or  of  the  soul.  For,  it  is  maintained,  while  the 
manifold  of  ideas,  emotions,  acts  of  will,  and  the  like,  come  and 
go, — appear  and  disappear — the  personality,  the  self,  the  ego 
remains.     Such  a  persistence  of  the  personality,  or  of  the  self, 

"  We  may  conveniently  attempt  to  construct  our  own  theory  of  the 
One  and  the  Many  by  first  excluding  views  which  appear  mistaken  in 
principle,  and  thus  gradually  narrowing  the  issues.  Among  these  mis- 
taken views  I  am  forced  to  reckon  all  forms  of  consistent  and  thorough- 
going Pluralism.  Pluralism  begins  by  misapprehending  the  facts  upon 
which  it  professes  to  base  itself,  and  ends  by  giving  an  interpretation  of 
them  which  is  essentially  irrational."  "  Any  genuine  Pluralism  must  be 
resolute  enough  to  dismiss  the  idea  of  a  systematic  interconnection  between 
its  independent  realities  as  an  illusion  of  the  human  mind." 

"  We  seem  driven,  then,  to  reject  the  view  that  the  ordered  world  of 
experience  can  be  the  expression  of  a  plurality  of  ultimately  distinct  and 
heterogeneous  principles.  Because  the  world  as  known  is  an  orderly 
system,  and  on  any  other  supposition  coherent  knowledge  is  impossible, 
tiie  world  must  be  regarded  as  the  complete  embodiment  and  expression 
of  a  single  ultimate  principle." 

"  The  world  for  knowledge  must  be  an  orderly  whole  or  system.  To 
be  a  system  at  all,  it  must  be  the  development  or  expression  in  detail 
of  a  single  principle.  Therefore  it  must  most  certainly  be  one.  But 
again,  because  it  is  a  system,  it  cannot  be  a  mere  unit;  it  must  be  the 
expression  of  a  single  principle  in  and  through  a  multiplicity  of  terms 
or  constituents.  To  think  of  the  world  as  a  single  systematic  unity,  then, 
means  to  think  of  it  as  a  manifestation  of  one  perfectly  determinate 
principle." 

"  We  may  take  a  further  most  important  step  forward.  In  the  all- 
embracing  systematic  whole  the  unity  and  the  multiplicity  must  be  equally 
real  and  each  must  be  real  through  the  other.  How  is  this  possible? 
Only  on  condition  that  the  whole  system  forms  a  single  experience  and 
that  the  constituent  factors  again  are  single  experiences."  "  It  would 
be  much  the  same  thing  if  we  called  it  a  subject  which  is  the  unity  of 
subordinate  subjects  "     Chap.  II.,  pp.  87-99,  passim. 

All  these  quotations  wire  first  given  in  mv  paper,  "  The  Logical  Struc- 
ture of  Self-refuting  Systems,"  Phil.  Revieir,  Vol.  XIX.,  No.  6,  pp.  610-631. 

''E.g.,  all  through  Fichte's  Wisse^ischaftslehre  (see  the  translation), 
also  in  Kant's  doctrine  of  the  transcendental  ego,  and  in  Berkeley's  posi- 
tion that  the  spirit  is  numerically  single   (see  Chap.  XXX). 


326  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

is  held,  further,  to  be  explicable  only  on  the  ground  that  the 
self  is  an  absolute  one,  and  not  many — even  as  an  organic 
whole.  For,  it  is  argued,  that  which  is  many  can  be  disin- 
tegrated in  respect  to  its  manifoldness  and  cease  to  &e.  And, 
further,  it  is  contended  that  the  absolute  unity  of  the  personality, 
of  the  ego,  or  of  the  self,  is  given  to  introspection  as  an  imme- 
diate, undeniable  fact. 

From  such  an  instance  of  an  absolute  unity  in  the  midst  of 
plurality — a  unity,  also,  that  binds  the  many  together  into  one — 
the  argument  is  readily  obtained,  that,  if  the  universe  can  be 
proved  to  be  an  absolute  one,  as  well  as  many,  then  this  oneness 
must  also  be  of  the  nature  of  personality,  or  of  self.  For,  it 
may  be  inquired,  where  else  is  a  concrete  instance  of  absolute 
oneness  discoverable?  Is  not  the  self,  the  ego,  the  only  instance 
of  this  that  comes  to  our  experience  ? 

In  comment  on  this  argument  it  may  be  inquired,  whether  it 
is  not  possible  that  the  view,  or  even  the  experience,  that  there 
is  an  absolutely  unitary  self,  ego,  or  soul,  is  not  itself  a  product 
of  the  same  tradition  ®  that  results  in  the  view  that  the  universe 
is  absolutely  one.  In  other  words,  may  there  not  be  a  tradition 
in  which  there  is  borne  that  logic  which  demands  absolute  one- 
ness in  the  midst  of  plurality,  and  which  leads  to  the  interpre- 
tation of  one  instance  of  such  oneness,  as  demonstrable  for  the 
universe,  by  analogy  with  another  instance,  originally  demon- 
strable, e.g.,  in  Plato — but  later  incorporated  in  the  tradition 
as  orthodox  belief  and  even  self-evident  fact  as  regards  the 
nature  of  the  self.  -^i^- 

Whether  this  inquiry  be  answered  with  ''yes"  or  with  "no," 
it  is,  nevertheless,  an  historical  fact  in  the  development  of 
philosophical  theories,  that  for  the  interpretation  of  the  nature 
of  the  unity  of  the  universe,  recourse  has  been  had  to  an  ego, 
a  soul,  or  a  personality  that  is  itself  regarded  or  experienced 
as  absolutely  unitary,  and  as  uniting  the  manifold  of  the  experi- 
ences of  each  personal  life  into  the  continuity  of  a  single  flow. 
Indeed,  is  not  this  the  only  "thing"  that  such  a  One — of  the 
universe — could  be  ?  For,  does  not  the  realm  of  physical  entities, 
as  known  by  modern  science,  fail  to  present  an  analogy  that 

'  The  Ariatott'lian.  with  its  niorU'l  of  the  physical  thing  defined  as  $k 
unitary  substratum  in  which  qualities  inhere. 


DERIVATION  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM  327 

serves  such  a  purpose?  For  example,  atoms  are,  at  best,  only 
either  organic  unities  or  mechanistic  systems  of  electrons,  and 
one  electron  does  not  unite  others — the  atom  being  only  the  unity 
of  electrons  in  relation,  with  no  empirically  found  entity,  over 
and  above  the  relations,  to  mediate  their  unity  in  an  atom. 
Quite  the  same  ''state  of  affairs"  holds  also  for  molecules,  par- 
ticles, cells,  organisms,  and  the  like.  These  are  unities,  but  in 
so  far  as  they  are  this,  their  unity  is  found  empirically  to  con- 
sist in  their  organization  and  the  constancy  of  the  relations  that 
generate  this  organization,  and  not  in  the  mediation  of  an  abso- 
lutely simple  and  underlying  one.  Therefore,  if  appeal  is  made 
to  the  realm  of  physical  entities  for  a  basis  for  the  analogy  we 
are  seeking,  the  only  possibility  of  success  lies  in  the  instance 
of  the  particular  physical  thing  as  this  has  been  defined  in  the 
tradition  and  is  accepted  in  common  sense  even  today — namely, 
as  a  unitary  substratum  in  which  qualities  inhere.  To  interpret 
the  Oneness  of  the  Universe  after  this  analogy  results,  however, 
in  what  is  termed  Materialism — a  position  that  usually  arouses 
only  the  most  vehement  abhorrence.  And  yet  it  may  be  asked, 
What,  logically,  is  the  difference  between  this  position,  which 
finds  a  single  substratum  to  the  universe,  and  calls  it  Matter, 
and  that  position,  which,  though  calling  itself  Idealism,  finds 
a  psychical  substratum  to  the  universe  on  the  ground  of  an  argu- 
ment that  springs  from  a  tradition  in  which  the  physical  thing 
has  been  the  dominant  influence  on  philosophy  and  logic?  For, 
as  we  have  seen,  it  is  the  physical  thing,  defined  as  a  substratum 
in  which  qualities  inhere,  that  dominates  the  Aristotelian  tradi- 
tion,^ and,  accordingly,  also,  the  views  that  develop  in  this  tradi- 
tion, particularly  the  views  that  in  the  human  personality  there 
is  a  substance-like  self  or  ego,  and,  in  the  universe,  a  substance- 
like One, — with  this  One  interpreted  after  analogy  to  the  human 
soul.  If  such  a  philosophy — of  a  world  substratum — has  this 
origin,  then,  although  it  be  called  Idealism,  does  it  differ 
logically  from  Materialism,  and  does  the  function  of  its  one 
universal  substratum  differ  from  the  function  of  that  substratum 
which  Materialism  also  finds  for  the  universe? 

The  answer  is  obvious.    And  yet  it  is  maintained  by  many — 
as  well  illustrated  by  Berkeley — that  the  material  substratum 
•  Cf.  Chaps.  III.  and  XXVII. 


328  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

of  the  physical  thing  is  not  so  certainly  given  to  sense  experi- 
ence as  is  the  spiritual  substratum  of  the  finite  self  given  to 
reason  and  to  introspection.  Therefore,  with  it  demonstrated 
that  there  is  a  Oneness — a  Substratum  in  the  Universe,  this  is 
interpreted  after  the  analogy  with  the  latter  rather  than  with 
the  former  possibility,  so  that  the  One  Substratum  of  the  uni- 
verse, whose  function  it  is  to  hold  all  entities  together,  and  to 
mediate  all  relations,  is  inferred  to  be  a  World-Soul,  or  World- 
Self,  that  is  psychical,  and  not  material  or  physical  in  nature.^** 


CHAPTER  XXXVI 
DEVELOPMENTS  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM 

I.   THEISM   AND  PANTHEISM 

But,  with  the  conclusion  of  the  foregoing  chapter  once 
reached — logically,  as  just  presented,  historically,  through  the 
alliance  of  philosophy  and  theology, — there  lies  ready  at  hand, 
as  suggested  by  the  dominant  interest  of  the  religious  conscious- 
ness, the  further  specific  conclusion,  that  a  World-soul,  AVorld- 
self,  or  World-personality  is  identical  with  God,  in  Whom  all 
"things"  in  some  manner  have  their  being,  Who  mediates  be- 
tween all  "things,"  thus,  perhaps,  to  insure  order,  design,  and 
purpose  in  the  universe,  and  Who  is  identical,  in  the  highest 
degree,  with  that  to  which  we  ascribe  highest  worth,  namely, 
personality. 

With  this  conclusion  once  reached.  Objective  Idealism  is, 
however,  in  a  position  to  become  the  orthodox  apologetic  for 
Christian  theology,  notwithstanding  that  its  tendency  is  away 
from  Theism  and  toward  Pantheism. 

"This  is  essentially  the  position  of  all  the  objective  idealists,  although 
there  arc  minor  differences  as  to  whether  such  a  Being  is  personal  or 
impersonal,  etc.  fSee,  e.g.,  Hegel,  Lofjik,  Werke,  III.,  i..  Chap.  I.;  Encyclop., 
(Jhap.  IV.,  §  51;  Phil,  of  Religion,  trans.,  III.,  p.  355  et  passim. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM      320 

Theism  is  the  position  either  that  God  is  apart  from  the  uni- 
verse, or  that,  if  the  universe  is  God,  He  is  more.  For  the  first 
kind  of  Theism,  God  is  either  the  creator  of  the  universe,  or 
its  designer,  or  at  least  an  active,  concrete  principle  in  it  that 
"makes  for  righteousness";  for  the  second  kind  of  Theism,  God 
is  immanent  in  the  universe,  and  yet  is  of  a  different  order  of 
reality  from  the  universe,  in  that  He  is  both  the  mediator  and 
relater  of  its  parts,  and  the  essence  of  these  parts  in  which  He 
manifests  Himself,  although  always  as  a  great  reserve  source 
which  is  more  than  its  manifestations.  Yet,  if  we  raise  the 
question.  How  God  can  thus  manifest  Himself,  the  answer  takes 
us  in  the  direction  of  Pantheism.  For,  if  God  but  orders  and 
relates  things  that  exist  apart  from  Him,  then  is  He  at  best 
only  a  designer  and  mechanician;  also,  "things"  are  related 
to  Him,  so  that  we  again  have  the  problem  of  the  mediation  of 
this  rclatedness.  Also,  if  God  is  regarded  as  the  creator  of  the 
universe  ex  nihilo,  then  is  our  power  to  conceive  this  baffled. 
For,  how  can  something  be  "made"  from  nothing?  And  if  it 
cannot,  then  must  God's  creation  be  but  His  manifestation  in 
the  sense  that  this  is  identical  with  an  emanation  from  and  a 
transformation  out  of  Him,  with  the  result,  not  only  that  He 
is  relater  and  designer,  but  also  that  He  is  all  "things"  and 
that  all  things  are  God. 

This  position  is  Pantheism.  Into  it  Theism  very  naturally 
and  very  logically  develops.  But,  underlying  both  these  the- 
ological positions  are  the  fundamental  logical  postulates  on 
which  Objective  Idealism  is  based,  namely,  that  terms  in  rela- 
tion demand  and  imply  a  unitary  being  which  transcends,  yet 
manifests  itself  in  the  terms,  and  mediates  the  relations  between 
them.  Such  a  unitary  being  is,  in  the  specific  Monism  under 
consideration,  first  identified  with  a  World-self,  or  World- 
personality,  and  then  with  God,  with  the  logical  result,  that 
all  "things"  are  psychical  or  spiritual  in  character — even  those 
that  seem  most  persistently  to  withstand  such  a  "reduction," 
as,  e.g.,  do  the  entities  of  the  physical  universe. 

II.    PANLOGISM   AND   ETHICAL  IDEALISM 

Conclusions  very  generally  similar  to  those  just  presented  are 
found  in  a  number  of  other  monistic  psychisms  that  differ  in 


830  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

respect  to  what  is  accepted  as  the  dominant  character  of  the 
Absolute  One,  while,  in  turn,  what  is  regarded  as  such  a  char- 
acter is  conditioned  by  the  position  that  is  taken  as  to  what 
is  the  fundamental  character  of  the  finite  human  self;  i.e., 
according  as  this  finite  self  is  found  to  be  predominantly  an 
intellectual  and  logical  self  or  ego,  or  an  ethical  being  that 
follows  the  dictates  of  conscience,  or,  possibly,  a  beauty-desiring 
soul,  so  is  the  Absolute  Self  regarded  as  being  predominantly 
one  or  the  other  of  these  characteristics.  Thus,  e.g.,  it  can  be 
demonstrated — by  analogy — that  that  Being  which  is  the  One 
of  the  universe  is  primarily  an  intellectual  Being,  the  logical 
laws  of  whose  mind  are  the  basic  principles  of  all  that  exists 
and  subsists.  This  specific  form  of  Objective  Idealism  is 
Panlogism.^ 

But  also,  by  a  different  specific  analogj^  it  can  be  demon- 
strated that  the  One  is  predominantly  both  a  conscience  that 
inherently  respects  the  principles  of  right,  a  tvill  that  purposes 
and  contrives  to  accomplish  ends,  and  an  intellect  that  adapts 
means  to  ends.^  By  thus  appealing  to  the  analogy  of  the  finite 
self  or  ego,  and  emphasizing  the  ethical  consciousness  as  the 
fundamental  feature  of  this  ego,  the  psychical  monist  is  able 
to  maintain  that  the  universe  is  an  ethical  system,  the  funda- 
mental laws  of  which  spring  from  or  are  identical  with  the 
dominant  ethical  characteristics  of  an  absolute  Ego. 

The  argument  for  such  an  absolute  ethical  Idealism  is  some- 
times buttressed  by  an  appeal  to  Phenomenalism.  This  phi- 
losophy, as  we  have  seen,  tacitly  makes  the  finite  self  a  psychical 
substance  that  is  in  causal  interaction  with  things-in-them- 
selves,  the  logical  outcome  of  this  assumption  being,  that  know- 
ing modifies  the  object-to-be-known.  Yet,  inconsistently  with 
this  implied  result.  Phenomenalism  maintains  that  the  nature 
of  the  finite  self  is  quite  knowable, — namely,  by  means,  first, 
of  discovering  those  principles  which  we  must  think,  and  then, 
secondly,  of  accounting  for  this  necessity  on  the  ground  that 
such  principles  are  identical  with  the  finite  self's  own  inherent 
nature,  which  nature  it  cannot  contradict.  These  principles,  in 
accordance  with  which  we  must  think,  are  ways  in  which  we 

'  The  position,  e.g.,  of  Hegel,  Bradley,  and,  I  should  say,  of  Royce. 
"  Fichte,  Miinsterberg. 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM      331 

relate  "things,"  and  it  is  by  virtue  of  relations  that  the  uni- 
verse is  a  system.  Briefly,  therefore,  in  accordance  with  Phe- 
nomenalism, the  system  of  the  universe  presupposes  an  ego  which 
thinks  in  accordance  with  certain  principles  which  are  the  laws 
of  the  ego's  own  nature;  or,  conversely,  a  suhstance-like  ego, 
thinking  in  accordance  with  its  own  nature,  relates  otherwise 
unrelated  "things,"  and  thus  makes  the  universe  a  system.^ 

Let  us,  now,  from  the  standpoint  of  this  position,  and  with 
the  main  argument  for  Objective  Idealism  still  in  mind,  inquire 
what  the  universe  would  be,  if  there  were  no  finite  egos.  Would 
it  not  be  only  a  chaos,  or  a  mass  of  unrelated  "elements"?  Let 
us  next  assume  just  this  chaos,  and  then  ask.  Whereby  would 
such  a  chaos  become  a  cosmosf  The  answer  to  this  inquiry  is 
evident.  It  is,  namely,  that,  with  a  cosmos  depending  on  know- 
ing, or  on  a  knower,  and  with  it  quite  conceivable,  e.g.,  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  empirical  sciences,  that  no  finite  knowers 
should  exist,  there  must  be  a  trans-finite,  or  infinite,  absolute 
knowing  or  knower,  who  relates  all  the  otherwise  unrelated  terms 
of  the  universe,  and  in  whom  the  principles  of  such  "related- 
nesses"  inhere,  even  as  the  qualities  of  a  physical  thing  seem 
to  inhere  in  a  material  substratum. 

Untrue,  then,  to  its  criticism  of  Phenomenalism,  namely,  that 
this  position  implicitly  presupposes  the  possibility  of  genuine 
knowing,  and  yet  explicitly  denies  this,  Objective  Idealism  uses 
the  phenomenalistic  doctrine,  that  the  ego  or  self  is  relater,  in 
order  to  demonstrate  that  the  Absolute  One  is  an  intellectualistic 
or  logical  ego  whose  function  it  is  both  to  mediate  all  relations 
and  to  relate. 

This  position  is  very  modern  monistic  and  idealistic  doctrine.* 
It  is  maintained,  that  to  know  is  to  systematize,  and  then,  from 
the  facts  (1)  that  the  universe  is  a  system — a  cosmos,  and  (2) 
that  finite  egos  are  conceivably  non-existent,  the  conclusion  is 
derived,  that  the  system  of  the  universe  implies  an  Absolute 
Ego  or  Self,  that  is  Absolute  One. 

In  criticism  of  this  argument,  it  may  be  said,  that  while  it  \ 

'  For  this  position  see  Joachim.  The  Nature  of  Truth,  pp.  78,  114;  T.  H. 
Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics;  Watson,  The  Interpretation  of  Religious 
Experience ;  Taylor,  Elements  of  Metaphysics,  Chap.  II.,  §  4,  et  seq.; 
Royce,  World  and  Individual,  p.  341  f. 

*  See  note  3;  also  the  quotations  given  in  Chap.  XXXV. 


332  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

may  be  granted  that  the  universe  is  a  system,  the  monistic 
conclusion  just  presented  follows  from  this  admission  only  on 
the  condition  that  a  certain  specific  assumption  is  made,  namely, 
that,  if  terms  are  in  specific  relations  to  one  another,  the  fact  of 
this  relatedness  implies  a  transcendent,  unitary,  and  mediating 
being.  Without  this  postulate,  and  with  an  opposed  postulate, 
the  monistic  conclusion  does,  however,  not  follow.  For,  granted 
that  the  universe  is  a  system,  and,  therefore,  a  manifold  of 
terms  in  relation,  then,  whatever  specific  type  of  system  the 
universe  may  be,  it  is  quite  possible,  that  relations  themselves 
"do  the  work"  of  uniting  terms,  and  furnish  the  universe  with 
all  the  unity  that  it  has.  This  unity,  and,  therefore,  the  system 
of  the  universe  may  be  any  one  of  those  types  that  are  distin- 
guished as,  e.g.,  organic,  causal,  continuous,  discontinuous,  and 
the  like,  without  being  an  absolutely  simple  One.  That  the 
universe  is  such  a  One  follows  only  from  a  specific  postulate. 
But  this  postulate  is  one  that  is  not  only  not  necessarily  true — 
although  it  may  be  true — but  that  is  also  open  to  the  criticism 
that  it  is  self-contradictory  in  its  implications,  as  we  have  previ- 
ously seen. 

In  further  criticism  of  the  argument  that  is  under  considera- 
tion, it  may  be  inquired,  whether  the  position  that  all  terms 
or  "things"  would  be  unrelated  were  it  not  for  the  agency  of 
an  Absolute  One  to  relate  them,  does  not  itself  presuppose  its 
contradictory;  i.e.,  does  it  not  presuppose  (1)  that,  before  such 
a  One  could  exercise  its  activity  in  relating,  "things"  would 
be  distinct  from  it,  even  though  "things"  are  its  manifestations; 
and  (2)  that,  as  thus  distinct,  "things"  would  be  either  similar 
or  dissimilar  to  that  which  relates  them;  and  (3)  that,  accord- 
ingly, certain  relations,  namely,  those  of  similarity  or  of  dis- 
similarity, would  be  independent  of  a  relater.  But,  if  there  are 
some  relations, — such  as  these,  that  are  not  "instituted"  by  an 
Absolute  One  as  relater,  other,  in  fact,  all  other  relations  may  be 
similarly  independent,  so  that,  if  there  be  an  Absolute  One,  such 
a  being  does  not  function  as  the  relater  of  the  terms  or  "things" 
of  the  universe. 

These  criticisms,  however,  are  either  ignored  or  not  accepted 
by  the  objective  idealist  who  derives  his  position  by  the  argu- 
ment that  has  just  been  given,  and  to  whom,  of  course,  that 


DEVELOPMENTS  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM      S33 

argument  is  quite  convincing.  The  result  is,  that,  with  it  once 
regarded  as  established,  that  there  is  an  Absolute  Knower  upon 
whom  the  system  of  the  universe  depends,  support  for  an 
ethical  idealism  and  monism  is  obtained  from  the  further  phe- 
nomenalistie  position,  (1)  that  there  are  two  *' worlds,"  the  one 
consisting  of  interacting  things-in-themselves  and  substance-like, 
finite  egos,  the  other,  of  the  causal  results  of  this  interaction, 
these  results  being  called  phenomena,  and  (2)  that  phenomena 
in  turn  are  of  two  kinds,  the  one  kind  being  psychical,  as  the 
result  of  the  action  of  things-in-themselves  on  finite  egos,  the 
other  kind,  physical,  as  the  result  of  the  action  of  finite  egos, 
with  their  laws,  on  things-in-themselves.  Since,  now,  an  effect 
owes  its  character  both  to  the  "thing"  acting  and  to  the  "thing" 
acted  upon,  both  psychical  and  the  physical  phenomena  bear 
the  "marks"  of  such  principles  as  cause  and  effect,  necessity, 
and  the  like,  and  in  this  respect  both  realms  are  causally  de- 
termined. But,  further.  Phenomenalism,  although  it  tacitly 
presupposes  the  contradictory,  explicitly  teaches  the  doctrine  of 
the  unknowableness  of  things-in-themselves.  Accordingly,  it  in- 
fers, that,  since  these  entities  are  not  known  to  he  determined, 
they  are  known  not  to  he  determined,  so  that,  it  is  further 
inferred,  they  furnish  opportunity  for  freedom — in  the  sense,  at 
least,  of  the  absence  of  causal  determination. 

Phenomenalism  and  Objective  Idealism  both  make  use  of  this 
conclusion  in  order  to  establish  an  Ethical  Idealism.^  For,  it  is 
argued,  that,  on  the  one  hand,  to  hold  a  man  responsible  and 
justifiably  punishable  for  his  acts,  is  impossible  unless  he  is 
free ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  as  a  member  of  both  the  psychical 
and  physical  worlds  in  which  every  event  is  caused  and  deter- 
mined, a  man  is  not  free ;  his  every  motive,  every  act,  every 
apparently  free  choice  is,  in  reality,  only  the  causal  result  of 
previous  acts  and,  finally,  of  heredity  and  environment.  This  is 
the  conflict.  On  the  one  hand  there  is  the  ethical  demand  that 
man  shall  be  free,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  the  nat- 
uralistic conclusion,  that  man  is  in  all  respects  only  a  link  in  a 
inflexible  causal  chain  of  heredity,  environment,  and  previous 
growth  and  development. 

This  problem  is  regarded  as  solved  by  the  phenomenalistic 

•  Fit'hte,  in  agreement  with  Kant;  see  Chap.  XXIX. 


334.  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

hypothesis,  that,  if  man  is  a  member  of  two  worlds,  namely, 
those  of  things-in-themselves  and  of  nature,  then  freedom  may 
exist  in  the  former,  causal  linkage  in  the  latter,  with  the  scien- 
tific knowledge  of  the  ''world"  demanding  this  (causal)  deter- 
mination, and  the  introspective  deliverances  of  conscience  con- 
firming the  freedom.  For,  although  the  regarding  ourselves  as 
free  may  be  the  hypostatization  of  our  ignorance  of  those  de- 
tailed causes  that  really  compel  us  to  do  whatever  we  do,  and, 
also,  although  the  conviction  that  we  are  free,  whether  this  be 
the  fact  or  not,  might  have  the  same  outcome  in  our  conduct 
■as  would  real  freedom,  and  be  quite  as  valuable  ethically,  never- 
theless it  is  a  fact  that  our  introspection  tells  us  that  we  are 
free.  Conscience  implies  free  action,  and  this  in  turn  is  found 
only  in  the  realm  of  things-in-themselves — for  Phenomenalism. 
Therefore  may  this  realm  be,  in  its  real  essence,  of  the  very 
nature  of  conscience  itself,  known,  not  by  sensation,  nor  by 
intellect,  but  in  moral  consciousness  and  feeling. 

Then  the  interesting  question  arises,  if  the  Absolute  One, 
Mediator  of  all  relations,  Manifestor  of  all  appearances,  Source 
of  all  those  results  which  are  mutually  dependent  upon  and 
relative  to  one  other,  Uniter  of  all-inclusive  self  and  not-self  in 
the  act  and  implications  of  knowledge,  may  not  itself  be  of  the 
nature  of  conscience,  or  of  an  active,  vivifying  moral  law?  The 
answer  of  the  ethical  monist  to  this  question  is  not  "may,"  but 
"must,"  and  thereby  is  the  easier  argument  hy  analogy  but- 
tressed by  this  more  complicated  argument  from  Kantian  Phe- 
nomenalism. But,  since  the  position  is  thus  a  derivative  both  of 
this  Phenomenalism  and  of  Monism,  it  stands  or  falls  with  these 
two  positions,  and  is  thereby  doomed  to  failure. 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  OF  IDEALISM        S35 

CHAPTER  XXXVII 

FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  OF  OBJECTIVE  IDEALISM 

I.   VOLUNTARISM 

If  the  Absolute  One  be  a  self  or  ego,  and  if,  as  a  self  or  ego, 
it  be  primarily  a  conscience,  then  is  it  also  Will.  Thus  is 
Ethical  Monism  also  Voluntarism.  Intellectually,  conscience  is 
that  faculty,  either  complex  or  simple,  to  which  there  are  pre- 
sented ends  to  be  accomplished,  means  to  these  ends,  and  ideals 
or  standards  under  which  both  ends  and  means  are  subsumed 
as  either  good  or  bad,  right  or  wrong.  Emotionally,  on  the 
other  hand,  conscience  is  that  faculty  which  can  only  prefer  the 
good  to  the  bad,  the  right  to  the  wrong,  and  which  is  itself  the 
innate  respect  and  reverence  for  the  one,  and  the  abhorrence  of 
the  other.  This  immanent  and  "natural"  preference  is  one 
phase  of  choice  or  will.  Will,  also,  is  the  act  of  iveighing  and 
deliberating  over  both  ends  and  means,  and  of  then  striving  to 
accomplish  the  chosen  end  by  this  means  or  that.  Thus  it  is, 
that  conscience  is  itself  will  with  an  emotionally  rooted  prefer- 
ence for  the  good  and  the  right  for  their  own  sake,  and  with 
an  intellectual  discrimination  between  the  good  and  the  bad,  and 
between  right  and  wrong  means  and  ends. 

This  Ethical  Voluntarism  readily  allies  itself  with  a  second 
type  or  more  extended  form  of  Voluntarism  that  has  its  motive 
in  the  dynamic  doctrines  of  modern  science,  while  these  doctrines 
are  in  turn  supported  by  dialectical  arguments,  derived  from 
the  Aristotelian  logic,  by  which  the  logical  necessity  of  change 
and  evolution  is  demonstrated. 

In  developing  this  more  extended  Voluntarism,  appeal  is  made 
to  the  fact,  that,  although  in  comparison  with  acts  of  will,  intel- 
lectual acts  and  emotions  are,  perhaps,  revealed  by  introspection 
as  relatively  statical,  this,  nevertheless,  is  only  comparatively 
the  case,  since  modern  psychology  shows  that  all  empirically 
given  consciousness  is  concretely  an  act  or  process.  This  is  quite 
generally  agreed  to,  whether  or  not  it  is  further  held,  that  there 


336  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

is  a  static  ego  or  self  which  unites  the  manifold  of  conscious 
processes  into  one  personality.  But,  in  acts  of  will  we  discover 
a  resistance  to  be  overcome,  a  push  or  a  pull  against  either  our 
better  nature,  or  against  our  appetites  and  desires,  and,  also,  a 
counter  push  or  pull,  with  actions  finally  emerging.  Here, 
therefore,  is  force, — energy,  here  is  vis  viva  revealed  at  first 
hand. 

Most  suggestive  of  further  hypotheses  now,  is  the  view,  that 
such  a  source  is  that  from  which  our  knowledge  of  the  dynamic 
springs,  and  that,  with  this  as  an  analogy,  men  have  been  uncon- 
sciously led  to  suppose  that  nature  itself  is  identical  with  change. 
But,  even  if  this  be  the  origin  of  our  knowledge  of  change,  it 
does  not  follow,  that  nature  is  not  really  of  this  character,  but 
is  only  thought  to  be  such  by  man.  For  the  esse  of  "things" 
is  not,  of  necessity,  identical  with  the  mode  of  its  discovery, 
unless  one  accept  the  fundamental  premises  of  such  positions 
as  Phenomenalism,  Subjectivism,  or  Humanism. 

However,  modern  science  takes  this  dynamic  view,  whatever 
interpretation  may  be  given  to  it.  Thus,  e.g.,  in  the  field  of 
physical  existents,  science  holds  that  all  is  energy,  either  in  the 
equilihrium  of  action  and  reaction,  or  of  change  when  the  one 
force  is  the  greater,  the  possible  exceptions  being  those  ultimate 
parts,  such  as  atoms  or  electrons,  out  of  which  specific 
energies  are  made  up,  although  even  such  seemingly  ultimately 
statical  entities  may  be  only  equilibriums  between  dynamic 
forces. 

The  psychical  life  is,  perhaps,  even  more  evidently  one  of 
change  and  push  and  pull,  ivith,  possibly,  not  even  the  same 
probability  of  unchanging  entities  such  as  seem  to  exist  in  the 
physical  world,  or  which  the  physical  world  presupposes.  For 
example,  space  and  time  do  not  change,  although  "things"  in 
them  may  change.  Voluntarism,  however,  neglects  these  re- 
finements, and,  also,  in  its  appeal  to  evolution,  is  not  troubled 
by  the  fact  that,  if  all  "things"  are  held  to  evolve,  this  sup- 
position is  contradicted  by  the  implied  fact,  that  the  principles 
of  evolution  and  of  change  do  not  themselves  change,  but  are 
invariants. 

The  theory  of  evolution  holds  in  a  crude  way  to  the  con- 
tinuity of  the  development  of  higher  plants  and  animals  from 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  OF  IDEALISM        337 

lower  forms,  and  this  evolution  is  held  to  extend  upward  until 
it  brings  the  flowering  of  a  fully  deliberative  will  as  the  crown- 
ing glory  of  nature 's  inherent  creative  impulse.  But,  downward 
also  does  the  continuity  extend  so  as  to  include  the  impulsive 
acts,  the  instincts,  the  tropisms,  the  chemical  and  physical 
reactions  and  events,  and,  finally,  the  so-called  inorganic  proc- 
esses. Accordingly  the  question  arises,  Shall  the  higher  partake 
of  the  nature  of  the  lower,  the  complex  be  like  the  simple,  or 
conversely?  But,  we  may  also  ask.  What  matters  it  which 
hypothesis  we  choose,  since  there  is  continuity  between  the  two 
extremes,  and  each  extreme  must  resemble  the  other? 

For  the  modern  voluntarist  this  evidence  from  evolution 
counts  for  much,  indeed  its  weight  tips  the  scales  in  favor  of 
the  inference,  that  "the  lower"  is  like  "the  higher,"  rather  than 
conversely.  For,  it  is  asked,  Do  we  not  get  our  first-hand 
knowledge  of  force,  of  energy,  of  change,  from  the  higher  by 
an  absolutely  reliable  introspective  knowledge  of  ourselves, 
whereas  the  innermost  essence  of  the  life  of  the  lower  animals 
and  of  all  plants,  and  of  the  processes  of  the  inorganic  physical 
world  is  concealed  from  us  by  the  coat  of  many  colors — appear- 
ances? Also,  must  not  the  lower  contain  that  which  the  higher 
reveals  in  order  to  account  for  the  higher  realities?  For  ex- 
ample, must  not  "the  lower"  be  or  contain  will  and  conscious- 
ness, in  order  to  account  for  will  and  consciousness  in  higher 
forms,  especially  if  evolution  is  continuous?  And  yet,  if  will 
is  present  at  such  lower  "levels,"  e.g.,  in  an  amoeba  or  in  an 
atom,  it  is,  nevertheless,  not  a  deliberative  will,  but  a  wull  that 
is  blind  and  impulsive,  dogged  in  its  urgings,  ever  unsatisfied 
in  its  attainment,  and,  perhaps,  ever  creating  new  desires,  and, 
therefore,  ever  new  suffering. 

Like  in  kind,  therefore,  would  be  the  higher  and  the  lower, 
like,  that  which  seems  to  be  as  different  as  are  the  physical  and 
the  mental,  like,  the  near  and  the  remote.  But  like  they  must 
he,  not  only  because,  as  evolution  teaches,  each  is  continuous 
with  the  other — roughly  so  at  least,  but  also  because  each  is  but 
the  upspringing  of  an  Absolute  Will  that  is  their  creator,  their 
relater,  and  their  inner  nature.  Thus  is  the  position  taken,  that 
the  essence  of  physical  force  and  energy  is  will,  and  the  essence 
of  will,  energy,  urging,  on-pouring. 


S38  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

This  is  modern  Voluntarism,  an  offshoot  of  Ethical  Monism. 
The  gap  between  it  and  Naturalism  is  not  wide,  since  to  bridge 
this  gap,  one  has  but  to  identify  the  Absolute  One  of  Monistic 
Idealism  with  an  Energy  whose  inner  nature  is  Will.  But 
whether  energy  be  will,  or  will  be  energy,  is,  perhaps,  an  option 
to  which  the  concrete  happenings  of  the  universe  are  quite 
indifferent  as  long  as  the  Ultimate  One  plays  only  the  function 
of  manifesting  itself  in  and  of  uniting  all  concrete  ''things" 
as  they  are  found  empirically.  For,  on  the  one  hand,  if  will  be 
energy,  as  the  materialistic  monists  claim,  then  the  world  is 
a  deterministic  system,  and  there  is  no  opportunity  for  teleology 
in  any  other  sense  than  that  of  mere  direction  and  irreversi- 
bility, while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  energy  be  will,  yet  a  will 
that  merely  underlies  and  relates  determined  empirical  happen- 
ings, then,  also,  is  there  no  teleology  in  the  sense  of  a  purpose 
that  is  aimed  at,  and  of  means  that  are  varied  to  its  accom- 
plishment. 

It  is,  however,  the  seeming  opportunity  of  making  determin- 
ism merely  apparent,  and  thus  of  finding  a  fundamental  on- 
tological  basis  for  a  genuine,  universal  teleology,  that  chiefly 
actuates  the  modern  voluntarist.  For,  if  energy  be  will  mani- 
festing itself  in  the  inorganic  wqrld,  and  especially  in  the  realm 
of  plants  and  animals,  then  there  certainly  does  seem  to  be 
opportunity  for  an  immanent  teleology,  with  the  result  that 
the  conflict  between  the  act  that  is  hoth  determined  and  pur- 
poseful seems  to  be  removable  by  putting  the  causal  determinism 
into  the  world  of  appearance,  and  the  purpose  a7id  freedom  of 
action  into  the  realm  of  ultimate  reality,  namely  the  Universal 
Will.  Thus  it  is  that  in  modern  Voluntarism  there  is  still 
retained  the  contrast  of  the  Kantian  Phenomenalism  between 
a  realm  of  appearances  and  a  realm  of  ultimate  realities  (things- 
in-themselves) ,  with  determinism  in  the  former,  and  purpose 
and  freedom  in  the  latter  realm.  Indeed,  all  Monism,  especially 
all  Objective  Idealism,  emphasizes  this  contrast  between  the 
realm  of  related  terms  as  appearances,  and  the  reality  of  the 
Ultimate  One  that  relates  these. 

As  regards  their  "practical  outcomes,"  however,  there  is  a 
striking  contrast  between  Ethical  Monism  and  Voluntarism; 
for,  while  the  former  is  essentially  a  philosophy  of  optimism, 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  OF  IDEALISM        339 

the  latter  readily  becomes  a  theory  of  deeply  grounded  pes- 
simism. 

The  One  of  Ethical  Monism  is  held  to  be  primarily  a  moral 
self  that  is  the  active,  living  principle  of  right  and  justice  in 
the  world,  although  that  such  a  being  cannot  consistently  be 
inferred  to  be  of  this  character,  we  shall  discover  shortly  in  our 
criticism  of  Objective  Idealism.  However,  this  criticism  is  not 
accepted  by  the  adherents  of  the  position.  Rather,  their  phi- 
losophy is  held  both  to  demand  the  conclusion  and  to  support 
the  conviction,  that  all  ''things"  work  togetlier  for  good. 
The  One  that  mediates  all,  and  that  is  all,  is  a  moral 
entity.  Therefore,  by  that  narrow  meaning  of  the  term  with 
which  Ethical  Monism  identifies  the  moral,  all  "things" 
must  be  in  their  essence  good,  and  all  evil  must  be  but  mere 
appearance. 

Voluntarism,  however,  does  not,  at  least  as  it  has  been  his- 
torically developed,  incline  to  this  optimism.  Eather,  the  will 
of  Voluntarism  is  interpreted  more  in  analogy  to  those  some- 
what blind,  instinctive  and  impulsive  willings  that  impel  us  to 
anger  and  to  wrath,  and  then  to  regret  and  to  sorrow,  or  to 
desire,  and  then,  following  upon  satisfaction,  to  still  further 
desire,  and  accordingly  to  no  final  satisfaction.  Thus  it  is  that 
Voluntarism  becomes  a  philosophy  of  unfulfilment  and  of  ever 
returning  unquenchable  longings  and  willings.  Yet  in  this 
flux  we  continue  to  "will  to  live,"^  and,  as  a  means  of  living, 
to  will  to  have  power  and  to  conquer.-  Yet  what  deeper 
ground  for  pessimism  than  to  he  a  will  that  forever  flows 
and  surges  into  ever  new  longings  and  ever  repeated  disap- 
pointments 1 

Voluntarism  is  based  in  part  on  the  scientific  and  naturalistic 
doctrine  of  the  evolution  and  change  of  all  "things,"  but  when 
further  support  is  needed,  it  accepts  this  from  whatever  sources 
are  available, — even  from  opposed  theories.     Accordingly,  Vol- 

*  Schopenhauer  (1788-1860),  collected  works  ed.  by  Deussen,  1911  ff.; 
translations:  World  as  Will,  and  Idea,  by  Haldane  and  Kemp,  3  vols., 
1884  ff.;  Fourfold  Hoot  and  Will  in  Nature,  by  Hillebrand,  2nd  ed.,  1891; 
Basis  of  Morality,  by  Bullock.     Cf.  Sully,  Pessimism. 

=  Nietzsche  (1844-1900),  col.  works  ed.  by  Koegel,  1895  ff.;  English 
trans,  by  A.  Tille.  See  especially  Jenzeits  von  Gut  and  Biise,  and  Zur 
Oenealogie  der  Moral  (Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  and  The  Genealogy  of 
Morals ) . 


340  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

untarism  brings  to  its  aid  a  theory  of  the  logical  necessity  of 
change  and  evolution.  This  theory  arises  in  the  development 
of  the  Aristotelian  logic,  and  is  closely  connected  with  the  argu- 
ment for  an  Underlying  One.  In  fact,  just  as  this  argu- 
ment deduces,  from  every  term's  implication  of  a  formal 
contradictory,  the  unity  of  the  two  terms,  and  the  underly- 
ing locus  of  this  unity,  so  logical  evolutionism  deduces,  from 
the  implication  of  a  formal  contradictory,  the  necessity  of 
change. 

In  order  to  make  this  demonstration  one  argues,  that  change 
as  empirically  discovered  can  only  mean  logically  that  A  be- 
comes B,  i.e.,  non-A,  where  A  and  B  are  things.  If,  now,  when 
A  becomes  B,  there  is  merely  an  A  at  one  instant,  and  a  5  at 
another  instant,  no  especial  difficulty  may  seem  to  arise.  But 
this  is  only  because  certain  problems  are  ignored.  For  there  is 
the  problem  as  to  hoiv  a  thing,  e.g.,  an  atom  of  carbon,  or  an 
electron,  can  cease  to  be  itself,  and  become  something  else.  But 
there  is  also  the  problem,  as  to  how,  if  such  a  becoming  seems 
to  be  an  empirical  fact, — as  it  does, — this  "ceasing"  to  be  one 
thing  and  "becoming"  another  thing  can  be  rationally  under- 
stood— indeed,  how  it  can  be  rationalized  at  all.  For,  although 
it  seems  to  be  readily  ascertainable  that  a  thing,  e.g.,  a  piece  of 
ice,  can  be  7iow  A,  and  then  B,  or  non-A,  at  instants  that  are 
somewhat  remote  from  each  other  (the  ice  can  become  water), 
it  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible  to  understand  the  implied  fact, 
that,  at  some  one  instant  the  real  transformation  takes  place 
{e.g.,  the  ice  melts),  so  that  a  thing  is  both  A  and  non-A  at  the 
same  instant  (the  water  both  solid  and  liquid). 

Change,  therefore,  presents  this  specific  problem  as  to  how 
contradictory  attributes  can  coexist  at  the  same  instant.  And 
the  solution  to  this  problem  is,  that  they  can  not,  except  in 
appearance.  For,  on  the  ground  of  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion, that  a  thing  can  not  both  be  and  not  be  (a  certain  quality 
or  property),  whatever  seems  to  involve  the  contradiction  of 
being  both  A  and  non-A  must  be  inferred  to  be  only  appear- 
ance, while  reality  must  be  inferred  to  be  that  which  does  not 
change. 

The  essence  of  change  is,  therefore,  the  self-contradictory  state 
of  affairs  of  A  and  non-A  coexisting  at  the  same  instant.    But 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  OF  IDEALISM        341 

this  state  of  affairs  is  an  instance  of  logical  necessity,  in  the 
sense,  as  we  have  already  seen,  that  A  implies  non-A.^  We  must 
conclude,  therefore,  that  change,  which  is  empirically  discovera- 
ble, but  which  is  also  self-contradictory,  is,  nevertheless,  logically 
necessitated,  although  in  the  realm  of  the  manifold  of  appear- 
ances, and  not  as  a  characteristic  of  that  One  which  is  tlie 
reality. 

However,  Voluntarism  is  not  alone  in  employing  this  argu- 
ment in  order  to  demonstrate  the  necessity  of  a  universal  change 
and  evolution  by  which  to  fortify  its  position,  that  all  is  Will, 
for  other  forms  of  Monism  also  use  it.  Thus,  e.g.,  Ethical 
Monism  employs  the  same  argument  in  order  to  show  that  a 
universal  ethical  advance  and  progress  is  logically  necessitated, 
and  Intellectualistic  Monism,  in  order  to  demonstrate  the  pres- 
ence of  a  logical  necessity  in  the  sequence,  e.g.,  of  the  several 
periods  of  the  development  of  human  institutions.  For  it  can 
be  thus  demonstrated,  e.g.,  that  the  several  phases  in  the  develop- 
ment of  religious  beliefs,  of  the  forms  of  government  and  of 
social  organization,  and  of  scientific  theories,  could  have  only 
that  order  ivhich  they  de  facto  have  had.*  Indeed,  every 
monistic  theory  can,  consistently  with  its  own  logical  founda- 
tion in  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations,  use  this  logical 
evolutionism  either  as  a  support  or  as  a  supplementary  doc- 
trine. For,  even  if  the  One  is  interpreted  after  the  analogy 
of  a  physical  thing  with  attributes  and  a  unitary  material 
substratum,  the  argument  for  logical  evolutionism  may  still  be 
used,  since  this  argument  forms  one  aspect  or  corollary  of  the 
argument  for  a  single  underlying  reality.^  Emphasize  the  unity 
in  the  relationship  of  contradictories,  and  the  conclusion  results, 
that  there  is  an  underlying  One ;  but  emphasize  the  implication 
of  the  contradictory  as  identical  with  the  process  of  one  "thing" 
becoming  another,  and  we  have  the  conclusion,  that,  whatever 
else  they  may  be,  e.g.,  progress,  advance,  and  betterment,  or 
the  opposite,  change  and  evolution  are  themselves  logically 
necessary. 

"  This  is  the  essence,  I  believe,  of  the  Hegelian  doctrine  of  the  logical 
necessity  of  evolution.  It  is  found  in  Fichte,  in  the  Wissenschaftslehre, 
and  in  Hegel  in  the  Logic  and  the  Encyclopedia.     See  Chap.  XXXV.,  il. 

*  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  History,  trans,  by  Sibree. 

»  See  Chap.  XXXV.,  ii. 


342  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

n.    VITALISTIC   AND   ROMANTIC   IDEALISM  ^ 

Still  another  variant  of  generic  Monism  is  derived  by  inter- 
preting the  nature  of  the  One  after  the  analogy  of  the  organism, 
or  of  life,  especially  as  this  is  regarded  in  those  specific  bio- 
logical theories  that  are  called  vitalistic.  Such  a  specific  monism 
may  be  called  Universal  Vitalism  or  Romanticism,  and  is  due, 
of  course,  to  the  influence  of  the  concept  of  biological  evolution 
and  of  the  science  of  biology.  Such  a  monism  is,  also,  clearly 
more  naturalistic  than  are  those  monisms  which  we  have  thus 
far  considered,  yet  it  is,  nevertheless,  a  monism  that  is  an  ideal- 
ism or  psychism,  since  it  is  based  on  a  psychistic  view  of  the 
organism  and  of  the  nature  of  life. 

One  and  perhaps  the  chief  characteristic  of  vitalistic  theories 
in  biology  is  their  opposition  to,  or  insistence  on  the  limitatiojis 
of,  the  mechanistic  position.  The  latter  position,  however,  is 
itself  seldom  formulated  with  precision.  Sometimes  it  is  defined 
as  meaning  merely  that  the  organism  is  determined  in  all  its 
structures  and  functions,  and  that  it  acts  with  such  a  regularity 
and  uniformity  that  experiments  can  be  repeated  and  "the 
same  results"  again  be  observed.  Also,  the  position  is  defined 
as  meaning  that  all  vital  phenomena  are  identical  with 
mechanistic  entities — without  this  term  (mechanistic)  itself 
being  defined.  Or,  again,  the  position  is  regarded  as  meaning 
(1)  that  an  organism  is  a  special  instance  of  an  organized  com- 
plex of  physico-chemical  forces,  even  as  any  such  complex  is 
specifically  different  from  others;  (2)  that,  accordingly,  the 
organism  has,  as  a  ivhole,  specific  characteristics,  such  as  repro- 
ductive ability,  self-maintenance,  and  selective  sensitivity,  which 
inorganic  complexes  do  not  have;  (3)  that  such  specific  char- 
acteristics are  not  identical  with  chemical  and  physical  forces, 
with  molecules,  with  atoms,  or  with  electrons,  although  they 
act  in  conformity  with  these  mechanistic  entities. 

This  last  mechanistic  position  is  of  such  a  character  that  it 
makes  it  quite  possible  to  combine  both  the  mechanistic  and 
vitalistic  contentions  into  a  common  theory,  but  this  possibility 

•  The  position  taken  by  Bergson  in  Creative  Evohitiov  and  other  works, 
and  by  Eucken  in  the  recent  volumes:  Main  Currents  of  Afodern  Thought, 
trans,  by  Booth;  Problems  of  lAfe,  trans,  by  Hough  and  Gibson;  Value 
and  Meaning  of  Life,  trans,  by  Gibson;  Life's  Basis  and  Life's  Ideal,  trans, 
by  VVidgery;  The  Life  of  the  Spirit,  trans,  by  Pogson. 


FURTHER  DEVELOPMENTS  OF  IDEALISM        343 

has  not  been  generally  recognized  by  either  party.  Accord- 
ingly Vitalism  is  also  advanced  in  quite  as  vague  a  form  as  is 
Mechanism,  namely,  as  the  negative  position  or  contention  that 
the  mechanistic  theory  does  not  "account  for,"  "explain,"  or 
describe  the  organism  completely,  especially  as  regards  its  dis- 
tinctly vital  characteristics.  In  other  instances,  however,  Vital- 
ism is  offered  as  a  much  more  definite  and  precise  theory, 
namely,  as  the  position,  that,  while  the  organism  is  in  part 
mechanistic,  it  nevertheless  "contains"  in  every  case  a  mys- 
terious entity  called  an  Entelechy  that  is  itself  non-meclianistic, 
although  it  may  with  foresight  use  mechanistic  means  to  its 
own  special  end — which  is  the  furtherance  of  Life.'' 

It  is,  now,  this  second  type  of  Vitalism  that  has  especially 
appealed  to  the  monistic  psychist  as  a  model  for  his  interpreta- 
tion of  the  specific  nature  of  the  One.  For,  if  it  can  be  demon- 
strated that  there  is  a  One,  then  why  should  this  One  not  be 
Life,  as  well  as  Intellect,  Will,  and  the  like,  especially  if 
intellect  and  will  are  empirically  known  only  in,  or  as  specific 
activities  of,  living  beings? 

This  identification  is  made  de  facto,^  and  the  resulting  posi- 
tion may  be  called  Monistic  Vitalism.     Its  dominant  tenet  is  i 
that  the  One  is  Life,  and  that  this  One  is  not  mechanistic,  al-  | 
though  its  functions  may  be   (1)    to  mediate  the  relationships' 
between    mechanistically    related    terms,    (2)    to    develop    and, 
evolve  into  such  an  intellectualizing-mechanizing  stage  in  the' 
case  of  human  beings,  and  (3)  to  guarantee  an  inner  purpose- 
fulness  in  all  "things." 

Monistic  Vitalism  thus  easily  develops  into  Monistic  Eo- 
manticism.  This  last  position  as  taken,  e.g.,  in  art  and  litera- 
ture, is  one  that,  negatively,  is  scornful  of  all  traditional  prin- 
ciples and  standards,  while,  positively,  it  holds  to  the  rule  of 
a  complete  reliance  upon  the  present  impression,  thus  placing 
the  emotions  and  the  will  above  the  intellect,  and  adopting  the 
pragmatic  rule  of  accepting  whatever  works  successfully.     Re- 

^  Cf.  Driesch,  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism,  1908 ;  Loeb, 
Mechanistic  Conception  of  Life,  1912;  Spaulding,  "Defense  of  Analysis," 
in  The  New  Realism,  and  Reviews  of  Driesch  in  the  Phil.  Review,  Vol.  VIII., 
1909,  pp.  63  ff.  and  436  fif.,  and  of  Loeb,  in  Science,  N.  S.,  Vol.  XXXVIII., 
pp.  333-336. 

*  The  position  taken  by  Eucken, 


344  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

lease  from  the  trammels  of  the  old,  freedom  to  produce  the  new, 
flux  and  flow  according  to  no  law  except  that  of  resulting  emo- 
tional satisfaction,  and  this,  perhaps,  to  but  one  individual — 
these  are  the  characteristics  of  Komanticism  in  the  field  of  the 
human  arts. 

How  romantic,  indeed,  were  the  universe,  if  it  were  of  this 
kind — a  living  organism,  bound  by  no  law,  producing  the  new, 
pregnant  with  possibilities,  full  of  surprises,  surcharged  with 
vital  impulses,  which  intellectual  reflection  must  follow  and 
not  lead,  many  and  yet  One!  For  the  emotionally  and 
artistically  inclined,  for  the  anti-intellectualists,  such  a  plea  is 
strong, — quite  convincing  men  like  Eucken  and  Bergson. 

Such  a  universal  Vitalism  and  Romanticism  is,  however,  as 
much  a  Monism  as  are  Panlogism,  Pantheism,  Ethical  Idealism, 
and  Voluntarism,  yet  such  a  philosophy  is  also  a  Monism  that 
verges  toward  Naturalism — although  toward  a  Naturalism  that 
is  also  a  strongly  tinged  Psychism.  For  it  is  life,  not  as  the 
natural  sciences  usually  interpret  this  phenomenon,  but,  rather, 
as  they  fail  to  interpret  and  explain  it,  that  becomes  the  model 
for  the  interpretation  of  the  specific  nature  of  the  One.  Life 
as  lived,  as  non-mechanical,  non-chemical,  non-geometrical,  non- 
determined,  freely  creating,  ever  surging  onward,  vague  and 
mystical — such  is  that  Life  which  is  the  One.  And  this  Life  can 
be  only  of  the  nature  of  Mind  or  Spirit,  which,  as  holding  the 
many  together  in  relatedness,  and  as  thus  not  itself  an  organized 
whole,  can  itself  be  only  Absolute  One.  Thus  it  is  that  Uni- 
versal Vitalism  and  Romanticism  emerge  as  further  variants 
of  generic  Monism. 


CONCLUSION  345 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII 

CONCLUSION 

I.  monism's  solution   op  philosophical  PROBLEMS:    CRITICISM 

This  detailed  discussion  of  monistic  systems  may  now  be  com- 
pleted by  presenting  those  solutions  which  these  positions  give 
to  the  main  philosophical  problems. 

First,  it  is  evident  that  all  these  monisms  are  in  their  result 
predominantly  ontologies.  They  solve  the  ontological  problem 
by  concluding,  not  merely  that  there  is  a  oneness  of  kind  of  all 
"things,"  as  Subjectivism,  Psychism,  and  Materialism  main- 
tain, but  that  there  is  a  numerical  One  which  relates  all,  is  all, 
and  underlies  or  transcends  all.  It  is  this  conclusion  that  dis- 
tinguishes these  positions  from  naturalistic  systems.  For  while 
these  last  positions,  in  some  cases  at  least,  conclude  that  ulti- 
mately all  "things"  are  of  the  same  kind,  they  nevertheless 
admit  the  genuine  distinctness  and  manifoldness  of  such  similar 
"things."  Monistic  systems  also  accept  a  pluralism,  but  they 
insist  also  upon  the  numerical  oneness  of  ultimate  reality,  allow- 
ing for  a  manifoldness  only  in  the  realm  of  manifestations  and 
appearances.  Further,  in  their  identification  of  the  One  with 
the  nature  of  some  finite,  entity,  such  as  self,  ego,  intellect,  will, 
or  life,  monistic  systems  give  an  answer  to  the  question,  What 
is  the  fundamental  stuff  of  the  universe?  quite  as  much  as  did 
those  earliest  ontologies  which  maintained  that  this  stuff  was 
water,  or  air,  or  fire. 

In  their  cosmology  monistic  systems  follow  modern  science, 
and  interpret  as  mere  appearances  of  One  Absolute,  all  those 
detailed  entities  with  the  discovery  of  which  science  is  partly 
identical.  They  also  maintain  the  presence  of  a  law  or  order 
in  "things,"  but  make  the  One  the  source  or  the  immanent  prin- 
ciple of  this  order.  Also,  as  the  general  concept  of  evolution 
has  developed  in  science,  monistic  systems  have  incorporated  its 
principles  in  one  way  or  another  into  their  cosmologies. 

Further,  with  the  phenomenalistic  distinction  at  hand,  of  two 
orders  of  reality,  the  one  of  appearances,  the  other,  of  genuine 


346  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

reality,  monistic  systems  claim  to  avoid  those  contradictions  that 
seem  to  subsist,  if  one  and  the  same  "thing"  or  event  is  both 
determined  and  purposeful.  For,  by  this  distinction,  each  and 
every  entity  can  be  maintained  to  have  its  source  in  a  free, 
purposing  One,  and  yet  to  be  also  a  member  of  a  causally  deter- 
mined series.  Such  an  immanent  teleology  is  accepted  by  all 
monistic  systems.  By  means  of  the  distinction  between  appear- 
ance and  reality,  such  systems  claim  to  be  able  consistently  to 
accept  both  the  deterministic  cosmology  of  natural  science  and 
the  teleology  of  an  ethics  and  a  religion  that  demand  freedom, 
responsibility,  conscience,  and  the  victory  of  the  good. 

Monistic  systems  also  give  a  very  definite  solution  to  the 
theological  problem.  While  perhaps  not  all  such  systems  ex- 
plicitly identify  the  One  of  the  universe  with  God,  yet,  if  what 
the  Deity  does  is  more  important  than  what  He  is,  then  is  this 
identification  made  by  each  specific  monism.  The  One  is  God, 
because  He  is  that  Being  who  not  only  is  all,  but  who  unites 
and  relates  all,  who  manifests  Himself  in  all,  and  who,  in  the 
midst  of  seeming  machine-like  chains  of  events,  guarantees  their 
inner  purposefulness,  and  perhaps  their  goodness.  Specific  sys- 
tems may  differ  as  to  whether  God  is  predominantly  Intellect, 
or  Will,  or  Life,  but  whichever  of  these  He  may  be  held  to 
be.  His  most  important  functions  are  the  same. 

In  monistic  systems,  therefore,  the  Deity  is  not  the  first  cause 
in  the  temporal  series  of  causes  and  effects ;  nor  is  He  architect, 
mechanician,  or  designer,  to  stand  outside  His  handiwork  and 
view  it  from  this  angle  and  from  that,  ever  to  bear  in  mind 
the  end  which  He  will  accomplish ;  nor  is  He  merely  a  Being 
that  is  thought  of  in  a  manner  consistent  and  free  from  con- 
tradiction, and  that,  therefore,  if  He  does  not  exist,  at  least  sub- 
sists. Bather,  in  Monism,  God  is  a  cause  that  underlies  or 
transcends,  and  that  is  first  in  just  this  specific  sense;  He  mani- 
fests Himself  in  all  "things"  as  their  essence,  and  is,  therefore, 
their  immanent  architect  and  designer;  He  exists  neither  here 
nor  there,  neither  now  nor  then,  and  thus  is  eternal  and  omni- 
present; and,  finally,  with  all  finite  "things"  related  by  Him, 
He,  as  their  relater,  is  in  some  vague  sense  infinite,  un- 
limited,— and  perfect.  In  this  manner  does  Monism  transform 
the  traditional  cosmological,  teleological,  and  ontological  proofs 


CONCLUSION  347 

for  God's  existence,  reinterpreting  them  in  the  light  of  its  own 
distinction  between  the  apparent  and  the  real,  the  related  and 
the  relater. 

In  their  solution  both  of  the  problem  of  values  and  of  the 
problem  of  knowledge  monistic  systems  are  very  definitely  ahso- 
lutistic,  and,  therefore,  anti-pragmatic  and  anti-relativistic.  In 
criticism  of  relativism,  all  monistic  systems  presuppose  the  prin- 
ciple that  absolute  knowledge  is  possible  in  some  cases  at  least, 
and  accordingly  all  accept  the  existence  or  subsistence  of  an 
absolute  good,  an  absolute  truth,  and  an  absolute  beauty.  Evil, 
error,  and  ugliness,  are  all  undeniably  facts  of  some  kind,  but 
for  monistic  systems  they  are  mere  appearances,  and  not  ultimate 
realities.  Indeed  these  entities,  as  well  as  the  good,  the  true, 
and  the  beautiful  could  not  be  other  than  they  are,  since  their 
appearance  is  the  product  of  a  logical  necessity.  Other  systems 
also  accept  an  absolute  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty,  and  a 
system  of  entities  that  are  knowable  as  they  really  are, — e.g., 
Realism  does  this.  But  this  does  not  carry  with  it  the  further 
acceptance  of  the  monistic  position,  that  there  is  One  underlying 
entity  which  is  either  identical  with  the  principle  of  goodness, 
truth,  and  beauty,  one  or  all  of  these,  or  through  which  these 
become  facts  in  the  manifoldness  of  the  universe. 

It  is  this  specific  identification  that  distinguishes  the  abso- 
lutism of  the  monistic  systems  from  that  of  other  absolutistic 
systems.  Other  positions  maintain  that  there  is  a  realm  of 
facts  and  of  states  of  affairs,  some  of  which  are  values  such  as 
goodness  and  beauty,  and  others,  non-values,  but  all  of  which 
are  related  in  various  ways,  thus  forming  some  kind  of  system, 
and  all  of  which  are  knowable,  though  perhaps  in  many  specific 
instances  unknown.  Every  system  that  presents  as  true  a  theory 
concerning  knowing,  makes  this  presupposition  of  the  absolute 
knowableness  of  some  "things," — a  presupposition  which  is 
identical  with  the  principle,  that  there  are  terms  which  are 
related,  and  yet  do  not  affect  one  another. 

One  can  grant,  therefore,  that  all  ''things"  form  a  system 
in  that  they  are  related,^  and  yet  not  be  forced,  also,  to  grant 
either  that  there  is  an  effect  of  each  "thing"  on  every  other 
thing,  with  all  "things"  thereby  becoming  similar  in  character, 

^  See  Chap.  XLI.,  iv.-vi. 


348  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

and  infinitely  complex,  or  that  a  relation  demands  an  under- 
lying unitary  entity  as  a  relater.  But  it  is,  of  course,  just  this 
last  assumption,  which  is  identical  with  the  underlying-reality 
theory  of  relations,  that  distinguishes  Monism  from  those  other 
positions  which  also  grant  that  there  is  a  realm  of  fact  to  he 
knoivn  as  it  really  is,  and  that  this  realm  is  a  system.  Accord- 
ingly, if  valid  criticism  can  be  brought  against  this  specific 
theory  of  relations,  or  against  its  application  to  the  Universe, 
we  can  give  up  Monism,  and  yet  both  retain  Absolutism  and 
maintain  that  the  universe  is  a  system.-  Just  this  conclusion, 
however,  is  one  of  the  findings  of  The  New  Realism  and  The  New 
Rationalism. 

Absoluiistic  as  they  are,  therefore,  in  their  position  toward 
both  the  knowledge  of  and  the  character  of  the  facts  which  are 
denoted  by  the  concepts  of  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty,  monistic 
systems  are,  further,  perfectionistic  and  formalistic  in  their 
position  concerning  both  the  factuality  of  ethical  and  cesthetic 
values,  and  the  knowledge  of  these,  or,  negatively  stated, 
monistic  systems  are  anti-hedonistic,  anti-utilitarian,  anti- 
relativistic,  anti-pragmatic.  Thus,  in  the  field  of  ethics,  monistic 
systems  teach  the  absoluteness  of  the  "standards"  of  right  and 
wrong,  and  of  goodness  and  evil.  Each  standard  is  an  eternal 
fact  or  entity  that  is  unchanged  and  unchanging,  although  its 
formulation  in  the  "trial  and  error"  development  of  knowl- 
edge may  vary  from  generation  to  generation,  and  from  race 
to  race.  Such  passing  "practical"  standards  may  seem  abso- 
lute to  him  who  is  immersed  in  the  flood  of  the  tradition  that 
they  themselves  help  to  form,  and  it  may  even  be  granted  that 
in  the  general  conflict  of  standards,  out  of  which  knowledge  of 
the  absolute  standards  shall  emerge  victorious,  it  is  better  to 
have  some  standard,  even  though  it  be  false,  than  to  have  none. 
But  still  the  perfectionism  of  the  monistic  systems  is  not  affected 
thereby.  For,  from  their  standpoint,  while,  e.g.,  all  the  formula^ 
tions  of  the  principles  of  right  and  wrong  that  have  been  made 
up  to  the  present  may  be  in  error,  such  formulations  represent- 
ing only  attempts  to  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  principles  by  the 
method  of  trial  and  error,  yet  such  absolute  principles  are  still 
entities  that  are  ever  present  to  be  attained,  if  possible,  and  that 

*  Ibid. 


CONCLUSION  349 

ever  challenge  us  to  further  gallant  effort.  Indeed,  the  sub- 
sistence (or  existence)  of  such  principles  is  maintained  by 
Monism  to  he  implied  by  the  very  approximateness  of  the  formu- 
lations that  mankind  has  made.  For  Monism,  as  part  of  its 
foundation  scheme  that  the  positive  term  implies  the  negative 
as  a  formal  contradictory,  must  also  hold  that  the  relative  im- 
plies the  non-relative,  the  passing,  the  eternal,  and  the  ap- 
proximating, the  limit  and  the  absolute. 

However,  other  positions  than  Monism  accept  this  absolutism 
and  perfectionism  of  standards,  so  that  again  it  is  the  identifica- 
tion of  these  with  the  essence  of  the  One  that  especially  dis- 
tinguishes monistic  systems.  Also,  in  thorough-going  Monism, 
this  perfectionism  is  made  to  concern  not  only  ethical  values,  but 
also  aesthetic  values,  with  the  modes  of  tentative  approach  to 
these  respectively  conscience  and  (Esthetic  appreciation.  Yet  it 
is  conceivable,  that  one  might  be  absolutistic  toward  ethical 
values,  and  relativistic  and  pragmatistic  toward  gesthetic  values. 
In  its  attitude  toward  truth,  however,  Monism  takes  the  clear 
and  precise  position,  that,  although  truth,  as  a  specific  relation 
of  correspondence  between  knowing  and  entity  known,  is  of 
value,  value  does  not  constitute  truth.  Truth  is  just  that 
specific  complex  entity  which  is  formed  by  this  specific  relation, 
while  this  complex  (truth)  is  itself,  in  turn,  an  absolute  value 
that  is  both  good  and  beautiful. 

In  their  solution  of  the  several  epistemological  problems, 
monistic  systems  are  all  in  essential  agreement.  All  are,  e.g., 
absolutistic  in  the  way  that  has  just  been  described.  There  are 
facts  to  be  known,  there  is  one  absolute  truth  to  be  attained  to, 
if  possible,  and  the  process  of  finite  knowing,  in  science,  phi- 
losophy, and  common  sense,  makes  neither  fact  nor  truth.  This 
Absolutism,  however,  does  not  exclude  tentativeness  and  error. 
The  best  that  we  can  do,  actuated  by  the  appreciation  of  the 
value  of  truth  for  its  own  sake,  is  to  make  every  effort  to  know, 
even  though  we  may  fail.  Monistic  systems  nevertheless  take 
the  position,  in  their  Absolutism,  that  such  possible  failure 
implies  a  standard,  not  yet  reached,  perhaps,  yet  ever  more 
closely  approached.  Indeed,  all  knowledge,  except  that  of  their 
own  positions,  is  usually  interpreted  by  monistic  systems  as 
being  of  this  tentative  character,  but,  toward  themselves,  each 


S50  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

monistic  system  presupposes,  tacitly  at  least,  that  it  is  not 
merely  an  approximation,  but  a  revelation  of  absolute  fact  with 
little  or  no  ground  for  doubt.  In  this  manner  monistic  systems 
usually  become  extremely  dogmatic.^ 

Many  monistic  systems  account  for  the  merely  approximating 
character  of  most  finite  knowledge  (the  exception  being  them- 
selves) by  the  hypothesis  of  the  organic  theory  of  truth  and  of 
knowledge,  and,  indeed,  of  all  fact.  Thus,  although  the  demand 
for  consistency  with  their  fundamental  postulate  of  the  under- 
lying-reality theory  of  relations  does  not  compel  them  to  do 
this,  they  nevertheless  maintain  as  regards  truth,  that  any  one 
truth  is  that  truth  only  hy  virtue  of  its  relation  to  all  other 
truths, — in  other  words,  that  the  modification  theory  of  relations 
is  valid  for  the  system  of  truths. 

One  consequence  of  this  position  is,  that  the  attainment  of 
even  one  perfect  truth  is  impossible,  unless  all  truths  to  which 
it  is  related  have  come  to  our  knowledge.  But,  it  is  argued, 
success  in  knowing  all  truths  is  impossible,  both  because  the 
totality  of  truths  can  be  arrived  at  only  by  gaining  a  succession 
of  single  truths,  and  because  we  as  finite  beings  cannot  deal 
with  a  possible  infinity  of  truths  and  their  relationships.*  There- 
fore, it  is  inferred,  that  to  finite,  human  beings  there  are 
accessible  only  those  truths  (?)  which  are  partial  in  the  sense 
that  they  consist  not  of  sharply  delineated  true  and  false  parts, 
but  of  a  complex  fusion  of  constituent  minor  truths  and  errors. 
Only  to  an  infinite,  unlimited,  perfect  mind,  that  knows  all 
facts,  all  truth,  and  all  relationships,  simultaneously  and  imme- 
diately, is  the  whole  absolute  truth  in  all  its  aspects  available.^ 

This  position,  since  it  itself  is  advanced  in  each  case  as  an 
absolute,  though  single  truth,  by  a  philosopher  who  is  a  finite 
human  being  (whatever  this  may  mean)  is  clearly  self-contra- 
dictory. For,  if  one  truth  ( ?),  namely,  the  truth,  that  no  truth 
can  he  known  in  isolation,  can  nevertheless  be  known  hy  itself, 
it  follows  that  many  other  truths  can  also  be  so  known.  Thus 
the  organic  theory  of  knowledge,  of  truth,  and  of  "things," 

'  See  The  New  Realism,  Introduction. 
*  Joachim,  op.  cit. 

'  Koyce  in  I'he  Spirit  of  Modern  Philosophy,  and  in  The  World  and  the 
Individual. 


CONCLUSION  351 

breaks  down  at  the  weakest  link  of  the  chain,  namely,  where  it 
would  connect  its  own  explicit  theory  with  the  conditions  that 
are  presupposed  in  advancing  that  theory  as  true. 

For  monistic  positions,  therefore,  the  nature  of  truth  is  not 
constituted  by  successful  workings,  as  is  contended  in  prag- 
matic systems,  but  by  coherence  among  truths  and  by  a  cor- 
respondence between  fact  and  knowing.  For,  granted,  e.g.,  the 
completely  intuitive  knowing  of  a  single  mind  that  underlies 
the  universe  of  organically  related  facts,  then  would  there  be 
a  perfect  correspondence  between  His  knowing  and  all  facts 
known.  Indeed,  since  for  monistic  systems  all  entities  (with 
one  exception)  are  the  manifestation  of  such  a  single  Being, 
His  knowledge  and  all  entities  are,  perhaps,  identical,  and  not 
merely  corresponding.  But,  for  finite  beings,  who  are  them- 
selves mere  manifestations,  the  correspondence  is  only  partial, 
incomplete,  confused,  and  vague. 

As  regards  the  problem  of  the  test  of  truth,  monistic  systems 
accept  the  empirical  confirmation  in  perception  both  for  common 
sense  and  for  scientific  knowledge.  Yet  this  knowledge  is  only 
of  appearances.  But  that  panoramic  knowledge  which  is  pos- 
sessed by  an  Entity  that  underlies  all  and  manifests  itself 
in  all,  is  held  to  subscribe  to  the  criteria  of  coherence,  of  con- 
sistency, of  freedom  from  contradiction,  of  self -evidence,  and 
of  the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite.  Thus,  coinciding  with 
the  tacit  presupposition  of  each  monistic  system,  namely,  that 
it  itself  is  absolutely  true,  there  is  this  special  set  of  tests  by 
which  this  absolute  truth  is  held  to  be  guaranteed.  But  it  has 
previously  been  shown  ^  both  that  such  tests  do  not  stand  their 
own  test,  and  that  history  shows  them  to  be,  because  of  the  very 
diversity  of  the  systems  to  which  they  lead,  quite  as  fallible  as 
are  other  tests.  Thus  it  is,  that  in  the  working  out  of  philo- 
sophical systems,  even  of  ahsolutistic  systems,  there  is  no  abso- 
lute criterion  for  the  attainment  of  what  the  absolutist  would 
have  absolute  knowledge.  No  one  can  do  more  than  attempt  to 
know,  supported  by  the  principle,  that  absolute  truth  may  be 
won,  although  absolute  proof  is  lacking.  On  the  basis  of  this 
principle,  it  is  possible  that  facts  should  be  revealed  to  him 
who  has  no  acquaintance  with  the  principles  of  proof,  and, 
•  Chap.  XV.,  IV.,  5,  6,  and  7. 


352  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

indeed,  it  is  precisely  in  this  way  that  the  untutored  person 
does  know.  So,  also,  can  this  same  principle  be  the  basis  for 
the  philosopher's  knowing.  It  is  only  the  attainment  of  more 
truth  that  is  conditioned  by  the  knowledge  of  the  methods  of 
proof,  and  the  like,  but  truth  itself  is  not  thus  dependent. 

The  solution  which  monistic  systems  give  to  the  problem  of 
the  origin  of  knowledge  is  in  agreement  with  the  distinction 
which  they  make  between  appearance  and  reality.  The  sciences 
and  common  sense  are  maintained  to  be  but  a  knowledge  of 
appearances,  and  this  knowledge  is  regarded  as  the  result  of  both 
intellectual  and  sensational  processes,  without  the  former  being 
a  transformation  of  the  latter,  and  with  sensational  processes 
themselves  existing  in  the  realm  of  appearances.  Some  knowl- 
edge is  thus  regarded  as  originating  in  sensation ;  other  knowl- 
edge as  having  a  purely  rational  source.  But  the  knowledge  that 
comes  from  reason  has  the  advantage,  that  at  least  some  of  it 
reveals  ultimate  reality,  and  not  mere  appearance.  Sensation 
can  never  lay  claim  to  this  prestige.  Sensation  may  be  the 
stimulus  or  occasion  for  the  appearance  of  rational  processes, 
even  as  the  closing  of  the  key  is  the  occasion  for  the  passing 
of  the  electric  current,  and  reason,  thus  aroused  to  action,  may 
work  upon  the  data  of  sensation.  But  when  reason  is  freed 
from  this  bondage,  then,  by  means  of  such  tests  as  self-evidence, 
and  the  inconceivability  of  the  opposite,  and  of  such  methods 
as  are  identical  with  the  very  presuppositions  of  thinking  and 
knowing,  there  is  opportunity  for  a  knowledge  of  the  ultimate 
nature  of  "things,'^  and  not  of  mere  appearances.  On  this 
bnsis  it  is  contended,  e.g.,  that  the  underlying-reality  theory  of 
relations  is  the  only  theory  that  accounts  for  relations  in  a 
manner  that  is  free  from  contradiction  and  consistent  with  what 
we  must  think ;  that,  accordingly,  ultimate  reality  is  numerically 
One,  and,  as  One,  Universal  Self,  Intellect,  Will,  Life,  Evolu- 
tion ;  and,  finally,  that,  even  as  the  finite  self  is  but  an  emana- 
tion from  or  a  manifestation  of  such  an  "infinite"  self,  so,  also, 
are  the  purely  intellectual  principles  of  the  finite  mind  one  with 
those  of  the  All-mind. 

In  conclusion,  it  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  to  find  that 
monistic  systems,  even  those  which  regard  the  All-One  as  of 
the  nature  of  Life  or  of  Evolution,  tacitly  make  this  a  unitary 


CONCLUSION  S53 

mibstraium-like,  or  siibstance-like  Being,  after  the  model  of  the 
traditional  view,  that  the  attributes  of  a  physical  object  inhere 
in  a  numerically  single  underlying  substance  or  suhstratum-like 
core.  For,  although  the  sciences  of  the  present  day  have  freed 
themselves  from  the  influence  of  this  view,  and  from  the  logic 
that  is  derived  from  it,  the  philosophy  and  the  logic  that  are 
taught  in  the  schools  have  not.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  the  logic 
by  which  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations  is  demon- 
strated, is,  in  fact,  only  the  Aristotelian  logic  of  the  identity 
of  a  "thing"  with  itself,  and  of  the  implication  by  each  "thing" 
of  its  formal  contradictory,  carried  one  step  further.  Therefore 
it  is  not  surprising  that  the  conclusion  should  be,  where  this 
theory  is  applied,  that  the  universe  is  One.  What  matters  it, 
then,  whether  this  One  be  Self,  Intellect,  Will,  Life,  or  the 
Absolute  Continuity  of  One  Evolution?  Is  not  the  One  in 
any  case  but  a  numerically  single  substratum  to  which  only  a 
different  nature  is  assigned  after  varying  analogies?  What 
matters  it  which  of  these  analogies  is  selected,  e.g.,  what  matters 
it  whether  Self,  or  Will,  or  Life  be  selected,  since  in  any  case 
both  that  from  which  the  analogy  is  drawn  and  that  to  which 
it  is  applied  is  but  an  underlying  substance  that  holds  in  its 
absolute  unity  the  manifold  of  its  attributes  ? 

To  these  inquiries  no  other  answer  can  be  given  than  the 
answer,  "It  does  not  matter";  indeed,  no  other  answer  than 
this  is  to  be  looked  for,  if  the  complete  development  of  the 
position  that  we  are  considering  is  borne  in  mind. 

That  development  began  with  the  unconscious  influence  of 
the  physical  thing — as  defined  as  a  substratum  or  substance 
with  attributes, — on  philosophy,  science,  and  logic,  the  result 
being  that  the  Aristotelian  logic  is  essentially  a  logic  of  things 
(as  thus  defined)  and,  therefore,  a  logic  in  which  the  concepts 
of  substance  and  of  cause  play  the  leading  role,  together  with 
the  specific  relatfons  of  similarity  and  dissimilaritj^  and  of 
inclusion,  complete,  partial,  or  negative.  This  logic  became  the 
logic  of  the  tradition — of  the  tradition  in  which  the  psychology 
and  the  philosophy  of  the  last  three  hundred  years  has  devel- 
oped— and,  accordingly,  as  due  to  its  influence,  there  appear  the 
views,  e.g.,  (1)  that  the  conscious  self  is  a  substance,  as  the 
unifying  relater  of  its  experiences,  and,  (2)  later,  in  Objective 


554  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

Idealism,  that  any  two  terms,  as  related,  demand  an  underlying 
entity  to  mediate  the  relationship  and  to  be  identical  with  the 
unity  which  the  inseparableness  of  the  related  terms  implies. 
With  this  specific  theory  of  relations  once  developed — by  the 
use  of  the  principle  of  contradiction — it  is  then  applied  to 
demonstrate  the  position,  that  the  Universe  as  cosmos  and  as 
system  is  Absolute  One.  Therefore  can  this  One  be  only  sub- 
stance or  substratum  in  its  functioning — whatever  else  it  may 
be — and  by  whatever  name  it  may  be  called — Self,  Ego,  Will, 
Life,  Elan  Vital,  or  even  Unknowable.  For  its  ** essence"  is 
its  functioning,  and  not  its  naming. 

Thus  it  is  that  the  circle  is  completed, — in  other  words,  thus  it 
is,  that  monistic  systems  both  begin  and  end  with  substance, 
even  as  might  be  predicted  from  the  domination  in  them  of 
the  old  logic,  and  from  their  ignoring  of  that  modem  logic  of 
series,  and  of  functions,  in  which  empirical  evidence  is  found 
for  the  theory  of  external  relations,  and  for  the  principle,  that 
related  terms  do  not  affect  each  other,  nor  demand  a  third  entity 
to  mediate  their  relation. 

n.   WHAT   CAN   THE  ABSOLUTE   ONE  BE? 

In  the  several  monisms  that  have  been  presented  the  crucial 
point  in  each  instance  is  the  selection  of  some  type-phenomenon 
by  analogy  to  which  the  further  character  of  the  universal 
underlying  one  shall  be  interpreted.  Reasons  are  advanced,  of 
course,  for  the  selection  of  one  specific  type  phenomenon  rather 
than  another,  but  this  means  only  that  one  positively  experi- 
enced attribute  rather  than  another  is  finally  chosen  and  the 
World-One  made  of  this  character. 

However,  one  may  prefer  not  to  select  any  one  type- 
phenomenon,  but  to  stop  with  the  general  argument  for  a  uni- 
versal underlying  One,  disclaiming  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
of,  or  of  valid  arguments  for,  the  further  character  of  this  One. 
Such  a  position  may  be  called  Agnostic  Monism.  It  is  Monism, 
since  it  maintains  that  there  is  a  numerically  single  entity 
which  makes  the  universe  One;  it  is  Agnosticism,  since  it  con- 
tends that  the  further  character  of  this  One  is  unknowable. 
Therefore  the  One  is  called  The  Unknowable. 

In  the  argument  for  this  position  it  is  contended,  that,  since 


CONCLUSION  355 

it  is  the  function  of  the  One  to  mediate  all  relations  between 
terms,  especially  between  those  terms  that  are  all-inclusive,  and 
since  the  evidence  for  this  mediation  is  derived  from  the  im- 
plication, by  each  term,  of  its  formal  contradictory,  it  is  a 
question  whether  this  underlying  One  can  he  of  the  nature  of 
either  term.  For  example,  if  self  and  not-self  are  the  contra- 
dictory terms,  it  may  be  asked,  whether  that  term  which  medi- 
ates the  relation  between  these  terms  can  itself  be  either  a  self 
or  a  not-self.  For  does  not  the  identification  of  the  One  with 
either  term  of  the  two  terms  between  which  the  One  mediates, 
imply  a  specific  relation  between  (1)  the  One,  as  so  identified, 
and  as  mediating,  and  (2)  the  two  terms  as  the  mediated,  so  that 
still  another  mediating  and  underlying  entity  is  implied,^  which 
entity  is  not  either  self  or  not-self,^ — in  the  example  chosen? 

Similarly,  if  good  and  not-good  (evil)  are  selected  as  the  pair 
of  contrasting  terms,  each  relative  to  the  other,  then  the  medi- 
ating One,  even  though  identified  with  a  Deity,  cannot  be  the 
Good.  For  that  which  is  good  by  virtue  of  its  contrast  with 
and  limitation  by  evil,  loses  this  character  if  it  is  made  all- 
inclusive  and  universal. 

The  same  criticism  may  be  brought  against  all  those  specific 
monisms  that  interpret  or  regard  the  all-inclusive  One  as  being 
of  the  character  of  some  finite  positive  "thing."  And  to  the 
writer  this  criticism  seems  to  be  quite  valid,  for  reasons  that 
proceed  both  from  the  old  and  from  the  new  logic,  and  that 
make  any  form  of  monism  untenable.  This  criticism  may  be 
considered  in  some  further  detail. 

First,  it  is  evident  that  the  monist  in  his  endeavor  to  identify 
the  One  with  some  positive  "thing"  is  searching  for  a  concept 
or  for  a  kind  under  which  everything  shall  be  contained,  and 
which  in  turn  shall  not  be  contained  under  any  other  concept; 
i.e.,  the  monist  is  usually  not  content  to  stop  merely  with  the 
conclusion,  that  there  is  a  One,  disclaiming  knowledge  of  what 
the  further  nature  of  this  One  is,  but  he  wishes  to  ascertain 
the  One's  further  positive  nature,  thus  to  show,  e.g.,  that  it  is 
spiritual,  or,  more  specifically,  that  it  is  Will,  or  Intellect,  or 

'Herbert  Spencer,  First  Principles,  ed.  1900  (Appleton),  pp.  3-129. 
'  Cf .  Bradley,  Appearcmce  and  Reality,  and  Taylor,  Elements  of  Meta- 
physics. 


356  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

Life.  To  succeed  in  such  an  endeavor  would  be  to  arrive  at 
a  kind  or  concept  which  is  all-inclusive,  and  to  find  what  the 
old  logic  calls  the  summum  genus. 

In  criticism  of  this  attempt  it  may  first  be  demonstrated  that 
even  by  the  principles  of  the  traditional  logic,  the  monist  cannot 
accomplish  his  purpose.  For  it  is  a  principle  of  this  logic,  that 
a  characteristic  which  differentiates  one  species  of  a  genus  from 
another  species,  ca^mot  also  be  a  characteristic  of  that  genus. 
The  genus  includes  in  its  connotation  only  that  which  is  common 
to  the  several  species,  while  the  species  are  differentiated  from 
each  other  by  characteristics  which  the  genus  cannot  have  in 
its  function  of  including  them,  and  of  denoting  all  the  indi- 
viduals that  the  species  denotes.  For  example,  vertebrates  and 
invertebrates  are  the  two  great  classes  of  animals.  The  presence 
of  a  spinal  column  and  a  cerebro-spinal  nervous  system  are 
the  differentia  of  the  former  (logical)  species,  while  the  lack  of 
these  characteristics  and  the  presence  of  only  a  ventral  nervous 
system  is  the  distinguishing  feature  of  all  invertebrates  except 
the  Protozoa  and  the  Porifera,  which  have  no  nerve  cells  at  all. 
But  the  logical  class  or  genus,  animal,  is  characterized  by  none 
of  these  differentia  of  the  species.  In  turn  this  genus,  animal, 
is  co-ordinate,  as  logical  species,  with  the  class,  plant,  with  both 
of  these  species  in  turn  subsumed  under  the  next  higher  genus, 
living  being.  In  the  connotation  of  this  last  genus  the  specific 
characteristics  of  the  two  species,  plant  and  animal,  are  absent. 
As,  now,  we  go  on  upward,  as  it  were,  in  the  survey  of  these 
relations  of  subsumption  of  species  to  genus,  we  approach  the 
summum  genus.  Thus,  living  being  is  a  co-ordinate  species  with 
non-living  being,  with  both  included  by  the  next  higher  genus, 
physical  entity ;  this  genus  is,  in  turn,  a  co-ordinate  species  with 
psychical  entity,  with  both  of  these  classes  under  the  genus 
existent;  existent  is,  in  turn,  co-ordinate  with  non-existent  sub- 
sistent,  which  denotes  such  entities  as  numbers,  and  laws,  as 
entities  that  are  not  correlated  either  with  a  specific  time  or 
with  a  specific  place;  the  genus  for  existent  and  non-existent 
subsistent  is  mere  entity,  defined  as  that  which  can  be  thought 
in  consistency  with  the  data  of  sense  experience  and  the  prin- 
ciples of  correct  reasoning. 

Have  we,  now,  reached  in  this  term,  entity,  a  summum  genus 


CONCLUSION  357 

which  has,  by  the  elimination  of  the  differentia  of  the  logical 
species,  only  the  characteristic  of  being  consistently  thought, 
or  are  we  forced  onward  to  a  still  higher  sitmnium  genus  of 
merely  mentionahle  "things"  which  shall  include  not  only 
'^things"  that  can  be  consistently  thought,  but  also  "things" 
that  cannot  he  so  thought,  that  are  not  implied  by  other 
'^  things,"  and  that  are,  perhaps,  self -contradictory? 

Either  of  these  options  places  the  monist  in  a  precarious 
position.  For,  if  the  One  is  to  be  all-inclusive,  it  must  be  iden- 
tical, in  some  way,  with  the  summum  genus,  while,  on  the  other 
hand,  if  the  One  is  to  have  some  positive  content,  beyond  that  of 
being  merely  the  consistently  thought  or  the  merely  mentionahle, 
it  must  share  the  characteristics  of  some  of  its  logical  species 
and  so  can  not  be  a  summum  genus.  But  the  first  alternative 
is  objectionable  to  most  monists,  since  they  wish  to  identify  the 
One  with  some  positive  content  such  as  self  or  will,  and  the 
second  alternative  runs  directly  counter  to  the  logic  of  genus 
and  species. 

If  the  character  of  the  One  be  only  that  of  being  mention- 
able,^  then,  of  course,  there  is  no  denying  the  formal  correctness 
of  this  identification;  for  the  absolute  One  certainly  is  mention- 
able,  being  at  least  a  combination  of  words  that  has  a  con- 
siderable power  of  verbal  suggestion.^**  But  the  monist  is,  of 
course,  not  content  with  this,  for  he  would  have  the  One  not 
only  mentionahle,  but  much  more — a  self -consistent  entity  at 
least.  However,  if  the  monist  advances  this  claim,  he  has  en- 
tered the  lists,  and  accepts  the  chance  of  defeat.  For  the  One 
may  prove  to  be  but  self -contradictory , — mentionahle,  of  course, 
along  with  other  entities,  but,  as  a  species,  differentiated  from 
them.  Precisely  this  seems  to  be  the  logical  status  of  the  One; 
for,  if  the  "office"  of  the  One  is  that  of  mediating  relations 
between  terms,  then  each  of  these  terms  is  in  turn  related  to 
the  One  as  mediator,  and  a  still  more  ultimate  One  is  demanded 
to  mediate  this  relation.  Thus  the  situation  that  seems  to  imply 
an  idtimate  One,  really  implies  that  no  One  is  ultimate.  But 
further,  if,  in  addition  to  performing  a  mediating  function,  the 
absolute  One  is  to  be  a  smnmum  genus,  or  a  kind  of  all  kinds, 

•  Cf .  Chap.  XLIV. 

"  See  The  New  Realism,  Introduction,  for  this  fallacy. 


358  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

a  class  of  all  classes,  then  it  must  logically  include  itself,  since 
it  is  an  entity  and  belongs  to  some  species.  But  this  self- 
inclusion  contradicts  the  principle  of  classification  advanced  by 
the  traditional  logic,  namely,  that  the  genus  cannot  include  itself 
as  a  species,  or  as  an  individual  of  any  of  its  own  species.  This 
principle  may,  however,  not  be  universal,  and  even  by  the  old 
logic  there  may  be  one  concept  that  meets  this  peculiar  demand, 
this  exception  being  the  concept,  mentionahle  ^'things" — for 
these  are  mentionahle.  On  the  other  hand,  hy  the  new  logic, 
this  problem  is  solved  by  the  realization,  that  only  implication 
and  objective  "states  of  affairs,"  and  not  mere  mentioning, 
constitute  or  make  a  concept. 

Here,  therefore,  entity,  with  its  definition  of  that  which  can 
he  consistently  thought,  fulfils  the  demand  made  on  the  summum 
genus,  namely,  that  it  shall  include  itself;  ^^  for  this  definition 
of  '^entity"  is  itself  an  "ohjective  state  of  affairs"  that  is  im- 
plied and  consistently  thought;  and,  an  entity  is  an  entity. 

The  options  of  the  monist  are,  therefore,  either  to  identify 
the  One  with  a  merely  mentionahle  entity,  at  the  risk,  however, 
of  such  an  entity  being  self-contradictory,  or  to  make  the  One 
an  entity  that  merely  possesses  the  characteristic  of  heing  con- 
sistently thought.  This  last,  of  course,  the  monist  would  claim 
the  One  to  be  as  the  result  of  his  argument  for  it;  yet,  if  he 
accept  this  alternative,  he  is  still  logically  prevented  from 
assigning  to  the  One  the  positive  characteristics  of  any  species, 
especially  of  the  characteristics  of  any  physical  or  psychical 
existent.  The  One,  therefore,  logically  remains  devoid  of  all 
content  except  as  it  is  thought  as  One — and  perhaps  it  is  not 
even  so  thought  consistently,  as  we  have  seen. 

Since  he  thus  fails  to  demonstrate  consistently  by  the  old 
logic,  either  that  there  is  an  underlying  One,  or  that  this  One 
is  identical  with  some  kind  of  "thing"  of  positive  content,  the 
monist  may  next  turn  to  the  new  logic  in  the  hope  of  accom- 
plishing his  purpose.  But  here  failure  again  awaits  him,  pro- 
vided the  results  of  modern  logical  analysis  are  used  correctly, 
and  are  not  misinterpreted. 

By  the  new  logic  we  may  indeed  accept  one  universe,  hut  a 
universe  that  is  one  only  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a  totality  of  terms 
"  Cf.  Chaps.  XLIII.  and  XLIV. 


CONCLUSION  S59 

and  individuals,  both  simple  and  complex,  classes  and  series, 
states  of  affairs,  existents,  and  subsistents,  that  are  all  related, 
though  in  different  ways,  and  with  neither  one  universal  rela- 
tion nor  one  mediator  of  all  relations.^"  The  universe,  therefore, 
may  be,  as  a  totality,  in  one-one  correspondence  with  the  number 
1.  However,  this  oneness  does  not  mediate  all  relations,  nor 
make  all  the  parts  of  the  totality  like  in  kind.  This  position 
may  be  called  additive  pluralism,  and  is  quite  as  compatible 
with  the  oneness  of  totality  as  is  the  position  which  maintains 
that  there  is  an  absolutely  simple  One  that  mediates  all  relations. 

However,  the  monist  is  not  satisfied  with  such  a  hare  oneness 
of  totality,  but,  having  reached  by  argumentation  an  Absolute 
One,  he  seeks  to  find  for  this,  by  proper  analogy,  an  appropriate 
content.  Therefore  he  may  turn,  e.g.,  to  the  straight  line  as  a 
favorable  possibility  for  such  an  analogy.  For  a  line  is  granted 
to  be  made  up  of  points,  and  thus  to  be  a  manifold,  but  it  is 
also  one,  and  seemingly,  as  a  line,  an  absolute  one,  homogeneous 
and  simple."  Have  we  not,  therefore,  here  an  instance  of  an 
entity,  which,  as  either  the  line  itself,  or  as  the  relation  between 
the  points,  or  even  as  the  concept  line  or  'Qoint,  is  itself  an  abso- 
lute one  that  mediates  the  relations  between  the  many  entities 
of  a  manifold,  and  that  is  also  a  specific  kiyid  of  thing? 

This  suggestion  has  considerable  plausibility,  which  might  be 
taken  advantage  of  by  the  monist.  Yet  a  little  rigorous  analysis 
shows  that  each  of  the  above  possible  hypotheses  must  be  re- 
jected, even  in  the  face  of  the  fact,  that  this  analogy  of  the  line 
is  as  favorable  a  possibility  as  the  monist  can  find.  For  in  the 
case  of  the  line  the  oneness  in  the  midst  of  multiplicity  is  much 
more  apparent  even  than  it  is  in  an  organism,  or  in  a  chemical 
compound,  or  in  a  functional  complex  such  as  motion,  and  the 
analogy  of  a  point  or  of  an  instant,  each  of  which  is  absolutely 
simple,  is  not  promising,  since  in  these  instances  there  is  no 
multiplicity. 

Yet  even  the  analogy  of  the  line  fails.  For  modern  logic 
shows  that  a  line  is  a  series  of  an  infi7iite  number  of  unextended 
elements  (points)  that  are  related  asymmetrically  and  transi- 
tively, the  "result"  being  that,  through  the  presence  of  these 
non-additive  relations,  extension  of  one  dimension  is  derived 

"  Ibid.  "  Cf.  Chap.  XLIII.,  vn. 


360  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

from  that  which  is  not  extended.  However,  the  asymmetrical 
and  transitive  relation  that  relates  the  points  is  not  the  only- 
relation  that  is  present.  For  the  line  consists  not  only  of  points, 
but  also  of  smaller  lines,  so  that  there  are  also  the  relations  of 
the  smaller  lines  to  one  another,  and  of  the  smaller  lines  to  their 
points,  and  of  the  whole  line  both  to  the  smaller  lines  and  to 
the  points.  But  even  if  there  were  not  many  relations,  but  only 
one,  this  relation  would  not  be  the  One,  for  besides  it  there 
would  be  the  terms  to  be  related.  It  is  fallacious,  therefore, 
to  identify  the  oneness  of  the  line  with  any  one  of  the  relations 
that  are  involved  in  it,  or  with  the  concept  of  relations  as  such. 
For  the  concept  of  relation  cannot  itself  perform  the  "function" 
of  forming  an  absolute  one  in  the  line,  since  concepts  do  not 
themselves  relate,  but  are  objective  "states  of  affairs"  that 
involve  one  or  more  specific  relations  of  similarity. 

Failure  also  meets  the  attempt  to  identify  either  the  concrete 
oneness  of  a  line  or  the  hare  concept  of  oneness  in  general  with 
the  all-mediating  One.^*  A  point  is  an  absolute  one.  So,  also, 
is  a  line  one,  but  a  one  that  is  at  once  a  totality,  a  class,  and 
a  series  of  points.  Point  is  that  concept  or  objective  state  of 
affairs  that  is  defined  in  a  very  specific  way,  in  relation  to  a 
line,  as  the  unextended  element  of  space,  while  a  point  is  any 
individual  that  this  concept  denotes,  or  of  which  this  definition 
holds.  A  similar  difference  subsists  between  the  concept,  line, 
and  any  individual  line.  However,  the  concrete  oneness  of  any 
point  of  a7iy  specific  line  does  not  mediate  the  relations  between 
all  the  points  of  that  line,  nor  does  the  oneness  of  the  line  as 
a  whole  perform  this  supposed  mediation.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  concrete  oneness  of  a  line  as  a  whole  is  a  derivative  oneness, 
since  it  is  logically  subsequent  to  the  subsistence  of  points  and  of 
certain  specific  relations  between  points.  Given  these  relations 
and  points,  and  the  line  subsists  as  one,  with  the  several  other 
relations  above  enumerated  also  subsisting.  Thus  neither  the 
oneness  of  a  point,  nor  the  oneness  of  the  line  mediates  the 
several  relations  that  subsist  in  the  line. 

It  is  a  very  similar  state  of  affairs  that  is  also  found  wherever 
there  is  a  oneness  of  kind  or  of  class,  and  of  the  concept  of  the 
class.  The  oneness  of  a  single  point  or  instant  is  not  mediated 
»*  Cf.  Chap.  XXVII. 


CONCLUSION  361 

by  a  relation,  but  the  oneness  of  the  class  of  points  is  mediated 
or — better  stated — organized  by  the  relation  of  similarity,  at  the 
same  time  that  there  are  other  relations  between  the  points 
whereby  they  form  a  line.  The  fact  of  the  similarity  of  the 
points  to  one  another  is  the  class  of  points,  and  this  entity  is 
numerically  distinct  from  any  one  point.  But  this  oneness  of 
a  class  is  organized  by  the  relation  of  similarity,  but  does  not 
itself  mediate  this  relation. 

By  the  new  logic,  further,  knowing  is  discovery.  When  cer- 
tain specific  discoveries  are  made,  classes  or  groups  of  entities 
that  are  related  by  similarity  are  revealed.  But  similarity  is 
not  the  only  relation  present.  For  example,  all  points  are 
similar — as  points,  but  it  is  not  this  relation  that  organizes 
points  into  a  line.  CJasses  may  also  be  similar  to  one  another, 
so  that  there  are  classes  of  classes;  e.g.,  both  points  and  instants 
are  similar  in  that  they  are  iiidivisihle  elements.  But  between 
points  and  instants  there  are  also  other  relations.  Thus,  e.g., 
by  virtue  of  one-one  correlating  relation  between  a  scries  of 
points  and  a  series  of  instants  there  is  an  entity  which  is  motion. 

However,  in  all  these  cases,  whatever  oneness  there  is, — 
whether  it  be  the  oneness  of  a  group  of  similar  entities,  or  of 
two  correlated  indivisible  entities  such  as  a  point  and  an  instant, 
or  of  a  series,  or  of  one  series  related  to  another,  and  the  like, 
the  oneness,  with  the  exception  of  the  absolute  numerical  sim- 
plicity of,  e.g.,  a  point  or  an  instant,  is  that  of  certain  entities 
in  certain  specific  relations.  It  is,  therefore,  a  oneness  of  an 
organized,  but  not  of  an  organic  whole.  Both  the  relations  and 
the  terms  are  objective,  and  the  terms  standing  in  specific  rela- 
tions are  an  objective  state  of  affairs,  that  specific  class  of  states 
of  affairs  in  which  the  relation  is  that  of  similarity  being  the 
class  of  objective  concepts.  The  concept  is,  therefore,  not  made 
by  the  mind,  but  is  discovered.  But  over  and  above  the  specific 
relation  of  similarity  that  subsists  in  such  cases,  there  is  no 
further  additional  entity  to  mediate  the  relation.  Whatever 
oneness  is  present  is,  therefore,  with  the  exception  of  the  abso- 
lute oneness  of  entities  such  as  a  point  or  an  instant,  a  oneness 
of  an  organized  whole  that  is  already  one  with  the  relating  of 
the  terms  by  the  relation.  Thus  it  is  that  modern  logic  shows 
not  only  that  there  is  no  Absolute  One  to  mediate  all  relations, 


862  SUBSTANCE  PHILOSOPHIES 

and  to  underlie  the  universe,  but  also  that,  even  if  there  were 
such  a  One,  it  could  not  be  identified  with  any  concept  or  kind 
of  "thing,"  not  even  with  such  kinds  as  term  and  relation.  For 
these  are  distinct,  and  are,  therefore,  two,  and  not  one.  Thus  it 
is,  also,  that  modern  logic  confirms  the  results  of  our  previous 
criticism,  which  showed  that  the  argument  for  the  underlying- 
reality  theory  of  relations,  i.e.,  for  the  necessity  of  a  one  to 
mediate  the  relation  between  terms,  is  self -contradictory .  Such 
a  one,  we  found,  is  never  reached,  provided  the  argument  by 
which  the  attempt  is  made  to  reach  it,  is  consistently  adhered 
to.  For  any  one  supposedly  final  underlying  reality  whose 
function  might  be  that  of  mediating  the  relation  between  two 
or  more  terms,  is  never  final,  since,  as  related  to  those  terms, 
it  demands  a  still  more  final  reality. 

Nor  is  the  search  for  an  Absolute  One  aided  by  the  endeavor, 
as  a  last  desperate  attempt,  to  identify  this  One  with  such 
refined  concepts  as  Oneness,  relation,  term,  mentionahle,  con- 
sistently, thought-entity,  and  the  like.  For  our  present  criti- 
cism shows,  on  the  one  hand,  that  these  concepts  are  always 
such  that  they  allow  of  "otherness,"  e.g.,  term  is  other  than 
relation,  so  that  the  problem  under  consideration  is  repeated  in 
the  form  of  the  question  as  to  what  is  the  nature  of  that  One 
which  mediates  the  relation  between  these  contrasted  entities. 
But  our  criticism  also  shows,  on  the  other  hand,  that  a  concept 
is  a  specific  and  objective  state  of  affairs  or  relation  of  similarity 
among  the  individuals  of  a  class.  Such  concepts  or  relations 
organize  such  individuals,  so  that  the  unity  that  results  is  only 
the  unity  of  ayi  organized  wholc,^^  but  nothing  more.  In  fact, 
that  each  of  the  specific  concepts  under  consideration  is  itself 
just  such  a  specific  organizing  relation,  is  disclosed  by  only  a 
slight  analysis.  Thus,  e.g.,  if  there  are  many  individuals  which 
are  each  one,  or  each  a  relation,  or  each  a  term,  then  are  one, 
relation,  and  teryn  each  a  specific  instance  of  a  "way"  in  which 
"something"  is  similar  to  "something"  else;  i.e.,  each  of  these 
concepts  is  a  specific  relation  of  similarity  in  which  individuals 
can  stand,  even  as  oneness,  relation,  and  term  must  themselves 
be  similar  to  one  another  in  order  to  belong  to  the  class  of 
concepts. 

"Not  organic;  cf.  Chapa.  XLIII.,  XLVI. 


CONCLUSION  363 

A  similar  assertion  may  also  be  made  of  many  other  entities, 
such  as  those  that  are  referred  to  in  this  very  discussion,  as, 
e.g.,  individual,  and  class.  But  our  analysis  is  sufficient  to 
warrant  the  conclusion,  on  the  one  hand,  that  there  is  no  other 
content  or  meaning  to  the  term.  The  Absolute  One,  than  that 
it  is  a  mere  mentionable,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that,  while 
the  universe  is  an  organized  whole, — indeed,  a  very  complex 
organized  whole — as  such  a  whole,  it  is  one  only  in  the  sense 
that  the  totality  of  all  'things''  is  one.  For  an  Absolute  One, 
other  than  the  oneness  of  a  totality  which  allows  also  of  the 
fact  of  an  organized  whole,  there  is,  then,  not  only  no  valid  and 
consistent  evidence  or  proof,  but  also  no  ascertainable  positive 
content,  other  than  that  of  being  a  mere  mentionahle.  For  that 
the  Absolute  One  is  at  least  this,  certainly  can  not  be  denied  at 
the  conclusion  of  a  discussion  in  which  what  the  nature  of  the 
Absolute  One  may  he  has  been  the  leading  topic  of  discourse. 


SECTION  IV 
EEALISM  * 

FUNCTION  PHILOSOPHIES 

Realism  is  that  constructive  philosophical  position  which  is 
derived  by  an  empirical  and  critical  examination  of  other  phi- 
losophies, most  of  which  are  found  to  presuppose,  or  to  contain, 
explicitly  or  implicitly,  positions  and  principles  that  are  to  be 
accepted  as  true.  The  systematic  and  consistent  body  of  these 
positions  and  principles  constitutes  that  philosophical  position 
which  may  be  called  Neo-Realism,  and  also  The  New  Rationalism. 
New  Realism,  or,  as  we  may  call  it  for  the  sake  of  brevity. 
Realism,  may  be  presented  and  discussed  to  advantage  under 
two  headings,  namely, 

I.  The  central  doctrine  of  Realism. 

II.  The  more  detailed  theory  of  Realism,  including  the 
Structure  of  the  Universe,  and  the  Realistic  Solution  of  the 
main  philosophical  problems. 


I.    THE  CENTRAL  DOCTRINE  OF  REALISM 

CHAPTER  XXXIX 

THE  SOLUTION  OF  THE  EGO-CENTRIC  AND  VALUE- 
CENTRIC  PREDICAMENTS 

The  central  doctrine  of  Realism  is  identical  with  that  solu- 
tion of  the  ego-centric  and  value-centric  predicaments  which  is 
found,  by  a  critical  examination  of  other  systems,  to  be  present 
logically  in  their  tacit  presuppositions,  implications,  and  admis- 
sions, and,  psychologically,  in  the  character  of  those  conditions 

*  The  general  bibliographv  for  Realism  will  be  found  at  the  end  of 
Chap.  XLIII, 

364 


EGO-  AND  VALUE-CENTRIC  PREDICAMENTS      365 

that  lead  to  and  permit  of  philosophical  deduction  and  investi- 
gation. In  presenting  the  evidence  which  thus  leads  to  an 
empirical  establishment  of  Realism,  we  need  to  a  large  extent, 
therefore,  only  to  summarize  the  criticisms  that  have  been  made 
at  various  stages  in  our  previous  discussions. 

The  most  important  and,  perhaps,  most  essential  realistic 
doctrine  is  the  solution  of  the  ego-centric  predicament}  First 
we  may  state,  at  the  risk  of  repetition,  that  this  predicament  is 
held  to  be  constituted  hy  the  fact  that  it  is  impossible  to  per- 
ceive, remember,  imagine,  think  of,  or  mention  any  object  that 
is  not  for  that  reason  a  perceived,  remerribered,  imagined,  thought 
of,  or  mentioned  object,  and  that  is  not,  therefore,  an  object  that 
is  in  relation  to  either  perceiving,  remembering,  imagining, 
thinking,  or  mentioning — briefly,  to  knowing,  either  actual  or 
possible.  Or,  if  objection  be  made  to  this  formulation,  then  the 
predicament  may  be  formulated  as  meaning  that  because  one 
can  in  some  sense  think  of,  or  at  least  name  the  universe  as  all- 
inclusive,  therefore  everything  is  thought  of,  and  so  is  in  relation 
to  knowing.  However,  such  a  knowing  is  quite  different  from 
that  which  we  usually  identify  with  genuine  knowing,  namely, 
a  knowing  alout  and  in  some  detail,  and  is  at  best  only  a  know- 
ing at  its  very  minimum,  namely,  as  perhaps  a  mere  mentioning, 
if,  indeed,  it  is  knowing  at  all. 

But  even  if  it  were  a  fact  that  the  universe  both  as  a  whole, 
and  in  every  detail,  is,  as  known  in  some  way,  related  to  some 
knowing,  either  past,  present,  or  future,  existent  or  merely 
subsistent,  this  would  be  of  consequence  only  on  certain  condi- 
tions. One  of  these  conditions  is,  that  two  terms— any  two — 
hy  virtue  of  being  related,  causally  infliience  each  other,  pro- 
ducing some  effect,  modification,  or  alteration,  each  on  the  other. 
The  other  condition  is,  that  aiiy  relation  between  two  terms 
mtist  be  mediated  by  a  third  entity.^  If  the  first  condition  were 
the  fact,  then  the  further  fact  that  the  world  which  we  know 
is  related  to  knowledge  would  have  important  consequences. 
For  we  should  then  be  obliged  to  infer  that  the  known  world  is 
one  that  is  affected,  altered,  or  modified  by  the  knowing  of  it.^ 

'  Cf.  Chaps.  X.,  XXVIII.,  in. 

*  Cf.  Chap.  XXVI. 

»Cf.  Chapa.  XXIX.-XXXIIL 


366  REALISM 

On  the  other  hand,  if  the  second  condition  were  the  fact,  there 
would  be  the  implication,  that  the  known  world  and  the  knowing 
are  related  and  united  by  an  underlying  or  transcendent 
numerically  simple  entity  that  makes  everything  in  some  sense 
an  Absolute  One.* 

The  first  position,  that  two  terms  affect  each  other  by  virtue 
of  being  related,  is  the  now  familiar  modification  theory  of 
relations ;  the  second,  the  familiar  underlying-reality  theory.  Of 
fthese  two  theories  the  latter  has,  however,  been  found  not  only 
to  lack  all  inductive  proof,  but  also  to  be  self-contradictory.^ 
No  concrete  entity,  i.e.,  one  not  merely  argued,  but  found  by 
some  other  means  of  cognitive  approach,  is  discovered  em- 
pirically to  be  the  universal  underlying  One  that  monistic  posi- 
tions claim;  while,  as  argued,  the  theory  is  self-contradictory, 
and  fails  to  attain  that  which  it  seeks,  since  at  each  step  of 
getting  to  an  underlying  entity  that  shall  mediate  the  relation 
between  two  terms,  this  entity  is  in  turn  found  to  be  related 
to  the  two  terms,  so  that  a  further,  more  ultimate  entity  is 
demanded.  Thus  each  "would-be"  ultimate  presupposes  that  it 
is  not  ultimate,  and  hence  the  self-contradiction.  Also,  as  re- 
gards the  former,  the  "modification  theory,"  this  is  shown  by 
direct  inductive  evidence  at  least  not  to  be  universal.*^  For 
certain  concrete  instances  are  found,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  many 
functional  complexes,  for  which  this  theory  does  not  hold, 
and  among  these  complexes  is  the  relational  uliole,  knowing 
and  object  known.  Therewith,  however,  is  the  ego-centric 
predicament  solved.  Just  how  this  is  the  case  we  shall  now 
examine. 

All  through  this  volume  many  of  the  important  points  of 
difference  between  the  old  and  new  logic  have  been  emphasized. 
We  have  seen  that  the  old  logic  was  unconsciously  formed  and 
developed  on  the  model  of  a  physical  thing.''  Accordingly  the 
relations  that  are  emphasized  by  this  logic  are  chiefly  those  of 
the  inherence  of  qualities  in  a  substratum,  of  similarity  and  dif- 
ference, of  the  inclusion  of  one  class  in  another,  of  causation, 
and  of  the  additiveness  of  parts  to  make  a  whole.  From  the 
same  source  or  influence  there  also  comes  the  identification  of 

*  Cf.  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII.  "  Chap.  XXVI.,  ii.,  2. 

'  Chap.  XXVI.,  II.,  3.  '  Chaps.  III.,  XXVI.,  and  XXVII. 


EGO-  AND  VALUE-CENTRIC  PREDICAMENTS      367 

all  terms,  either  (1)  with  "things"  that  interact,  giving  the 
modification  theory  of  relations,  or  (2)  with  "things"  whose 
relatedness  demands  another  entity  to  mediate  the  relations  be- 
tween them,  giving  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  relations. 
But  of  the  non-additive  relationship  of  parts  to  form  a  whole, 
i.e.,  of  the  modern  principle  of  order,  and,  therefore,  of  the 
relationship  of  function  as  sharply  diii'erent  from  that  of  causey 
and  of  the  method  of  analysis  in  situ,  and  the  like,  the  old  logic 
was  entirely  ignorant.  The  formulation  of  the  principles  and 
the  methods  that  are  involved  in  these  situations  is  identical 
with  the  new  logic,  both  as  this  has  been  used  unconsciously  in 
the  development  of  such  exact  sciences  as  mechanics,  and  also 
as  it  has  been  consciously  recognized  in  recent  years.  ^ 

Now  it  is  precisely  by  either  the  tacit  or  the  explicit  pre- 
supposition and  use  of  certain  principles  of  this  new  logic,  more 
specifically  of  the  method  of  analysis  in  situ,  and  of  a  functional 
or  external  relationship,  that  the  ego-centric  predicament  is 
solved,  and  made  no  longer  a  predicament,  even  by  those 
philosophies  that  are  explicitly  developed  from  contrary 
principles. 

The  modern  investigation  and  analysis  of  motion,  as  illus- 
trated by  the  pioneer  work  of  Galileo  in  discovering  the  laws  of 
motion,  is  an  example  of  the  use  of  these  principles  and  methods. 
Motion  cannot  be  removed  from  time,  nor  time  from  motion  in 
particular  cases  of  its  occurrence,  so  that  the  character  of  their 
relatedness  can  be  discovered  only  by  an  analysis  in  situ.  But 
such  an  analysis  shows  that  time  and  motion  are  related,  and 
yet  that  neither  is  thereby  causally  influenced  in  any  way  by 
the  other.  Neither  one  "makes"  the  other,  neither  affects,  modi- 
fies, alters,  or  causes  the  other.  Thus  motion  in  general  is  found 
to  be  a  function  of  time.  Specific  motions,  with  specific 
numerical  values  for  (in  correlation  with)  different  specific 
velocities  in  the  case,  e.g.,  of  retarded  and  accelerated  motions, 
are  functions  of  specific  times,  with  a  one-one  correspondence 
between  each  such  value  and  some  one  instant  of  the  specific 
time  period  concerned. 

Innumerable  other  instances  of  analysis  in  situ  could  also  be 
given,  for  the  method  is  a  widely  accepted  logical  and  scientific 

«  Chaps.  XXI.-XXV.,  XXVII.,  XLI.,  XLIII.,  and  XLIV. 


S68  REALISM 

means  of  procedure,  upon  which  some  of  the  greatest  modern 
discoveries  and  advances  in  knowledge  have  been  dependent. 

With,  now,  an  analysis  in  situ  the  only  practical  method  of 
procedure  in  many  cases  that  require  analysis,  such  an  analysis 
is  also  a  method  that  leads  to  the  discovery  of  relations  that 
are  external.^  The  relations  between  time  and  motion,  and  be- 
tween time  and  change  of  velocity,  i.e.,  of  acceleration,  are  ex- 
amples of  such  relations.  Other  examples  are  the  relations 
(1)  between  any  two  points  of  a  line,  (2)  between  any  two 
instants  of  time,  (3)  between  a  point  and  an  instant, — which 
complex  is  the  "element"  of  motion.  In  each  of  these  instances 
two  terms  are  related  that  yet  do  not  and  cannot  causally  affect 
and  modify  each  other  except  on  the  condition  that  each  thereby 
becomes  complex  and  so  presupposes  ultimately  simple  elements 
that  are  externally  related. 

The  time  has  been  when  the  two  theories  of  relations  that 
are  opposed  to  this  "external  theory"  have  been  based  on 
grounds  that  were  regarded  as  self-evident,  or  as  excluding  the 
conceivahility  of  the  opposite.  But  today  these  methods  of 
establishment  are  found  to  be  no  more  than  mere  psychological 
tests,  and  thus  to  give  proofs  which  show  now  one  principle 
and  now  another  to  be  "absolutely  true,"  and  shift  one's  con- 
victions first  to  one  position  and  then  to  another."  The  evi- 
dence for  the  external  theory  is,  however,  not  tested  by  these 
criteria.  It  is  a  theory  which  is  not  self-evident,  nor  is  it  one 
whose  opposite  is  inconceivable,  although  the  two  theories  op- 
posed to  it  presuppose  it,  so  that  it  is  presupposed  by  its  own 
denial  in  them.^^  It  is,  moreover,  a  theory  that  is  shown  by 
inductive  evidence  to  be  the  correct  theory  for  at  least  some 
instances  of  related  terms. 

With  such  examples  of  scientific  analysis  in  situ  and  of  ex- 
ternally related  terms  before  us,  the  hypothesis  is  permissible, 
that  the  problem  of  the  relationsliip  of  knowing  to  the  object 
known  may  be  examined  by  the  same  method  and  principles, 
with  the  residt  that  the  knoivn  object  may  be  discovered  to  be 
1  elated  to  the  knowing,  but  not  to  be  caused,  altered,  or  modified 
thereby.     This  hypothesis,  however,  solves,  if  it  is  correct,  the 

•  See  Chap.  XXVI.,  ii.,  1. 
^o  Cf.  Chap.  XV.,  IV.,  5,  6. 
"  Chap.  XXVI.,  II.,  1. 


EGO-  AND  VALUE-CENTRIC  PREDICAMENTS      369 

ego-centric  predicament.    But,  that  it  is  correct  is  shown  by  its 
empirical  confirmation  in  a  number  of  instances: — 

I.  Just  in  so  far  as  any  state  of  affairs,  holding  of  any  en- 
tities whatsoever,  is  advanced  in  any  science  or  in  any  philo- 
sophical position  as  a  state  of  affairs  that  is  true,  there  is  presup- 
posed (1)  that  this  situation  of  a  known  state  of  affairs  can  be 
analyzed  with  the  knowing  left  in  situ;  (2)  that  these  two 
terms,  namely  the  knowing  and  the  complex  ohject  or  state  of 
affairs  known,  can  be  distinguished;  (3)  that,  if  this  particular 
knowing  were  not  present,  the  state  of  affairs  would  still  be 
the  same  as  it  is  when  the  knowing  is  present.  This  last  specific 
presupposition,  particularly,  is  the  sole  logical  condition  on 
which  any  theory,  scientific  or  philosophical,  can  (be  claimed 
to)  portray  the  facts,  and,  therefore,  be  (advanced  as)  a  true 
theory.  And  the  discovery  of  this  presupposition  means  that 
one  has  found  another  instance  of  the  validity  of  the  theory  of 
external  relations.  Knowing  and  known  object,  complex  though 
this  be,  are  related ;  even  the  whole  universe,  if  we  can  use  this 
term  so  as  denotatively  to  know  all,  may  not  be  exempt  from 
this  judgment ;  but,  whatever  the  object  known  may  be,  it  is 
presupposed  to  he  related  to  the  knowing  as  if  this  were  not 
taking  place,  and,  therefore,  as  independent  of  the  knowing. 

These  presuppositions  are  made  even  by  those  philosophical 
systems  which,  like  Phenomenalism,  Subjectivism,  Materialism, 
and  Pragmatism,  advance  explicitly  a  developed  theory  of  a 
different  state  of  affairs,  namely,  one  in  which  it  is  maintained 
that  knowing  does  make  some  difference  to  the  object  known, 
and  that  the  latter  is  not  (causally)  independent  of  the  former.^^ 
For  in  each  of  these  philosophies  this  last  specific  state  of 
affairs  is  tacitly  assumed  to  be  related  to  knowing,  and  yet  not 
to  be  either  constituted  or  altered  thereby.  Thus  all  these  posi- 
tions are  inconsistent,  self-contradictory,  and  self-refuting. 

II.  These  positions,  as  well  as  others,  also  presuppose  that  the 
ego-centric  predicament  is  solved  in  a  number  of  other  instances 
than  that  of  the  knowing  of  those  states  of  affairs  which  are 
represented  in  their  theories  as  true.  Thus  (1)  Phenomenalism 
makes  this  presupposition  in  tacitly  assuming,  e.g.,  that  things- 
in-themselves  form  a  manifold,  and  act  on  transcendental  selves, 

"  See  the  criticism  of  these  positions  in  Chaps,  XXIX.-XXXUI. 


870  REALISM 

and  that  the  "categorical  machinery"  of  the  transcendental 
self  is  known. 1^  So  also  (2)  Subjectivism  both  tacitly  assumes 
and  explicitly  concludes  that  finite  spirits,  their  ideas  and  "no- 
tions," God,  and  His  ideas  are  not  constituted  or  altered  by 
the  knowing  of  them — by  some  finite  spirit  (Berkeley,  or  any 
other  subjectivist).^*  (3)  Positivism  tacitly  assumes  that  im- 
pressions (sensations)  and  the  copies  of  these,  called  ideas,  can 
be  known  as  they  really  are  without  being  constituted  or  altered 
by  those  ideas  in  which  they  are  known  and  to  which  they  are 
related/^  (4)  Naturalism,  Parallelism,  Materialism,  and  Psy- 
chism,  also,  all  frankly  make  the  same  presupposition  regarding 
the  knowing  situation. ^^  Each  of  these  positions  is,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  result  of  an  attempt  to  derive  a  philosophy  by  ex- 
tending and  making  universal  some  rather  special  scientific  view 
of  the  universe,  although  science  for  them  is,  seemingly,  linfi- 
ited  to  astronomy,  physics,  chemistry,  biology,  and  psychology, 
so  that,  owing  to  this  shortsighted  and  inaccurate  view,  these 
philosophical  positions  are  open  to  severe  criticism.  Neverthe- 
less, as  generalizations  from  a  limited  group  of  sciences,  they 
all  frankly  admit,  with  these  sciences  themselves,  that  the  know- 
ing and  the  entities  known  are  totli  numerically  distinct  and 
externally  related,  and  thus  all  rest  on  the  solution  of  the  ego- 
centric predicament,  not  only  as  regards  that  general  state  of 
affairs  which  is  the  content  of  their  theory  in  each  case,  but 
also  as  regards  the  several  more  specific  objects,  qualities,  and 
relations,  the  knowledge  of  which  is  presented  in  the  details  of 
their  theory.  At  every  point  in  their  explicitly  advanced  doc- 
trines, they  therefore  grant  that  the  knowing  situation  can  be 
examined  by  an  analysis  in  situ,  with  the  result  that  knoivi^ig  is 
found  to  have  no  effect  on  the  object  as  known,  and  that,  al- 
though always  present  to  the  known  world,  it  is  present  as  if 
it  were  not  present. 

(5)  Pragmatism  also  makes  the  same  assumptions  at  a  num- 
ber of  stages  in  the  development  of  its  explicit  doctrines  as  well 
as  in  its  fundamental  principles. ^^  Thus,  e.g.,  so  far  as  Prag- 
matism is  an  extended  and  generalized  doctrine  of  evolution,  it 

^»  See  Chap.  XXIX.  "  See  Chap.  XXXT. 

"  See  Chap.  XXX.  '"  See  Chap.  XXXII. 

"  See  Chap.  XXXIII. 


EGO-  AND  VALUE-CENTRIC  PREDICAMENTS      S71 

explicitly  accepts  the  solution  of  the  ego-centric  predicament. 
It  is  disloyal  to  this  solution,  and  becomes  self-contradictory,  as 
do  also  Naturalism  and  Materialism,  when  the  doctrine  of  the 
evolution  of  all  "things,"  including  knowing,  is  based  on  the 
principle  of  a  universal  causal  interaction.  For,  very  evidently, 
if  all  "things,"  including  consciousness  and  knowing,  causally 
affect  and  are  causally  affected  by  other  "things,"  then  knowing 
makes  a  dijfere7ice  by  its  very  presence,  and  things  are  not  the 
same  as  known  as  they  are  when  knowing  is  absent.  This  con- 
clusion holds  of  the  knowing  both  of  the  whole  state  of  affairs 
and  of  all  the  details  presented  in  these  respective  theories, 
although  quite  the  contradictory  position  is  presupposed  in  of- 
fering these  as  true  theories  suitable  for  popular  consumption. 
However,  to  remain  consistent  with  the  principle  which  each  of 
these  theories  actually  presupposes  in  that  it  is  advanced  as  a 
theory  that  presents  facts,  each  must  grant  that  not  all  "things" 
causally  interact,  but  that  some,  particularly  that  complex  ob- 
ject or  state  of  affairs  which  forms  the  content  of  each  theory, 
and  the  knowledge  of  this  object,  do  not.  These  two  terms  are 
externally,  and,  as  it  were,  functionally  related. 

(6)  Monistic  systems,  for  the  most  part,  as  we  have  already 
seen,^^  frankly  admit  that  the  ego-centric  predicament  is  solved. 
This,  indeed,  is  the  very  essence  of  their  historical  criticism  of 
Phenomenalism.^''  Their  one  concern  is  to  tind  evidence  or  proof 
for  an  Absolute  One  which  shall  mediate  all  relations  between  all 
terms,  and  manifest  itself  in  the  world  of  concrete  entities  or 
appearances.  But  monistic  sj'stems  do  not  doubt  that  this  One 
both  in  its  essence  and  its  activity  in  manifesting  itself  can  he 
known  as  it  really  is,  and  thus  be  in  relation  to  a  knowing,  and 
yet  not  be  constituted  or  altered  thereby.  It  is  only  in  so  far 
as  some  monistic  systems  are  based  on  certain  specific  argu- 
ments,^"' that  they  are  derived  from  the  false  proposition,  that 
the  ego-centric  predicament  is  insohihle.  Thus,  e.g.,  it  is  a 
thorough-going  phenomenalistic  argument,  that,  in  the  hypo- 
thetical absence  of  finite  knowers,  there  must  be  an  infinite 
knower  to  give  the  otherwise  chaotic  world  the  unity  and  order 
of  certain  relationships.  This  last  is,  indeed,  a  very  modern 
monistic   proof.     So   also   is  the   argument,   that,   because   all 

"  See  Chap.  XXXIV.       ^^  See  Chap.  XXXIV.       "  See  Chap.  XXXVIII. 


372  REALISM 

''things"  are  related  and  so  affect  one  another,  they  are  all 
alike,  and  therefore  that  the  universe  is  07ie  in  kind.  Against 
the  first  argument  it  may  be  said,  that,  if  knowing  in  no  ease 
alters  or  constitutes  the  terms  of  the  universe,  it  also  need  not 
constitute  the  relations  of  this  universe ;  while  against  the 
second  argument  one  may  insist,  until  proof  to  the  contrary  is 
found,  that  even  if  all  "things"  are  related,  they  may  never- 
theless be  independent  and  not  causally  connected,  and,  there- 
fore, qualitatively  different  and  unlike.  These  alternatives  to 
monism  are  pluralism. 


CHAPTER  XL 

REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES 

The  central  doctrine  of  Realism  is  obtained,  therefore,  by 
the  solution  of  the  ego-centric  predicament.    Knowing  may  not 
be  existentially  eliminated  from  the  known  world — indeed,  it 
may  even  be  granted,  that,  if  we  endeavor  to  think  or  to  know 
a  world  as  unknown,  we  but  once  again  have  a  world  that  is 
knoAvn  and  related  to  knowing.    But  there  is  always  the  possi- 
bility  that  this  knowing  situation   can  be   dealt   with   by   an 
analysis  in  situ,  and  the  discovery  made,  (1)  that  the  knowing 
and  the  known  are  numerically  distinct,   (2)    that  these  two 
terms  are  related  to  each  other,  and   (3)   that  the  relation  be- 
tween them  is  external.     This  hypothesis  is  confirmed  by  the 
several  specific  cases  of  knowing  just  examined.    Therefore  the! 
assertion  is  justified,  that  in  so  far  as  Realism  is  identical  with? 
the  solution  of  the  ego-centric  predicament  and  with  that  posi-i 
tion  which  holds  the  theory  of  external  relations  to  apply  to  I 
the  relation  between  knowing  and  the  known.  Realism  is  a  posi- 
tion that  is  established  by  empirical  methods  and  not  by  a  priori 
arguments  and  assumptions.     Accordingly,  with  this  empirical 
proof  at  hand,  deductive  results  by  way  of  forming  further 
hypotheses  may  be  derived  from  the  fact  of  the  external  or 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  37S 

functional  relation  of  Imowing  to  the  known  object,  and  con- 
firmation of  these  hypotheses  be  sought  for.  Some  of  these 
hypotheses  are  as  follows : — 

Knowing  and  known  object  may  he  qualitatively  different 

Hypothesis  I.  If  knowing  and  object  known  are  numerically 
distinct  and  externally  related,  the  former  neither  affecting  nor 
constituting  the  latter,  then  may  the  two  in  some  instances  be 
qualitatively  different.  In  general  the  external  theory  logically 
permits  very  different  terms  to  be  related,  simple  with  complex, 
and  qualitatively  unlike  with  unlike.  On  the  other  hand,  mutual 
causal  influences  make  terms  alike.  Therefore,  if  related  terms 
appear  qualitatively  different,  and  there  is  no  reason  for  trans- 
forming this  difference  into  a  similarity,  this  difference  may 
be  accepted  as  ultimate. 

Realism,  so  far  as  it  is  identical  with  the  solution  of  the 
ego-centric  predicament,  would  be  quite  compatible  with  the 
empirical  discovery  that  all  the  existential  entities  of  the  uni- 
verse are  like  in  kind.  But  by  common  sense  and  science  they 
are  not  found  to  be  this,  while  the  several  demonstrations  in 
Subjectivism,  Positivism,  Naturalism,  Materialism,  and  monistic 
Idealism  for  such  a  likeness  of  all  "things"  are  either  a  priori 
and  so  not  empirical,  or  self-contradictory  and  so  not  valid. 
Therefore,  in  the  absence  of  valid  reasons  to  the  contrary, 
Realism  concludes,  that  knowing  and  the  known  are  in  many 
cases  qualitatively  different,  even  as  different  as  empirical  investi- 
gation and  the  results  of  the  sciences  show,  e.g.,  physical  entities 
and  such  non-existent  suhsistents  ^  as  number,  space,  and  time, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  psychical  processes,  on  the  other  hand,  to  be. 
Only  when  one  psychical  process  is  the  known  object  to  another 
process  as  the  knowing  process,  are  knowing  and  known  object 
(to  this  extent)  similar,  but  this  similarity  does  not  result  from 
any  causal  interaction  between  the  two.  Rather,  it  is  purely 
incidental  to  facts, — namely,  the  facts  of  the  universe,  and  thus 
is  quite  analogous  to  that  similarity  between  points  which  is 
quite  compatible  with  the  dissimilarity  between  all  points  and 
all  instants  as  two  distinct  classes. 

With  the  theory  of  external  relations  empirically  established 
>  See  Chap.  XLIV. 


374  REALISM 

for  the  relation  between  knowing  and  the  knoivn,  and  also  with 
an  empirical  confirmation  at  hand  for  the  logically  consistent 
hypothesis  of  the  dissimilarity  of  knowing  and  the  known,  the 
further  hypotheses  are  derivable,    (1)    that  external  relations 
may  subsist  in  a  great  many  other  instances  in  the  universe, 
and  (2)  that  a  great  many  different  kinds  of  entities  may  exist  | 
and  subsist  and  be  related  in  many  different  ways.-     These  I 
hypotheses  taken  together  mean  a  logically  pluralistic  ''world,"  | 
i.e.,  a  "world"  or  universe  that  is  "made  up"  of  many  different   .. 
kinds  of  entities,  all  related,  but  in  qualitatively  different  waj^s, 
some  causally,  but  others  not,  some  dependent,  but  others  not, 
and  with  no  single  underlying  One  to  mediate  all  relations. 

Illusory  objects  are  objective 

Hypothesis  II.  The  second  hypothesis  that  is  logically  possi- 
ble if  knowing  and  known  object  are  numerically  distinct  and, 
in  some  cases,  qualitatively  different,  and  in  all  cases  externally 
related,  is,  that  at  least  many  classes  of  so-called  illusory  ob- 
jects are  not  constituted  by  the  consciousness  of  them,  but  are 
quite  as  objective  as  are  non-illusory  entities.  This  hypothesis 
is  again  one  that  is  confirmed  by  the  results  of  empirical  investi- 
gation, and  thereby  a  disproof  furnished  of  a  certain  specific 
argument  that  is  often  advanced  in  support  of  a  position,  namely. 
Subjectivism,  which  in  some  of  its  doctrines  is  diametrically 
opposed  to  Realism.  Subjectivism  in  its  position  concerning 
the  knowledge  of  spirits  is,  as  we  have  seen,  realistic ;  but  in 
holding  that  the  physical  world  is  not  numerically  distinct  from 
the  percepts  and  ideas  of  it,  but  is  identical  with  these,  it  is 
directly  anti-realistic.^  For  knowing  is  thus  made,  not  merely 
alterative,  but  constitutive  of  the  physical  world. 

The  logical  and  historical  argument  for  this  position  proceeds, 
as  we  have  seen,  from  the  assumed  subjectivity  of  some  quali- 
ties and  the  impossibility  of  concretely  experiencing  a  material 
substratum,  to  the  denial  of  this  substratum  and  the  inference 
that  all  qualities  are  subjective.'*  But  this  demonstration  is  fre- 
quently buttressed  by  the  further  argument  from  dreams,  hal- 
lucinations, errors  of  judgment,  and  both  normal  and  abnormal 

'  See  Chaps.  XLIII.-XLVI.  "  Chap.  XXX.  *  Chap.  XXX. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  »75 

illusions.^  Thus  it  is  claimed,  e.g.,  that  dream  objects  are  purely 
subjective,  and  then,  by  analogy,  that  all  illusory  objects  are 
also  of  this  "character.  It  is  then  argued,  that  even  the  normal 
objects  of  the  world  about  us  may  be,  or,  in  fact,  are  but  one 
common  illusion  or  dream,  and  so  entirely  subjective. 
"  One  obvious  criticism  of  this  argument  is,  that  the  illusory 
and  hallucinatory  in  any  instance  implies  that  which  is  not  of 
this  character,  so  that,  if  the  one  be  subjective,  the  other  must 
be  objective  in  the  sense  of  not  being  constituted  by  conscious- 
ness or  by  knowing.  Yet  this  objective  character  need  not  be 
existential ;  it  may  be  subsistential,  and  still  meet  the  logical 
requirements  of  the  implication. 

But  further  it  is  a  very  general  principle  of  procedure  that, 
if  a  specific  argument  is  based  on  one  alternative  when  other 
possibilities  exist  and  are  ignored,  then  that  argument  is  en- 
dangered when  those  other  alternatives  are  considered.  Pre- 
cisely this  situation,  however,  is  found  in  the  case  of  the  argu- 
ment, that  illusory  objects,  such  as  the  seeming  convergence  of 
the  rails  of  the  railroad,  or  the  seeming  bentness  of  a  straight 
stick  in  the  water,  must  be  subjective  or  conscious  in  character, 
because  (1)  the  parallelness  and  straightness  are  objective,  and 
because  (2)  objectively  the  coexistence  of  the  contradictory 
characters,  parallelness  and  convergence,  straightness  and  bent- 
ness, at  the  same  place  and  time,  is  impossible.  Surely 
it  is  to  be  admitted  that  the  rails  cannot  be  both  con- 
vergent and  parallel,  the  stick  both  straight  and  bent.  But 
if  for  this  reason  it  is  inferred  that  consciousness  is  the  locus 
of  the  convergence  and  the  bentness,  then  may  this  inference 
itself  be  in  error,  provided  there  are  other  alternatives  for  solv- 
ing the  difficulty.  But  other  alternatives  there  are.  For  the 
convergence  may  be  a  characteristic  of,  and  have  a  locus 
in,  the  relational  complex,  light-traveling-in-straight-lines-from- 
each-rail-to-the-eyes,  or  to  a  photographic  plate,  and  the  bent- 
ness be  a  characteristic  of  the  complex,  light  rays-coming-from- 
the-stick-through-the-refractive  medium  of  water.  This  other 
alternative  is,  indeed,  the  scientific  explanation  in  each  of  these 
cases.  But  this  explanation  is  one  which  means  that  the  dif- 
ferent locus  which  is  demanded  by  the  principle  of  contradiction 
"  Chaps.  X.,  XXX.,  XLIII.,  i.,  n. 


376  REALISM 

for  the  convergence  and  bentness  is  found  quite  as  readily  in 
an  objective  relational  complex  as  it  is  in  a  consciousness  or 
mind. 

With  this  the  case  there  is  a  confirmation  of  the  hypothesis 
that,  if  the  normal  object  and  knowing  are  related  externally, 
are  numerically  distinct,  and  in  some  instances  are  qualitatively 
different,  with  the  known  object  objective  in  just  these  respects, 
so  also  may  all  illusory  objects  and  the  cognition  of  them  be 
similarly  related. 

It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  if  there  is  this  alternative  method 
for  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  certain  illusions,  one  cannot 
pass  it  wholly  by,  and  conclude  that  the  only  locus  for  illusory 
objects  in  general  is  consciousness,  and  that  all  objects  might 
analogously  be  conscious  in  nature.  Yet  it  is  just  this  pro- 
cedure that  is  adopted  by  many  philosophers  who  first  persist 
in  ignoring  the  alternative  possibility,*'  and  then  insist  that 
the  crucial  test  of  Eealism  is  its  ability  to  explain  error,  and  that 
it  fails  to  do  this,  and  who  finally  infer  not  only  that  all  illusory 
objects  are  subjective,  but  also  that  all  objects  may  be. 

It  is  by  using  the  other  alternative  that  the  subjectivistic 
or  idealistic  argument  and  conclusion  from  illusions  can  be 
disproved,  and  the  main  realistic  position  once  again  be  sup- 
ported. For  other  kinds  of  illusory  objects  and  other  instances 
of  error  can  be  explained  in  much  the  same  way  as  are  the 
instances  just  considered.  Thus,  e.g.,  it  will  be  granted  that, 
if  the  theory  of  external  relations  has  the  genuine  inductive 
basis  of  a  few  typical  instances,  then  there  may  be  further 
instances  for  which  it  holds.  One  group  of  these  instances  is 
found  in  sense  perception,  and  in  perceptive  judgments.  One 
need  not  perceive  the  whole  of  an  object  correctly  in  order  to 
perceive  part  of  it  as  it  really  is.  This  is  clearly  the  case,  pro- 
vided that,  although  two  percepts  are  related,  they  do  not  influ- 
ence each  other.  Thus  the  superstitious  person's  perception  of 
a  noise  may  be  correct,  but  his  interpretation  of  this  as  the 
fluttering  form  of  a  ghost  be  quite  wrong.  The  gliost  may  not 
exist.  The  person's  "taking"  it  to  exist  and  to  be  moving 
about  constitutes  his  perceptual  error.    It  is  just  this  "taking" 

*  Lovcjoy,  e.g.,  in  his  controversy  with  Cohen  in  the  articles  referred  to 
in  Chap.  XLIII.,  i.,  n.,  iii. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  377 

a  ** thing"  to  he  what  it  is  not,  that  constitutes  many  kinds  of 
error,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  illusory  and  hallucinatory  objects. 
But  since  even  here  there  is  a  scientific  explanation  that  makes 
these  objects  objective,  one  cannot  safely  ignore  this  and  be 
free  to  infer  that  all  such  objects  are  subjective. 

It  is  characteristic  of  all  dreams  and  hallucinations  that  they 
never  present  self-contradictory  objects.  That  which  is  known 
in  these  cognitive  processes  may  not  exist,  but  no  character  is 
ever  presented  in  them  that  could  not  exist,  or  be  a  fact  of  some 
kind.  In  accordance  with  our  previous  arguments,  such  objects, 
therefore,  may  be  called  suhsistent.  They  have  the  same  status 
that  have  many  objects  of  the  imagination  and  the  reason.  But, 
unless  the  whole  argument  for  subsistents  is  invalid,  it  is  not 
to  be  therewith  inferred  that  these  dream  contents  are  npt  as 
objective  as  any  object  is,  only  they  may  not  be  existent 
objects. 

The  philosophical  position  which  accounts  thus  for  illusory 
and  hallucinatory  objects  and  which  thus  holds  to  the  objec- 
tivity of  many  other  kinds  of  subsistents,  as  well  as  of  existents, 
may  itself  be  in  error,  of  course.  For  we  can  only  attempt  to 
know,  and  there  is  no  absolute  test  of  knowledge.  But  such 
a  pan-objectivistic  position  ^  has  the  advantage,  that  it  is  self- 
consistenty  that  it  avoids  many  of  the  most  patent  errors  of 
other  systems,  and  that  it  does  not  fallaciously  base  its  con- 
clusions exclusively  on  one  alternative,  when  there  are  other 
alternatives  to  be  considered. 

That  many  difficulties  are  present  in  the  general  problem  of 
error,  one  must  frankly  admit,  as  also  must  one,  that  all  of 
these  difficulties  have  not  been  solved.  But  the  evidence  at 
hand  clearly  shows,  that  the  method  of  procedure  must  be  here, 
as  it  is  elsewhere,  the  empirical  one  of  analyzing  data,  of  forming, 
if  necessary,  alternative  hypotheses,  and  of  awaiting  the  con- 
firmation of  these  by  concrete  fact  and  by  consistent  agreement 
with  other  knowledge. 

Eelying  upon  this  method,  it  would  seem,  that  much  that  in 

the  past  has  been  regarded  as  subjective  can  with  much  greater 

justification  be  concluded  to  be  objective,  and  that  the  final  and 

irreducible  subjective  element  in  error  is  only  the  psychological 

'  See  Chap.  XLIV.,  ll. 


S78  REALISM 

fact  of  "taking  a  'thing'  to  be  what  it  is  not."  If  this  is  the 
case,  then  the  solution  of  this  problem  belongs  not  so  much  to 
philosophy  as  to  psychology,  for  this  science  can,  perhaps,  tell 
us  why  we  take  one  "thing"  to  be  another.  But  if  psychology 
succeeds  in  solving  this  problem,  its  solution  does  not  do  away 
with  the  objectivity  of  all  "things"  that  are  thus  confused. 

This  problem  belongs  to  philosophy  perhaps  only  in  so  far 
as  each  special  science  contributes  its  quota  to  that  general 
philosophical  account  of  things  that  is  made  up  of  all  special 
accounts.  In  this  respect  the  realistic  and  objective  account  of 
error  that  has  just  been  presented  is  one  that  contributes  its 
small  share  to  the  ontological  and  cosmological  branches  of  phi- 
losophy,^ For  it  shows  that  the  universe  is  not  made  up  merely 
of  things,  each  identical  with  itself,  yet  similar  to  and  causally 
acting  on  other  things,  but  there  are  also  events  and  relations 
of  many  kinds,  and,  as  it  were,  disembodied  qualities  without 
a  substratum,  and  existents  and  non-existents.  Thus  the  ob- 
jective universe  contains  not  only  the  straight  stick,  but  also 
the  bentness;  not  only  the  parallel  rails,  but  also  the  con- 
vergence ;  not  only  the  rustling  of  the  curtain,  but  also  the  flimsy 
ghOst;  not  only  the  existent  poisons,  but  also  the  imagined 
ones  of  the  dream  and  the  hallucination.  In  this  manner  does 
the  realistic  account  augment  the  usually  accepted  objective 
richness  and  manifoldness  of  the  world  in  which  we  live. 

1.  Objects  may  be  genuinely  known: 

2.  They  may  become  known  and  cease  to  be  known. 

3.  Not  all  objects  are  known. 

Hypothesis  III.  If  the  ego-centric  predicament  is  solved  in 
the  presuppositions  that  are  made  by  such  philosophies  as  Phe- 
nomenalism and  Subjectivism  in  regard  to  the  knowing  both  of 
complex  states  of  affairs  as  well  as  of  particular  classes  of  en- 
tities, such  as  things-in-themselves,  spirits,  and  the  like,  and  if 
this  relation  between  knowing  and  entity  known  is  an  instance 
of  external  relations,  then  the  hypotheses  are  permissible,  (1) 
that  the  known  object  can  be  known  as  it  really  is,  (2)  that  it 
may  become  known  and  cease  to  be  known,  and  (3)  that  not  all 
objects  are  known. 

*  See  Chaps.  XLII.  and  XLIII. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  879 

The  first  supposition  is,  as  we  have  seen,  confirmed  in  the 
case  of  any  theory  that  would  present  a  real  state  of  affairs, 
even,  indeed,  the  contradictory  one,  that  "things"  cannot  be 
known  as  they  really  are.  For,  whatever  state  of  affairs  is 
presented  in  a  philosophy,  it  is  offered  as  the  real  state  of  affairs, 
and  therefore  the  presupposition  is  made  that  at  least  some 
"things"  can  be  known  as  they  really  are.  No  a  priori  or  logical 
obstacle  can  consistently  be  placed  in  the  way  of  the  recognition 
of  this  presupposition,  since  to  attempt  this,  and  to  claim  some 
opposed  presupposition  to  be  the  state  of  affairs,  is  again  to 
conform  to  this  specific  presupposition — that  something  can  be 
genuinely  known.  But  if  some  entities  can  be  genuinely  known, 
it  is  implied  that  other,  perhaps  all  other  entities  may  also  be 
so  known ;  and  also,  if  no  a  priori  argument  can  be  brought 
against  the  possihility  of  genuine  knowledge,  even  when  such  an 
argument  is  attempted  (in  some  cases),  it  follows  that  the  dif- 
ficulties in  the  way  of  attaining  genuine  knowledge  are  em- 
pirical difficulties  and  not  such  as  are  inherent  in  the  knowing 
situation.  But  empirical  difficulties  are  removable  by  empirical 
means,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  actual  development  of 
the  methods  and  technique  of  scientific  (and  philosophic?) 
investigation  is  in  part  identical  with  the  discovery  of  the 
nature  and  conditions  of  specific  errors,  and  of  the  means  for 
avoiding  these.  Illusions,  hallucinations,  preconceptions,  errors 
of  measurement,  and  the  like,  have  become  understood,  and  their 
control  and  elimination  has  been  achieved. 

But  although  it  is  implied  or  presupposed  that  "things"  can 
be  known  as  they  really  are,  still  it  may  he  that  few  'things" 
are  so  known.  However,  this  possibility  does  not  imply  the 
actuality.  But  there  is  still  the  empirical  difficult}^  that  there 
is  no  absolutely  certain  test  by  which  to  determine  whether  or 
not  fact  has  been  thus  revealed.  The  possibility  of  error  is 
always  present,  and  the  best  that  one  can  do  is  to  attempt  to 
know,  and  to  utilize  as  many  tests  as  possible.  Direct  or  imme- 
diate experience,  consistency  with  other  facts,  the  convincing 
appeal  to  the  reasoning  of  many  rather  than  of  one,  and  the 
survival  in  the  struggle  for  existence  among  theories,  hypotheses, 
and  methods  as  knowledge  develops,  are  all  tests  of  knowledge. 
Yet  even  if  in  this  way  no  knowledge  is  obtained  that  is  ahso- 


380  REALISM 

lutely  certain,  the  situation  is,  nevertheless,  saved  by  the  prin- 
ciple, that  true  knowledge  is  independent  of  ilie  proof  that  it 
is  siicli,  else  were  common  sense  and  the  earliest  knowing  of 
the  race  only  error  and  complete  illusion.  One  may  conclude, 
therefore,  (1)  that  other  than  those  difficulties  which  may  be 
removed  by  empirical  methods,  there  is  no  obstacle  to  the  gen- 
uine knowing  of  "things,"  (2)  that,  accordingly,  if  some  things 
are  unknown,  they  are  not,  for  that  reason,  unknowable,  and 
(3)  that  even  though  absolute  proof  be  lacking,  absolute  knowl- 
edge is  quite  possible.  But,  if  "things"  are  genuinely  knowable, 
and  if  knowing  makes  no  difference  to  them,  then  knowing  may 
now  be  present  to  them  and  now  absent  from  them,  with 
"things"  hecoming  known  and  then  ceasing  to  be  known.  Some 
"things,"  therefore,  at  some  times,  are  unknown. 

This  hypothesis  is  not  invalidated  by  the  argument,  that  one 
can  think  the  whole  universe,  and  that,  therefore,  everything 
is  known,  and  that  nothing  is  unknown  or  vnthought.  There  is 
all  the  difference  in  the  world  between  knowing  "things"  in 
a  lump  and  knowing  "things"  in  detail  and  with  precision. 
Accordingly,  when  I  think  the  whole  universe — whatever  this 
may  mean — it  may  be  that  I  should  call  this  knowledge;  but 
there  is  certainly  more  knowledge,  if  I  can  assert,  with  proof 
therefor,  that  the  universe  is,  e.g.,  a  mere  collection,  and  not  an 
organic  unity.  And  there  is  still  more  knowledge,  of  a  precise 
kind,  if  I  am  also  perceiving,  e.g.,  that  a  particular  organism 
under  my  microscope  is  vorticclla,  and  if  I  am  observing  and 
understanding  its  behavior.  Therefore,  if  thinking  the  whole 
universe  is  to  be  called  knowledge,  it  is  such  a  knowledge  as 
allows  of  the  ignorance  of  details,  and  the  absence  of  the  knowl- 
edge of  some  entities.  Accordingly,  we  must  conclude,  not  only 
that  all  "things"  are  not  known,  and  are  not  in  relation  to 
specific  knowings,  but  also  that  this  fact  is  itself  now  known. 
Indeed  this  is  the  view  that  is  taken  in  both  common  sense  and 
science,  and  that  is  confirmed  by  the  scientific  investigation  of 
the  problem  of  the  knowing. 

This  conclusion  leads,  however,  to  further  interesting  con- 
siderations. It  has  just  been  said  that  there  is  all  the  difference 
in  the  world  between  knowing  "things"  in  a  lump  and  knowing 
them  in  detail.    The  knowing  process  in  both  eases  is  a  specific 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  381 

event,  taking  place  at  some  specific  time,  in  some  individual, 
yet  in  the  two  cases  the  object  is  known  in  a  radically  different 
mariner.  I  know  that  there  are  Chinamen,  but  I  know  no 
individual  Chinaman.  I  may  perceive  a  space  as  a  whole,  but 
I  may  be  quite  ignorant  of  the  science  of  spatial  relations.  So 
also  I  may  be  able  to  think  the  universe,  but  may  know  little 
of  its  details.  It  is,  therefore,  evident  that  there  are  two  kinds 
of  knowing,  and  that  the  one  does  not  imply  the  other,  else  from 
my  thinking  the  universe  as  such,  I  might  discover  its  details. 
But  this  possibility  is  not  confirmed  empirically.  Rather,  experi- 
ence shows  that  the  universe  must  be  studied  in  detail  and  by 
analytic  induction,  and  not  by  deduction  from  such  propositions 
as  "the  universe  is  thought"  or  "the  universe  is  One."  Even 
if  these  propositions  were  true,  the  knowledge  of  the  particular 
entities  that  make  up  the  universe  could  not  be  derived  from 
them,  and  such  entities  would  remain  unknown,  were  not  other 
methods  at  our  disposal. 

When  we  ask  the  question,  therefore,  Are  things  unknown? 
our  affirmative  reply  is  not  to  be  circumvented  by  the  claim, 
that  all  "things"  are  known  because  they  are  thinkable  as  a 
lump-universe.  The  question  refers  to  detailed  knowledge,  and 
such  knowledge  we  do  not  possess  of  all  "things." 

With  this  limitation  of  the  meaning  of  our  question,  we  may 
next  ask,  Are  more  "things"  known  than  are  unknown?  And 
the  answer  must  be,  seemingly,  "Yes."  The  evidence  for  this 
answer  is,  that  human  knowledge  encompasses  the  main  types 
of  "things,"  and  that  it  is  chiefly  the  subordinate  and  minor 
types,  and  matters  of  minute  detail  that  yet  remain  to  be 
known.  This  evidence  is  obtained  by  the  "method  of  residues," 
in  accordance  with  which,  if  phenomena  are  found  for  which 
other  phenomena  as  causes,  or  as  conditions,  or  as  independent 
variables,  and  the  like,  are  not  yet  known,  these  explanatory 
entities  must  be  sought  for,  the  need  for  this  search  being  dis- 
closed either  by  experimental  analysis,  or  by  the  development 
of  implications.  As  judged,  now,  by  this  twofold  method,  it 
may  be  asserted,  that  the  main  types  of  entities  that  '  *  make  up ' ' 
the  universe  are  known  either  descriptively,  as  in  sciences  like 
biology,  or  explanatorily,  as  in  sciences  like  physical  chemistry 
and  mechanics,  in  which  explanation,  as  correctly  understood, 


382  REALISM 

means  not  to  identify,  but  to  correlate  series  of  specifically  dif- 
ferent types.  Such  a  correlation  allows  two  or  more  qualita- 
tively distin  t  series  t'^  **act"  in  conformity  with  one  another, 
yet  without  identity  with  or  the  possibility  of  deduction  from 
one  another,  and  accounts  for  the  empirical  fact  that  most,  if, 
indeed,  not  all  of  the  entities  of  the  universe  are  susceptible  to 
a  "treatment"  by  the  science  of  order,  i.e.,  by  the  principles  of 
modern  logic.^ 

Other  instances  of  external  relations.    The  Freedom  of  Reason 

Hypothesis  IV.  If  knowing  and  knoivn  object  are  numer- 
ically distinct  and  externally  related,  the  forr.ier  neither  affect- 
ing nor  constituting  the  latter,  then  not  only  is  the  knowing 
situation  characterized  by  the  several  aspects  of  the  external 
relationship,  but  also  there  may  be  other  instances  of  the  types 
of  relations  that  are  involved  in  the  knowing  situation. 

It  may  well  be  that  many  terms  are  so  related  that  they 
influence  one  another  causally,  but  it  is  impossible  to  maintain 
in  other  than  a  very  arbitrary  manner,  that  this  principle  holds 
of  all  related  terms  by  virtue  of  their  mere  relatedness.  Indeed 
this  cannot  be  at  all  validly  maintained  provided  there  are  one 
or  more  instances  of  terms  that  are  related  and  yet  causally 
independent.  One  such  instance,  however,  we  have  found  to 
be  the  pair  of  related  terms,  knowing  and  known  object.  And 
another  instance  is  the  relationship  between  time,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  motion  and  acceleration  on  the  other  hand.  In  this 
case  time  is  the  independent  variable,  motion  and  acceleration, 
the  dependent  variables;  time  is  not  the  cause  of  these  changes, 
nor  are  they  the  cause  of  it;  yet  time  is  the  condition  for  their 
occurrence,  although  they  do  not  condition  time ;  were  there  no 
motion  and  no  acceleration,  there  would  still  be  time,  but  were 
there  no  time,  they  would  be  impossible. 

Time  is  a  one-dimensional  series  formed  by  asymmetrically 
and  transitively  related  instants.  In  the  case,  now,  of  any 
specific  finite,  accelerated  motion,  one  and  only  one  specific 
velocity  is  related  to  a  specific  individual  instant.  Yet  this 
instant  is  related  also  to  other  instants,  and  would  retain  this 

»  See  Chaps.  II.,  XXVII.,  XLI.,  XLIIL,  and  XLIV.,  u. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  38S 

relationship  even  if  there  were  no  acceleration  and  no  motion. 
Here,  therefore,  is  a  case  of  a  term,  namely,  an  instant,  that  is 
in  one  specific  relation  to  other  terms,  i.e.,  to  other  instants, 
and  that  can,  nevertheless,  without  loss  or  change  of  this  rela- 
tion, "come"  into  relation  with  another  (complex)  term,  namely, 
a  velocity.  Also,  in  the  case  of  that  series  of  points  ivhich  con- 
stitutes the  path  of  a  moving  body,  any  one  point  may  retain 
its  relations  to  other  points,  and  yet  gain  and  lose  the  specific 
relation  of  deing  occupied  by  a  material  particle  for  an  instant. 
And  finally,  in  the  case  of  a  specific  acceleration,  which  is  itself 
a  series  of  individually  distinct  velocities,  there  is  for  each 
instant  of  the  time  and,  also,  for  each  point  of  the  path  (of  the 
moving  body)  one  and  only  one  specific  velocity,  and  not  an- 
other. Each  such  specific  velocity  is  gained  and  then  lost — by 
both  the  point  and  the  instant  to  which  it  is  related.  In  each 
of  these  cases  we  have,  therefore,  an  external  and  not  a  causal 
relation.  Such  a  relation  also  subsists  in  the  case  of  the  relation 
between  a  specific  acceleration  as  a  ivhole,  and  the  specific  time 
and  path  (as  wholes)  to  which  the  acceleration  is  related.  The 
acceleration,  the  time,  and  the  path  are  each  a  series,  and  the 
relation  between  them  is  not  causal,  but  functional  or  external. 
However,  with  such  instances  of  externally  related  entities 
before  us,  namely,  of  relational  wholes  in  which  terms  gain  and 
lose  specific  relations  to  other  terms  without  being  affected 
thereby,  we  must  grant  the  possibility  of  still  other  instances  of 
the  same  generic  situation  or  state  of  affairs,  and  this  possibility 
is  shown  by  empirical  observation  to  be  an  actuality.  For  there 
is  evidence  that,  in  at  least  certain  instances  of  the  knowing 
situation,  the  object  known  retains  its  relationship  to  other 
entities  while  its  gains  and  loses  the  knowing  relation.  For  exam- 
ple, that  this  is  the  fact,  is  presupposed  for  any  object  or  entity 
being  kno^vn  as  it  really  is.  And  since  some  entities  and  states  of 
affairs  are  assumed  or  presupposed  to  be  so  known,  even  by  those 
philosophers  who  explicitly  advance  a  different  theory  of  know- 
ing, one  may  generalize,  and,  until  good  evidence  to  the  con- 
trary is  found,  maintain  that  only  that  theory  of  the  knowing 
situation  is  correct  which  recognizes  it  to  be  an  indispensable 
condition  for  genuine  knowing,  that  the  relation  of  the  knowing 
to  the  object  known  may  be  gained  or  lost  without  this  gain  or 


384  REALISM 

loss  having  any  effect  on  the  object  as  known.  For  otherivise, 
the  knowing  in  "coming"  into  relation  with  the  object  (to  be) 
known  will  modify  that  object,  and,  therefore,  make  it  different 
as  known  from  what  it  really  is. 

Indeed,  it  may  be  said,  in  general,  that  the  relation  between 
knowing  and  object  known  is  720;^  causal,  but  functional  or  ex- 
ternal. Knowing,  thinking,  reasoning  are  related  to  that  which 
is  known  so  as  to  reveal  the  object  as  it  really  is  both  as  a  whole 
and  in  some  detail,  and  accordingly  in  a  manner  that  may  be 
interpreted  as  a  relation  of  correspondence  after  the  model  of 
the  functional  relationship.  From  this  state  of  affairs,  which 
holds  both  of  the  knowing  situation  and  of  the  relation  between, 
e.g.,  time  and  any  finite  motion,  and  where  we  may  argue  from 
either  instance  to  the  possibility  of  the  other  instance,  our 
fourth  hypothesis  is  formed. 

An  object  can  retain  its  relation  to  other  objects,  and  yet 
both  enter  into  and  lose  the  knowing  relation.  So  also  can  a 
finite  space  gain  and  lose  its  relation  to  a  specific  finite  motion. 
Generalizing,  we  may  say,  (a)  that  some  entities  can  retain 
certain  relations,  and  yet  gain  and  lose  others;  further,  that, 
just  as  motion  does  not  cause  time  and  space,  nor  they  cause  it, 
and  just  as  time  and  space  would  be  facts  were  there  no  ma- 
terial particles  either  to  move  or  to  be  at  rest,  although  there 
could  be  no  moving  or  resting  material  particles  were  there  not 
both  space  and  time,  so  also  (b)  may  there  be  many  instances 
of  entities  so  related  that  one  logically  {not  causally)  necessi- 
tates the  other,  but  not  conversely.  Indeed,  the  knowing  situa- 
tion seems  to  present  just  such  an  instance.  For  knowing  pre- 
supposes "something"  that  is  known,  although  this  "some- 
thing" would  be  a  fact,  and  would  retain  at  least  many  of  its 
relations  to  other  entities,  were  it  not  known. 

Both  of  these  principles  or  doctrines  or  hypotheses  concerning 
relations  are  parts  of  the  general  theory  of  external  relations.'^'* 
The  one  doctrine  maintains,  that  one  and  the  same  entity  may 
stand  in  many  relations  to  many  entities,  and  may  gain  and  lose 
at  least  some  of  these  relations  quite  independently  of  others. 
The  other  hypothesis  maintains,  that  certain  entities  are  in  the 
relation  of  a  one-sided,  non-causal  dependence.  This  relation 
'"Chap.  XXVI.,  11.,  1. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  385 

is  that  of  logical  suhsequency,  with  its  inverse,  the  relation  of 
logical  priority.  A  is  logically  prior  to  B,  if  B  presupposes  A, 
but  A  does  not  imply  B.^^  Both  hypotheses  assert  in  common, 
that  causal  dependence  and  a  resulting  change  and  alteration 
of  the  terms  related  are  not  of  necessity  involved  in  the  mere 
fact  of  relatedness. 

Both  principles  have,  however,  an  extensive  empirical  basis, 
or,  if  regarded  as  hypotheses,  receive  an  extensive  confirmation 
in  the  realm  of  both  common  sense  and  science.  They  are  also 
confirmed  in  any  larger  field  of  human  knowledge  in  which  de- 
ductions are  not  made  from  their  explicit  denial,  as  is  the  case, 
e.g.,  in  Naturalism,  which  applies  the  principle  of  causation  to 
everything,  even  to  human  reason  and  conscience.^-  But  even 
in  such  a  philosophy  both  principles  are  presupposed  at  certain 
junctures.  They  therefore  express  that  which  is  to  be  regarded 
as  one  aspect  of  the  structure  of  the  universe. 

To  give  another  instance  of  their  occurrence,  it  may  be  said, 
that,  just  as  time  and  space  are  independent  of  matter  and 
motion,  so  are  numbers  independent  of  time  and  space.  For 
it  is  implied  that  were  these  last  two  entities  not  facts,  never- 
theless the  real  numbers,  namely,  the  integers,  rational  frac- 
tions, and  irrational,  both  positive  and  negative,  would  be  facts. 
Also,  it  is  implied,  that  if  a  continuous  space  and  time  were  cre- 
ated, then  would  these  entities  incorporate  in  themselves  in  re- 
spect to  the  order  of  both  points  and  instants,  those  entities  and 
relations  which  are  identical  with  that  relational  complex  which 
is  called  the  arithmetical  continuum.^^ 

These  specific  relations  of  the  number  continuum  to  con- 
tinuous space  and  time,  and  of  these  in  turn  to  matter  and 
motion,  are  instances  of  the  relation  of  logical  priority.  There- 
fore, it  is  very  evident  that  this  relation  is  qualitatively  dif- 
ferent and  distinct  from  both  temporal  and  spatial  priority; 
for  the  priority  of  numbers  to  space  and  time  is  itself  neither 
^spatial  nor  temporal. 

If,  now,  one  seeks  still  other  instances  of  logical  priority,  his 
r^arch  is  readily  and  quickly  rewarded.     For  the  universe  is 

"  Cf.  Chap.  XLI.,  XXII. 

"  Chaps.  XXXII.  and  XXXIII. 

"  See  Chap.  XLIII,,  vi,-x. 


386  REALISM 

found  to  have  that  ''structure"  which  may  be  described  as  a 
stratification  of  the  main  types  of  entities.  This  stratification 
is  due  to  the  fact  that  each  main  type  is  logically  necessitated 
or  presupposed  by  that  type  which  is  logically  subsequent,  but 
which  does  not,  conversely,  imply  or  necessitate  it.  The  fol- 
lowing are  some  of  the  main  types  or  strata  of  reality  in  the 
order  of  their  logical  dependence,  the  later  named  types  being 
logically  prior  to  the  earlier  named,  the  earlier  named,  logically 
subsequent  to  the  later  named.  The  order  is:  (1)  psychical  proc- 
esses, subdivided,  perhaps,  in  the  order  of  their  dependence, 
into  (a)  reasoning,  (b)  imagination,  (c)  memory,  (d)  sense 
perception,  and  (e)  certain  instincts  and  instinctive  feelings; 
(2)  animal  and  plant  behavior  consisting  of  reflexes  and 
tropisms;  (3)  complex  and  also  relatively  simple  physiological 
processes;  (4)  chemical  and  physico-chemical  processes;  (5) 
physical  processes  and  "things,"  such  as  heat,  electricity,  light, 
moving  bodies;  (6)  pure,  actual  motion  in  accordance  with 
causes,  as  specified  by  the  laws  of  Newton;  (7)  motion  in  gen- 
eral, subsist ential,  and  not  existential,  in  accordance  with  the 
general  concept  of  cause,  but  not  as  this  is  specified  by  the 
Newtonian  laws  or  the  other  orthodox  mechanical  principles; 
(8)  space  and  time  (it  being  difficult  to  say  that  either  of  these 
depends  on  the  other)  ;  and  (9)  finally,  the  real  numbers, 
positive  and  negative. 

There  is  doubtless  opportunity  for  much  correction  and  ex- 
pansion of  this  list,  since  the  application  of  the  principles  which 
it  illustrates  is  to  be  determined  only  empirically.  However, 
further  details  that  are  involved  in  this  theory  of  the  stratifica- 
tion of  the  universe  will  be  considered  in  that  part  of  this 
section  which  deals  with  the  realistic  and  neo-rationalistic 
structure  of  the  universe.^* 

We  may  now  consider  in  some  detail  our  second  principle, 
namely,  that  "one  and  the  same  entity  may  stand  in  many 
relations  to  many  entities,  and  may  gain  or  lose  at  least  some 
of  these  relations  quite  independently  of  others."  The  list  of 
instances  by  which  this  principle  is  empirically  confirmed  is 
too  long  to  enumerate  completely,  but  a  number  of  important 
instances  may  be  presented. 

"  Chaps.  XLIIl,  and  XLIV, 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  SSf 

One  of  these  instances  is  that  of  the  motion  of  a  material 
body,  or  of  its  center  of  mass.  In  this  instance  (1)  each  point 
remains  identical  with  itself,  i.e.,  is  that  individual  point,  and 
(2)  each  point  retains  its  relation  to  other  points,  and  yet 
lacks,  gains,  and  then  loses  the  relation  of  being  occupied  at  a 
specific  individual  instant  by  the  center  of  mass.  So  also  does 
the  center  of  mass  remain  that  individual  center,  and  yet  first 
lack,  then  gain,  and  then  lose  its  relation  of  occupying  a  specific 
point  for  a  specific  instant. 

These  are  examples  of  our  principle  as  it  is  found  in  the 
world  of  physical  events.  By  them  it  is  shown,  however,  that 
certain  events  presuppose  or  imply  entities  that  are  independerit 
of  some,  even  if  not  of  all  relations.  Those  relations  which 
form  a  minimum,  and  which  can  only  with  great  difficulty  be 
postidated  as  absent  (if,  indeed,  they  can  be  thus  postulated 
at  all),  are  similarity  and  difference,  and  identity  or  individ- 
uality. But  other  relations,  s^ich  as  causation  and  correlation, 
can  readily  be  lacking. 

An  entity,  such  as  a  point  or  an  instant,  that  is  presupposed 
as  an  idtimate,  non-complex  element  out  of  which  complexes 
are  *'made,"  and  that  is  related  to  other  simple  elements  by 
similarity  and  difference,  is  logically  atomistic.  It  may  gain 
and  lose  other  relations  without  prejudice  to  its  own  inherent 
character.  But  whether  one  can  find  among  the  things  as  op- 
posed to  the  events  of  the  physical  world,  instances  of  entities 
that  are  atomistic,  and  that  could  lose  all  of  their  relations 
without  being  altered  thereby,  is  an  open  question.  It  would 
seem,  of  course,  that  at  least  most  physical  tilings  such  as  plants 
and  animals,  chemical  mixtures  and  compounds,  are  altered  and 
modified  by  virtue  of  gaining  and  losing  relations  to  other 
things.  But  it  would  also  seem  that  this  implies,  on  the  one 
hand,  ultimate  entities,  such  as  atoms  or  electrons,  that  can 
gain  and  lose  relationships  without  being  altered  thereby,  and 
that,  on  the  other  hand,  through  the  gain  and  loss  of  specific 
relations,  specifically  new  qualities  and  characteristics  appear 
and  disappear.  In  all  such  cases,  however,  the  whole  that  results 
(from  the  gaining  of  new  relations)  is  not  the  mere  additive 
result  of  the  parts,  but  is  characterized  by  qualities  which  the 
parts  do  not  possess.    There  is,  in  other  words,  a  non-additive, 


388  REALISM 

a  creative  synthesis}^  Recognition  of  this  fact  goes  far  toward 
solving  such  problems  as  are  raised,  e.g.,  in  biology  between 
vitalism  and  mechanism  in  the  issue  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
organism.  For  if  a  whole  is  not  the  mere  additive  result  of  its 
parts,  then  the  organism,  plant  or  animal,  is  marked  by  char- 
acteristics that  are  not  to  be  found  among  so-called  inorganic 
"things,"  although  its  ultimate  parts  are  only  the  same  physical 
forces  and  chemical  elements  that  are  found  in  this  inorganic 
realm. 

But  in  addition  to  entities  such  as  atoms  or  electrons,  which 
in  the  world  of  material  "things"  seem  to  be  presupposed  as 
unalterable  ultimates,  in  order  that  the  "things"  composed  of 
them  may  he  alterable,  there  also  seem  to  be  many  other  entities 
that  can  lose  or  gain  certain  specific  relations  without  being 
altered  thereby.  Thus,  if  the  relations  won  or  lost  can  be 
those  of  similarity  and  difference,  of  "greater  than"  and  of 
"less  than,"  of  inclusion  and  of  exclusion,  then  is  there  no 
alteration  of  the  terms  concerned,  since  7io  causal  relation  of 
necessity  accompanies  these  other  relations.  The  causal  relation 
may  subsist  side  by  side  with,  but  not  by  virtue  of  other  rela- 
tions. Indeed,  non-causal  relations  subsist  not  only  among  ele- 
ments, such  as  electrons,  but  also  among  the  complexes  that  are 
made  up  of  these  elements,  although  the  complexes  may  also  be 
causally  related.  And  yet  in  addition  to  this  relation  (among 
complexes)  there  may  be  other  relations,  the  gaining  or  losing 
of  which  has  no  modifying  influence  whatsoever  on  the  entities 
concerned,  an  illustration  in  point  being  the  relations  of 
similarity  and  dissimilarity,  of  "greater  than"  and  "less  than," 
and  of  inclusion  in,  and  of  exclusion  from  a  class. 

The  same  situation  in  respect  to  relations  is  found  among 
the  several  other  types  of  entities,  namely,  among  psychical 
existents,  and  among  subsistents,  only,  in  the  case  of  the  former 
there  are  relations  of  causation,  while,  in  the  case  of  the  latter, 
specific  causal  relations  are  absent,  and  other  relations  play  the 
dominant  role.  As  regards  psychical  existents,  however,  it 
would  seem  doubtful  whether  there  are  psychical  elements 
analogous  to  the  atoms  and  electrons  of  the  physical  world, 
although  there  are  doubtless,  among  psychical  entities,  relations 
"  Chap.  XLIII.,  IV.,  v.,  VI. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  389 

that  are  not  causal,  as  well  as  those  that  are.  Modern  psy- 
chology is,  as  is  well  known,  based  on  the  position  (or  postulate) 
that  causal  relations  are  present  among  psychical  entities.  But 
the  fundamental  error  here  as  elsewhere  is  to  insist  either  ex- 
plicitly or  implicitly,  that  there  are  no  terms  that  are  not 
causally  related,  and  no  relations  that  do  not  of  necessity  carry 
causal  relations  with  them.  Such  an  insistence  or  postulation 
results  in  Pragmatism  and  Naturalism,  yet  it  is  one  that  can  be 
as  surely  discredited  as  can  anything  in  the  whole  field  of 
science  and  philosophy. 

There  may,  therefore,  be  no  psychical  elements  after  the 
manner  of  electrons  and  atoms,  and  yet  there  may  be  a  causal 
relationship  between  certain  psychical  processes,  and  none  be- 
tween others.  Thus,  in  so  far  as  particular  instances  of  con- 
sciousness appear  and  disappear,  there  are  conscious  processes, 
and  the  opportunity  for  their  causal  connection.  But,  also,  in 
so  far  as  entities, — including  states  of  affairs,  sithsistents  and 
existents,  individual  terms,  qualities,  relations,  and  events — 
must,  in  order  to  be  known  as  they  really  are,  not  he  altered 
by  the  process  in  which  they  are  known,  it  must  be  admitted 
that  they  get  into  the  knowing  relation,  and  yet  that  there  is 
an  absence  of  causation. 

Further,  in  so  far  as  any  psychical  process,  such  as  memory 
or  perception,  is  specifically  different  from  other  "things."  it 
is  of  itself  qualitative.  But  this  does  not  demand  a  suhstance- 
like  substratum  in  which  the  specifically  different  quality  shall 
inhere.  Some  of  the  entities  of  the  universe  may  be  substances, 
but  certainly  not  all  are,  and  some  of  those  that  are  not,  may, 
as  it  were,  be  disembodied  qualities  or  entities  that  are  not 
qualities  of  anything,  but  that  are  qualitatively  different  from 
other  "things."  There  is  a  large  field  for  investigation  con- 
cerning these  possibilities,  and  one  cannot  make  dogmatic  asser- 
tions as  regards  the  details  of  the  position,  that  knowing  and 
perhaps  consciousness  in  general  are  qualitatively  spicijic  rela- 
tions into  which  entities  get  when  they  become  known.  But  the 
evidence  is  strong  against  knowing  and  consciousness  being 
either  substance  or  energy,  or  qualities  of  these  entities,  and 
also  against  their  being  causally  related  to  all  other  "things," 
especially  to  the  entity  that  is  known. 


390  REALISM 

While,  now,  both  psychical  and  physical  existents  are  in  some, 
and  doubtless  in  many  eases,  subject  to  causation,  suhsistents  ^* 
lack  this  relation.  Therefore  the  relations  that  do  hold  among 
these  entities  do  not  carry  with  them  the  further  relation  of 
causation  and  so  either  the  mutual  or  one-sided  alteration  of 
related  terms.  Thus,  among  subsistents,  one  point  does  not 
cause,  alter,  or  change  another  point,  nor  one  instant  another 
instant.  Nor  is  space  caused  or  modified  by  time,  or  conversely, 
though  of  course  the  two  are  related.  Also  the  perfect  circle 
is  not  caused  by  the  physically  round  things  that  approximate 
to  it,  nor  by  the  other  geometrical  figures.  Yet  suljsistent  en- 
tities are  related  to  one  another,  and,  in  some  cases,  in  such  a 
way  that  one  entity  seems  to  necessitate,  or  be  necessitated  by 
others.  But  this  relation  is  one  of  implication,  and  not  of 
causation. 

Whether,  indeed,  change  of  any  kind  is  possible  in  the  realm 
of  subsistents,  is  an  open  question.  If  it  is  not,  then  relations 
in  this  realm  cannot  be  won  and  lost  as  they  are  among  ex- 
istents, and  yet,  by  the  method  of  analysis  in  situ,  it  is  discov- 
ered that  certain  subsistent  entities  are  externally  and  func- 
tionally related,  after  the  manner  of  those  existents  which  do 
gain  and  lose  certain  relations  without  being  altered  thereby. 

The  hypotheses  advanced  in  the  foregoing  discussion  are  also 
important  because  of  their  bearing  on  still  other  philosophical 
problems.  For  both  the  formulation  and  the  confirmation  of 
these  hypotheses  we  have  thus  far  found  a  number  of  instances 
(1)  of  terms  that  are  related  and  yet  that  do  not  causally  affect 
one  another,  (2)  of  entities  that  are  logically  prior  to  others, 
and  (3)  of  terms  that  gain  and  lose  relationships  without  being 
altered  thereby.  If,  now,  there  are  "these  instances" — of  this 
character,  there  may  be  still  others,  of  similar  character,  and 
further  specific  hypotheses  can  be  formed  for  the  solution  of 
specific  problems. 

07ie  of  these  problems  concerns  the,  for  us,  important  situation, 
(1)  that  the  specific  conclusions  which  one  obtains  in  endeavor- 
ing to  solve  problems  by  deductive  reasoning  are  conditioned 
by  the  assumptions  that  one  makes,  either  explicitly  or  implicitly, 
to  start  with,  and  (2)  that  one  reaches  opposed  results  by  rea- 
"  See  Chaps.  XLIII.  and  XLIV- 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  spi 

soning  from  opposed  assumptions}'^  This  very  possibility,  how- 
ever, of  freeing  one's  self  from  one  universe  of  discourse,  con- 
ditioned by  one  set  of  assumptions,  and  of  then  putting  one's 
self  into  another  "universe,"  leads  to  the  specific  hypothesis, 
that  any  specific  reasoning  process  is  certainly  not  causally 
related  to  all  other  "things,"  and  perhaps  not  even  to 
other  conscious  processes,  or  even  to  other  specific  reasoning 
processes. 

The  meaning  of  this  hypothesis  must,  however,  be  made  more 
clear  and  precise.  To  do  this,  it  may  be  again  emphasized,  that 
one  of  the  main  postulates  of  one  great  line  of  philosophical 
development  is,  that,  although  all  "things"  may  be  related  in 
many  other  ways,  they  are  also  all  related  causally  by  virtue 
of  being  related  at  all.^^  This  assumption  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  product  of  the  domination,  in  the  tradition,  of  the  Aris- 
totelian logic,  with  its  emphasis  of  the  physical  thing  as  the 
great  type  phenomenon.^''  It  is  an  assumption  that  conditions 
Locke's  philosophy,  and  through  this,  Berkeley's  and  Hume's; 
it  conditions  Kant 's  Phenomenalism  and  the  naturalistic  systems 
of  the  Mills  and  of  Herbert  Spencer ;  and,  finally,  it  conditions 
modern  Pragmatism  with  its  doctrine,  that,  because  of  uni- 
versal causation,  all  things  evolve,  ivith  a  resulting  (causal) 
selection  of  only  that  which  is  fit  and  useful.  If,  now,  causa- 
tion applies  to  all  "things,"  it  applies  to  reason. 

Theoretically,  therefore,  hy  this  philosophy,  we  are  not  free 
to  reason,  in  order,  in  some  cases,  to  arrive  at  genuine  knowing, 
tut  are  forced  hy  certain  causes  to  reason  in  certain  ways, 
namely,  in  just  the  way,  in  each  specific  instance,  that  we  do 
reason.  For  universal  causation  means  not  only  that.  Whatever 
is,  is,  but  also  that.  Whatever  is,  must  be.  If,  therefore,  "to 
reason"  be  defined  as  meaning  to  discover  and  conform  to 
(objective)  relations  of  implication,  success  in  reasoning  thus 
would  be  a  matter  of  mere  chance,  in  that  sense  of  the  term 
chance  by  which  it  is  identical  with  our  ignorance  of  detailed 
yet  ruthlessly  operating  causes. 

In  accordance,  therefore,  with  any  philosophy  that  maintains 
the  universality  of  causation,  no  reasoning  is  free  to  discover 
relations  of  implication,  but  all  so-called  reasoning  (in  normal 

"  iSee  Chap.  I.  "  Chaps.  XXIX.-XXXIII.  "  Chap.  III. 


S92  REALISM 

persons)  bears  the  same  relation  of  causal  determination  to,  say, 
other  mental  processes,  that  the  vagaries  of  the  insane  man  do 
to  certain  dominating  and  distorting  fixed  ideas  in  his  con- 
sciousness. The  hypothesis  of  a  universal  causation  is  accord- 
ingly incompatible  with  our  freedom  to  change  from  one  set  of 
assumptions  or  universe  of  discourse  to  another,  and,  if  we  do 
so  change,  it  is  only  because  we  must,  and  not  because  ive  may. 

But  at  this  point  the  interesting  situation  is  disclosed,  that 
the  very  hasis  on  which  this  "causal  position"  is  itself  taken,  in 
opposition  to  the  "freedom  position,"  is  one  that  presupposes 
the  freedom,  and  not  the  causation  of  our  processes  of  assuming 
and  of  reasoning.  For,  briefly,  we  seem  to  be  free  either  to 
assume  causation,  and  reason  from  this  assumption,  or  to  assume 
the  freedom  of  reason,  and  to  reason  from  this.  Thereby,  how- 
ever, the  position  or  postulate,  that  all  cur  postulating  and 
reasoning  is  caused,  is  itself  shown  to  be  self-contradictory,  and 
the  opposed  position,  that  there  is  a  freedom  in  these  processes, 
is  shown  to  be  self-confirming.  The  latter  assumption  is  alone 
consistent  with  the  way  or  manner  in  which  it  is  made,  namely, 
freely,  while  the  former  and  opposed  hypothesis  contradicts  the 
very  condition  for  its  own  riaking.  The  advantage  clearly  lies 
with  the  second  position. 

As  opposed,  therefore,  to  the  naturalistic  and  pragmatistic 
contention,  that  all  entities  causally  influence,  modif}^  and  de- 
termine one  another,  we  now  have  the  hypothesis,  that  among 
the  entities  of  the  universe  that  are  not  connected  with  others 
by  the  relation  of  causation,  reason  is  one.  However,  this  does 
not  mean  that  reason  is  undetermined,  or  that  it  is  lawless.  It 
means,  rather,  much  the  same  as  would  a  similar  statement  con- 
cerning time  and  space.  These  entities  are  not  caused  by  any- 
thing else,  nor  are  their  parts,  such  as  instants,  points,  lines, 
and  the  relations  holding  between  these  parts,  causally  con- 
nected. Yet  each  is  a  field  in  which  law  "holds  good"  and  is 
inherent.  In  this  sense  each  is  determined  and  each  has  a  quale 
which  the  other  lacks. 

Much  the  same  thing  can  be  said  of  reason.  That  reason  is 
not  causally  determined  hy  something  else  is  the  one  principle 
on  which  one  can  explain  that  which  is  reason's  specific  func- 
tion, namely,  the  discovering  of  implications  as  the  objective 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  393 

threads  of  necessity  within  a  complex  state  of  affairs}'^  This  is 
the  principle  of  the  freedom  of  reason,  while  the  function  of 
discovering  implications  is  reason's  peculiar  quale.  Performing 
this  function  in  innumerable  instances  under  varying  specific 
circumstances,  reason  acts  in  accordance  with  law,"^  and  is 
inherently  determined;  but  in  so  acting  it  is  not  caused  by, 
although  it  is  related  to,  other  events  and  processes. 

This  specific  hypothesis  of  the  freedom  of  reason  receives 
confirmation  from  two  sources.  In  the  first  place,  as  has  been 
said,  the  freedom  of  reason  is  presupposed  as  the  sole  condition 
on  which  the  otherwise  machine-like  causal  grasp  of  tradition,^^ 
training,  and  personal  predisposition  on  all  our  mental  proc- 
esses can  be  avoided.  If  it  is  open  to  reason  even  to  help  to 
discover  "things"  as  they  really  are,  then  reason  must  be  free 
to  conform  to  "things," — functionally,  perhaps, — and  not  he 
completely  determined  causally  by  preceding  mental  processes 
after  the  modus  operandi  in  mente  of  the  insane  man.  And  in 
the  second  place,  if  we  may  trust  our  direct  experience,  and  not 
maintain  contrary  to  or  against  it,  that  freedom  is  but  ignorance 
of  detailed  causes,  then  again  and  again  does  each  one  of  us 
receive  direct  confirmation  of  reason's  freedom.  This  occurs 
in  every  case,  where,  e.g.,  the  possibility  of  error  of  judgment 
is  granted,  and  the  re-examination  of  grounds  is  urged.  Also, 
that  we  can  form  hypotheses  that  are  contrary  to  fact,  then  to 
discover  the  implied  consequences  of  these,  retracing  our  steps 
to  begin  over  again,  if  error  of  judgment  is  surmised, — that  we 
can  do  all  this  is  experienced  by  all  of  us,  especially  by  one  who 
insists  that  this  very  experience  is  itself  illusory,  and  that  it  is 
really  an  instance  of  determination  by  detailed  causes  of  which 
we  are  ignorant.  For  does  not  he  who  is  himself  thus  convinced 
of  the  correctness  of  the  naturalistic  doctrine,  endeavor  to  con- 
vince others,  thus  tacitly  to  presume  in  them  the  freedom  of 
their  reason  to  turn  from  the  error  of  their  non-naturalistic  way 
to  the  truth  of  naturalism?  But  does  not  the  naturalistic  and 
the  pragmatistic  philosopher  thus  contradict  in  a  very  practical 
way  the  very  teachings  and  implications  of  his  own  philosophy? 

'"  See  Chaps.  I.,  XIII.,  i.,  and  Chap.  XXI. 
-'^  See  Chap.  XLIIL,  v.  and  VI. 
«'  See  Chap.  III. 


394  REALISM 

This  principle  of  the  freedom  of  reason  to  discover  (objective) 
implications  and  to  be  determined  by  them  and  by  the  structure 
of  that  which  is  known  rather  than  by  preceding  physical  and 
psychical  causes,  is  very  similar  to  the  principle  of  the  freedom 
of  the  will.  Both  principles  are  opposed  to  the  naturalistic  doc- 
trine of  a  universal  causation,  and  yet  neither  means  lawlessness. 
For  both  a  free  reason  and  a  free  will  are  related  to  other 
entities  functionally  and  externally.  Each  forms  a  new  and 
higher  stratum  of  psychical  existence  that  has  its  own  peculiar 
laws  of  action,-^  and  that  is  related  to  other  strata,  but  not 
causally. 

By  free  reason,  now,  we  discover  entities  that  do  not  exist 
but  are  nevertheless  factsr^  States  of  affairs  holding  of  ex- 
istent entities,  relations  of  implication  between  these  states  of 
affairs,  and  logically  consistent  possibilities  are  examples  of 
such  facts.  Thus  only  by  free  reason  and  not  by  sense  percep- 
tion, do  we  discover,  e.g.,  the  perfect  circle;  for  this  does  not 
exist  in  nature,  and  so  cannot  effect  us  causally.  Yet  we  know 
this  entity,  and  from  its  implications  can  discover  still  other 
entities,  and  are  actuated  and  influenced  by  it  as  an  ideal  object. 
In  quite  a  similar  way,  reason,  when  it  is  directed  to  the  dis- 
covery of  ethical  values,  reveals  ideals,  which,  although  they 
may  never  have  been  realized  in  human  development,  neverthe- 
less are  of  just  that  character, — as  ideals — that  they  demand 
realization  if  possible.-^  The  knowledge  of  these  ideals  may  be 
said,  in  accordance  with  the  terminology  of  Kant,  to  come 
through  "practical  reason,"  while  the  imperative  demand,  pre- 
sented by  them  to  human  action  and  will,  that  every  effort  ought 
to  be  made  to  realize  them,  may  be  said  to  be  given  to  conscience. 

The  hypothesis  that  there  is  such  a  freedom  of  the  will  by 
virtue  of  which  one  can  act,  not  in  accordance  with  what  has 
been,  but  with  what  ought  to  be,  is  confirmed  in  two  ways.  In 
the  first  place,  this  hypothesis  is  presupposed  as  the  sole  condi- 
tion on  which  a  human  being  can  he  something  other  than  a 
mere  machine  that  is  produced  by  heredity  and  environment, 
and  that  is  causally  compelled  to  do  all  that  it  does  by  antecedent 
physical  and  mental  events.  It  is  thus  the  sole  condition  on 
which  a  human  being  can  be  held  responsible  for  his  acts  and 

"  Chap.  XLllL,  V.  and  vi.  -*  Chap.  XLTV.,  u.  ■'  Chap.  XLV. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  895 

his  motives  in  any  other  sense  than,  e.g.,  a  stick  of  dynamite  is 
held  responsible  for  exploding.  The  dynamite  is  kept  in  a 
place  where  there  are  causes  that  prevent  its  exploding,  or 
where,  if  it  explodes,  it  will  do  the  least  harm.  Such,  also,  must 
be  the  defense,  e.g.,  for  imprisoning  a  human  being,  if  he  is 
completely  determined  causally,  and  cannot  act  in  accordance 
with  ideals,  thus  to  hold  himself  responsible  and  to  feel  the 
command,  "Do  the  right."  To  punish  him  for  the  sake  of 
revenge  only  repeats  the  problem,  since  it  means  either  that 
men  must  do  this  as  themselves  mere  machines,  or  that  society, 
in  thus  proceeding,  acts  in  harmony  with  that  ideal  of  justice 
which  our  practical  reason  gives  us. 

But  in  the  second  place,  the  hypothesis  of  a  free  will  is  con- 
firmed by  the  direct  experience  of  most  men.  Most  men  do 
have  ideals,  do  feel  their  command,  and  do  experience  the  free- 
dom to  obey  this  command  and  to  go  counter  to  the  desires  and 
impulses  that  are  causally  and  instinctively  rooted  in  human 
nature. 

From  the  advocate  of  Naturalism  the  retort  comes,  however, 
that  this  direct  experience  of  freedom  is  but  the  hypostatization 
of  our  ignorance  of  detailed  causes,  and  that  our  so-called  volun- 
tary acts  are  really  caused,  though  we  do  not  know  by  what. 
The  reply  to  this  retort  is,  that  even  causal  complexes  presup- 
pose non-causal  terms  and  relationships.  For  example,  every 
mechanism,  and  every  machine  presuppose  time  and  space  as 
entities  that  are  not  causally,  but  that  are  functionally  related 
to  them.  In  quite  a  similar  way  a  human  being  can,  physi- 
ologically, and,  to  a  certain  extent,  psychologically,  be  a  causal 
complex,  and  yet  be  related  to  and,  indeed,  be  determined  by 
entities  which,  like  ideal  justice,  do  not  exist,  but  are  neverthe- 
less objective  facts.-^  Discovered  by  pure  and  by  practical 
reason,  these  entities  appeal  to  conscience  as  ideals  that  are 
worthy  of  the  highest  regard,  and  that  in  their  own  way  actuate 
a  man  to  action  quite  as  certainly  as  do  causally-related 
entities. 

These  developments  with  reference  to  the  freedom  of  reason 
and  of  will,  and,  in  general,  to  non-causal  relationships 
among  terms,  lead  to  three  further  hypotheses,  which  may 
*o  See  Chap.  XLV. 


396  REALISM 

advantageously  be  discussed  together.    These  hypotheses  are  as 
follows : — 

Philosophical  problems  not  generated  hy  their  history 

Hypothesis  V.  If  reasoning  processes  are  free  in  the  sense 
that  they  are  not  causally  related  either  to  other  psychical  proc- 
esses or  to  the  entities  reasoned  about,  then,  throughout  the 
history  of  human  thought,  problems  in  philosophy  and  science 
have  been  problems,  710^  because  they  have  had  a  history,  hut 
because  they  concern  matters  of  fact.  In  other  words,  reason 
has  been  free  to  investigate  fact,  and  to  ignore  and  challenge 
the  tradition  in  every  specific  field  of  subject  and  of  method.^^ 

Truth  an  external  and  non-causal  relation 

Hypothesis  VI.  If  not  all  "things"  are  related  causally, 
and  if  one  and  the  same  "thing"  can  stand  in  independent  rela- 
tionships to  different  "things,"  then  the  natiire  of  truth  may 
not  be  identical,  as  Pragmatism  claims  it  to  be,  with  causally 
determined  concrete  results,  with  efficiency,  and  with  the  pro- 
duction of  satisfaction,  but  it  may  be  an  external  and  non-causal 
relation  between  knowing  and  that  which  is  known. 

The  confirmation  of  this  hypothesis  invalidates  the  position 
of  Pragmatism  and  of  Naturalism  that  all  that  survives  in  a 
causal  system  of  a  general  struggle  for  existence  must  for  that 
reason  be  usefid,  and  that  truth  is  identical  with  this  causal 
efficiency  and  usefulness.^ ^ 

Analysis  does  not  alter  the  '* thing"  analyzed 

.'-'Hypothesis  VII.  If  not  all  "things"  are  related  causally, 
then  not  only  can  an  analysis  in  situ  be  made  in  at  least  certain 
instances,  but  also  certain  classes  of  entities  can  be  experi- 
mentally removed  from  their  context  without  thereby  being 
altered,  and  in  both  cases  the  parts  thus  discovered  can  be 
revealed  as  they  really  are,  both  quite  unaltered  by  the  analysis, 
and  in  most  cases  as  qualitatively  different  from  the  whole  that 
is  analyzed. 
With  this  hypothesis  confirmed,  the  anti-intellectualistic 
"  Cf.  Chap.  I.  "  Chaps.  XXXII.  and  XXXIII. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  S97 

claim,  that  all  analysis  as  such  is  falsification,  is  invalidated;-^ 
for  hy  it  the  discovery  of  parts,  whether  these  are  left  in  situ 
in  the  whole,  or  are  taken  out  of  it,  is  possible,  at  least  in  many- 
cases.  The  (act  of)  analysis  does  not  itself  alter  the  entity 
analyzed,  and  the  only  difficulties  in  the  way  of  analysis  are 
empirical. 

The  confirmation  of  the  first  of  these  three  hypotheses  is 
found  in  the  facts  of  the  historical  development  of  both  phi- 
losophy^ and  science,  especially  science.  Thus,  even  if  there 
are  certain  exceptions,  the  sciences  and  most  other  "bodies  of 
knowledge"  concern  matters  that  yield  proMems,  not  because 
these  problems  have  had  a  history,  but  because  they  contain 
something  of  which  we  are  ignorant,  and  of  which  we  desire 
knowledge.  The  science  of  history  is  itself  a  good  example  of 
this  principle,  since  history  deals,  not  with  the  history  of  his- 
tory, but  with  the  facts  of  history,  and  the  case  is 
quite  similar  with  biology,  chemistry,  and  other  sciences. 
Indeed,  one  may  go  so  far  as  to  say,  that,  if  there 
were  not  always  questions  of  fact  for  an  inquiry  that  is 
unbiased  by  tradition,  then  would  there  have  been  no  historical 
development  of  any  science — at  least  there  could  have  been  no 
start,  no  first  problem.  But  there  have  been  first  problems, 
and  then  new  ones  which,  though  they  were  suggested  by 
previous  problems,  nevertheless  concerned  non-historical  facts. 
The  discovery  by  Galileo  of  the  functional  ]'elationship  between 
acceleration  and  time  is  a  good  example  of  both  a  problem  and 
a  method  for  solving  it  that  primarily  concern  fact,  and  not 
history  and  the  historical  development  of  problems. 

The  bearing  of  this  principle  upon  the  history  of  philosophy 
is  important.  For  by  it  one  can  recognize,  in  the  first  place, 
that  certain  problems  are  indeed  created  by  their  own  historical 
genesis,  and  for  that  reason  are  often  false  problems.  Thus, 
e.g.,  the  problem  as  to  the  weight  of  phlogiston  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  eighteenth  century  was  a  false  problem  that  was  created 
by  the  antecedent  hypothesis  {current  in  that  century),  that, 
all  combustible  substances  contained  a  substance,  phlogiston, 
which  was  given  off  when  things  burned.  As  a  result  a  thing 
should  be  lighter  after  burning  than  before.  When,  however, 
"  Cf.  Chap.  XXXIII.,  I.  and  il. 


SOB  REALISM 

Lavoisier  discovered  that  the  products  of  combustion  were 
heavier  than  the  original  substance,  the  discrepancy  was  ac- 
counted for  by  the  further  false  hypothesis,  that  phlogiston  was 
of  negative  weight,  i.e.,  that  it  possessed  levity. 

The  very  recognition  that  there  is  such  an  historical  genesis 
of  some  problems  is  the  touchstone,  however,  by  which  to  dis- 
tinguish in  some  cases  between  the  true  and  the  false.  One  thus 
becomes  free  and  able  to  turn  from  those  universes  of  discourse 
in  which  problems,  methods,  and  solutions  are  determined  by 
tradition,  authority,  and  imitation,  to  those  fields  in  which  there 
is  unbiased,  free  inquiry  into  what  the  facts  are,  irrespective  of 
consequences.  Indeed,  to  turn  from  the  traditional  view,  that  all 
"things"  are  causally  connected  whether  by  virtue  of  heing 
related  in  other  ways  or  for  some  other  reason,  and  to  entertain 
the  opposed  hypothesis,  is  a  good  example  of  that  freedom  of 
procedure  which  is  necessary  if  one  woidd  investigate  facts  and 
not  continue  the  study  of  false  prohlems.^'^ 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  said,  that  the  study  of  the  historical 
and  oftentimes  distorting  influences  on  the  development  of 
human  thought  may  be  of  fascinating  interest,^^  but  that  of 
equal  interest  and  greater  importance  are  the  problems  to  which, 
whether  they  be  new  or  old,  reason  turns  in  its  cherished  freedom 
of  breaking  from  the  past  in  order  to  look  to  the  future.  Even 
as  the  point  divides  the  line  into  two  segments  that  are  not 
causally  connected,  so  may  reason  release  us  from  the  thraldom 
of  the  past  and  place  us  in  the  freedom  of  a  realm  of  new 
inquiry  that  is  unbiased  by  our  desires  and  fears.^^ 

The  second  of  our  hypotheses,  the  anti-pragmatistic,  is  con- 
firmed in  a  number  of  ways,  though  chiefly,  perhaps,  by  the 
tacit  presuppositions  of  Pragmatism  itself.  For,  on  the  one 
hand,  by  the  implicit  principles  of  the  pragmatic  theory,  there 
is,  as  has  been  previously  pointed  out,^^  no  legitimate  oppor- 
tunity for  the  distinction  between  the  true  and  the  false,  since, 
by  these  principles,  all  that  is  still  persisting  in  the  development 
of  organs,  functions,  and  the  like,  bears  the  stamp  of  either  a 
present,  a  lingering,  or  a  coming  usefulness.  Therefore, 
wherever  there  is  occasion  for  applying  Pragmatism's  definition 

»»  Cf.  Chap.  I.  "  See  Chap.  I. 

"1  Chap.  XXVIII.  •'  Chap.  XXXIII. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  399 

of  truth,  namely,  that  truth  is  identical  with  usefulness,  one 
must  say,  that  all  persisting  theories,  laws,  and  ideas  are  true. 
The  attempt  to  invalidate  this  conclusion  by  the  argument,  that 
it  leads  to  the  admission  of  rnany  contradictory  truths,  fails  of 
its  purpose,  since  Pragmatism,  by  its  own  preferred  tenets, 
accepts  no  standard,  but  allows  that  truth  comes  to  each  to 
whom  satisfaction  results  from  any  idea,  belief,  theory,  or  law. 
For  who  shall  say,  that  what  is  useless  to  one,  is  not  useful 
to  another  ?  Then  may  not  I  make  my  own  truth,  and  you  make 
yours,  even  though  the  very  "holding  of  an  idea  to  be  true," 
as,  e.g.,  in  the  lelief  in  immortality,  is  the  condition  for  the 
satisfactory  working  of  that  idea? 

This  is  Pragmatism's  own  explicit  doctrine.  No  standard  of 
truth,  but  many  truths,  even  as  many  as  there  are  outcomes  that 
give  the  warmth  of  some  satisfaction!  No  falsity — since  every- 
thing that  persists  is  useful  in  some  sense — to  some  one ! 

True,  therefore,  must  be  those  great  philosophical  systems  that 
have  so  persistently  stood  the  test  of  time,  and  that  are  useful, 
in  the  pragmatic  sense,  in  that  they  give  satisfaction  to  their 
adherents.  Such  systems  include  Phenomenalism  and  Objec- 
tive Idealism.  Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  Pragmatism  is  itself  a 
philosophy,  in  respect  to  a  number  of  specific  problems,  that 
is  advanced  as  true  in  opposition  to  these  philosophies.  Thus 
Pragmatism  maintains  against  Phenomenalism,  that,  e.g.,  there 
are  no  a  priori  principles  which  make  up  the  unchangeable 
"sti-ueture  of  the  reason,"  but  that  all  such  so-called  categories 
are  only  specific  adaptations  and  convenient  modes  of  reaction. 
Against  Absolutism  Pragmatism  maintains  that,  e.g.,  the  doctrine 
of  an  unchangeahle  eternal  standard  of  truth  and  of  right  is 
false,  and  that  these  concepts  themselves  and  all  that  may  come 
under  them  are  but  ephemeral  and  changing  ideas  and  ideals. 
And  against  Objective  Idealism,  Pragmatism  holds,  that  there  is 
not  any  One  Absolute  Spirit,  Ego,  Self,  Reason,  or  Will.  How- 
ever, in  thus  maintaining  that  these  opposed  philosophies  are 
false  in  such  respects,  and  that  it  alone  is  true.  Pragmatism 
grants  a  distinction  between  the  true  and  the  false,  and  thus  is 
inconsistent  with  its  own  explicit  doctrine,  that  whatever  per- 
sists and  develops  and  is  satisfactory  and  useful  in  some  sense 
is  a  fortiori  true. 


400  REALISM 

But  Pragmatism  departs  from  its  own  explicit  teachings  in 
still  other  respects.  Thus,  as  concerns  itself,  it  presupposes  an 
absolute  truth,  such  as  certain  opposed  systems  maintain,  with 
the  failure  to  obtain  this  truth  due  only  to  empirical  difficulties, 
and  not  to  an  evolutionary  shifting  in  truth  itself.  Also,  in 
maintaining  against  other  systems  that,  when  the  satisfactory 
outcome  of  an  idea,  a  theory,  or  a  belief  is  itself  the  result  of 
holding  such  an  idea  to  be  true,  this  outcome  is  not  a  test  or 
character  of  truth,  Pragmatism  grants  that  there  is  a  very 
fundamental  difference  betiveen  the  test  and  the  nature  of  truth. 
Thus,  with  respect  to  itself,  Pragmatism  employs  this  distinction 
in  maintaining  that  the  successful  working  of  its  own  theory  is 
due,  not  to  the  belief  in  this  theory,  but  to  the  fact  that  it  repre- 
sents or  corresponds  to  an  objective  state  of  affairs.  But  it 
thereby  "makes"  truth  a  relation  of,  perhaps,  functional  cor- 
respondence between  judgments  and  objective  states  of  affairs, 
and  presupposes,  tacitly,  at  least,  that  its  own  explicit  theory 
works  successfully  because  or  in  that  it  is  true,  rather  than  that 
it  is  true,  because  it  works  successfully. 

The"  third  hypothesis,  namely,  that  analysis  is  as  reliable  a 
method  for  discovering  and  revealing  entities  as  are  other 
methods,  such  as  feeling  and  intuition,  is  confirmed  in  innumera- 
ble instances.  Such  a  confirmation  is  reached  by  first  noting 
that  over  and  above  an  insistence  on  its  empirical  difficulties, 
there  is  no  attack  on  analysis  ^*  as  such  that  is  not  made  either 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  dogmatic  assumption,  (1)  that  non- 
analytical  methods  alone  reveal  facts,  or  from  the  demonstration 
(2)  that  analysis  introduces  contradictions  at  one  or  at  many 
points,  or  (3)  that  it,  by  its  very  nature,  alters  and  therefore 
falsifies  the  "thing"  analyzed.  The  first,  the  dogmatic  position, 
can  be  neglected,  since  it  very  evidently  begs  the  very  question 
at  issue.  One  can  with  equal  justification  dogmatically  maintain 
that  analyses  are  made  as  a  matter  of  fact,  and  do  reveal  enti- 
ties. The  second  position,  that  analysis  introduces  contradic- 
tions, is  found  to  be  dependent  upon  the  prior  misinterpretation 
of  correct  analyses,  e.g.,  that  the  "elements"  of  motion  are 
rests,  and  therefore  collapses  as  an  attack  as  soon  as  the 
actual  results  of  (correct)  analysis  are  correctly  stated. 
"  Cf.  Chaps.  XXIl.-XXIV. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  401 

'Accordingly  only  the  third  position  needs  a  rebuttal  at  this 
juncture. 

This  rebuttal  is  readily  found  by  first  ascertaining  what  that 
major  principle  is  from  which  this  third  position  is  derived. 
And  that  principle  is  readily  seen  to  be  the  now  familiar  princi- 
ple, that  all  "things"  and  entities  that  are  related  in  any  other 
way  are  perforce  also  related  causally.  From  this  principle 
several  deductions  are  made.  One  is,  that  the  very  act  of 
analysis  itself  causally  modifies  and  so  falsifies  that  which  is  to 
be  analyzed;  another  is,  that  analysis  can  proceed  only  by 
removing  certain  entities  out  of  their  collocation  and  thus  away 
from  the  causal  influence  of  other  entities,  so  that,  as  analyzed, 
any  complex  of  parts  is  not  the  same  as  it  is  as  unanalyzed. 

Whether  this  position  is  disproved,  and  our  hypothesis  con- 
firmed, finally  comes  down,  therefore,  to  a  question  of  purel.y 
empirical  fact,  namely,  Ave  there,  or  are  there  not,  instances  of 
terms  that  are  not  related  causally  f  To  the  writer  it  seems  to 
be  undeniable  that  many  such  instances  are  discovered.  The 
relations  that  motion,  acceleration,  change  in  general,  and 
matter  bear  to  space  and  time  are  excellent  instances.  But 
this  empirical  fact,  together  with  the  fact  that  in  many  attacks 
on  analysis  the  actual  extant  analyses  are  misstated,  leads  the 
writer  to  conclude,  that  the  modern  attack  on  analysis  fails  at 
every  point,  and  that  our  third  hypothesis  (of  the  foregoing 
three)  is  empirically  confirmed.^^ 

In  no  case  does  the  trouble  lie  with  intellect  or  with  analysis 
as  such,  but  only  with  the  false  presuppositions  that  are  made 
with  reference  both  to  the  character  of  the  relationship  between 
the  parts  of  a  whole,  and  to  the  methods  that  are  attributed  to 
intellect.^®  Curiously  enough,  also,  it  may  be  remarked  in  con- 
clusion, all  attacks  on  analysis  are  themselves  made  by  an 
analytical  argument  and  method.  The  suggestion  lies  near, 
therefore,  that  the  difficulties  that  may  beset  analysis  are  not 
inherent,  but  are  only  such  empirical  ones  as  are  common  to  all 
methods  of  arriving  at  truth  and  fact. 

These  criticisms  of  Pragmatism  and  Anti-intelleetualism  lead 
to  the  formulation  of  two  final  hypotheses,  which,  as  confirmed, 
"  Chap.  XXXIII.,  I.  and  ii.  •"  Chap.  XXXIIL,  i.  and  ii. 


402  REALISM 

make  up   further  fundamental   doctrines  of  Kealism   and   of 
Eationalism. 


Individualism  and  Skepticism  are  logically  false  positions 

Hypothesis  VIII.  If  Pragmatism  (or  any  other  theory) 
either  presupposes  or  explicitly  accepts  the  positions,  (1)  that 
there  is  a  difference  between  truth  and  falsity,  and  (2)  that  it 
itself  is  true  in  the  sense  that  it  is  a  theory  to  be  generally 
accepted,  then  the  two  philosophical  positions  of  Individualism 
and  Skepticism,  that  are  old  in  history,  but  that  are  today 
founded  on  Evolutionism,  are  false.  Skepticism  is  false  in  its 
position,  that  there  is  no  truth,  if  truth  is  an  absolute  definite 
relationship  between  the  state  of  affairs  to  be  known  and  the 
knowledge  of  this,  and  Individualism  is  false  in  its  doctrine, 
that  there  are  as  many  truths  (in  any  sense)  as  there  are  indi- 
viduals. 

Analysis  reveals  facts,  and  Mysticism  {of  a  certain  type,  at 
least)  is  false 

Hypothesis  IX.  If  there  are  innumerable  instances  of  reali- 
ties that  are  revealed  by  analysis,  with  this  a  method  that  is 
quite  as  well  authenticated  as  is  the  opposed  one  of  intuition 
and  immediate  experience,  and  also  if  any  explicitly  anti- 
analytical  position  can  itself  he  founded  and  defended  only  by 
ayialytical  methods,  then  must  analysis  be  accepted,  together, 
perhaps,  with  intuitive  and  immediate  experience,  as  revealing 
facts,  and  any  type  of  Mysticism  that  would  deny  this  must  ,be 
false. 

Both  Skepticism  and  Individualism  are  derivable,  within  the 
larger  frame  of  Pragmatism,  from  the  assumptions  (1)  that 
Evolution  is  universal;  (2)  that  all  "things"  are  subject  to  the 
rigorous  sifting  process  of  a  universal  causation;  (3)  that  all 
surviving  and  persisting  entities  are  only  of  instrumental  value 
in  the  furthering  of  life;  and  (4)  that  truth  is  identical  with 
usefulness.  It  is,  now,  particularly  the  second  of  these  postulates 
that  is  the  basis  upon  which  both  the  Skepticism  and  the 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  403 

Individualism  of  the  ancients  was  developed.^^  For,  if  each 
individual  is  but  a  congeries  of  causally  interacting  atoms,  then 
there  is  little  probability  that  any  two  individuals  will  be  the 
same;  each  individual  will  be  peculiar  to  himself  and  different 
from  every  other;  and,  as  between  two  or  more  individuals, 
words  will  not  mean  the  same,  nor  percepts  and  concepts  be 
the  same,  so  that  in  general  each  individual  is  completely  shut 
up  within  himself.^ ^ 

Modern  Individualism  ^^  merely  adds  to  these  ancient  doc- 
trines the  further  position,  that  each  individual  is  in  all  respects 
the  product  of  the  universal  causal  process  of  evolution,  and  is, 
therefore,  in  constant  change,  so  that  (1)  the  facts  and  experi- 
ences of  no  two  instants  are  ever  the  same,  except  by  the  rarest 
chance,  (2)  that  only  the  experience  of  the  moment  is  to  be 
accepted,  and  (3)  that  anything  general  which  might  connect 
moment  with  moment  must  be  spurned.  Thus,  as  an  advance 
on  ancient  Individualism,  we  have  in  the  modern  doctrine, 
owing  to  the  influence  of  Evolutionism,  the  individualism  of  the 
passing  moment. 

Skepticism  *^  also,  as  another  conclusion  from  these  same 
premises,  lags  not  far  behind  its  mate  in  running  its  race  and 
spending  itself.  Indeed  modern  Individualism  is  one  argument 
for  Skepticism.  For,  if  everything  is  quite  concrete,  particular, 
and  individual,  then  there  is  nothing  general,  and  if  everything 
is  shifting  and  sifting  in  a  universal  causal  flux  and  flow,  then 
there  is  no  place  for  truth  in  the  sense  of  a  common  state  of 
affairs  that  is  discoverable  both  to  you  and  to  me  even  as  we 
change  and  grow  and  develop.  But  Skepticism,  as  thus  derived 
from  the  (incorrect)  assumption,  that  all  "things^'  change  and 
evolve,  also  means,  that  truth  itself  must  change,  and  that  there 

^'  Prominent  among  the  Greeks  and  the  Romans  who  held  to  the  indi- 
vidualistic position  were  Protagoras,  Prodicus,  Gorgias,  and  Hippias,  the 
sophists;  also  Democritus,  Epicurus,  and  Lucretius;  cf.  the  dialogues  of 
Plato;  also  Epicurus,  by  A.  E.  Taylor,  and  Marius  the  Epicurean,  2  vols., 
1910,  by  W.  Pater. 

^'  E.  g.,  Protagoras. 

"  Among  modern  individualists  are  Leibniz,  Nietzsche,  works  ed.  by 
Tille;  Max  Stirner  (pseud.),  Der  Einzige  und  sein  Eigenthum ;  also,  im- 
plicitly, if  not  explicitly,  many  pragmatists  are  individualists. 

*"  In  the  list  of  prominent  skeptics  are  Pyrrho  (.365-270  B.C.),  Carne- 
ades  (213-129  B.C.),  ^nesidemus  (active  180-210  A.D.),  Montaigne 
(1533-92),  Pierre  Bayle  (1647-1706).  Also  Descartes  in  his  method,  and 
Hume  in  certain  parts  of  his  philosophy,  are  skeptics. 


'404.  REALISM 

is  no  truth  in  the  usual  sense  of  the  term.  Indeed,  in  this  evo- 
lutionistic  scheme  of  "things,"  truth  seems  to  be  regarded  as 
mere  idea  or  concept  that  is  psychical  in  character,  and  that 
is  imbedded  in  the  same  causal  flux  and  flow  in  which  all  other 
"things"  are  assumed  to  be  imbedded. 

Skepticism  is  also  derived  by  an  (incorrect)  inductive  gen- 
eralization from  the  admitted  growth  and  development  of 
science,  philosophy,  and  religion,  particularly  from  the  lack  of 
absolutely  certain  knowledge,  and  from  the  diversity  of  opinion 
in  any  field,  at  any  time.  It  is  argued  that,  since  there  is  no 
absolute  criterion  of  truth,  and  since  what  was  once  held  to  be 
true  is  not  in  every  case  now  so  regarded,  truth  itself  is  always 
shifting.  The  further  conclusion  is  also  drawn,  that  truth  as 
absolute  is  a  non-entity,  or  that  it  is  only  a  word,  or  a  par- 
ticular, concrete  experience,  recurrent  and  at  present  useful, 
but  open  to  elimination  along  with  everything  else  that  may 
no  longer  serve  the  needs  of  the  living  organism. 

It  is  quite  evident,  however,  from  a  little  inspection,  that 
some  of  these  conclusions  that  are  identified  with  Individualism 
and  with  Skepticism  do  not  follow  from  the  premises  that  are 
assumed.  Thus,  quite  apart  from  questioning  the  universality 
of  the  causal  relation  and  of  evolution,  one  may  doubt  whether 
the  fact  of  differences  among  individuals  precludes  the  possi- 
bility of  similarities,  samenesses,  and  identities.  However, 
Individualism,  and  perhaps  also  Skepticism,  each  insists  on  such 
a  preclusion,  and  draws  consequences  from  this.  But  both  posi- 
tions contradict  themselves,  since  they  both  argue  from  the 
similarity  of  all  "things"  in  respect  to  their  being  in  the  causal 
relation,  and  each  also  presents  itself  as  a  theory  for  yoii  and 
me  to  accept  as  true.  Each  position  thus  presupposes  not  only 
a  state  of  affairs  that  is  common  to  and  that  holds  of  many 
instances,  as,  e.g.,  the  fact  of  change,  but  also  such  a  similarity 
in  our  minds  as  enables  us  to  discover  and  agree  on  this  state 
of  affairs,  and,  discovering  it,  have  our  judgments  true.  But 
thereby  the  valid  principle  is  accepted,  that,  though  "things" 
differ  in  some  respects,  they  do  not  differ  in  all.  But  a  simi- 
larity in  psychical  processes  together  with  similarities  and 
common  states  of  affairs  among  objects  known,  furnishes  an 
adequate  and  sufficient  basis  not  only  for  anti-individualism,  but 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  405 

also  for  anti-skepticism.  Accordingly  each  of  the  theories  under 
discussion  presupposes  the  "anti-doctrine";  Individualism  pre- 
supposes the  truth  of  its  own  doctrine,  and  the  convincing  char- 
acter of  this  on  all  right-thinking  individuals,  and  Skepticism 
tacitly  accepts  the  same  presupposition.  In  short,  both  doctrines 
refute  themselves  in  this  way. 

But  also  from  the  fact  that,  e.g.,  certain  theories,  laws,  and 
principles,  which  were  once  accepted  as  true,  are  now  no  longer 
so  regarded,  the  conclusion  does  not  follow,  that  there  is  no 
truth  at  all,  or  at  least  none  accessible  to  man.  Skepticism  in 
respect  to  itself  presupposes  the  direct  opposite  of  this;  i.e.,  it 
presupposes  not  only  that  there  is  unchangeable  truth,  but  also 
that  it  itself  is  a  special  case  of  this  truth.  But,  also,  in  addition 
to  this  criticism,  it  may  be  said,  that  the  lack  of  absolute  cer- 
tainty as  to  what  is  absolutely  true  does  not  preclude  certain 
specific  instances  of  knowledge  from  being  absolutely  true.  Cer- 
tainty has  to  do  with,  e.g.,  the  evidence  and  the  testimony  that 
influence  our  judgment  and  convictions,  and  is  in  some  cases 
at  least  the  causal  effect  of  these  influences,  but  truth  is  a  specific 
non-causal  relation  between  knowing  and  that  which  is  known. 
Then  truth  and  certainty  are  not  identical.  Therefore  a  judg- 
ment may  be  true,  although  we  have  no  means  whereby  to 
become  certain  of  it,  while,  conversely,  in  a  great  many  notorious 
instances,  men  have  been  certain  of  judgments  that  have  not 
been  true.  For  example,  at  one  time  men  were  certain  that 
the  earth  was  flat,  that  animal  and  plant  species  were  immutaMe, 
and  that  heavier  bodies  fell  the  faster,  but  these  certainties 
turned  out  to  be  false.  On  the  other  hand,  when  these  cer- 
tainties began  to  be  questioned,  there  were  judgments,  which, 
although  men  were  not  certain  of  them,  were  nevertheless  true. 

If  truth,  therefore,  is  not  a  psychical  process  that  is  concrete 
and'  causally  related  to  other  concrete  and  particular  existing 
and  occurring  "things,"  but  is  a  non-causal  relationship  between 
the  known  and  the  knowing;  and,  further,  if  truth  is  not  the 
same  as  certainty,  then  it  follows,  (1)  that  common  sense  and 
science,  philosophy  and  religion  may  all  through  their  develop- 
ment contain  true,  although,  perhaps,  not  absolutely  certain 
judgments;  (2)  that  there  is  an  ideal,  if  not  an  existent  state 
of  affairs  that  is  identical  with  absolute  truth;  and  (3)  that  this 


406  REALISM 

very  specific  state  of  affairs  may  be  approached  step  by  step,  by 
the  winning  now  of  one  individual  truth  and  now  of  another, 
with  such  individual  truths  7iot  causally  modifying  one  another, 
although  they  are  related.  A  causal  relationship,  although  it 
may  in  some  cases  hold  between  judgments,  is  precluded  from 
holding  between  truths  by  the  fact  that  these  are  not  existent, 
but  subsistent  entities. 

In  thus  formulating  those  positions  which  Individualism  and 
Skepticism  tacitly  presuppose,  yet  explicitly  deny,'*^  we  are  also 
stating  those  positions  which  any  other  system,  such  as  Phe- 
nomenalism and  Idealism,  also  presupposes,  and  which  are  also 
constituent  parts  of  Realism  and  of  Rationalism.  Systems  make 
these  presuppositions  whether  they  will  or  no;  therefore,  if  a 
system  denies  them  explicitly,  it  is  self-nugatory,  while,  if  it 
accepts  them,  it  is  in  this  respect  self-consistent.  These  pre- 
suppositions, which,  as  made  by  any  system,  whether  it  explicitly 
recognizes  them  or  not,  confirm  Hypothesis  VIII.,  and  become 
incorporate  principles  of  Realism  and  Rationalism,  may  be  given 
the  following  formulation: — 

All  philosophical  systems  either  explicitly  accept  or  tacitly 
presuppose  (1)  that  there  is  a  distinction  between  truth  and 
falsity  {e.g.,  as  regards  themselves  and  other  positions)  and, 
therefore,  (2)  that  there  is  such  an  entity  as  truth;  (3)  that 
there  are  similarities  among  human  minds  whereby  this  truth 
can  be  attained  by  many  individuals;  (4)  that  this  truth  is  not 
a  concrete  causally  related  "thing"  or  process,  but  a  non-causal 
relationship  between  the  known  entity  and  the  knowing;  (5) 
that  this  relationship  is  one  that  is  not  identical  with  certainty, 
but  that  may  subsist  quite  independently  of  proof  and  of  the 
application  of  any  criterion  of  truth, — indeed,  in  many  instances, 
quite  incidentally ;  and  (6)  that  particular  truths,  although  re- 
lated, are  not  causally  dependent,  and  do  not  modify  or  influ- 
ence one  another  either  positively  or  negatively. 

From   these  propositions,   which   imply   the   falsity   of  both 
;  Individualism  and  Skepticism,  and  which  yet  are  affirmed  by 
all  systems,  even  by  Individualism  and  Skepticism  in  their  pre- 
suppositions, it  follows  that  hoth  Skepticism  and  Individualism 
are  false,  i.e.,  that  they  are  self-refuting. 

*'  Cf.  Chap.  XLI.,  viii.-xi. 


REALISM'S  HYPOTHESES  407 

A  similar  conclusion  results  in  the  case  of  Hypothesis  IX., 
that,  if  there  are  well  authenticated  instances  in  which  intel- 
lectual analysis  reveals  fact,  then  Mysticism,*^  of  a  certain 
type  at  least,  namely,  Bergsonian  mysticism,  and  Anti- 
intellectualism  ^^  are  false,  and  feeling,  emotion,  and  intuition 
cannot  be  accepted  as  the  sole  method  of  approach  to  reality, 
with  only  an  instrumerital  role  granted  to  intellect.  This  con- 
clusion is  similar  to  the  one  preceding,  because  Anti-intellectual- 
ism  and  Mysticism,  if  they  are  defended  hy  argument,  are  self- 
refuting,  and  if  they  are  maintained  merely  dogmatically ,  are 
no  better  oif  in  their  logical  position  than  are  the  opposed, 
dogmatically  asserted  positions  of  Intellectualism  and  analysis. 
Indeed,  any  position  that  is  presented  and  defended  by  argu- 
mentation, proof,  and  the  advancing  of  evidence  not  only  pre- 
supposes the  validity  and  the  trustworthiness  of  analysis  as  a 
method  of  discovering  states  of  affairs  as  well  as  other  facts,  but 
also  presupposes  the  propositions  just  stated  above  as  to  the 
nature  of  truth,  and  the  like.  Feeling,  emotion,  intuition,  and 
ecstasy  may  be  means  for  getting  at  reality,  or  they  may  not, 
but  at  least  that  they  are  not  the  only  means  is  presupposed 
by  any  position  that  is  analytically  defended,  even  though  such 
a  position  explicitly  develops  the  opposed  view  regarding 
analysis.  The  frank  acceptance  of  these  presuppositions  makes 
Intellectualism  and  Rationalism  self -consistent  as  regards  at 
least  this  point,  while  the  tracing  of  the  implications  of  these 
presuppositions  leads  to  the  discovery  of  entities  that  are  real, 
though  they  do  not  exist,  and  of  relations  that  are  not  causal.*'*' 

*^  Among  the  great  mystics  of  history  are  the  Neoplatonists  of  the 
third  and  fourth  centuries  A.D.,  such  as  Plotinus,  Porphyry,  and 
Jamblichus;  also  St.  Bernard,  Bonaventura,  and  Meister  Eckhart  from 
the  eleventh  to  the  fifteenth  century;  Thomas  a  Kempis  (1380-1471). 
The  "  mystical  quality "  is  also  found  in  the  great  majority  of  philo- 
sophical works,  notably  in  those  of  Plato,  Philo,  Augustine,  Scotus 
Erigena,  Roger  Bacon,  Duns  Scotus.  Nicolas  of  Cusa,  Spinoza,  Pascal, 
Schelling,  Fichte,  Schleiermacher,  and  all  the  recent  objective  idealiste. 
Bergson  also  is  to  be  ranked  as  a  mystic. 

General  works  on  Mysticism  are:  Vaughan,  Hours  with  the  Mystics, 
2  vols.;  R.  B.  Jones,  Studies  in  Mystical  Religions;  Wm.  James,  Varieties 
of  Religious  Experience ;  Evelyn  Underhill,  Mysticism. 

*'  Cf.  Chap.  XXXIII.,  I.  and  ii. 

"  See  Chap.  XLIV. 


408  REALISM 

CHAPTER  XLI 
THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM 

At  the  beginning  of  this  section  the  statement  was  made  that 
the  central  doctrines  of  Realism  and  Rationalism  are  derived 
from  the  criticism  of  opposed  positions.  This  criticism,  however, 
is  specific.  By  it  there  are  discovered  certain  propositions, 
certain  states  of  affairs  which  opposed  systems  presuppose  and 
imply.  Anti-Intellectualism,  Mysticism,  Individualism,  Skepti- 
cism, Pragmatism,  Naturalism  in  its  several  branches,  Positivism, 
Idealism,  and  Phenomenalism  are  the  main  positions  criticized. 
The  nine  hypotheses  just  discussed  are  suggested  by  this  criti- 
cism, and  for  these  confirmation  has  been  sought  and  found. 
The  Realism  with  which  these  hypotheses  are  identical  is  a 
position  that  accepts  at  face  value  the  entities  which  are  revealed 
by  reason  as  well  as  those  which  are  given  by  sense  experience 
and  emotion,  and  that,  therefore,  consistently  allows  its  own 
rational  defense  and  establishment  as  presenting  an  objective 
state  of  affairs  that  is  independent  of  being  known.  It  is,  there- 
fore, a  realism  of  suhsistents  as  well  as  of  existents,  of  principles 
and  ideals  as  well  as  of  physical  and  mental  entities,  and  of 
non-causal  as  well  as  of  causal  relations.  Since  some  of  these 
characteristics  distinguish  this  position  from  previous  realisms, 
e.g.,  from  Scotch  Realism,^  it  may  be  called  the  New  Realism. 
But  also  it  is  new  in  its  Rationalism.  For  not  only  does  the 
logic  of  Aristotle  serve  the  master,  reason,  but  also  that  other 
new  logic  which  is  found  to  be  inherent  in  and  among  the  com- 
plex entities  and  situation  with  which  reason  deals.^  Rational- 
ism by  recognizing  and  using  this  logic  is  able  to  solve  many 
a  problem  that  is  insoluble  by  other,  older  methods.^ 

This  Realism  and  Rationalism  may  now  be  stated  in  systematic 
and  positive  form  as  a  constructive  system  Avhieh  shall  liave  the 
title  Detailed  Realism,  or  The  Realistic  Structure  of  the  Uni- 

'  The  position  of  Reid,  MrCdsh.  and  others. 
■'  See  Cliaps.  XXI.,  XXV.,  XXVII.,  XLIIl. 
"  Cf.  Chaps.  XXII.,  XXIH. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  409 

verse.  In  presenting  this  position  we  shall  give  the  realistic 
and  rationalistic  solution  of  the  main  philosophical  problems 
that  are  outlined  and  analyzed  in  Section  II.  of  Part  I. 

Antecedent  and  basic  principles  of  this  detailed  Realism  and 
Rationalism  are,  however,  the  several  confirmed  hypotheses 
that  have  just  been  presented  in  Chapter  XL.  These  hypotheses, 
however,  involve  certain  (other)  principles  which  should  now 
be  presented  in  systematic  form  as  the  principles  of  a  con- 
structive position  and  system.  These  principles  are  presup- 
posed by  every  philosophical  position  or  system  at  least  at  that 
point  where  such  a  system  finds  an  (objective)  state  of  affairs 
which  it  presents  as  true,  and  which  it  discovers,  analyzes,  and 
defends  by  reason. 

The  presentation  of  these  principles  in  systematic  form  is 
possible  through  the  discovery,  n?  and  among  them,  of  a  specific 
logical  order,  which  is  that  of  logical  priority.  This  order  is 
observed  in  the  sequence  in  which  the  principles  are  presented, 
logically  prior  principles  being  presented  antecedently  to 
logically  subsequent  principles,  with  the  possibility  of  error  in 
detecting  this  order  alv.^ays  granted. 

The  Principles 

I.  There  are  propositions. 

II.  There  are  terms  and  relations. 

Discussion:  It  is  difficult  to  determine  which  of  these  two 
principles  or  presuppositions  is  logically  prior.  For,  on  the 
one  hand,  a  proposition  is  terms-in-relation,^  and  therefore  seems 
to  presuppose  both  terms  and  relations.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
if  any  philosophy  presupposes  that  there  are  terms  and  rela- 
tions, such  as  the  relations  of  implication,  similarity,  and  dif- 
ference, "member  of,"  and  inclusion,  then  Principle  II.  is  itself 
this  presupposition.  But  this  presupposition  is  itself  a  proposi- 
tion, and  therefore  presupposes  that  there  are  propositions. 
Also,  that  there  are  propositions  is  presupposed  by  itself,  since 
it  is  a  proposition.  This  principle  thus  applies  to  itself,  or  is 
reflexive.  Any  philosophy,  even  one  that  denies  this,  presup- 
poses that  there  are  propositions. 

*  Chap.  XIII.,  I. 


410  REALISM 

It  is  also  difficult  to  determine  whether  it  is  terms  or  rela- 
tions that  are  logically  prior  each  to  the  other.  On  the  one 
hand,  it  might  seem  that,  if  there  were  only  one  term,  there 
would  be  710  relations,  i.e.,  that  "a  relation  is  a  character  that 
an  object  possesses  as  a  member  of  a  collection  (a  pair,"  etc.),^ 
and  that,  therefore,  relations  presuppose  terms.  Yet,  on  the 
other  hand,  one  term  might  be  in  relation  to  itself;  e.g.,  a  term 
might  be  identical  with  itself,  with  the  result,  that  neither 
"term"  nor  "relation"  is  logically  prior  to  the  other. 

However,  it  is  doubtful  if  a  philosophy  does  not  presuppose 
more  than  one  term.  But,  if  there  are  (many)  terms,  there 
are  also  relations,  at  least  those  of  conjunction  (symbolized  by 
"and")  and  of  similarity.  For  terms  are  at  least  similar,  as 
terms. 

With  these  points  elucidated,  we  may  next  consider  certain 
important  relationships  between  Principles  I.  and  II.,  noting 
that,  if  there  are  these  relationships,  then  each  of  these  Princi- 
ples must  itself  be  a  (complex)  term,  i.e.  (at  least  by  the  defini- 
tion quoted  above),  relationships  imply  terms.  But,  if  this  is 
the  case,  then  it  is  presupposed,  that  there  are  relations  of  im- 
plication. 

But  there  are  relationships  between  Principles  I.  and  II. 
Therefore  these  Principles  are  terms;  therefore,  again,  as  terms, 
they  are  similar — and  similarity  is  a  relation.  But  Principles  I. 
and  II.  are  each  terms  in  relation,  and  each  is  a  proposition. 
Therefore  (1)  as  terms,  they  are  each  complex,  and  so,  again, 
similar,  and  (2)  at  least  some  terms-in-relation  are  proposi- 
tions. 

Whether  all  terms-in-relation  are  identical  with  propositions 
may  be  open  to  question,  but  if  there  are  some  terms-in-relation 
that  are  not,  it  is  difficult  to  know  what  to  call  them.  Yet  that 
all  terras-in-relation  are  propositions  is  shown  perhaps  by  the 
fact  (1)  that  it  seems  to  be  empirically  ascertainable  that  what- 
ever implies  is  a  proposition  (since  typical  cases  are  propositions 
that  do  imply)  and  (2)  that  all  or  any  terras-in-relation  imply 
(since,  whatever  a  relation,  R,  may  be,  any  complex  x  R  y  implies 
or  necessitates  the  inverse,  y  R  x.^    The  identity  of  propositions 

■  Royce,  in  his  essay  on  the  Principles  of  Logic;  sec  Chap.  II. 
«  See  Chap.  XIII. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  411 

with  terms-in-relation  would,  therefore,  seem  to  be  empirically 
established. 

By  this  definition,  then.  Principles  I.  and  II.  are  each  a 
proposition ;  for  Principle  I.  is  a  relation  of  inclusion  of  proposi- 
tions in  the  class  of  ''  'things'  that  are,"  i.e.,  the  class,  entities, 
while  Principle  II.  is  the  relation  of  inclusion  of  terms  and 
relations  in  this  same  larger  class.'' 

Further  analysis  of  the  "state  of  affairs"  that  is  identical 
with  Principles  I.  and  II.  would  reveal  the  presence  in  it  of 
a  number  of  other  relations  than  those  thus  far  discovered — 
e.g.,  there  are  the  relations  of  (1)  difference  of  terms  and  rela- 
tions, and  (2)  "member  of,"  for  Principles  I.  and  II.  are  each 
a  "member  of"  the  class,  propositions.  However,  into  the 
further  discussion  of  these  refined  matters  we  need  not  go,  since 
it  is  more  important  to  consider  the  several  types  of  relations 
that  "give"  propositions,  and  to  recognize  the  fact  that  there 
are  other  propositions  than  those  which  are  accepted  in  the 
traditional  logic. 

The  traditional  logic  is,  as  we  have  seen,  one  that  makes 
almost^  exclusive  recognition  of  ''class"  and  of  "subject- 
predicate"  propositions.  The  latter,  however,  can  be  translated 
into  the  former.  Thus  the  proposition,  "a  stone  is  hard,"  while 
it  is  identical  with  the  relation  of  the  inherence  of  the  quality 
hardness  in  the  subject,  stone,  becomes,  by  translation,  "stones 
are  hard  objects,"  where  it  is  identical  v/ith  the  relation  of 
inclusion  of  the  class,  stones,  in  the  larger  class,  hard  objects. 
The  relationship  of  inclusion  by  which  some  propositions  are 
generated,  may  be,  as  we  have  previously  seen,  complete,  partial, 
or  negative.  The  relation  "member  of"  (a  class)  also  "gives" 
propositions  that  are  illustrated  by  the  proposition,  "this  object 
(that  I  am  now  holding)  is  a  pen." 

But  there  are  other  relations  than  those  just  mentioned,  and, 
therefore,  other  propositions  than  those  which  the  traditional 
logic  recognizes.  Such  a  distinct  class  of  propositions  may  be 
called  "relational"  to  distinguish  them  from  "class"  and 
"subject-predicate"  propositions.  Indeed  it  may  be  said  in 
general,  that  all  those  relations  that  are  present  in  series  or  in 
complexes  of  series,  and  the  like,  give  relational  propositions, 
'  Qf.  Chap.  XLIV.,  u. 


412  REALISM 

although,  "side  by  side"  with  these,  "class"  and  "subject" 
propositions  may  also  be  present.  Thus,  to  illustrate,  the  sev- 
eral relations  that  are  present  in  that  relational  complex  which 
is  accelerated  motion,  give,  most  of  them,  relational  propositions. 
For  example,  "the  instant  A  pr£££des  the  instant  C,"  "the 
instant  B  is  between  A  and  C,"  "the  point  a  is  in  one-one 
correlation  with  the  instant  A,"  are  all  propositions  that  are 
not  generated  by  relations  of  similarity,  '^member  of,"  inher- 
ence, or  inclusion  of  any  kind.  Evidence  that  there  are  these 
relational  propositions  is  given  by  the  historical  fact,  that,  in 
order  to  deal  adequately  and  precisely  with  such  complexes  as 
accelerated  motion,  it  was  necessary  to  develop  radically  new 
methods  of  reasoning,  such  as  the  calculus.  Indeed  the  greater 
part  of  modern  exact  science  is  identical  with  the  knowledge 
of  such  relational  propositions  and  with  what  they  imply,  namely, 
other  relational  propositions. 

This  suggests  our  third  principle,  which  is  presupposed  by  any 
system  of  philosophy  that  is  reasoned  either  in  its  detailed  doc- 
trine or  in  its  defense,  but  which  also  seems  to  be  logically  subse- 
querit  to  the  fact  that  there  are  entities,  namely,  propositions, 
such  as  Principles  I.  and  II.,  that  imply. 

III.    There  is  {the  relation  of)  implication. 

Discussion:  The  problem  of  implication,  its  nature,  and  the 
conditions  of  its  occurrence,  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  problems 
in  all  logic  and  philosophy,  as  it  is,  also,  a  problem  that  is  most 
infrequently  considered.     However,  the  attempt  to  examine  it 
has  been  made  at  a  number  of  junctures  in  this  volume,^  with 
the  result  that  it  has  been  found  (1)  that  the  relation  of  im- 
plication is  a  specific  relation  that  subsists  between  propositions;  \ 
(2)   that  it  is,  like  other  relations  and  terms,  objective  in  the  j 
sense  that  it  is  neither  a  creation  of  nor  a  law  or  concept  of 
the  knowing  mind;   (3)  that  it  is  identical  with  a  relation  of  ' 
necessary  connection  between  propositions,  whereby,  if  proposi- 
tion A  is,  proposition  B  must  be;  (4)  that  it  is  logically  subse- 
quent to  some  other  relations,  in  that  it  depends  on  them,  al- 
though they  do  not  depend  on  it;**  (5)  that,  therefore,  it  is  a 
specific  relation  that  is  not  itself  iynplied,  but  that  merely  co-   \ 
subsists  with  certain  other  relations;  (6)  that  it  is  specifically 

*  See  Chap.  XIII.  •  See  Chaps.  Xlll.  and  XXL 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  413 

different  from  consistency  and  contradiction;'^^  (7)  that  it  is 
a  non-symmetrical  and  transitive  relation, — which  allows  for  its 
occasional  symmetry,  if  not  for  its  intransitivity. 

To  enumerate  and  present  all  those  types  of  relational  com- 
plexes, and  all  those  types  of  relations  that  carry  w^ith  them  the 
relation  of  implication  would  demand  that  we  should  examine 
all  those  situations  that  permit  of  correct  inference.  Such  a 
complete  examination  of  the  implicative  situation  is,  however, 
not  necessary  to  our  purpose,  but,  instead,  the  presentation  of 
a  few  typical  instances  will  suffice. 

1.  Every  relation,  e.g.,  every  dyadic  relation,  symbolized  by 
X  R  y,  is  one  that  gives  a  basis  for  the  implication  of  its  inverse, 
y  R  X.  It  would  seem,  then,  that,  if  there  were  the  very  minimum 
of  relations,  namely,  those  of  conjunction,  expressed  by  "and," 
and  of  similarity  and,  perhaps,  of  difference,  there  would  also 
be  implication.  For  A  and  B  implies  B  and  A,  as  does  also  A 
similar  to  B  imply  B  similar  to  A. 

2.  In  the  very  typical  case  of  the  relation  of  inclusion  of  one 
class  A  in  another  class  B  that  in  turn  is  included  in  a  class  C, 
there  is  the  relation  of  implication,  for  it  is  implied  that  A  is 
included  in  C.  Here  two  propositions,  A  R  B,  and  B  R  C,  with 
neither  implying  the  other,  imply  a  third,  ARC.  This  is  the 
case  also  where  an  asymmetrical  and  transitive  relation  relates, 
not  classes,  but  the  individuals  of  a  series.  Thus,  if  <  be  the 
sign  for  any  relation,  such  as  "before,"  "greater  than,"  and 
"ancestor  of,"  whereby  serial  order  is  generated  among  indi- 
viduals, then  A  <i  B,  and  B  <.  C,  implies  A  <  C.^^ 

These  are  instances  of  propositions  that  imply  other  proposi- 
tions, but  there  are  also  certain  propositions  that  do  not  in  the 
least  seem  to  be  implicative  of  others.  For  example,  "A  is  taller 
than  B"  does  not  imply  any  "hlood  relationship''  between  A  and 
B,  and  "A  is  similar  to  B"  does  not  imply  that  either  terra 
precedes  the  other.  Implication,  therefore,  seems  to  subsist  be- 
tiveen  sorne  propositions,  hut  not  between  or  among  all.  There- 
fore, where  it  does  subsist,  there  must  be  certain  other  relations 
on  which  it  rests.     However,  that  implication  is  objective,  is 

^*  See  the  next  two  discussions. 

"  For  further  typical  implicative  situations,  see  Chaps.  XIII.,  i.,  and 
XXI. 


414  REALISM 

itself  a  proposition  that  is  implied  by  whatever  propositions  are 
employed  in  any  argument  either  pro  or  con  its  hypothetical 
subjectivity.  For,  if  one  does  not  dogmatically  assert,  e.g.,  the 
subjective  character  of  implication,  but  endeavors  to  demon- 
strate this,  then  to  the  investigating  mind  the  propositions  that 
constitute  this  demonstration  and  the  relations  between  these 
propositions  are  objective,  and  among  these  relations  is  im- 
plication. 

That  implication  is  sometimes  symmetrical  is  shown  by  dis- 
covering specific  instances  of  its  symmetry.  One  such  instance 
is  the  complex  situation  or  state  of  affairs,  that  (1)  if  the  rela- 
tion JK  of  a  to  &  is,  e.g.,  the  asymmetrical  relation  "greater 
than,"  then  the  inverse  relation,  K,  is  "less  than";  but  that 
(2)  between  the  two  complexes,  a  B  b  and  b  B  a,  there  is,  in 
addition  to  this  "first"  relation  of  "inverseness,"  the  relation 
of  implication,  for  any  relation  x  B  y  implies  its  inverse  y  B  x, 
as  we  have  seen;  calling  tJiis  particular  relation  of  implication 
between  a  B  b  and  b  B  a  the  relation  B^,  it  is  then  to  be  seen 
that  (3)  the  complex  {a  B  b)  B.^  {b  B  a)  implies  its  inverse, 
namely,  the  complex  (&  B  a)  B^  {a  B  b) ;  so  that  (4)  JSg  ''here" 
is  symmetrical. 

However,  in  most  instances  implication  is  a  non-symmetrical 
relation  in  accordance  with  the  definition  that  "a  relation  is 
non-symmetrical  if  it  is  such  that  it  de  facto  precludes  the  iden- 
tity of  the  inverse  with  itself"  (the  original  relation).  This 
non-symmetry  is  illustrated  in  the  relationship  between  time  and 
motion:  motion  implies  time,  but  the  inverse  relation,  that  of 
time  to  motion,  is  not  one  of  implication. 

IV.    There  is  the  relation  of  contradiction. 

Discussion:  Although  it  is,  doubtless,  somewhat  difficult  to 
discover  the  exact  character  of  this  relation,  it  is  readily  demon- 
strated that  any  system  of  philosophy  presupposes  it.  For  who- 
ever both  asserts  and  denies,  conforms  logically  to  this  principle 
as  holding  between  that  which  is  respectively  asserted  and 
denied.  Thus,  e.g.,  to  de7iy  contradiction  (as  a  specific  state  of 
affairs  in  the  universe)  is  to  presuppose  it. 

The  difficulties  in  the  problem  lie  in  the  concept  of  the  nega- 
tive, with  which  contradiction  seems  to  be  most  intimately  con- 
nected, if,  indeed,  the  two  are  not  identical.^^    Thu5,  e.g.,  one 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  415 

finds  it  stated,  that  contradiction  subsists  both  between  classes 
and  propositions,  but  that  its  definition  for  either  of  these  cases 
depends  on  the  concept  of  negation.  This  is  very  evident  if, 
for  example,  the  contradictory  class,  symbolized  by  x,  is  defined, 
in  relation  to  a  positive  class,  x  (which  itself  is  "defined  by 
a  certain  norm"),  as  the  class  that  consists  of  whatever  objects 
are  not  x.^^  It  is  also  quite  as  evident,  if,  e.g.,  the  contradictory 
of  the  relational  proposition,  '^A  is  greater  than  B,"  is  defined 
as  "A  is  not  greater  than  B." 

To  understand  ivhat  contradiction  is,  seems  to  demand,  there- 
fore, the  understanding  of  the  concept  of  the  negative,  or  of 
negation.  But  here  again  difficulties  are  met  with,  if,  e.g.,  an 
endeavor  is  made  to  understand  the  negative  by  first  under- 
standing zero,  only  in  turn  to  define  zero  by  the  use  of  the 
negative.  This  circle  is  committed  in  Mr.  Russell's  discussion 
of  his  view  "that  numbers  are  properties  of  general  terms,  not 
of  physical  things  or  mental  occurrences,"  so  that  "  'one'  is 
not  a  property,"  for  example,  "of  the  moon  itself,"  but  only 
"of  the  general  term  'earth's  satellite.'  "  "Similarly,  0  is  a 
property  of  the  general  term,  'satellite  of  Venus,'  because  Venus 
has  no  satellite."  ^* 

However,  some  light  is  thrown  on  the  nature  of  the  nega- 
tive and  of  contradiction  by  considering  the  nature  of  the 
number  zero  as  this  occurs  in  the  nnniber  series.  Briefly,  we 
will  say,  that  the  number  zero  and  the  negative  numbers  are 
implied  by  removing  the  limitation  from  the  operation  of  sub- 
traction, so  that  the  greater  whole  number  can  be  "taken  from" 
the  lesser,  as  well  as  the  lesser  from  the  greater;  i.e.,  so  that 
x  —  ^  is  possible,  whatever  " values''  x  and  y  may  have.  Sub- 
traction is  the  operation,  or  step  of  "going"  (perhaps  that  of 
moving  our  attention) — in  the  series  of  numbers — from  that 
which  follows  to  that  which  precedes,  while  addition  is  the  inverse 
step  of  "going"  from  that  which  precedes  to  that  which 
follows.  Thus  these  two  operations  are  defined  by  reference  to 
series. 

If,   now,   4"   before   a  number   represents   the   operation   of 

"Chap.  XVI. 

**  Hoyce,  Essay,  op.  cit.,  p.  108. 

**  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy,  p.  202.     Italics  mine. 


416  REALISM 

addition  and  —  that  of  suhstraction,  as,  e.g.,  -f-  5,  and  —  5, 
and  if  we  start  with  a  whole  number  5,  carefully  distin^iishing 
between  the  status  of  signed  numbers  and  of  unsigned,  then  -|-  5 
is  a  step  "forwards"  by  which  we  "go"  from  5  to  10,  and  — 5 
is  the  step  "backwards"  by  which  we  "go"  from  5  to  0.  There- 
fore, the  steps  —  6,  —  7,  and  the  like,  taken  from  5  as  a  "start- 
ing point,"  bring  us  to  the  negative  numbers,  — 1,  — 2,  etc., 
respectively. 

It  is  to  be  noted  here,  however,  that  the  sign  which  is  some- 
times interpreted  as  a  negative  sign,  first  stands  for  a  very 
positive  '^ thing, '^  namely,  for  the  step  or  operation  of  "going" 
from  greater  to  lesser.  The  same  conclusion  results,  also,  from 
the  further  examination  of  the  negative  numbers  themselves, 
and  of  zero.  This  examination  shows,  in  the  first  place,  that 
the  negative  numbers  are  implied  facts,  and  are,  therefore,  in 
some  sense  entities,  namely,  subsistents ;  ^^  and  in  the  second 
place,  that  we  are  as  free,  in  performing  successively  the  opera- 
tion -f- 1,  to  start  with  a  negative  number  or  with  zero,  as  we 
are  to  start  with  a  positive  whole  number. 

There  may  be  many  other  considerations  that  bear  on  the 
nature  of  the  negative,  but,  in  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  all  of 
these  lead  to  but  one  conclusion,  namely,  that  the  number  0, 
the  negative,  negation,  and  contradiction  is  in  each  instance 
something  that  is  a  positive  content  of  experience.  This  content 
may  be  the  positive  fact  of,  e.g.,  a  difference  in  the  "sense"  or 
direction  of  a  series,  whereby  we  speak  of  "backwards"  and 
"forwards" ;  or  the  difference  of  individuality,  as  when  we  speak 
of  the  points  (apexes),  A,  B,  and  C  of  a  triangle,  or  the  differ- 
ence of  qualities,  whereby  there  are  the  classes,  X  (animals)  and 
Y  (plants).  In  each  of  these  instances  either  or  any  of  the  posi- 
tive terms  can  be  symbolized  by  the  prefix  "not."  Thus  "back- 
wards" is  "not-forwards,"  points  B  and  C  are  not- A,  animals 
are  not-plants,  and  conversely.  Yet  this  negative  prefix  does 
not  do  away  with  the  fact,  that  the  differences  among  these 
entities  are  positive,  although  they  are  open  to  a  negative  char- 
acterization in  relation  to  one  another.  These  differences  subsist 
at  different  and  numerically  distinct  loci  that  are  logical,  and, 
also,  in  some  instances,  spatial  and  temporal  in  character.  It 
"  Cf.  Chap.  XLIV.,  II. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  417 

is,  now,  this  factual  diversity  and  difference  of  the  entities  of 
the  universe  that  is  that  universal  fact  of  exclusion  with  which 
contradiction  is  identical.^® 

It  follows  that  such  a  formulation  of  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction as  the  very  usual  one  of  the  text-books  that  "a  'thing* 
(entity)  cannot  hoth  be  and  not  he  a  certain  quality"  {e.g.,  that 
the  motion  of  a  falling  body  cannot  be  both  continuous  and  not 
continuous)  is  in  reality  only  a  restatement  (1)  of  the  em- 
pirically discovered  fact,  that  certain  characteristics  do  subsist 
at  different  loci,  plus  (2)  the  unjustified  conviction  that  they 
cannot  have  the  same  locus.  For  many  attributes  which  have 
been  regarded  as  necessarily  exclusive,  e.g.,  finiteness  and  in- 
finity, are  now  known  to  cosubsist,  as,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  a  line, 
which  is  infinite  in  respect  to  points,  but  finite  as  regards 
smaller  lines  as  components. 

From  this  example  it  may  be  seen  that  to  discover  what 
entities  exclude  one  another,  and  what  do  not,  is  a  wholly  em- 
pirical matter.  Therefore  the  only  norm  that  is  really  offered 
by  the  principle  of  contradiction  is,  that  one  should  not  think 
or  "take"  two  or  more  characteristics  or  entities  that  are  found 
empirically  to  have  different  loci,  to  be  at  the  same  locus.  Any 
two  contradictory  entities  can  be  at  different  spatial  and  tem- 
poral loci,  or  at  those  logical  loci  that  are  called  "universes  of 
discourse." 

Self-contradiction  subsists,  at  least  in  the  case  of  propositions, 
when  characteristics  that  are  (found  empirically  to  be)  exclusive 
are  brought  in  some  way  into  the  same  locus.  Thus,  e.g.,  the 
statement,  "there  is  no  truth,"  is  self-contradictory,  because  it 
presupposes  the  truth  of  itself  as  present  in  a  universe  of  dis- 
course from  which,  by  its  own  meaning,  truth  is  absent.  The 
difficulty  is  resolved  by  the  subsistence  of  two  "universes," 
excluding  each  other,  in  one  of  which  truth  is  present,  in  the 
other,  absent.  Thus  the  two  propositions,  "there  is  some  truth," 
and  "there  is  some  not-truth,"  are  both  facts. 

In  two  ways,  therefore,  aiiy  system  of  philosophy  presupposes 

the  relation  of  contradiction.    One  of  these  ways  is,  that  there 

is  a  diversity  of  entities  in  the  universe,  and  that  among  these 

there  are  empirically  discovered  exclusions.     The  negative,  or 

"Cf.  Chap,  XLIV, 


418  REALISM 

the  contradictory,  is  merely  anotJier  name  for  any  one  entity, 
simple  or  complex,  that  is  in  relation  of  some  kind  of  difference 
to  another  entity  or  entities,  with  the  two  subsisting  at  different 
loci.  Thus  when  we  say,  having  set  out  to  classify  any  region 
of  our  world,  real  or  ideal,  that  "with  reference  to  a  given 
norm,"  the  individuals  of  that  region  will  belong  either  to  the 
class  X  or  to  its  contradictory  class  x,  we  mean,  that,  if  these 
individuals  are  not  in  one  locus,  they  are  in  the  other,  with  both 
realms  equally  positive  in  character.  The  other  way  in  which 
contradiction  is  presupposed  is  normative  in  character.  It 
means,  that  the  error  should  not  be  committed  of  "taking"  en- 
tities that  are  diverse  in  character  and  that  subsist  at 
different  loci,  to  have  the  same  locus.  This  norm  af  think- 
ing should,  of  course,  be  observed  by  any  philosophical 
system. 

V.    There  is  consistency. 

Discussion:  The  two  foregoing  discussions  of  implication  and 
of  contradiction  bring  us  to  the  discussion  of  consistency.  It  is, 
perhaps,  doubtful  if  consistency  is  a  relation,  and  therefore 
also  doubtful  if  a  system  of  philosophy  presupposes  such  a  rela- 
tion. Yet  that  a  philosophy  must  be  consistent  is  a  presupposi- 
tion or  demand  that  is  made  by  all  philosophies,  although  one 
may  ask,  whether  this  means  more  than  that  a  philosophy  must 
not  be  self -contradictory  in  the  sense  in  which  we  have  just  de- 
fined this  term.  Such  self-contradiction  is  illustrated  by  any 
philosophy  which  maintains  that  all  terms  are  causally  related, 
and,  therefore,  mutually  modify  one  another ;  for  this  means  that, 
logically,  knowing  and  object  known  are  no  exceptions  to  the 
rule,  and  that,  accordingly,  knowing  affects  the  object  (to  be) 
known,  so  that  7io  state  of  affairs  (or  anything  else)  can  be 
known  without  being  modified.  Such  a  position,  now,  logically 
brings  itself,  as  a  specific  knowing  of  a  specific  state  of  affairs 
(the  above  theory)  within  this  realm  in  which  genuine  knowl- 
edge is  impossible,  but  it  thereby  precludes,  or  makes  it  im- 
possible, that  that  knowledge  with  which  it  as  a  philosophical 
position  is  identical,  should  be  what  it  is  presumed  to  be,  namely, 
genuine  knowledge.  Thus  the  position  invalidates  itself.  To 
recognize  that  any  philosophy  presupposes  and  is  under  obliga- 
tion to  conform  to  consistency  in  the  sense  of  the  absence  of 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  410 

such  self-contradictions  as  that  just  presented,  would  seem  to 
be  a  minimum  requirement  to  ask  any  philosopher  to  observe. 

The  specific  self-contradiction  just  presented  is  avoided  by 
accepting  the  two  propositions,  that  ''some  'things'  are  causally 
related,"  and  that  ''some  'things'  are  not  so  related.  But,  if 
self-contradiction  is  to  he  avoided,  it  may  well  be  that  mere 
contradiction,  as  identical  with  the  relation  of  difference  between 
entities  that  subsist  at  different  loci,  is  not  only  presupposed  by 
all  philosophies,  hut  also  is  identical  with  consistency. 

Paradoxical  though  it  may  seem,  thus  to  identify  contradiction 
with  consistency,  and  to  maintain  at  the  same  time,  that  con- 
sistency is  independent  of  implication,  the  empirical  examina- 
tion of  the  evidence  at  our  disposal  nevertheless  seems  to  lead 
to  this  conclusion.  All  facts  and  entities  are,  just  because  they 
are  facts  and  entities,  consistent  with  one  another.  If  they 
cannot  cosubsist,  or  coexist,  "at"  or  "in"  the  same  locus,  then 
they  must  be  at  different  loci,  or  in  different  universes  of  dis- 
course. Conversely,  the  hypothesis,  that  there  are  different 
universes  of  discourse,  allows  for  the  factuality  of  all  entities 
that  are  experienced.  Inconsistency  is  present,  then,  as  an 
error,  only  when  entities  which  factually  are  exclusive  and  have 
different  loci  are  "taken"  to  have  the  same  locus.  But  entities 
as  diverse  and  as  in  different  loci  may  be  quite  unrelated  by 
implication,  as  can  be  shown  in  innumerable  instances. 

These  developments  concerning  contradiction,  consistency,  and 
implication  may  be  illustrated  to  advantage  by  an  example  from 
the  scientific  field.  The  geometers,  Lobatchewsky,  in  1829,  and 
Bolyai,  in  1832,  each  succeeded  in  working  out  a  consistent  sys- 
tem of  geometry  that  differed  from  the  traditional  geometry 
of  Euclid  in  respect  to  the  postulate  and  theorems  that  concern 
parallels}'^  Euclid  assumed,  in  "axioms"  and  theorems,  that 
through  a  point  P,  outside  a  line  L  there  is  only  one  line  parallel 
to  L.  Bolyai  and  Lobatchewsky,  however,  assumed  that  there 
is  an  infinite  numher  of  parallels  through  P,  and  then  developed 
the  implications  of  this  and  of  the  other  usual  postulates,  one  of 
these  implications  being  that  the  sum  of  the  angles  of  a  {plane) 
triangle  is  less  than  two  right  angles. 

These  two  opposed  assumptions  regarding  parallels,  in  respect 
"  Cf.  Chap.  I. 


420  REALISM 

to  which  these  two  geometries  differ,  may  be  regarded,  now,  as 
contradictory,  i.e.,  they  can  at  least  be  formulated  in  the  nega- 
tive contrast  of  ''one  parallel"  and  "not  one  parallel."  They 
are  of  such  a  character,  that,  if  both  were  assumed  in  one 
system,  together  with  other  postulates,  they  would  lead  to  all 
sorts  of  difficulties.  No  ''concrete  representation"  of  the  theory 
to  which  they  thus  might  lead  is  found.  On  the  other  hand, 
as  "placed"  in  different  universes  of  discourse  in  recognition 
of  the  empirical  discovery  of  their  mutual  exclusion,  each  of 
these  postulates  as  to  parallels  leads  to  an  internally  consistent 
geometrical  system,  i.e.,  one  for  which  a  concrete  representation 
is  found. 

There  are  other  non-Euclidian  systems  than  that  of  Bolyai 
and  Lobatchewsky,  as,  e.g.,  that  of  Riemann,^^  But  the  point 
to  be  emphasized  regarding  all  of  these  systems  is,  that,  as 
distinct  and  cosubsisting  universes  of  discourse,  they  are  con- 
sistent with  one  another.  This  they  must  be,  since  each  is  a 
system  of  entities  or  of  facts  that  are  discovered  by  reason.  Yet, 
as  consistent  in  this  sense,  they  are  also  contradictory  of  one 
another  in  certain  specific  respects.  But,  also,  taking  the  three 
systems  together  as  geometrical  systems,  we  have  a  concrete 
representation  of  geometrical  theory.  We  conclude,  therefore, 
that  in  the  instance  of  these  systems  we  have  a  concrete  case 
of  the  identity  of  consistency  with  contradiction,  and  that  the 
only  contradiction  that  is  at  all  damaging  and  that  is  to  be 
avoided,  is  that  of  "taking"  the  different  postulates  regarding 
parallels  into  one  system  or  one  locus  of  discourse,  when  they 
should  be  kept  distinct  in  three  loci. 

Each  of  these  systems  is  itself  internally  consistent,  since 
a  concrete  interpretation  of  each  can  be  given  that  satisfies  all 
its  postulates.  But  further,  each  system  is  derived  by  dis- 
covering the  implications  from  a  relatively  few  propositions 
that  are  regarded  as  postulates,  and  not  as  axioms.  These 
postulates,  however,  do  not  imply  one  another,  since,  if  any 
one  postulate  were  implied,  one  would  not  be  obliged  to  postu- 
late it,  but  would  deduce  it  from  the  other  postulates.  Accord- 
ingly, in  order  to  ascertain  whether  a  specific  proposition  is  to 
be  postulated,  or  whether  it  can  be  deduced,  one  first  assumes 

•"  Cf.  Chap.  I. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  421 

the  formal  contradictory  of  a  certain  postulate,  X,  and  then 
finds  that  the  remaining  postulates  together  with  this  contra- 
dictory give  a  consistent  system.  It  follows  that  these  remaining 
postulates  are  7iot  implied  by  X,  nor  X  by  them.  Any  set  or 
group  of  postulates  that  can  be  successfully  submitted  to  this 
test  is  thereby  proved  to  be  a  set  of  propositions  that  are  inde- 
pendent (in  just  this  sense  of  not  being  implied  by  one  another), 
and  yet  that  are,  also,  consistent.  We  therefore  have  a  specific 
demonstration,  that  implication  and  consistency  are  not  only 
not  identical  with,  but  also  independent  of,  each  other,  and  that 
this  independence  "persists"  even  in  the  case  of  consistent 
propositions  that  do  imply  one  another,  but  that  can  be,  as 
distinct  propositions  of  positive  content,  transformed  into  formal 
contradictories.  This  demonstration  consists  in  finding  that  con- 
sistency is  sometimes  accompanied  by  implication,  and  sometimes 
not, — in  which  respect  it  is  similar  to  the  independence  of  such 
relational  characteristics  as  symmetry  and  transitivity}^ 

We  conclude,  therefore,  (1)  that  consistency  may  cosubsist 
with  but  is  not  identical  with  nor  dependent  upon  implication; 
(2)  that  it  means  the  absence  of  self-contradiction,  but  (3)  that 
it  is  in  some  cases  identical  with  that  contradiction  which  is 
the  factual  exclusion  of  entities  into  different  universes  of  dis- 
course, or  their  factual  subsistence  at  different  loci. 

Any  system  of  philosophy  presupposes  consistency  in  these 
three  meanings  or  ways. 

VI.    There  is  a  system  of  propositions. 

Discussion:  Every  philosophy  makes  this  presupposition. 
With  a  proposition  defined  as  a  relationship  between  terms, 
whether  these  be  simple  or  complex,  and  with  all  philosophical 
s^tems  presupposing  tJiat  there  are  propositions,  it  is  evident 
that  a  philosophical  system  presupposes  that  there  is  a  system 
of  propositions. 

A  system  of  propositions  may  be  defined  as  a  set  of  proposi- 
tions that  are  related  either  by  implication,  or  by  consistency, 
or  also,  if  one  will,  by  contradiction.  Since  a  proposition  is, 
however,  a  relation  between  terms,  a  philosophical  system  also 
presupposes,  as  possibly  included  within  itself,  all  the  several 
kinds  of  relations  as  well  as  all  the  several  kinds  of  terms  or 
"  See  Chap.  II.,  p.  22. 


422  REALISM 

entities  that  are  known.  Although  these  terms  and  relations 
are  too  various  to  enumerate  completely,  it  will  be  seen  that  they 
include  simple  and  complex  terms,  and  those  relations  that 
generate  both  classes  and  series,  i.e.,  relations  of  similarity  and 
difference,  and  of  asymmetry  and  transitivitj'-  respectively. 

A  system  may  also  be  defined  as  an  ordered  manifold  of  en- 
tities. But  entities  are  ordered  by  relations.  It  would  seem, 
therefore,  that  there  might  be  "degrees"  of  order,  with  certain 
"degrees"  independent  of  others.  Thus  a  system  from  which 
all  series  and  whatever  depends  on  series,  as,  e.g.,  functions, 
should  be  absent,  can  be  postulated.  Such  a  system  would,  how- 
ever, admit  of  classes  and  their  relations.  The  Platonic  phi- 
losophy is  in  part  identical  with  such  a  system. 

A  system  may,  also,  be  only  partially  implicative  in  char- 
acter, and  there  would  also  seem  to  be  systems  of  contradictory 
(consistent)  systems,  each  internally  consistent,  as  illustrated 
by  the  system  of  geometrical  systems.  But  any  system  of  phi- 
losophy that  is  open  to  examination  and  proof,  and  to  rational 
defense  and  development,  presupposes  a  system  of  propositions, 
some  of  which  at  least  are  implicative  of  one  another,^^  and, 
therefore,  more  than  merely  consistent. 

However,  that  the  system  of  propositions  which  constitutes 
a  philosophy  is  an  organic  system,  is  disproved  in  two  ways. 
An  organic  system  of  propositions  is  defined  as  one  in  which 
each  proposition  is  constituted  by  its  relation  to  all  other  proposi- 
tions, so  that  no  proposition  can  be  genuinely  known  until  all 
others  are.  Clearly  such  a  system  is  modeled  after  a  completely 
causal  system.^^  That  the  system  of  propositions  which  are  at 
our  disposal  is  not  organic  in  this  sense  is  proved  by  the  fact 
(1)  that  there  are  instances  of  propositions,  as  in  the  geometrical 
systems  just  discussed,  that  are  not  implied  by,  although  they 
and  their  contradictories  are  consistent  with,  other  propositions ; 
and  (2)  that  no  relation,  either  of  implication  or  consistency  (or 
any  other  relation)  between  propositions  carries  with  it  the 
mutual  modification  or  constitution  of  any  one  proposition  by 
others,  except  as  this  modification  is  deduced  from  the  purely 
gratuitous  assumption  (postulation)  of  the  modification  theory 
of  relations.  But  if  a  system  of  propositions  is  not  organic, 
"  See  Chap.  XIII.  "'  See  Chap.  XXVI.,  n.,  2. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  423 

then  an  entirely  correct  knowledge  of  some  (one  or  more) 
propositions  is  possible,  even  though  other  implied  or  implying, 
and  consistent  or  inconsistent  propositions  are  not  known. 

VII.  There  are  specific  processes  called  knowing,  and  there 
is  knoivledge. 

Discussion:  Every  philosophical  system  presupposes  this. 
Knowledge  may  be  defined  as  that  which  is  common  to  past, 
future,  and  present  knowing  processes.  A  knowing  process  may 
be  defined  as  one  in  which  there  is  awareness,  without  it  being 
necessary  that  there  should  in  turn  be  an  awareness  of  this 
awareness.  This  corresponds  to  the  distinction  between  con- 
sciousness and  self-consciousness.  There  is  positive  evidence 
that  mere  consciousness  and  awareness  is  identical  with  a  specific 
relation  w^hose  presence  is  conditioned  by  a  certain  complex  in 
which  a  nervous  system  with  a  cerebral  cortex  is  one  term,  al- 
though there  may  also  be  other  radically  different  terms  than 
such  neural  complexes  as  conditions  for  consciousness.  The 
conditions  for  self-consciousness  are  more  specific  than  are 
those  for  mere  consciousness.  Special  kinds  of  awareness 
are  those  which  are  usually  called  reasoning,  imagining, 
remembering,  and  perceiving,  and  the  like,  but  these  processes 
can  take  place  without  a  simultaneous  or  subsequent  conscious- 
ness of  them. 

As  thus  far  defined,  no  distinction  is  made  between  that 
knowledge  which  is  true,  and  that  which  is  not.  But  perhaps 
there  is  no  distinction,  since  ^'true  knowledge"  may  be  a 
tautology,  and  "false  knowledge"  a  misnomer.  But,  be  that  as 
it  may,  all  philosophical  systems  presuppose  that 

VIII.  There  is  truth. 

Discussion:  Truth  may  be  defined  as  the  subsistence  of  a 
specific  relation  between  the  knowing  process  and  the  entity 
known.  Were  there  not  knowing,  there  would  be  only  fact, 
but  neither  truth  nor  error.  But,  secondly,  this  specific  relation 
subsists,  when,  in  the  awareness,  tiie  entity  is  revealed  as  it  really 
is.  In  this  state  of  affairs  the  knowing  and  the  entity  known  are 
externally  related  after  the  model  of  the  functional  relationship, 
i.e.,  they  are  in  correspondence. 

The  objection  that  this  is  a  question-begging  definition  of 
truth  does  not  invalidate  it,  but  only  indicates  the  difficulty  of 


424  REALISM 

finding  a  test  whereby  to  ascertain  whether  knowledge  in  any 
specific  instance  is  true  or  not.  But  the  presence  or  absence 
of  this  test  is  not  identical  with  the  presence  or  absence  of 
knowledge,  for  the  former  concerns  proof  and  the  grounds  of 
conviction,  the  latter,  the  presence  or  absence  of  truth.  "Were 
there  not  this  difference,  there  would  'be  no  truth  unless  there 
were  a  test,  yet  every  test  would  be  worthless  unless  true.  The 
'principles  of  proof  must  themselves,  therefore,  be  submitted  to 
proof  and  to  testing.  But,  since  with  these,  as  with  other  proposi- 
tions, proof  in  an  indefinite  series  is  impossible,  the  only  alterna- 
tive is  to  accept  it  as  a  fact  that  at  some  point  proof  is  im- 
possible, and  that  truth  is  distinct  from  and  independent  of 
proof,  evidence,  and  testing.  This  is,  indeed,  the  onl}'^  ground 
or  principle  on  which  ultimate  unproved  or  unprovable  tests 
can  themselves  be  true,  but  it  is  also  a  principle  that  logically 
allows  itself  to  he  true,  although  it  is  not  proved.  Indeed,  were 
this  principle  not  thus  true,  then,  since  the  human  race  as  yet 
possesses  no  complete  proof  and  no  absolute  test  for  the  absolute 
truth  of  any  knowledge,  there  could  be  no  knowledge.  But, 
conversely,  if  the  principle  is  true,  then  there  is  implied  the 
possibility  of  genuine  knowledge,  both  in  the  race  and  in  the 
individual,  antecedent  to  the  demonstration  that  in  any  specific 
instance  there  is  such  knowledge. 

This  means  that  facts  can  be  revealed  and  discovered 
antecedently  hath  to  the  evidence  or  proof  that  this  is  the  case, 
and  also  to  the  explanation  of  how  they  can  be  these  facts.  For 
example,  our  ancestors  perceived  and  knew  the  fact  that  their 
canoes  would  float  on  the  water  without  understanding  either 
the  perceiving  or  the  floating.  Likewise  it  is  possible  that  one 
should  discover  that  there  are  certain  presuppositions  or  con- 
ditions for  knowledge,  and  yet  not  understand  in  all  details 
how  knowledge  is  brought  about.  The  experience  of  fact  is  but 
the  antecedent  occasion  for  subsequent  explanation  and  proof. 
It  is  a  principle,  then,  that 

IX.    Truth  is  distinct  from  certainty. 

Discussion:  Certainty  is  a  specific  consciousness  which  has 
some  other  consciousness  as  its  object,  and  is,  perhaps,  always 
an  instance  of  self-consciousness.  It  concerns  evidence  and 
proof  and  the  grounds  for  our  convictions.     Thus  it  can  be 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  425 

causally  grounded  in  personal  influences,  in  tradition,  and  in 
custom. 22  Such,  e.g.,  is  the  conviction  and  certainty  that  attends 
our  beliefs,  the  self-evidence  of  so-called  axioms,  and,  perhaps, 
the  inconceivability  of  their  opposites.-^  In  contrast  truth  is  a 
specific  relation  between  knowing  and  that  which  is  known. 
Proof  and  evidence  are,  therefore,  only  methods  for  attaining 
truth,  with  "successful  working"  in  some  cases  as  one  such 
test,  but  with  the  success  conditioned  by  truth,  and  not  con- 
versely.-* This  last  proposition  may  be  stated  in  the  form  of 
another  principle  to  the  effect  that 

X.  The  nature  of  truth  is  not  the  same  as  the  outcome  of 
knowledge,  i.e.,  of  its  successful  and  satisfactory  working. 

Discussion:  This  "working"  is  in  many  cases  brought  about 
by  holding  the  very  "idea"  in  question  to  be  true,  as  is  illus- 
trated by  the  conviction  that  a  friend  is  sincere,  by  the  belief 
in  immortality,  and  the  like.  Accordingly  it  is  clear  that,  in 
these  circumstances,  one  is  not  free  to  hold  one's  judgment  in 
suspense,  thus  to  put  an  idea  or  theory  to  a  test  that  is  inde- 
pendent of  emotion,  of  desire,  of  tradition,  and  of  social 
pressure,  but  that  in  order  that  an  idea  or  theory  should  be 
true  in  the  sense  of  working  successfully,  one  must  prejudge 
the  question,  and  hold  something  to  be  true  antecedently  to 
''there  being  truth."  Belief  thus  generates  truth,  so  that  ulti- 
mately there  is  no  difference  between  the  true  and  the  false. 

But,  since  belief  somewhere,  by  some  one,  is  always  to  be 
found,  it  follows  that  there  is  only  truth,  and  no  falsity.  But 
also  specific  disbelief  and  doubt — somewhere — by  some  one — are 
not  absent  in  respect  to  any  "object  of  belief,"  with  the  con- 
sequence that,  as  regards  any  such  "object"  or  "idea,"  there 
is  always  a  specific  lack  of  "satisfactory  working,"  so  that 
there  is  nothing  that  is  not  also  false.  Thus  does  the  position, 
that  truth  is  identical  with  satisfactory  working,  reduce  to  an 
absurdity,  and  the  converse  position — of  science,  that  truth  is 
not  so  constituted,  receive  confirmation.  Not  only  the  absence 
of  belief,  but  also  of  disbelief,  or  rather  the  independence  of 
both,  is  the  state  of  affairs  that  is  recognized,  by  science,  as  the 
condition  for  the  bringing  about  of  that  kind  of  satisfactory 
outcome  and  working  that  is  acceptable  to  science.     Such  an 

"  Cf.  Chap.  III.       =■ '  Chap.  XV.,  iv.,  4,  5,  6.      "  Cf.  Chap.  XXXIII.,  iv. 


420  REALISM 

outcome,  however,  is  one  that  is  brought  about,  not  by  the 
psychological  causes  of  belief,  desire,  and  tradition,  but  by  the 
objective  realities  that  are  known — else  were  everything  true, 
and  nothing  false,  and,  also,  everything  false,  and  nothing  true. 
It  is  because  ideas  are  true  that  they  work  satisfactorily  where 
both  belief  and  disbelief  keep  aloof.  Yet  the  satisfactory  out- 
come even  here  only  makes  us  regard  them  as  true,  but  does 
not  make  them  true. 

With  truth  thus  found  to  be  distinct  from  certainty,  and 
also  from  "successful  workings,"  we  may  now  present  as  our 
next  principle,  that 

XI.  Although  there  is  no  absolute  test  of  absolute  truth,  and 
although  certainty  may  be  lacking,  nevertheless  there  may  be 
true  knowledge;  the  latter  is  not  of  necessity  absent  even  when 
the  two  former  are  not  present. 

Discussion:  This  means  that  true  theories,  true  hypotheses, 
and  the  like,  may  often  be  won  by  guesswork, — an  origin  which 
the  history  of  science  shows  to  have  been  frequently  the  case. 

We  now  reach  a  somewhat  different  group  of  propositions, 
which,  while  they  have  been  discussed  and  developed  in  a 
number  of  preceding  chapters,  should  now  be  stated  briefly, 
since  they  are  principles  that  all  philosophical  systems  presup- 
pose in  one  way  or  another,  and  that,  therefore,  form  an  im- 
portant part  of  Realism  and  Rationalism.  The  first  of  these 
propositions  is  that 

XII.  Analysis  is  possible. 

Discussion :  This  means  that  knowledge  by  analytical  means 
is  possible,  but  that  this  does  not  exclude  immediate  experience, 
such  as  feeling  and  intuition,  from  also  revealing  fact  and 
giving  truth. ^^  The  development  of  the  technique  of  modern 
methods  of  knowing  is  identical  in  part  with  the  development 
of  methods  of  analysis.  Analysis  itself  has  thus  been  analyzed, 
one  result  of  this  being  the  discovery  of  methods  of  analysis 
that  leave  the  entities  thus  discovered  in  situ.  Such  methods 
are  most  important,  as  we  have  seen,  for  the  solution  of  the  ego- 
centric predicament.^^  Analysis  shows  a  great  many  instances 
in  which  entities  are  related,  not  causally,  but  functionally  or 
after  the  manner  of  the  functional  relationship,   so  that  one 

=■>  Chap.  XV.,  IV.,  2.  =»  Chaps.  XXVIII.  and  XXXIX. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  427 

can  only  dogmatically,  but  not  validly  claim  that  a  relation 
ipso  facto  carries  with  it  the  modification  and  alteration  of  the 
related  terms.  In  other  words,  the  theory  of  external  relations 
is  shown  empirically  to  hold  for  at  least  a  great  many  instances 
of  related  terms.  Therefore  the  modification  theory  of  relations 
to  the  effect  that  all  relations  a  fortiori  carry  with  them  a  mutual 
causal  effect  of  term  on  term,  is  shown  not  to  he  universal.  It 
may  apply  to  some  instances  of  related  terms,  but  it  certainly 
does  not  to  all.  And  for  the  underlying-reality  theory  of  rela- 
tions it  has  been  already  shown  that  there  is  only  an  argument, 
and  a  self-contradictory  one  at  that,  but  no  empirical  basis. 

With  the  fact  established  empirically  that  there  are  some 
instances  of  terms  that  are  externally  related,  it  is  open  to 
empirical  investigation  to  disclose  others.  This  search  is  re- 
warded by  finding  it  to  be  not  only  a  fact  of  direct  observation, 
but  also  a  condition  of  our  discovering  implication  and  of  know- 
ing "things"  as  they  really  are  (which  possibility  is  accepted 
by  every  philosophy  at  some  point)  that 

XIII.  Reason  is  free  in  the  sense  that  it  is  neither  lawless 
nor  yet  causally  determined  hy  preceding  psychical  processes 
in  the  individual  and  the  race,  hut  that  it  follows  whither  it  is 
led  by  the  implicative  structure  of  reality. 

In  other  words,  reason,  in  that  it  is  "true  to  itself,"  is  de- 
termined, not  by  antecedent  causes,  but  by  the  structure  of 
that  to  which  it  is  directed.  Thus,  e.g.,  it  can  study  the  facts 
of  development  without  being  causally  determined  by  its  own 
development.    It  is  free  to  ignore  its  own  origin. 

Discussion :  Some  of  the  important  results  that  are  obtained 
by  a  reason  that  is  free  in  this  sense,  and  that  can  analyze 
"things"  in  situ,  as  well  as  discover  the  implications  of  experi- 
mental analysis,  may  now  be  stated,  in  summary  of  previous 
discussions,  as  still  further  principles. 

XIV.  By  an  analysis  in  situ  knowing  can  always  he  left 
in  relation  to  the  entity  known,  and  yet  the  two  he  discovered 
to  he  in  an  external  relation.  Thus  the  ego-centric  predicament 
can  he  granted,  and  yet  he  shown  to  he  quite  harmless. 

Further  analysis  of  the  "truth  situation"  shows  that 

XV.  Although  there  is  only  One  Truth,  this  means  that  there 
is  one  system  of  many  truths,  or,  more  precisely,  of  propositions 


428  REALISM 

of  ivhich  some  are  merely  consistent  with,  hut  not  implicative 
of,  one  another,  hut  that  in  neither  case  are  either  truths  or 
propositions  constitutive  of  one  another. 

Discussion:  Implication  and  consistency  (if  it  is  a  relation) 
are  as  distinctly  non-causal,  non-constitutive,  and  external 
relations  as  are  any  other  specific  relations  that  are  of  this 
character. 

But  it  is  also  shown  hy  analysis  that  the  One  Truth,  defined 
as  one  system  of  many  truths  (a  truth  being  a  known  proposi- 
tion), need  not  be  an  existent  system.  For  there  is  evidence 
that  some  "things"  are  unknown — although  they  are  not  un- 
knowahle.  It  may  therefore  be  formulated  as  another  principle 
that 

XVI.  The  knowahleness  of  entities  implies  that,  if  {true) 
knowledge  of  some  or  of  many  entities  does  not  yet  exist,  there 
is,  nevertheless,  a  subsist ent  or  ideal  knowledge  that  may  ''hud 
into  existence''  under  certain  specific  conditions,  and  that  the 
system  of  such  ideal  knowings  is  the  system  of  Ideal  Truth. 

XVII.  The  suhsistence  of  an  external  relation  hetween  the 
knowing  and  the  entity  known  logically  allows  the  latter  to  he 
hoth  qualitatively  and  numerically  differeni  and  distinct  from 
the  knowing. 

Discussion:  This  implied  result  is  confirmed  by  both  common 
sense  and  science.  It  is  a  result,  however,  that  is  directly 
opposed  to  those  results  that  follow  logically  from  the  postula- 
tion  of  the  theory  of  internal  relations  for  the  knowing  situation. 
Such  results  are  (1)  that  knowing  modifies  the  object  (to  be) 
known,  (2)  that  these  two  entities  causally  "fuse"  together, 
so  that  each  is  like  the  other  and  neither  is  really  distinct,  or 
(3)  that  the  apparent  difference  and  distinctness  are  really 
illusory,  and  that  the  reality  is  a  numerically  single  underlying 
oneness.  It  is  to  such  a  logical  origin  that  certain  monistic  and 
idealistic  systems  are  due. 

In  this  summary  there  may  be  given  as  further  principles 
the  following  propositions,  though  these  are  to  be  regarded  as 
results  that  are  ohtained  hy  that  analysis  which  is  presupposed 
to  he  possihle  hy  any  philosophical  system,  and  which  reason  is 
capable  of  making  by  virtue  of  its  freedom  to  follow  implica- 
tions. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  REALISM  429 

XVIII.  Particular  existing  entities  are  not  the  only  objects 
that  are  open  to  investigation  and  analysis,  but  also  classes  and 
series,  states  of  affairs  and  non-existent  suhsistents,  and  relations 
between  all  these  (includi^ig  the  relation  cf  implication),  can 
be  studied,  and  discoveries  ynade  concerning  them. 

XIX.  There  are  two  ways  of  knowing,  namely,  by  "specifica- 
tion" and  by  "type."  The  former  is  illustrated  by  any  par- 
ticular act  of  sense  perception,  the  latter  by  our  knowledge  of 
prehistoric  man. 

XX.  That  some  and  perhaps  many  "things"  are  unknown  in 
either  of  these  two  ways  is  not  identical  with  nor  implicative 
of  their  being  unknoivable.  There  are  only  empirical  difficulties 
in  the  way  of  genuine  knowledge,  but  there  is  no  obstacle  in- 
herent in  the  knowing  situation  itself,  contrary  to  the  claim  of 
many  philosophical  systems,  notably  of  Phenomenalism. 

XXI.  Error  is  an  undeniable  fact,  but  it  can  be  explained, 
and  the  means  for  avoiding  it  can  to  a  large  extent  be  acquired 
by  the  wiiining  of  a  scientific  technique  in  both  analysis  and 
synthesis.  The  "taking"  of  one  entity  to  be  another  that  it  is 
not,  and  the  localizing  of  it  in  some  time  and  place,  one  or  both, 
or  in  some  other  universe  of  discourse,  to  which  it  does  not 
belong,  are  the  ultimate  errors.  But  the  factual  status  of  all 
entities,  such  as  physical  and  mental  processes,  dream,  illusory, 
and  normally  imagined  objects,  and  all  possible  objects,  can  be 
found  in  one  consistent  system,  and  all  self-contradictions  be 
avoided.  Some  entities  are  existent,  while  others  are  only  sub- 
sistent,  but  all  entities  can  be  related  functionally  and  efficiently, 
and  not  causally,  to  the  knowing  process  in  which  they  are 
"content." 

XXII.  Among  entities  various  relations  are  found,  an  im- 
portant case  of  these  being  the  relation  of  logical  priority,  which 
is  defined  as  subsisting,  if  b  implies  a,  but  a  does  not  imply  b. 
By  virtue  of  this  relation  entities  are  "stratified"  into  various 
types. 

XXIII.  Relations  are  themselves  not  causally  related,  causa- 
tion itself  being  a  specific  relation.  Certain  relations  are,  how- 
ever, dependent  on  others,  e.g.,  the  converse  relation,  b  R  a,  on 
the  original  relation,  a  R  b,  but  this  dependence  is  not  causal. 
Other  relations  are  not  even  thus  dependent,  but  are  merely 


430  REALISM 

consiste7it.  Thus  a  term  can  stand  in  a  number  of  independent 
relations  to  different  terms,  losing  or  gaining  any  of  these  rela- 
tions without  the  others.  Entrance  into  and  loss  of  the  relation 
of  a  particidar  knowing  process  is  an  important  instance  of  this 
independence.  Entities,  including  terms  and  relations,  can  ac- 
cordingly he  known  as  they  really  are,  this  knowledge  heing 
sometimes  identical  with  immediate  experience,  and  sometimes 
with  that  which  is,  or  which  results  from,  analysis  and  reasoning. 

This  concludes  the  summary  of  those  principles  which,  as  dis- 
covered by  the  criticism  of  systems  that  are  explicitly  opposed 
to  Realism  and  Rationalism,  are  nevertheless  found  to  be  tacitly 
accepted  and  presupposed  hy  these  (opposed)  systems.  These 
principles  form  the  general  basis  for  a  constructive  and  detailed 
Realism  and  it  is  to  the  presentation  of  this  constructive  posi- 
tion that  we  now  proceed. 


II.    CONSTRUCTIVE  AND  DETAILED  REALISM 
CHAPTER  XLII 

THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  AS  SOLVED  BY  REALISM 

I.   INTRODUCTORY 

It  is  characteristic  of  the  majority  of  the  philosophical  sys- 
tems of  at  least  the  last  century  and  a  half  that  they  have 
deemed  it  necessary  to  solve  the  problem  of  how  we  know  before 
they  have  endeavored  to  solve  other  problems.  The  epistemo- 
logical  problem  has  thus  had  a  temporal  priority  over  other 
problems,  although  it  is  doubtful  whether  this  priority  has 
been  important,  and  whether  it  indicates  that  logical  priority 
which  has  been  traditionally  ascribed  to  the  problem  of  knowl- 
edge. 

This  traditional  position  toward  the  knowledge  problem  has 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  4,31 

resulted  from  the  conviction  of  many  philosophers  that  they 
were  placed  in  the  ego-centric  predicament, — with  no  way  of 
getting  out.  If  this  is  the  case,  then  it  would  seem,  of  course, 
that  we  must  study  knowing  before  we  study  "things." 

The  position  taken  toward  the  epistemological  problem  by 
Realism  is  the  same  in  some  respects  as  that  taken  by  opposed 
systems,  but  is  radically  different  in  other  respects.  Thus, 
although  both  realist  and  non-realist  may  each  study  the  prob- 
lem first,  they  reach  very  different  conclusions.  For  example, 
the  non-realist  concludes,  that  the  temporal  priority  of  the 
knowledge  problem  over  other  problems  rests  on  or  implies 
a  logical  priority,  the  reason  for  this  conclusion  being  the  tacit 
assumption  of  the  theory  of  internal  relations  as  valid  for  the 
knowing  situation.  Since  hy  this  assumption  knowing  does  make 
a  difference  to  the  entity  known,  it  follows,  of  course,  that 
knowing  must  be  studied  before  other  "things"  are  studied,  and, 
therefore,  that  the  epistemological  problem  has  more  than  a 
merely  temporal  priority. 

The  results  which  the  realist  reaches  are  very  different  from 
this.  He  finds  that  the  priority  of  the  epistemological  problem 
is  only  temporal  and  psychological,  but  in  no  way  logical.  Thus, 
although  he  may  study  this  problem  first,  he  finds  that  it  need 
not  have  heen  studied  in  order  to  know,  or  in  order  to  go  ahead 
and  discover  various  details  of  reality.  And  the  ground  of  this 
conclusion  is,  of  course,  the  discovery  (1)  that  there  is  a  virtual 
elimination  of  knowing  from  the  entity  known — by  the  method 
of  an  analysis  in  situ;  and,  accordingly,  (2)  that  the  relation 
between  knowing  and  known  object  is  external;  (3)  that  the  ego- 
centric predicament  is  soluble;  (4)  that  knoumig  is  not  con- 
stitutive of  the  object  known;  and  (5)  that  problems  are  isolahle, 
even  as,  empirically,  they  arc  isolated. 

On  this  basis  the  realist  discovers  that  the  non-epistemological 
problems  can  be  studied  before  as  well  as  after  the  problem  of 
knowledge,  and  non-developmental  and  non-historical  problems 
before  as  well  as  after  those  of  development  and  history,^  In- 
deed, the  view  is  taken,  that  there  are  good  reasons  for  exam- 
ining the  facts  of  knowing,  and  of  development  and  of  history 
only  after,  and  not  before,  other  facts  are  examined.  The  former 
*  Cf.  Chaps.  I  and  XXVIII. 


432  REALISM 

are  but  a  small  part  of  the  total  realm  of  facts,  while  the  study 
of  other  facts  seems  to  be  more  illuminative  of  the  study  of 
knowing  than  conversely. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  in  the  presentation  of  our  o^vn 
scheme  of  constructive  Realism  we  begin,  not  with  the  epistemo- 
logical,  but  with  the  ontological  problem,  and  with  those  solu- 
tions which  Realism  finds  for  this  problem. 

II.  realism's  solution  of  the  ontological  problem 

This  problem  has  to  do,  as  we  have  seen,^  with  the  question 
as  to  what  is  the  ultimate  nature  of  reality.  Is  it  one  both  in 
kind  and  number,  and,  if  so,  what  is  this  kind;  or,  is  it 
many  in  number  while  yet  one  in  hind;  or  is  it  many 
both  in  kind  and  number f  The  answer  "yes"  to  the  first  ques- 
tion gives  qualitative  and  numerical  monism ;  to  the  second, 
qualitative  monism  and  numerical  pluralism ;  to  the  third,  both 
qualitative  and  numerical  pluralism.  Modern  transcendental 
Idealism,  as  the  doctrine  that  everything  is  One  Spirit  or  Con- 
sciousness, is  an  example  of  the  first  position ;  atomistic  Ma- 
terialism and  Berkeleian  Idealism  are  examples  of  the  second; 
and  Realism  is  an  example  of  the  third. 

Each  of  these  solutions,  however,  is  an  answer  to  a  question 
that  is  directed  to  the  universe,  and  that  concerns,  therefore,  all 
the  entities  of  the  universe.  Nothing  can  escape  this  inclusion, 
no  matter  what  it  may  be.  The  problem  raises  the  question, 
therefore,  as  to  whether  certain  entities  really  are  what  they 
seem  to  be,  and  whether  they  may  not  be  reduced  either  to  one 
kind  or  to  one  entity,  or  to  both  one  kind  and  one  entity. 

With  the  problem  thus  stated,  it  is  illuminative  to  remind 
ourselves  of  some  of  the  types  of  entities  that  are  contained 
within  this  universe,  and  that,  if  there  is  to  be  a  reduction,  must 
be  reduced,  either  to  a  qualitative,  or  to  a  numerical  One,  or 
to  an  entity  that  is  both  qualitatively  and  numerically  one. 
For,  that  everything  must  be  considered  and  inchide<\  is  made 
clear  by  the  fact,  that  were  even  one  entity  omitted,  it  might 
prove  refractory  to  that  reduction  to  which  all  other  entities  may 
submit  themselves,  with  the  result  that  monism  would  be  im- 

"Cf.  Clwp    V. 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  433 

possible,  and  a  dualism  or  a  pluralism  of  some  sort  would  be 
the  ontology  that  we  would  have  to  accept. 

The  difficulty  of  the  task  that  thus  lies  before  the  philosopher 
who  would  reduce  all  "things"  to  One,  either  in  quality  or  in 
number,  is  made  impressive  by  a  survey  of  even  a  small  part 
of  the  entities  that  must  suffer  such  a  fate — if  this  fate  be 
theirs  to  suffer.  But  by  this  survey  there  becomes  evident,  also, 
the  delicacy  of  the  task  of  discovering  the  relations  and  the 
systems  of  entities  of  the  universe,  whether  they  are  "reducible" 
or  not.  For,  if  they  are  reducible,  the  problem  of  their  rela- 
tionship as  appearances  still  persists,  while,  if  they  are  not 
reducible,  the  same  problem  stands  in  respect  to  their  "face 
value. ' ' 

Among  the  most  interesting  entities  that  must  be  thrown  into 
that  total  which  is  the  universe,  and  for  which  place  must  be 
found,  is  error.^  For  within  the  universe  error  is;  it  is  a  fact 
of  some  kind.  Therefore,  if  one  is  a  "reductionist"  and  a 
monist,  and  his  opponent  is  not,  then  must  either  the  error  of 
the  latter  find  its  niche  in  the  monistic  Hall  of  Fame,  or  the 
error  of  the  former  must  be  distinct  and  different  from  the 
truth  of  the  latter 's  position  and  find  its  place  in  the  Eogues' 
Gallery  of  pluralism. 

But  there  is  not  alone  error  and  truth.  There  are  also  words, 
and  judgments,  and  attempts  to  know ;  proofs,  refutations,  agree- 
ments, disagreements,  convictions,  beliefs,  hj^potheses,  "things" 
to  know,  states  of  affairs,  etc.,  etc.  These  are  all  "somethings" 
— although  whether  they  are  real  or  unreal,  true  or  false,  actual 
or  possible,  possible  or  impossible,  may  be  difficult  to  ascertain. 
But  at  least  they  are  entities  of  some  kind  that  must  in  some 
manner  be  recognized  in  any  attempt  to  reduce  everything  to 
One. 

But  in  addition  to  judgments,  to  the  attempts  to  know,  and 
the  like,  there  are  also  dijficiilties,  and  alternative  ways  of  solv- 
ing philosophical  problems.  Also,  there  are  other  human  beings 
whom  we  would  oppose  or  convince.  And  there  are  systems, — 
not  one,  but  many, — and  postulates  and  assumptions.  Then,  too, 
there  is  society,  and  custom  and  tradition,  and  hopes  and  de- 
sires, and,  also,  the  influences  of  all  these  on  that  which  some 
•  Cf.  Chaps.  X.,  XLI.,  xx. 


434  REALISM 

of  us  believe  or  hold  to  be  true.  This  leads  us  to  recognize  that 
there  are  discoveries  and  inventions,  works  of  art  and  mechan- 
ical constructions,  "things  good"  and  "things  evil,"  opinions 
and  points  of  view.  All  of  these  are  facts  in  some  seyise  and  have 
to  he  taken  account  of  in  any  system  of  philosophy  that  deals 
with  the  universe.  Systems  of  philosophy  other  than  our  own 
may  be  mere  errors  or  inventions,  but  even  then  they  are  some 
kind  of  fact  or  occurrence  within  the  universe,  so  that  our 
system  is  not  innocent  of  their  guilt. 

But  just  as  there  are  many  philosophical  systems,  so  also 
there  are  science  and  religion  and  logic,  and  different  "positions" 
within  these.  All  the  entities  which  have  appeared  in  these 
developments  have  some  sort  of  status,  either  of  error,  or  of  in- 
vention, or  of  discovery.  In  a  monistic  system  all  these  must 
be  reduced,  while  in  a  pluralistic  system  their  reduction  is 
found  impossible  and  they  all  exist  or  subsist,  although,  perhaps, 
at  different  places  and  times,  or  in  other  different  universes  of 
discourse. 

Science  and  logic  have  given  us  an  almost  inexhaustible  list 
of  entities  only  the  most  important  of  which  can  be  indicated. 
For  example,  there  are  simple  and  complex,  real  and  unreal, 
existent  and  subsistent,  inorganic  and  organic,  physical  and 
mental  entities;  there  are  individuals,  classes  and  series,  things, 
events,  qualities  and  relations;  there  are  continuity  and  dis- 
continuity, infinity,  finiteness,  and  endlessness ;  numbers,  space 
and  spaces,  and  time;  dimensions,  correspondences,  variables 
and  constants ;  intensity,  extensity,  quantity,  magnitude  and 
measurement ;  unity  and  plurality,  fields  and  domains,  universes 
of  discourse,  the  positive  and  the  negative,  conditions,  connec- 
tions and  meanings.  And  one  cannot  neglect  consciousness, 
sensations,  judgments,  reason,  emotions,  instincts,  behavior,  sat- 
isfaction, illusions,  electrons,  atoms,  molecules,  particles,  forces, 
energies,  directions,  laws.  Formidable  also  is  the  field  of  rela- 
tions in  its  resistance  1o  the  effort  to  reduce  all  "things"  to 
One,  for  in  some  sense  there  are  the  relations  of  identity,  simi- 
larity and  difference,  inclusion,  exclusion  and  contradiction, 
cause  and  function,  dependence  and  independence,  implication 
and  consistency,  whole  and  part,  logical  priority,  symmetry  and 
asymmetry,  and  transitivity  and  its  lack. 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROBLEM  435 

Finally,  for  religion  and  art,  there  are  goodness  and  beauty, 
evil  and  ugliness,  worth  and  its  opposite ;  divinity,  the  super- 
natural, creation,  emanation,  immanence  and  transcendence, 
heaven  and  hell,  God  and  immortality,  death  and  salvation. 
Be  these  errors  or  truths,  inventions  or  discoveries,  they  must 
find  their  place  in  The  One,  if  there  be  One,  or  must  resist 
reduction,  if  there  be  Many. 

This  rather  long  list  of  entities  that  in  some  sense  are  facts 
is  merely  illustrative  of  the  tremendous  manifold  of  "things" 
which  make  up  the  totality  of  the  universe,  and  which  must  he 
reduced  in  some  manner,  if  Monism  is  to  succeed. 

Yet  there  are  those  that  are  not  without  hope  in  this  task, 
as  we  have  already  seen,  though,  in  the  opinion  of  the  writer, 
this  hope  is  not  realized.  All  attempts  to  ground  a  Monism 
in  solution  of  the  ontological  problem  fail,  because  they  are  all 
attempts  which  are  based  solely  on  an  argument,  from  specific 
postulates,  that  becomes  self-contradictory  at  a  certain  points 
And  a  One  that  is  single  numerically  and  qualitatively  is  not 
discovered  empirically. 

The  realist,  therefore,  can  accept  no  one  quality  or  substance, 
no  one  "stuff,"  either  mind  or  matter,  or  some  unknown  or 
unknowable  underlying  entity,  to  which  all  other  entities  are 
reducible,  and  which  they  ultimately  are,  or  of  which  they  are 
manifestations.  Rather,  for  him,  there  are  kinds  that  are  irre- 
ducibly  different,  and  there  is  an  irreducible  plurality  of  these 
kinds.^ 

In  accepting  this  pluralistic  ontology  the  realist  and  the 
modern  rationalist  do  not,  however,  deny  that  the  numerically 
distinct  and  qualitatively  different  entities  of  the  universe  are 
related.  Indeed  it  may  be  that  there  are  no  two  entities  that 
are  not  related  in  one  or  more  ways.  But  it  is  found  that  mere 
r elatedness  does  not  carry  with  it  either  the  (causal)  dependence 
of  term  on  term,  or  the  necessity  of  an  underlying  reality  to 
mediate  any  relation.  Were  there  such  a  dependence,  and  were 
it  causal,  then  each  related  term  would  partake  of  the  nature 
of  all  the  others,  all  terms  would  fuse,  there  would  be  not  many 
terms,  but  One,  and  this  One  would  be  homogeneous  in  ehar- 

*  Chaps.  XXVI.,  II.,  3,  XXXIV.,  XXXV.,  and  XXXVIII. 
»  Cf.  Chap.  XLIV.,  II. 


436  REALISM 

acter.  Qualitative  and  numerical  monism  could  thus  be  in- 
ferred, if  it  could  be  shown  that,  because  all  terms  are  related, 
they  causally  affect  one  another.  But  this  is  precisely  what 
empirical  evidence  refutes,  since,  as  we  have  previously  dis- 
covered, there  are  undeniable  instances  of  external  and  func- 
tional relations,  i.e.,  of  terms  related  and  yet  independent.  Also, 
a  monistic  ontology  could  be  established  provided  it  were  an 
empirical  fact  of  either  sense  or  reason  that  an  underlying 
reality  mediates  the  relation  between  terms. 

Other  systems  that  are  monistic  ontologies  in  one  way  or 
another  have  also  been  found  not  to  stand  the  test  of  criticism. 
Chief  among  these  are  Subjectivism,  Positivism,  Materialism, 
Psychism,  and  the  mystical  Evolutionism  of  some  modern  phi- 
losophers. All  these  positions  collapse  when  put  to  the  test  of 
a  critical  method  whose  principles  are  presupposed  as  valid  by 
each  of  the  systems  in  question.^ 

For  our  acceptance,  then,  there  remains  only  an  ontological 
pluralism,  provided  that  no  empirical  evidence,  as  distinct  from 
the  artificial  character  of  the  above  mentioned  systems,  can  be 
found  against  this.  And  none  can.  No  all-inclusive,  all-entity- 
constituting  Being,  One  in  kind  and  number,  is  empirically  dis- 
covered; neither  is  an  entity  that  is  one  in  kind,  hut  many  in 
number,  nor  is  an  entity  that  is  many  in  kind,  but  one  in  num- 
ber. Indeed  there  is  not  even  one  principle,  one  proposition,  or 
one  state  of  affairs,  implying  all  others,  that  is  empirically  dis- 
coverable, i.e.,  there  is  no  logical  monism.''  Implication  is  found 
to  be  a  relation  that  is  widespread  in  its  subsistence,  but  it  is 
not  universal.  For  even  as  terms  are  related  without  being 
causally  dependent,  so  are  some  propositions  related  without 
there  being  implication  between  them. 

One  may  conclude,  therefore,  that,  from  the  proposition  that 
the  entities  of  the  universe  form  a  system,  no  more  unity  can  be 
deduced  {as  present  in  the  universe)  than  that  there  is  a  system 
of  individuals,  classes,  series,  and  the  like,  that  subsist  side  by 
side  "at"  some  kind  of  loci,  are  merely  consistent  with  one 
another,  and  do  not  imply  one  another.  In  other  words,  from 
the  relatedness  of  the  entities  of  the  universe,  one  can  no  more 

•  Bee  the  criticism  of  these  positions  in  Chaps.  XXIX  to  XXXIII. 
'  Cf.  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 


THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROBLEM        437 

conclude  to  the  universality  of  the  implicative  relation,  than 
one  can  to  that  of  the  causal  relation,  or  to  the  subsistence  of 
one  underlying,  all-relation-mediating  entity.  By  empirical 
means  one  cannot  go  beyond  the  specific  type  of  relation  that  is 
found  in  each  case.  And  relations  that  are  neither  implicative 
nor  causal  are  found  a-plenty. 

To  accept  this  empirical  method  and  the  specificity  of  rela- 
tions thereby  discovered  is  the  procedure  of  Eealism  and  of 
Rationalism.  But  it  is  a  procedure  that  leads  to  the  con- 
clusion, that  Monism  of  any  kind  can  be  grounded  only  arti- 
ficially, and  that  a  Pluralism  of  many  entities,  of  many  kinds, 
in  many  different  relations,  at  many  different  loci  is  the  only 
ontology  which  stands  the  test  of  empirical  investigation.  Such 
an  ontology  is,  however,  also  a  Cosmology.  For  a  universe  of 
entities  that  are  related  in  any  way  is  a  cosmos.  It  is,  then,  to 
the  task  of  presenting  a  realistic  and  rationalistic  cosmology 
that  we  now  devote  ourselves,  with  an  apology  for  the  very 
evident  insufficiency  of  our  statement  in  the  light  of  the  great 
wealth  of  material  that  is  at  hand. 


CHAPTER  XLIII 

THE  REALISTIC  SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL 
PROBLEM  1 

I.  NORMAL  OBJECTS,   II.   ERROR,   AND  III.   THE  NATURE 
CONSCIOUSNESS 

The  solution  which  Realism  and  Rationalism  give  to  the 
cosmological  problem  extends  far  beyond  the  answers  given  to 
the  questions.  Whether  law  and  order  are  discovered,  invented, 
or  projected  into  reality?  Whether  everything  is  change  and 
evolution,  or  there  is  some  rest  and  permanence?  Whether 
there  is  chance  and  novelty,   or  only   absolute   and   complete 

^Cf.  Chap.  VI. 


488  REALISM 

determinism,  and  eternally  old  "things"?  Kealism  answers 
these  questions,  but  also  does  much  more.  Pluralistic  in  its 
ontology,  it  arrives  also  at  a  broad  cosmology  in  which  the 
solutions  of  other  philosophical  problems  are  an  integral  part. 

There  is  little  need  to  restate  that  Realism  maintains  that 
terms,  relations,  laws,  principles,  regularities,  order,  classes,  and 
series  are  discovered,  and  not  invented.  Known  entity  and 
knowing  process,  whatever  its  further  nature  hiay  be,  are  found 
empirically  to  be  related  externally  and  functionally,  so  that 
there  is  no  empirical  reason  for  transforming,  as  do  all  opposed 
systems,  those  relations  and  entities  that  are  known.  System 
is  found  to  be  as  compatible  with  the  lack  of  universal  implica- 
tion and  causation  as  it  is  with  them,  and  the  subsistence  of 
relations  not  to  be  identical  with  the  dependence  of  related 
terms,  nor  mandatory  of  further  transcendent  and  mediating 
entities.  Realism  thus  takes  "things"  as  it  empirically  finds 
them.  In  this  empiricism  Realism  accepts  analysis  as  one  means 
of  discovering  fact,  and  finds  that  reason  is  free  to  follow  the 
outline-threads  of  implication,  whereby  states  of  affairs  as  well 
as  particular  objects  become  known.  Such  an  empiricism  is, 
indeed,  guaranteed  by  every  philosophical  system — even  by 
those  that  attempt  to  insist  on  contrary  doctrines.  Relying  on 
this  guarantee.  Realism  proceeds  to  the  winning  of  its  view  of 
the  detailed  nature  of  the  universe — which  is  that  totality  of 
"things"  in  which  everything  must  find  its  place. 

Some  of  the  most  important  entities  and  principles  that  are 
recognized  and  used  by  Realism  in  building  up  this  detailed 
position  are:  (1)  relations  ^nd-. organization  (not  the  same  as 
organic),  especially  the  relations  of  similarity  and  difference, 
inclusion,  "member  of,"  asymmetry,  transitivity,  correlation, 
logical  priority,  and  independence  as  a  very  special  type  that  is 
distinct  from  causation;  (2)  the  methods  of  knowing  by  type 
and  of  analyzing  in  situ.  The  most  important  general  hy- 
potheses are  those  in  which  the  ubiquitous  application  of  the 
concepts  of  substance  and  cause  is  looked  at  askance,  and  con- 
tradiction is  robbed  of  its  terrors.  And  important  among  special^ 
problems  are  those  of  error  and  of  the  nature  of  consciousness. 
These  two  problems  hang  together  most  intimately,  and  ac- 
cording as  one  solution  or  another  is  obtained  for  them,  one 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      439 

is  forced  to  accept  specific  solutions  of  certain  other  problems. 
Conversely,  if  one  solve  other  problems  first,  the  solutions  thus 
obtained  (may)  have  a  most  important  bearing  on  the  solution 
of  this  twofold  problem. 

In  elucidation  of  the  statements  it  may  be  said,  that,  through- 
out the  greater  part  of  the  historical  development  of  philosophy 
consciousness  has  been  regarded  as  a  kind  of  thing,  substance, 
medium,  or  menstruum,^  and  accordingly,  that  the  problem  of 
error  has  been  solved  by  putting  all  errors  entirely  into  this 
conscious  medium,  thus  to  make  their  esse  their  percipi  or 
concipi.  This  is  the  solution  which  is  made,  e.g.,  of  the  specific 
problem  as  to  the  status  of  the  dreamt  "falling  from  a  roof," 
of  the  seen  convergence  of  the  parallel  rails,  and  of  the  apparent 
bentness  of  the  straight  stick  in  the  water.  Thus,  in  the  case 
of  the  last  example,  it  is  argued  that  the  stick  cannot  be  hoth 
straight  and  not  straight  (bent),  since  these  are  contradictories; 
therefore,  to  avoid  the  contradiction,  the  straight  stick  only  is 
accepted  as  real,  while  the  locus  of  the  bentness  is  placed  in 
consciousness.^  For  consciousness,  conceived  of  as  a  substance 
or  medium,  is  indeed  a  sort  of  receptacle  in  which  all  entities 
that  are  not  objective  can  (seemingly)  be  placed.  Historically, 
therefore,  it  has  been  the  concept  of  substance  that,  as  applied 
to  consciousness,  has  conditioned  a  certain  specific  solution  of 
the  problem  of  error.  And  with  all  error-objects  regarded  as 
subjective,  the  next  step  to  Subjectivism  has  been  easy,  namely, 
to  conclude  that  all  objects  are  in  their  esse  identical  with  their 
percipi  or  with  their  coiicipi.^ 

'  Cf.  Chap.  III. 

'  Cf.  as  a  typical  example  of  this  argument  the  articles  by  A.  0. 
Lovejoy:  "Reflections  of  a  Temporalist  on  the  New  Realism,"  Jour,  of 
Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  VIII.,  pp.  589-590;  "Secondary 
Qualities  and  Subjectivity,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  XL,  p.  214  tf.;  "Relativity,  Reality,  and  Contradiction,"  Jour,  of 
Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XI.,  p.  420  ff.;  also  see  M.  R. 
Cohen's  replies  to  Lovejoy:  "The  Supposed  Contradiction  in  the  Diversity 
of  Secondary  Qualities,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  XL,  pp.  510-512,  and  "  Qualities,  Relations,  and  Things,"  Jour,  of 
Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XL,  pp.  617-627;  cf.,  also, 
F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge.  "  The  Deception  of  the  Senses,"  Jour,  of  Phil., 
Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  X.,  pp.  5-13,  and  A.  0.  Lovejoy,  "  Some 
Novelties  of  the  New  Realism,"  Jour,  of  Phil,  Psych.,  and  Scientific 
Methods,  Vol.  X.,  pp.  29-43;  also  the  Essays  by  Montague  and  Holt  in 
The  New  Realism,  and  Holt,  The  Concept  of  Consciousness,  Chap.  XIIL 

*  Cf.  Chap.  XXX. 


440  REALISM 

On  the  other  hand,  the  independent  investigation  of  error  in 
recent  times  has  been  held  by  some  philosophers  to  lead  to  the 
acceptance  of  such  a  view  as  to  the  nature  of  consciousness  that 
it  must  be  regarded  as  a  substance  or  medium.  The  argument 
of  these  philosophers  has  been,  again,  that  contradictory  char- 
acteristics cannot  coexist,  and  that  accordingly  the  locus  of 
apparent  "things"  can  only  be  in  consciousness.  Or  the  argu- 
ment has  been,  that  dreamt,  imagined,  remembered,  and  con- 
ceived objects  do  not  exist,  and  therefore  cannot  be  efficient  in 
producing  a  consciousness  of  them,  so  that  consciousness  itself 
must  produce  them.^ 

The  first  of  these  arguments  fails  to  convince,  since  it  ignores 
other  possihilities  as  to  the  locus  of  the  apparent  object, — e.g., 
in  the  case  of  the  bentness  of  the  stick,  the  complex,  stick,  water, 
and  light.  And  the  second  argument  also  fails,  because  it 
neglects  certain  efficiencies,  which,  though  not  causal,  are  never- 
theless real.^  If  these  efficiencies  are  considered,  then,  e.g., 
dream-objects  are  as  real  as  are  existent  ones,  although  they  are 
not  realities  of  the  same  kind  as  are  these  last. 

From  this  it  is  evident  that  a  specific  theory  as  to  the  nature 
of  consciousness  leads  to  a  specific  solution  of  the  problem  of 
error,  and,  conversely,  that  a  specific  solution  of  the  problem 
of  error  leads  to  a  specific  theory  as  to  the  nature  of  conscious- 
ness. But  it  also  thereby  becomes  evident,  that  another  and 
different  specific  theory  as  to  consciousness  should  lead  to  a 
different  solution  of  error,  and  conversely,  another  and  different 
theory  of  error  to  a  different  view  as  to  the  nature  of  con- 
sciousness. These  suppositions  are  confirmed  by  that  account 
which  Kealism  and  Rationalism  give  of  both  consciousness  and 
error.  Consciousness  is  found  not  to  be  a  substance,  energy, 
medium,  or  menstruum;  error  not  to  be  subjective  in  its  locus 
and  status. 

One  may  start  with  either  problem  in  order  to  establish  these 
conclusions.  Thus,  on  the  one  hand,  one  may  first  ask  the 
question,  What  is  that  condition  on  which  the  genuine  knowl- 
edge of  objects,  as  unmodified  by  the  very  act  of  knowing,  is 
possible?  and  then  find  in  answer  that  this  condition  is,  that 

°  Lovejoy's  articles,  cited  in  note  3,  are  typical  ol  this  position. 
"Cf.  Chap.  XLIV. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      441 

knowing  and  object  should  be  externally,  i.e.,  not  causally 
related.'  But  the  further  condition  for  such  a  non-causal  rela- 
tion is,  that  knowing  and  consciousness  should  not  be  of  the 
nature  of  a  substance,  after  the  historical  model  of  a  physical 
thing  with  a  substratum  and  inhering  qualities.^  For,  if  con- 
sciousness were  such  an  entity,  it  would  causally  affect  that  to 
which  it  is  related,  and  so  alter  the  entity  to  he  known.  There- 
fore, if,  as  the  very  condition  for  there  being  genuine  knowing, 
consciousness  cannot  ie  a  suhstance,  its  capacity  is  lost  for 
holding  or  containing  all  dreamt,  illusory,  remembered,  im- 
agined, and  conceived  objects,  after  the  manner  of  qualities 
inhering  in  a  substratum,  and  these  objects  must  be  in  some 
other  locus. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  one  first  investigates  errors  or  error- 
objects  in  specific  instances,  he  finds  that  there  already  is  a 
locus  for  them  other  than  a  substance-like  consciousness.  For 
example,  in  the  case  of  the  bentness  of  the  straight  stick  in 
the  water,  this  locus  is  the  complex,  stick,  water,  and  light, 
while  in  the  instance  of  the  parallel  rails  it  is  the  complex,  rails 
and  light.^  The  substitution  of  a  camera  for  a  perceiving 
organism  establishes  this  in  both  instances. 

For  all  other  cases  of  objects  that  are  illusory  or  hallucinatory, 
remembered  or  imagined,  hypothetical  or  abstract  in  general, 
a  very  similar  solution  can  be  found.  The  "force"  that  his- 
torically and  traditionally  is  used  to  "drive"  all  such  objects 
into  a  receptacle-like  consciousness, — already  modeled  after  the 
analogy  of  a  physical  thing — and  that  makes  of  this  a  sub- 
stance, springs  either  (1)  from  the  necessity  of  avoiding  a 
specific  contradiction  or  (2)  from  regarding  only  normal 
physical  objects  as  possessing  efficiency. 

However,  these  two  difficulties  are  avoided,  and  other  possi- 
bilities are  opened  up  by  bearing  in  mind  the  true  nature  of 
contradiction.  This  is,  as  we  have  seen,  exclusion}^  Exclusion 
is  a  real  fact  in  the  universe.  But  what  features  of  the  universe 
are  exclusive  of  one  another  is  to  be  ascertained  only  by  eni- 

^  Cf.   the   criticisms   of   opposed   theories    in    Chaps.    XXIX.-XXXVIII., 
also  in  Chaps.  I.,  II.,  and  III. 
«  Cf.  Chap.  III. 

•  Cf .  Chaps.  X.,  XI.,  XL.,  n.,  XLI.,  xx. 
^°  Chap.  XVI. 


44S  REALISM 

pirical  investigation.  A  priori,  solidity  and  color  might  be 
thought  to  exclude  each  other  from  coexisting  in  the  same  place 
at  the  same  time,  but  empirically  they  are  found  to  coexist. 
Blue  and  red,  however,  are  found  to  exclude  each  other  under 
such  conditions.  If  entities  are  mutually  exclusive,  they  must 
subsist  in  different  loci,  though  it  is  for  empirical  investigation 
to  find  out  what  these  loci  are.  They  may  be  spatial,  temporal, 
or  logical.  If  entities  do  not  have  excluding  characteristics, 
they  may  cosubsist  at  the  same  locus,  whatever  this  may  be. 
Thus  the  ghost  that  is  imagined  to  be  stalking  in  a  room  is 
really  there,  though  as  a  non-existing  reality.  Some  place  in 
the  cosmos  must  certainly  be  found  for  it,  and  if  this  locus  is 
not  consciousness,  it  can  be  space,  although  the  ghost  does  not 
belong  to  the  universe  of  discourse  of  existent  objects.  Once 
relieved  from  the  necessity  of  identifying  the  locus  of  all  such 
entities  with  consciousness,  one  is  free  to  find  other  loci. 
And,  conversely,  one  is  freed  from  the  hypothesis  that  con- 
sciousness is  a  substance,  by  this  very  possibility  of  putting 
error-objects  into  some  other  locus  than  consciousness. 

Analogously,  by  realizing  that  entities  other  than  physical 
objects  have  efficiency,  and  that  causation  is  not  the  only  in- 
stance or  kind  of  efficiency,  one  is  relieved  from  concluding  that, 
e.g.,  objects  that  are  remembered  and  yet  no  longer  exist,  are 
factual  only  in  a  receptacle-like  consciousness.  Within  the 
cosmos  past  time  is  a  reality  in  some  sense,  quite  as  much  as 
are  the  future  and  the  "specious"  present,  and  past  (physical) 
occurrences  and  objects  are  also  real,  though  perhaps  not  as 
existing.  Yet  as  real  they  are  efficient,  though  not  causally  so — 
which  they  need  not  be.  And  as  efficient  in  a  non-causal  sense, 
they  account  in  part  for  the  consciousness  of  them, — when  the 
demand  is  made  that  this  consciousness  be  accounted  for.  In 
this  way  one  reaches  the  conclusion,  that,  e.g.,  though  the  red 
mittens  of  his  boyhood  have  long  since  disappeared  into  mere 
nothingness,  still  they  need  not  subsist  in  his  consciousness  when 
he  remembers  them,  but  are  quite  as  well  oft"  with  an  efficient 
subsistence  in  a  time,  which,  though  past,  is  nevertheless  real. 

This  solution  of  the  twofold  problem  of  error  and  of  the 
nature  of  consciousness,  namely  (1)  that  error-objects  are  not 
subjective   (conscious)    in  their  locus  and  character,  and    (2) 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      413 

that  consciousness  is  not  a  substance,  may  itself  he  ohtained 
either  before  other  cosmological  problems  are  solved,  or  after. 
In  either  case,  however,  the  solutions  obtained  for  some  problems 
are  helpful  as  regards  others.  There  may  be  a  psychological 
influence  of  one  procedure  on  another  in  solving  problems,  but, 
unless  the  states  of  affairs,  the  entities  investigated,  are  de- 
pendent in  such  a  vs^ay  as  mutually  to  constitute  one  another, 
one  is  free  both  logically  and  psychologically  to  begin  with 
almost  any  problem.  But  that  there  is  an  independeiice  among 
states  of  affairs  and  universes  of  discourse,  and  the  like,  has 
already  been  shown  to  be  a  fact.  We  are  free,  therefore,  to 
solve  other  cosmological  problems  in  the  light  of  our  solution 
of  the  twofold  problem  of  error  and  the  nature  of  consciousness, 
or  conversely.  But  our  realistic  cosmology  must  be  such  as  to 
include  the  solution  of  these  problems,  since  they  concern 
entities  that  have  some  "place"  in  that  totality  which  is  the 
universe. 

In  deriving  this  detailed  realistic  cosmology,  one  should  con- 
tinually bear  in  mind  the  great  manifold  of  entities  both  in 
kind  and  number  that  are  "somewhere"  in  the  universe.  But 
one  also  should  not  forget  that  there  is  not  more  order  in  the 
universe  than  there  actually  is,  and  that  the  universe  as  the 
totality  of  entities  is  quite  compatible  with  a  bare  minimum  of 
relationships,  namely,  with  the  merely  additive  relation  ex- 
pressed by  "and,"  and  with  the  relations  of  similarity  and  dif- 
ference. If  the  presence  of  only  these  relations  means  that  the 
universe  is  a  Chaos,  and  not  a  Cosmos,  then  Chaos  it  is.  In 
fact,  certain  philosophies,  notably  Humanism,  accept  this  possi- 
bility, and  endeavor  to  make  not  only  the  three  relations  just 
mentioned,  but  also  all  others,  merely  human  inventions  that  are 
"read  into"  the  universe,  but  that  are  not  of  it.  However, 
Humanism  always  neglects  to  inquire  if  some  order,  and,  there- 
fore, some  cosmology  is  not  already  presupposed  in  the  very 
possibility  of  these  inventions  as  human  institutions.^^ 

The  realist,  however,  basing  his  position  on  rationalism,  finds 
that  there  are  a  great  many  other  relations  than  those  just  men- 
tioned, and  that  all  relations  are  objective  to  the  knowing  con- 
sciousness, and  not  resident  in  it.^^ 

"  Chap.  XXXIII.,  V.  and  vi.  "  Cf.  Chap.  II. 


444  REALISM 

rv.   COMPLEX  ENTITIES;  V.   CREATIVE  SYNTHESIS;   VI.   FREEDOM 

The  physical  universe  is  accepted  by  Realism  essentially  as 
it  is  portrayed  by  the  physical  sciences,  notably  astronomy, 
physics,  chemistry  and  physical  chemistry,  physiology,  and 
biology.  "Fundamental"  realities  other  than  those  which,  such 
as  electrons,  are  discovered  by  these  sciences,  are  not  accepted, 
i.e.,  the  physical  universe  is  not  regarded  as  transformable  into, 
e.g.,  One  Underlying  Spirit,  of  which  all  else  is  manifestation.^^ 

Yet  Realism  criticizes  these  sciences,  or,  rather,  the  scientist 
who  pursues  them,  when  he  becomes  short-sighted  and  dogmatic, 
and  identifies  the  story  which  these  sciences  tell  with  the  whole 
story  that  is  to  be  told.  Such  dogmatism  leads  to  Naturalism.^* 
There  is  much  else  in  the  universe  besides  those  entities  that  are 
studied  by  the  natural  sciences.^^ 

Further,  Realism  does  not  consider  or  regard  the  physical 
sciences  to  be  either  entirely  correct,  or  complete.  The  scientist 
makes  errors,  taking  that  to  be  existent  which  may  not  be,  and 
making  only  approximations  in  most,  if  not  in  all  cases.  But 
there  is  nothing  inherent  in  this  situation  either  to  prevent 
errors  from  being  eradicated,  and  from  having  their  own  nature 
revealed,  or  to  preclude  existent  entities  from  being  discovered, 
and  ever  closer  approximations  made.  Also,  many  entities  and 
many  kinds  of  entities  may  be  still  unknown,  but  there  is  nothing 
in  the  knowing  situation  to  make  them  essentially  unknowable. ^'^ 

Contradictions  exist  or  suhsLst  in  the  realm  of  the  physical 
sciences  in  the  sense  in  which  contradiction  has  been  defined, ^'^ 
but  there  are  no  se?/-contradictions,  and  no  contradictions  that 
cannot  be  resolved.  For  example,  there  are  contradictory  the- 
ories, of  course;  but  this  situation  can  be  solved  by  showing 
that  the  entities  denoted  by  one  theory  are  not  in  the  same  locus 
or  universe  of  discourse  as  are  those  denoted  by  another,^**  and, 
therefore,  cosubsist.  Thus  the  entities  of  one  theory  may  be 
existents,  those  of  another,  non-existent  subsistents,  such  as, 
e.g.,    is    the    "hypothetical"    perpetual    motion    machine    of 

"  Cf.  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 

''  Chaps.  XXXll.,  I.,  II..  and  in. 

"  Cf..  e.g..  Chaps.  XL,  XXL,  XXII.,  XXV.,  XXVII.,  XLV. 

'"  Chap.  XLl.,  XX. 

"  Chap.  XVI. 

"•  Cf.  Chap.  XVI. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      445 

mechanics.  For  such  a  machine  is  a  rationally  consistent  reality. 
Likewise  each  instance  of  a  seemingly  damaging  and  always 
formally  expressible  contradiction  in  the  realm  of  existent 
physical  entities,  as,  e.g.,  the  parallel  rails  and  their  apparent 
convergence  (non-parallel),  this  red  and  that  blue  and  that 
solidity  (both  not-red) ,  can  always  be  solved  by  finding  a  dif- 
ferent spatial  locus,  if  the  entities  exclude  one  another,  or  a 
common  locus,  if  it  is  a  fact  that  they  coexist. 

Within  this  physical  universe  one  finds  innumerable  instances 
of  such  relations  as  cause  and  effect,  function,  independence, 
logical  priority,  and  whole  and  part,  whereby  there  is  organiza- 
tion— though  in  every  instance  of  a  specific  kind.  Accordingly 
one  finds  different  types  of  wholes,  of  parts,  of  unities,  and  of 
individuals.^^  Some  of  these  types  are  not  usually  noticed  by 
the  natural  scientist,  and  may,  therefore,  be  advantageously 
brought  to  attention  in  the  presentation  of  a  realistic  cosmology. 

The  physical  sciences,  together  with  common  sense,  accept  the 
existence  of  individual  things,  such  as  tables  and  books,  batteries 
and  bombs,  gas  fumes  and  smoke,  though  there  may  not  be 
agreement  as  to  the  definition  of  a  thing,  and,  therefore,  dif- 
ficulty in  some  eases  in  determining  whether  "something"  is 
a  thing  or  not — as,  e.g.,  a  current  of  electricity.  But  Avithin 
that  realm  in  which  there  is  agreement  as  to  what  entities  are 
things,  it  is  recognized  that  things  move  and  also  undergo  a 
change  in  quality,  and  therefore  that  also  there  are  relations  of 
causation,  and  of  similarity  and  difference.  But  as  both  similar 
and  different,  things  form  classes  in  respect  to  specific  qualities 
and  characteristics,-"  Thus,  e.g.,  there  are  some  beings  that 
reproduce  their  kind,  are  sensitive  and  respond  to  stimuli,  and 
some  that  do  not;  and  in  turn  among  these  beings  there  are 
those  that  have  a  nervous  system  consisting  of  a  brain  and 
spinal  cord,  and  those  that  have  not.  But  also,  as  somewhat 
different  from  these  classificatory  characters,  there  are  the 
electrical,  magnetic,  thermic,  osmotic,  chemical,  and  other 
forces  that  are  present  in  individual  physical  things,  or  of  which 
a  particular  physical  thing  is  a  complex,  and  in  respect  to  these 
characteristics  there  are  also  classes.  The  class  in  each  such 
instance  is  composed  of  individuals;  yet  in  the  midst  of  the 
"  Chap.  XXVII.  '"  Cf.  Chap.  XIII. 


446  REALISM 

individuality  there  is  a  specific  similarity,  which  is  the  fact  of 
otie  state  of  affairs  for  all  individuals.  This  fact,  however,  is 
not  identical  with  any  one  individual  of  the  class,  nor  with 
the  whole  group  of  individuals  that  make  up  the  class.  It  is, 
rather,  "over  and  above'  both  individual  and  group,  and  may 
be  called  the  "objective  concept,"  the  knowledge  of  which  is 
the  subjective  concept.  States  of  affairs  of  this  kind  hold  of  the 
individuals  of  all  classes,  being,  in  respect  to  the  individuals  of 
which  they  hold,  inclusive  of  some,  and  exclusive  of  other  indi- 
viduals, while  they  may  also,  as  specific  states  of  affairs,  them- 
selves be  members  of  other  classes.  Generic  facts  of  this  kind 
are  tacitly  recognized,  though  they  are  not  explicitly  formulated 
by  the  physical  sciences. 

More  interesting,  however,  than  these — to  the  logician — very 
trite  matters  are  certain  other  facts  that  also  are  not  usually 
recognized  by  the  scientist.  Certain  individual  objects,  e.g., 
those  individuals  that  go  by  such  names  as  protozoa,  porifera, 
and  coelenterates,  are  groups  of  certain  specific  biological  attri- 
butes that  are  organized'  by  one  or  more  relations,  and  that  co- 
exist in  the  same  place  at  the  same  time.  But  in  addition  to 
the  biological  properties  of  these  individuals,  there  are  other. 
parts,  and  the  attributes  of  these  parts.  Thus,  e.g.,  some  of  the 
parts  of  an  amoeba  are  (1)  molecules  in  colloidal  solution,  (2) 
atoms,  and,  if  modern  physics  is  correct,  (3)  electrons.  Yet 
each  of  these  is  also  a  whole  as  well  as  a  part;  in  one  relation 
it  is  the  former,  in  another,  the  latter. 

In  a  similar  manner  any  organism  is  iXHeU.many  "things" 
at  the  same  time.  It  is  both  one  and  fnawjl;  also,  both  organism 
and  physiccd  object.  As  an  organism  it  is  one  and  is  related  to 
other  organisms  in  many  ways,  while  as  a  physical  and  chemical 
object  it  is  subject  to  gravitation,  to  thermic  and  electric  forces, 
and  is  a  complex,  perhaps,  indeed,  finally  an  organized  group 
of  a  tremendous  number  of  electrons.  The  fact  that  it  is  organ- 
ized does  not,  however,  make  it  organic,  for  many  organized 
entities  are  not  organic.  Thus,  atoms  are  organized  into  a 
molecule,  but  the  latter  is  not  organic.  The  organic  character 
of  the  organism  is  identical,  rather,  with  those  specific  attributes 
which  appear  as  a  result  of  its  specific  organization. 

An  organism  is  each  one  of  all  these  "things"  and  attributes 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM   44,7 

by  virtue  of  being  an  organized  whole,  or  a  relational  complex. 
But  it  could  be  a  moving  body  and  a  chemical  complex  without 
being  a  living  being.  Therefore  some  of  the  "things"  or  quali- 
ties which  an  organism  is  by  virtue  of  the  organization  of  cer- 
tain parts,  such  as  colloidal  particles,  molecules,  and  atoms, 
are  7iot  necessitated,  implied,  or  caused  by,  though  they  are 
compatible  with,  such  parts. 

The  situation  just  described  as  holding  for  any  organism  is 
one  that  is  found  to  be  repeated  for  all  complex  and  organized 
individuals,  living  and  non-living,  plant  and  animal,  in  the 
physical  world,  additive  wholes  alone  being  the  exception.  In- 
deed it  is  a  situation  that  is  also  found  in  the  mental  realm,  and 
in  that  field  which  is  neither  physical  nor  mental,  yet  factual, 
namely,  the  field  of  subsistents.  Certain  further  and  important 
aspects  of  this  situation  should  now  be  mentioned. 

In  the  physical  world  (and  elsewhere)  it  is  an  established 
empirical  fact,  that  parts  as  non-additively  organized  form  a 
whole  which  has  characterictics  that  are  qualitatively  different 
from  the  characteristics  of  the  parts.  A  simple  and  familiar 
illustration  of  this  is  the  formation  of  water  out  of  hydrogen 
and  oxygen.  The  relation  between  hydrogen  and  oxygen  is 
7iot  additive,  but  organizing,  and  the  characteristics  of  the 
water  are  not  the  same  as  are  those  of  its  chemical  components. 
Also,  the  appearance  of  these  7iew  characteristics  (of  the  whole) 
is  not  nullified  by  the  hypothesis  that  they  are  potential  in  the 
parts  in  any  sense ;  for,  even  if  it  be  granted  that  this  hypothesis 
does  anything  more  than  conceal  our  ignorance,  it  but  repeats 
the  problem  in  the  form  of  the  question  as  to  Jiow  the  existential 
appears  out  of  the  qualitatively  different  potential.  On  the 
other  hand,  if  the  hypothesis,  that  there  are  non-additive  rela- 
tions, is  accepted  as  an  empirically  established  principle  from 
which  deductions  concerning  specific  instances  can  be  made, 
then  one  can  understand  in  just  this  sense  the  specific  de  novo 
appearance  of  certain  qualities.  "Things"  added  give  merely 
a  total  of  the  same  qualities  as  the  parts  have.  For  example, 
one  atom  of  carbon  plus  another,  plus  a  third,  are  three  times 
one  atom  in  respect  to  all  qualities  that  one  atom  has.  But 
three  atoms  of  any  kind  organized  chemically,  i.e.,  related  nan- 
additively,  are  a  molecule,  even  as  H  H  0  organized  are  water, 


448  REALISM 

and  the  resulting  whole  has  characteristics  different  from  those 
of  the  parts. 

This  process  of  the  formation  of  new  qualities  through  the 
organization  of  parts  into  wholes  may  be  called  creative  syn- 
thesis. Just  as  in  the  case  of  classes,  in  which  individuals  are 
organized  by  the  relation  of  similarity,  the  state  of  affairs  of 
a  specific  similarity  is  itself  unitary  and  not  many,  and  is  dis- 
tinct both  from  each  individual  of  the  class,  and  from  the  class 
as  a  whole,  so  in  other  organized  wholes  a  similar  situation 
is  found.-^  Certain  specific  relations,  recognized,  named,  and 
technically  formulated  in  special  sciences,  organize  parts  into 
wholes,  and  there  are  states  of  affairs  resulting  that  are  identical 
with  new  properties,  and  that  are  different  and  distinct  from 
the  individual  parts  and  their  properties.  Therefore  the  reduc- 
tion of  these  new  properties  to  those  of  the  parts  in  the  sense  of 
identification,  and  the  finding  of  a  causal  determination  also 
in  this  same  sense  is  impossible.  The  properties  of  the  whole 
are,  at  least  some  of  them,  new,  and  in  just  this  respect  are  a 
''law  unto  themselves"  and  in  this  sense  free.  This  does  not 
mean  that  they  are  lawless,  but  only  that  their  specific  prin- 
ciples of  "behavior"  are  not  identical  with  those  of  the  parts. 

Such  a  situation,  however,  presents  certain  interesting  and 
important  instances  of  principles  that  have  been  emphasized 
throughout  this  volume.  An  individual,  defined  as  the  sub- 
sistence and  perhaps  coexistence  of  several  qualities,  attributes, 
or  characteristics  in  the  same  locus,  is  m- ny  "things"  at  once, 
which,  however,  are  not  all  causal  derivj: lives  of  one  another. 
Thus,  e.g.,  an  organism  is  a  biological  individual,  with  specific 
characteristics  that  follow  biological  laws;  but  it  is  also  a 
physical  complex  of  forces  that  follows  the  laws  of  physics,  and 
a  chemical  complex  of  entities  that  follows  the  laws  of  chemistry. 
For  each  biological  quality  and  its  changes  there  are  correspond- 
ing purely  physical  and  chemical  qualities  and  changes,  hut  this 
relation  of  correspondence  is  not  causal.  Rather,  it  is  func- 
tional. The  physical  and  chemical  changes  could  take  place 
without  there  being  a  biological  individual.  Therefore,  it  is 
their  organization  by  specific  organizing  relations  that  "gives" 
the  organism  and  the  qualities  that  arc  peculiar  to  it.^^     And 

*'Cf.  Chap.  XXVIl.  "' Cf.  lialdwiii,  Divelopmfnt  and  Evolution. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      449 

the  situation  is  quite  the  same  as  regards  inorganic  physical 
bodies  and  their  chemical  constituents.  In  both  cases  constit- 
uent parts  may  come  and  go,  hut  the  organization  remains; 
the  latter  is  more  permanent  than  the  residence  in  it  of  the 
''material"  parts. 

At  or  within  each  level  of  phenomena  that  thus  results  from 
the  organization  of  parts  into  a  whole  causal  relations  exist,  and 
individuals  are  found  to  resemble  one  another  in  respect  to 
these  relations.  Accordingly  empirical  causal  laws  are  discov- 
erable. Thus,  e.g.,  the  entrance  of  the  nucleus  of  the  sperma- 
tozoon into  the  ovum  is  said  to  cause  cell  division.  But  this 
empirical  fact,  at  this  level,  is  neither  supplanted  by,  nor 
incompatible  with,  nor  deducible  from,  the  further  facts,  that 
both  spermatozoon  and  ovum  are  physical  bodies  and  complexes 
of  chemical  compounds,  and  follow  physical  and  chemical 
laws. 

From  facts  of  this  kind  there   is   derivable   an   interesting  ^ 
definition  of  freedom  that  may  best  be  indicated  by  first  em- 
ploying it,  to  the  effect,  that  at  each  level  or  stratum  of  reality 
formed  by  the  non-additive  organization  of  parts  into  a  whole, 
qualities  or  phenomena  are  free  to  act  in  accordance  loith  their 
own  nature  and  their  own  causal  connections  iviih  other  quali- 
ties of  this  level,  for  the  absence  of  these  qualities  at  other  and 
"lower"  levels  is  the  absence  of  the  occasion  either  for  deter- 
mination {or  its  lack)  in  respect  to  these  qualities.    No  higher 
level  violates  the  laws  of  those  lower  levels  which,  in  individual 
instances,  are  organized  in  the  higher  level  as  its  constituent 
parts;  but  also  no  loiver  level  causally  determines  any  higher 
level.    Accordingly  there  is  the  interesting  and,  for  the  solution 
of  many  a  moot  question  in  both  philosophy  and  science,  im- 
portant principle,  that  as  between  any  ttvo  levels  there  is  (1)  no  , 
occasion  for  conflict,  but  only  opportunity  for  compatibility ;  I 
yet   (2)   no  possibility  of  derivation  and  deduction  of  higher 
levels  from  lower,  and  therefore   (3)    no  complete  identity  of  , 
higher  levels  with  lower,  so  that  (4)  all  levels  that  are  higher  | 
in  relation  to  others  as  lower  are  primarily  discoverable  and 
ascertainable    only    by   inductive   and   empirical   investigation, 
although  (5)  once  discovered,  the  compatibility  and  correlation 
of  higher  levels  with  lower  is  also  determinable,  so  that  (6)  sub-  \ 


450  REALISM 

sequently  computations  in  terms  of  lower  levels  may  be  made 
as  the  means  of  control  and  prediction  of  higher  levels,  even  as 
this  is  done,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  instance  of  every  cor- 
relation of  independent  (lower)  and  dependent  variable  (higher 
level).  This  principle  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  in  all  those 
instances  in  which,  by  means  of  the  most  exact  and  precise 
analysis  and  measurement,  a  correlation  of  all  higher  levels  with 
that  level  which  is  lowest  and  most  fundamental  has  been  estab- 
lished, namely,  with  the  number  series,  this  series  is  used  as 
a  means  of  computation  and  prediction  and  the  like.  But  this 
fact  does  not  mean,  certainly,  the  complete  identity  of  all  higher 
levels  with  number. 

Freedom  consists,  therefore,  of  action  in  accordance  with  those 
characteristics  which  subsist  at  a  certain  level  of  organization, 
but  do  not  exist  at  other  (lower)  levels,  yet  is  quite  compatible 
with  law  and  determination  both  at  this  higher  level  and  at 
lower  levels.  Freedom  of  this  kind  subsists  at  each  level  of 
reality  in  the  universe,  not  only  in  the  mental,  but  also  all 
through  the  physical  and  the  merely  subsistent  realms. 

An  example  of  this  phase  of  realistic  and  rationalistic  cos- 
mology will  help  both  to  make  our  discussion  clear,  and  to 
present  considerations  of  very  practical  bearing. 

A  human  being  is,  like  other  living  beings,  at  one  and  the 
same  time  a  biological  individual,  a  complex  of  chemical  com- 
pounds, and  a  physical  object.  Even  that  which  distinguishes 
him  as  human  from  other  living  beings  is  his  pecidiar  biological, 
physical,  and  chemical  organization.  But  a  human  being  is  also 
an  ethical  and  a  reasoning  being.  However,  neither  his  ethical 
nor  his  rational  nature  conflicts  with  his  biological,  his  phj^sical, 
or  his  chemical  characteristics,  since,  by  virtue  of  the  former 
he  is  something  more  than — he  is  over  and  above — the  latter. 
The  particular  ethical  and  rational  characteristics  presuppose 
the  particular  biological,  physical,  and  chemical  characteristics 
embodied  in  any  one  human  individual,  but  they  cannot  be 
derived  from  or  identified  with  these  latter,  though,  once  dis- 
covered, they  can  in  some  way  be  correlated  with  them.  But 
from  this  there  follows  the  conclusion — of  the  gravest  impor- 
tance for  the  world  in  the  present  world-conflict  of  standards — 
that  ethics  is  not  a  iranch  of  biology,  even  as  biology  is  not  a 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      451 

branch  of  chemistry  and  physics,  and  also  that  conscience,  will, 
and  reason,  although  not  undetermined  and  lawless,  are  never- 
theless free — free,  however,  in  the  very  specific  sense  of  being 
realities  in  a  realm  from  which  causation  is  absent,  hut  in  which 
the  ideals  of  right  and  justice  and  truth  are  present  as  ef- 
ficiencies, thus  to  lead  men  to  'act  as  they  ought  to  act,  and 
to  reason  as  the  implicative  structure  of  reality  dictates,  and 
not  as  tradition  and  custom  and  authority  would  have  them 
reason. 

VII.  AND  Vm.   SPACE  AND  TIME  AS  PART   OP  THE   COSMOS 
INFINITY   AND   CONTINUITY  ^^ 

The  cosmological  principles  thus  far  discovered  are  further 
exemplified  by  such  entities  as  space  and  time  in  contrast  with 
their  constituent  parts,  and  by  the  relation  of  the  physical 
world  to  these  two  entities. 

It  is  a  commonplace,  of  course,  to  remark,  that  the  physical 
world  is  spatial  (and  temporal),  but  just  what  this  means,  as 
a  proposition,  is  anything  but  a  matter  of  common  knowledge. 
Accordingly  a  determination  of  the  more  exact  and  precise 
meaning  of  this  statement  will  be  attempted,  as  an  essential  part 
of  our  outline  of  realistic  cosmology. 

Several  meanings  to  the  statement  that  the  physical  world  is 
spatial  are  distinguishable,  as,  e.g.,  that  physical  objects  (1)  are 
spatially  extended,  or,  (2)  as  extended,  exist  in  space,  or  (3) 
have  the  same  characteristics  as  space,  or  (4)  presuppose  space. 
The  latter  meaning  is,  however,  most  important,  since  the  former 
three  either  reduce  to,  or  depend  upon  this  specific  relation  of 
presupposition.  Therefore,  with  the  characteristics  of  this  rela- 
tion determined,  the  former  meanings  can  be  made  clear,  pro- 
vided the  nature  of  space  itself  is  first  explained. 

Physical  objects  presuppose  space  in  the  sense,  that  they  could 
not  exist  were  space  not  a  reality,  but  that  space  would  be  a 
reality  without  them.  Briefiy,  space  is  logically  prior  to  physical 
objects.  Physical  objects  depend  on  space,  but  are  not  caused 
by  space ;  they  do  not  constitute  space,  and  space  does  not  depend 

^''Cf.  this  presentation  with  Chaps.  I.,  XXL,  XXII.,  XXIII.,  XXIV., 
and  XXVU. 


452  REALISM 

on  them,  yet  space  constitutes  them  in  part,  and  conditions  them, 
though  not  causally. 

Space,  like  time,  is  an  organized  whole  or  relational  complex, 
that  consists  of  several  kinds  of  parts,  and  that  has  various 
characteristics.  It  consists  of  dimensions,  such  as  lines,  planes, 
and  volumes,  in  specific  relations  to  one  another,  and  also  of 
points.  Also,  any  finite  space  consists  of  smaller  spaces;  i.e., 
lines,  as  finite,  consist  of  smaller  lines,  planes,  of  smaller  planes, 
and  volumes,  of  smaller  volumes.  These  several  kinds  of  parts, 
as  organized  in  specific  instances  by  certain  specific  relations, 
form  ivJioles;  for  space  is  not  the  merely  additive  result  of  its 
parts,  but  is  a  non-additive  whole.  Indeed,  this  is  the  secret  of 
the  fact  (1)  that  points,  defined  as  the  unextended  elements  of 
space,  form  extension  of  one  dimension,  as  it  is  also  of  the  facts, 
(2)  that  lines  form  a  plane,  and  (3)  planes,  a  three-dimensional 
manifold  or  volume.  In  space,  then,  there  are  embodied  specific 
organizing  relations.  These  relations  are  asymmetrical  and 
transitive,  and  are  similar  to  the  relations  of  "ancestor  of" 
and  "greater  than."  Thus,  e.g.,  since  the  relation  "ancestor 
of"  is  not  identical  with  its  inverse,  "descendant  of,"  it  is  asym- 
metrical, and  also,  since  if  A  is  ancestor  of  B  and  B  is  ancestor 
of  0,  A  is  ancestor  of  C,  it  is  transitive. 

But  extension  as  a  whole,  e.g.,  any  specific  extension,  is  dis- 
tinct from  both  the  parts  and  their  relations.  Thus  a  finite 
line  'consists  of  both  smaller  lines  and  points;  a  plane,  of  both 
smaller  planes  and  lines;  and  a  volume,  of  smaller  volumes, 
planes,  and  points.  But  while  the  parts  (of  each  kind)  and 
the  relations  are  individuals,  and  therefore  many,  and  each  be- 
longs to  a  specific  type,  the  whole  that  results  from  the  organ- 
ization of  the  parts  is  one,  although  it  has,  or,  more  precisely, 
is  properties  that  are  different  both  from  the  organizing  rela- 
tions and  from  certain  kinds  of  parts,  if  not  from  others.  For 
example,  a  finite  line  and  the  smaller  lines  that  are  its  parts 
are  of  one  type,  for  both  are  extensions;  but  the  other  type  of 
parts,  namely,  the  points,  lack  this  specific  characteristic. 

In  respect  to  each  of  the  several  different  kinds  of  parts,  the 
whole  that  "results"  from  their  organizaiion  may  have  dif- 
ferent and  distinct  characteristics.  Thus,  e.g.,  in  respect  to 
smaller  finite  lines  as  parts,  a  line  is  finite,  or,  if  the  parts  are 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      453 

very  small  relatively  {as  units  of  measurement),  endless  (which 
means,  7iot  ivithout  end,  but  only  not  yet  ended  or  measured)  ; 
yet,  in  respect  to  points  the  line  is  also  infinite.  But  since  the 
line  is  made  up  both  of  smaller  lines  and  of  larger  ones,  and 
also  of  points,  it  is  "at  one  and  the  same  time  ^'endless,  finite, 
and  infinite.  These  are  quite  consistent  characteristics,  since 
they  concern  different  phases  or  aspects  of  the  line,  and  belong 
in  different  universes  of  discourse.  The  line  itself,  however, 
is  that  unitary  entity  which  is  the  organization  of  these 
** phases,"  and  of  the  parts  which  "condition"  them. 

The  infinity  of,  e.g.,  a  line  consists  in  the  fact  that  there  are 
as  many  points  in  any  finite  part  as  there  are  in  the  whole.  How 
many  points,  one  cannot  say,  i.e.,  one  cannot  count  them,  or 
designate  them  by  any  finite  number,  but  one  can  say  "as 
many,"  if  not  "how  many,"  This  definition  of  infinity  is,  evi- 
dently, in  terms  of  the  relation  of  one-one  correspondence  be- 
tween the  points  of  the  whole  line  and  those  of  any  of  its  proper 
parts  (smaller  lines).  It  is  a  definition  whose  "principle," 
however,  allows  us  also  to  define  a  cardinal  number  as  the  "class 
of  all  classes  that  are  in  one-one  correspondence."  Thus,  e.g., 
in  the  case  of  the  soldiers  of  the  regiment  to  whom  guns  are 
assigned,  one  gun  per  man,  two  classes,  men  and  guns,  agree  in 
one  characteristic,  namely,  their  cardinal  number,  N,  so  that 
this  is  a  class  of  those  two  classes.-^ 

This  definition  of  cardinal  number  clearly  makes  no  distinc- 
tion between  finite  and  infinite  numbers.  However,  such  a  dis- 
tinction is  made  by  the  definition,  that  an  infinite  number  is 
that  class  of  two  classes  one  of  which  is  a  proper  part  of  the 
other,  as,  e.g.,  the  even  integers  (as  well  as  the  odd)  are  a 
proper  part  of  the  series  of  doth  odd  and  even  integers.  It  then 
follows  that  a  finite  number  is  one  that  is  not  infinite.  That 
specific  state  of  affairs  which  is  infinity  does  not  hold,  there- 
fore, of  a  line  in  reference  to  the  smaller  lines  that  are  its 
constituents,  for  clearly,  in  reference  to  these,  there  are  more 
constituents  in  the  whole  than  in  any  proper  part.  But,  in 
reference  to  points,  there  is  a  one-one  correspondence  between 
whole  and  proper  part.    It  must  be,  therefore,  that  points  have 

'*  This  is  Mr.  Russell's  definition  of  cardinal  number,  which  seems  to 
be  accepted  by  the  majority  of  mathematicians,  if  not  by  all. 


454  REALISM 

no  size,  no  extension,  and  that  they  themselves,  as  individuals, 
are  neither  infinite,  finite,  nor  endless.  We  may  conclude,  then, 
that  these  last  characteristics  result  from  the  organization  of 
points,  and  belong  to  the  line  as  a  whole,  but  not  to  the  points 
or  to  the  organizing  relations. 

If,  now,  instants,  lines,  and  planes  are  organized  by  asym- 
metrical transitive  relations,  we  have,  respectively,  time,  planes, 
and  volumes,  as  the  resulting  wholes.  Yet  of  each  of  these  dif- 
ferent types  of  whole,  essentially  the  same  propositions  hold 
that  have  just  been  stated  as  holding  for  lines.  Thus,  e.g.,  time 
(all  time)  is  a  one  dimensional  series  of  instants,  related  asym- 
metrically and  transitively,  and  without  beginning  and  end; 
past  time,  however,  ends  with  the  present,  as  future  time  begins 
with  it,  yet  each  is  infinite.  Any  finite  period  of  time,  with 
two  ends,  instead  of  one,  is  also  infinite — in  respect  to  instants ; 
but  it  is  finite  in  respect  to  smaller  times,  as  opposed  to  instants, 
although  it  is  also  endless  if  these  smaller  times  are  so  small 
that  their  enumeration  is  not  ended.  In  a  similar  way  a  plane 
is  infinite  in  respect  to  lines,  yet  also  both  finite  and  endless 
in  respect  to  smaller  planes;  a  volume,  infinite  in  respect  to 
both  planes  and  lines  (and  points),  but  finite  and  endless  in 
respect  to  smaller  volumes. 

But  there  are  other  characteristics  of  these  wholes  that  must 
also  be  briefly  considered  in  order  that  our  presentation  may 
be  complete  in  certain  essentials.  These  characteristics  concern 
continuity,  discontinuity,  and  ''density."  -^  First,  it  may  be 
remarked,  that  owing  to  the  relative  grossness  of  even  the  most 
refined  experimental  methods,  it  is  impossible  to  ascertain 
whether  the  space  and  time  of  our  perception  are  strictly  con- 
tinuous or  only  dense,  if  they  are  not,  indeed,  discontinuous. 
The  reason  for  this  inability  of  experimentation  is,  that  the 
limits  of  those  errors  that  are  unavoidably  incurred  in  meas- 
urement are  such  as  to  include  the  differences  between  continu- 
ous and  dense,  and  perhaps,  also,  between  co7itinuous  and 
discontinuous  space  and  time. 

The  differences  between  these  three  characteristics  or  entities, 
whichever  one  space,  time,  and,  also,  motion  and  change  in  gen- 
eral may  be,  have  been  technically  determined,  with  very  great 

^»  Cf.  Chaps.  II.,  XXII.,  XXIII.,  XXIV.,  XXV. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      455 


precision   and   exactness,   during  the  last  fifty  years,   chiefly, 
however,  through  the  investigation  of  mimher. 


26 


IX.   NUMBER 

In  the  results  thus  obtained  a  cardinal  numher  is  defined  as 
the  number,  N,  of  any  two  groups  of  objects,  no  matter  what 
their  character,  that  are  in  one-one  correspondence  with  each 
other.  A  cardinal  number  is,  therefore,  the  very  mi7iimum  of 
resemblance  between  two  specific  groups  in  respect  to  their 
manifoldness.  The  group  of  positive  integers,  or  of  natural 
numbers,  is  the  group  of  cardinal  numbers,  N's,  that  are  thus 
discovered.  These  integers  in  their  natural  order,  i.e.,  the  order 
of  magnitude,  are  a  series. 

This  series  may  be  defined  as  determined,  generated,  or  or- 
ganized by  a  relation,  R,  "less  than,"  symbolized  by  <,  that 
is  (1)  "connected,"  (2)  "irreflexive,"  (3)  "transitive  for 
distinct  elements,"  and  (4)  "asymmetrical  for  distinct  ele- 
ments,"" the  two  last  properties  being,  perhaps,  the  most  im- 
portant ones  to  which  to  give  our  attention.  In  so  far  as  the 
relation  <  has  these  four  properties,  it  satisfies  respectively 
three  postulates  and  one  theorem,  namely, 

"Postulate  1.  If  a  and  b  are  distinct  elements  of  the  class,  K, 
then  either  a  <,b,  or  b  <.  a." 

"Postulate  2.    If  a  <  b,  then  a  and  b  are  distinct.'' 

"Postulate  3.   If  a  <b  and  b  <.  c,  then  a  <  c." 

'"The  presentation  that  follows  is  one  the  essential  features  of  which 
may  be  found  in  a  number  of  recent  treatises  on  the  subject.  Tlie  best 
presentation  known  to  the  writer  is  E.  W.  Hobson's  Theory  of  Functions 
of  a  Real  Variable,  1907 ;  other  systematic  presentations  are  those  of 
V\hitehead,  Introduction  to  Mathematics;  J.  W.  Young,  Fundamental 
Concepts  of  Algebra  and  Geometry,  especially  Chaps.  VI. -XI;  W.  H.  and 
G.  C.  Young,  Theory  of  Sets  of  Points,  1906;  G.  H.  Hardy,  Pure  Mathe- 
matics, 1908,  especially  Chap.  I.;  E.  Cassirer,  Substanzbegriff  und  Funk- 
tionsbegriff,  Chap.  II.  on  Number  and  Chap.  III.  on  Geometry. 

Cf.,  also,  as  some  of  the  more  imi)ortant  contributions  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  modern  theory  of  number,  etc. :  Bolzano,  Paradoxien  des 
Vnendlichen,  1851 ;  R.  Dedekind,  Stetigkeit  und  irrat.  Zahlen,  1872,  and 
Was  sind  und  tvas  sollen  die  Zahlen,  trans,  by  Beman  as,  Essays  on 
Number  1901;  G.  Cantor,  Grundlagen  einer  algem.  Mannigfaltigkcitslehre, 
1883;  G.  Frege,  Die  Grundlagen  d.  Arithmetik,  1884;  Russell,  Principles 
of  Mathematics,  and  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy  in  various  places; 
Koyce,  The  Principles  of  Logic,  loc.  cit.j  and  E.  V.  Huntington,  "  The 
Continuum  as  a  Type  of  Order,"  Annals  of  Math.,  Vols.  VI.  and  VII., 
1905,  and  The  Continuum,  1917. 

*'E.  V.  Huntington,  The  Continuum,  1917,  p.  11,  note. 


456  REALISM 

"Theorem  I.    If  a  <  &  is  true,  then  6  <  a  is  false."  ^* 

These  postulates  can  be  demonstrated  to  be  consistent  and  yet 
independent.-'' 

A  slight  critical  inspection  of  the  class  of  all  the  natural 
numbers,  1,  2,  3,  4  .  .  .  n  —  1,  n,n  -\-l  (or  the  first  n  of  them), 
in  their  natural  order,  reveals  the  fact  that  this  class  is  a  series 
in  that  it  satisfies  these  three  postulates  and  Theorem  I.,  and  is 
generated  by  a  relation  which  has  the  properties  1  —  4. 

The  negative  numbers  and  0  may  be  dismissed  with  the  state- 
ment, that  they  are  implied  by  the  possibility  of  a  certain 
operation,  substraction,  such  that,  if  a  and  h  are  any  two  nat- 
ural numbers,  a  —  b  is  a  number.  Evidently,  if  a  <ib,  then 
6  —  a  is  a  positive  integer,  as,  e.g.,  3  —  2  =  1;  but  likewise,  for 
the  operation,  a — &,  if  a  <  &,  there  must  be  negative  numbers, 
as,  e.g.,  5  —  7  =  —  2,  and,  in  the  special  case  of  a  =  &, 
a  —  &  =:  0.  In  this  series  of  negative  and  of  positive  integers 
and  zero,  the  asymmetrical  and  transitive  relations  above  men- 
tioned relate  any  three  distinct  numbers. 

But  there  are  not  only  natural  numbers,  such  as  we  have  just 
examined,  but  there  are  also  fractions.  Fractions,  however,  are 
of  two  kinds,  rational  and  irrational.  Rational  fractions  may 
be  defined  in  a  number  of  ways,  one  definition  being  that  they 
are  those  numbers  which  are  implied  by  a  certain  operation, 
namely,  division,  provided  this  is  not  the  same  as  repeated  sub- 
traction, or  identical  ivith  an  integer.     Division  is  defined  by 

the  operation   -^  which  is  such  that,  if  -j-  be  "taken"  b  times, 

20 
A  })  =  a.    If,  in  a  concrete  case,  this  is,  e.g.,    -„-,  one  can  say 
0  ' 

the    result    is    the    same    as    "  taking    7    away    twice,"    and 

finding  6  as  a  remainder,  and,  in  another  concrete  case,  if  we 
have    -=-,  this  =2.     A  rational  fraction  may,  therefore,  be 

D 

defined  as  such  a  number  as  is  implied  by  a  division  that  is  not 
reducible  to  either  of  the  two  cases  thus  exemplified.  As  exam- 
ples that  fulfil  these  conditions  we  may  cite  1/2,  1/3,  1/4,  1/5. 

As  characteristic  of  these  fractions  it  is  found,  that,  if    -r- 
"  Ibid.,  p.  10.  "  Jhid.,  Chap.  II. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      457 

c 
and  —5-   be  any  two  such  numbers,  there  is  always  a  fraction 

—   7~  _. —    betiveen  them.     Thus,  e.g.,  between  1/4  and  1/2 

there  is  the  fraction  3/8,  between  1/4  and  3/8  there  is  the 
fraction  5/16,  and  between  1/4  and  5/16  the  fraction  9/32,  and 
so  on  to  infinity;  i.e.,  between  any  two  rational  fractions  there 
is  an  infinity  of  rational  fractions. 

This  characteristic  may  be  used  in  a  second  definition  of 
rational  fractions,  though  not  as  an  exclusive  definition,  since 
irrationals  also  have  the  same  property.  But  it  is  a  character- 
istic that  distinguishes  rational  fractions  (as  well  as  irrationals) 
from  integers.  Rational  fractions  are  numbers  such  that  (1) 
between  any  two  there  is  a  third  and  therefore  an  infinity  of 
other  similar  "elements,"  so  that  (2)  no  rational  fraction  is 
next  to  any  other  rational  fraction,  i.e.,  no  rational  fraction  has 
an  immediate  successor  or  an  immediate  predecessor.  In  con- 
trast with  these  two  characteristics  of  rational  fractions,  the 
integers,  both  positive,  negative,  and  zero,  in  their  natural  order 
are  such  that  the  members  of  some  pairs  of  integers  have  no 
integer  between  them,  and  are,  therefore,  next  to  each  other. 
This  is  the  fact,  e.g.,  with  the  pairs  (7,  8),  ( — 4,  — 3),  etc. 

However,  integers  and  rational  fractions  are  similar  in  respect 
to  the  characteristic,  that  the  difference  between  any  two  ele- 
ments of  either  class  is  finite,  although  this  difference  may  in 
some  instances  be  very  small.  This  is  quite  evident  in  the  case 
of  the  integers,  where  the  difference  between  any  two  integers 
is  always  another  integer  that  occupies  some  place  in  the  series 
of  integers.  Thus,  e.g:,  9  —  4=:5;3  —  1  =:■  —  4.  But  the  same 
principle  holds  also  of  the  rational  fractions,  since  the  difference 

a  c  • 

between  any  two  such  fractions,  -^  and  —-,  is  itself  a  fraction, 

0  d 

da  —  c  h  1  1  3         J  •    M    -A       r\      •  i-i. 

? — n >  ^-d-y    -?r ?-  —  i>v»  s^^d  IS  finite.    One  important 

ha  2  5  10 

bearing  of  this  principle  is,  that  if  any  series,  e.g.,  that  series  of 
velocities  which  is  accelerated  motion,  were  ordered  like  the 
series  of  rational  fractions  in  order  of  magnitude,  there  would 
be  "sudden  jumps," — i.e.  (in  the  instance  of  accelerated  mo- 
tion), jumps  from  one  specific  finite  velocity  to  another,  in 
which  case  continuous  change  of  velocity  would  be  impossible. 


458  REALISM 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that,  if  there  are  series  and  processes 
which  are  genuinely  continuous,  they  must  present  a  type  of 
order  that  is  dijferent  from  and  something  more  than  that  type 
which  is  presented  by  the  integers  and  rational  fractions  in  order 
of  magnitude. 

Such  a  type  is  found  by  developing  the  implications  of  certain 
characteristics  of  the  rational  numbers,  namely,  the  integers  and 
rational  fractions.  Such  a  method  leads  to  the  discovery  of  still 
another  type  of  numlier,  namely,  the  irrationals,  and  it  is 
through  these  numbers,  together  with  the  rationals,  that  the 
precise  nature  of  continuity  is  established,  or  that  the  con- 
tinuum is  generated.  On  the  basis  of  the  principles  that  that 
which  is  (found  to  be)  implied  must  be  admitted  to  be  a  fact, 
irrationals  are  to  be  accepted  as  facts — though  of  a  specific  kind 
— as  much  as  is  anything  else  which  is  disclosed  either  by 
reasoning  or  by  sensation. 

That  characteristic  of  rational  numbers  which,  through  the 
development  of  its  implications,  most  particularly  leads  to  the 
discovery  of  irrationals  is  called  a  "cut."  A  "cut"  may  be 
defined  as  a  separation  of  an  ordered  class  into  two  sub-classes, 
A-L  and  A2,  such  that  every  element,  a^,  of  one  class,  A^,  pre- 
cedes every  element  a,  of  the  other  class  Ao. 

In  the  case  of  the  series  of  all  integers  (positive,  negative, 
and  zero)  this  cut  is  identical  with  each  and  every  integer;  for 
each  integer  a  separates  the  series  into  two  sub-classes,  A^  and 
An,  one  of  which,  A-^,  is  less  than  a,  and  the  other,  A^,  greater 
than  a.  But  whatever  integer  a  may  be,  e.g.,  5,  then  those 
integers  that  are  less  than  a  include  a  last  number,  and  those 
that  are  greater  include  a  first,  4  and  6  respectively  in  the  ex- 
ample chosen;  also,  the  number  a  may  be  assigned  either  to 
those  numbers  which  are  less,  or  to  those  ivhich  are  greater,  so 
that,  in  the  former  case,  every  number  of  class  Aj  and  also  a 
itself  <  A„,  while,  in  the  latter  case,  every  element  oi  A^  <.  a 
and  also  every  element  of  A,.  In  both  cases,  A^  has  a  last,  and 
A2  a  first  number,  and  they  are  next  to  each  other. 

However,  this  state  of  affairs  is  not  found  for  the  rational 
fractions,  as  may  be  made  clear  by  taking  an  example.  Let  us 
suppose  an  element,  a,  say,  1/3,  and  let  this  be  the  last  of  the 
elements  of  the  class  4,  all  of  whose  elements  (numbers)  <  all 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      459 

those  of  Ao.  Then  A^  has  a  last,  but  Ao  has  no  first  element, 
in  distinction  from  the  case  with  the  integers.  For  betiveen 
any    fraction,    ^3    (of  -^2)9  and  1/3,  there  is  another  fraction, 

—  '     ^  ,  and  so  on,  so  that  1/3  is  not  next  to  any  fraction  that 

is  greater. 

The  interesting  question  next  arises,  whether  there  are  also 
numbers  or  "cuts"  (A^  A^)  of  such  a  character  that  not  only 
An  has  no  first  (as  with  the  rational  fractions),  but  also  that  A-^, 
which  precedes,  has  (in  distinction  from  the  rational  fractions) 
110  last  element.  In  other  words,  is  there  such  a  "cut"  or 
number,  A^  An,  that,  to  state  it  somewhat  paradoxically,  all 
those  numbers  that  are  less  (than  all  those  that  are  greater) 
have  no  last,  and  all  those  that  are  greater  (than  all  those  that 
are  less)  have  no  first  element? 

Investigation  shows  that  this  question  must  be  answered  with 
**yes."  Again  to  take  an  example,  there  is  a  number,  a,  let 
us  say  (V  2  ),  such  that,  if  we  evaluate  it,  using  rational 
fractions  (decimals)  therefor,  and  approximating  nearer  and 
nearer,  yet  getting  now  a  fraction  that  is  too  large,  and 
now  one  that  is  too  small  to  equal  2  when  "squared,'^ 
this  number  a  separates  the  whole  class  of  such  (decimal) 
fractions  into  two  sub-classes  which  have  the  characteristic 
that,  while  all  the  elements  of  the  one,  A-^,  are  smaller 
than  all  the  elements  of  the  other.  An,  nevertheless  in  the  one, 
A-^,  there  is  no  "largest"  and  last  element,  and  in  the  other,  Ao, 
no  "smallest"  or  first  element.  Thus,  in  our  example,  in  the 
first  sub-class,  A^,  there  is  an  infinite  series  of  fractions  that 
are  all  greater  than  any  mentionable  one,  such  as  1.4142,  but 
that  are  still  all  less  than  any  one  of  the  infinite  series  of  frac- 
tions of  the  second  class,  Ao,  all  of  which  are  greater  than  any 
element  of  A^ ;  yet  in  this  sub-class,  A2,  there  is  likewise  an 
infinite  series  of  fractions  that  are  smaller  than  any  mentionable 
one,  such  as  1.4143.  The  number  a,  i.e.,  the  actual  number  so 
inadequately  symbolized  in  our  example  by  V  2  ,  and  impossi- 
ble of  naming  or  stating  by  any  decimal,  is  not  a  member  either 
of  A^  or  of  An,  and  in  this  respect  differs  from  any  rational 
fraction,  such  as  1/3,  which  is  either  a  member,  namely,  the  last,] 
of  that  series,  A^^,  all  of  whose  elements  are  less  than  all  the 


460  REALISM 

elements  of  A^  that  have  no  first,  or,  is  the  first  of  that  series, 
A2,  all  of  whose  elements  are  greater  than  all  those  elements 
of  Ai  that  have  no  last  element. 

Another  and  less  technical  way  of  stating  the  same  thing 
is, — to  continue  the  example — that  a,  as  the  square  root  of 
2  (V  2  ),  is  not  a  member  of  either  the  series  of  rational  frac- 
tions that  are  smaller  or  of  those  that  are  greater  than  a,  but  is 
the  limit  that  is  approached  by  both  the  smaller  rational  frac- 
tions, A^,  as  they  "become"  larger  and  larger,  and  by  the 
larger  fractions,  A^,  as  they  "become"  smaller  and  smaller. 
Between  these  two  series  a  is  "squeezed"  in,  and  to  it,  as  a 
limit,  one  can  "come"  as  near  as  one  pleases,  without  ever 
reaching  it ;  also  between  it  and  any  rational  fraction  ' '  on  either 
side,"  the  difference  is  not  finite,  in  contrast  with  those  differ- 
ences that  subsist  between  all  rational  numbers.  In  this  con- 
trast there  lies,  perhaps,  the  secret  of  the  "ability"  of  the 
irrationals  to  generate  the  continuum,  in  the  strictest  modern 
sense  of  this  term.  And  also  in  the  fact  that  an  irrational  is 
not  a  member  of  either  of  the  two  sub-classes  or  sub-series  that 
approach  it,  we  may  discover  the  important  principle  that  a  I 
limit  is  not  a  member  of  the  series  of  ivhich  it  is  a  limit.  Such  J 
a  principle  has  an  important  bearing  on  the  status  of  ideals  in 
questions  that  concern  the  logical  possibility  of  any  genuine 
progress  and  advance  in,  e.g.,  the  ethical  condition  of  mankind. 

In  summary,  then,  we  may  assert  that  modern  analysis  dis- 
closes several  different  types  of  numbers,  important  character- 
istics of  some  of  which  have  just  been  presented,  and  that  those 
types  which  chiefly  concern  us,  in  our  discussion  of  cosmology, 
are  positive  and  negative  numbers,  and  zero,  and  integers,  ra- 
tional fractions  (both  rational)  and  irrationals.  There  are  fur- 
ther technical  differences  between  these  several  types  that  need 
not,  however,  for  our  purposes,  be  considered  or  presented.  Such 
differences  concern,  e.g.,  such  definitions  as  that  integers  are 
those  7iumbers  ivhich  are  natural;  rational  numbers,  those  which 
are  pairs  of  integers;  and  real  numbers,  those  ivhich  are  classes 
or  fundamental  segments  of  rationals. 

As  sufficiently  accurate  for  our  purposes,  therefore,  we  may 
accept  the  distinctions  above  stated,  and  then  point  out,  that, 
if  we  "take"  a  certain  specific  series  that  is  constituted  by  (1) 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      461 

integers,  say,  — 1,  0,  and  +1,  (2)  rational  fractions,  namely, 
the  infinity  of  such  fractions  between  —  1  and  0,  and  0  and  +  1 
respectively,  and  (3)  the  irrationals  between  these  two  end- 
points,  -with  (4)  all  elements  of  these  three  types  in  order  of 
precedence  or  of  magnitude,  we  then  have  a  series  that  (5)  is 
a  linear  continuum  in  the  most  precise  modern  sense  of  this 
term,  and  that  also  (6)  is  sometimes  called  a  class  of  real 
mimhers. 

This  series  satisfies  the  three  postulates,  1  —  3,  and  also 
Theorem  I,,  previously  stated,  and  is  generated  by  a  relation 
that  is  ''connected,"  "irreflexive, "  asymmetrical,  and  transi- 
tive; hut  it  (this  series)  also  satisfies  a  principle  which  has  just 
been  disclosed  in  our  discussion  of  "cuts,"  and  which  may 
now  be  formulated  as  Postulate  4  (Dedekind's),  and,  finally, 
satisfies  two  other  postulates,  namely,  those  of  (5)  density 
(illustrated  by  the  rational  fractions)  and  (6)  linearity. 

Postulate  4.  If  J.^  a7id  A^  are  any  two  non-empty  suh-classes 
of  A,  such  that  every  element  of  A  belongs  either  to  A^  or  to  A^, 
and  every  element  of  A^  precedes  every  element  of  A^,  then 
there  is  at  least  one  element  a  in  A  such  that: 

(1)  Any  element  that  precedes  a  belongs  to  Aj^  and 

(2)  A7iy  element  that  follows  a  belongs  to  A^.^'^ 
Postulate  5  {postulate  of  density).    If  a  and  b  are  elements 

of  the  class  A,  and  a  <Cb,  then  there  is  at  least  one  element 
X  in  A  such  that  a  <.  x  and  x  <  b.^^ 

Postulate  6  (postulate  of  linearity).  The  class  A  contains  a 
denumerable  sub-class  R  in  such  a  ivay  that  between  any  two 
elements  of  the  given  class  A  there  is  an  element  of  R.^- 

In  explanation  of  the  terms  here  used  it  may  be  further  said 
that  a  class  is  denumerable  if  it  is  such  that  its  elements  can  be 
put  into  one-one  correspondence  with  the  elements  of  a  pro- 
gression, the  simplest  example  of  which  is  the  series  of  natural 
numbers  in  the  usual  order,  1,  2,  3,  .   .   . 

Postulates  1-6  and  Theorem  I.  define,  in  the  most  accurate 
way  that  modern  analysis  has  yet  determined,  the  linear  con- 
tinuity of  a  series.  In  other  words,  any  series  that  satisfies  these 
postulates  is  a  continuous  linear  series.  Such  a  series  is  found 
in  the  case  of  the  series  of  real  numbers   (positive,  negative, 

»"  Huntington,  op.  cit.,  p.  44.  »'  Ihid.  "•  Ibid. 


462  REALISM 

or  zero)  in  their  usual  order  (that  of  magnitude),  and  also  in 
any  series  that  is  in  one-one  correspondence  with  this  series. 
Such  possibly  continuous  series  are,  space  of  one  dimension, 
time,  motion,  acceleration,  and  qualitative  changes  in  general. 

If  such  series  are  continuous  in  the  strict  sense  of  this  term, 
then  they  conform  to  that  type  of  order  which  satisfies  the  six 
postulates  and  one  theorem  just  referred  to.  But,  as  before 
stated,  experimental  verification  that  there  is  such  conformity 
in  any  specific  instance  is  impossible,  owing  to  the  relative 
grossness  of  experimental  methods.  Therefore,  so  far  as  experi- 
mental methods  can  determine,  such  series  as  space  of  one 
dimension  (and  indeed  of  ?2-dimensions),  time,  motion,  and  the 
like,  may  be  merely  dense,  or  even  discontinuous,  but  to  which- 
ever of  these  characteristics  they  may  conform,  a  precise  defini- 
tion of  their  character  is  nevertheless  at  hand. 

Thus  if  space,  time,  or  any  other  series  is  dense,  it  conforms 
to  the  order  type  of  the  rational  fractions,  thereby  excluding 
the  irrationals,  and  satisfies,  with  the  exception  of  Postulate  4, 
all  the  postulates  1-6,  and  Theorem  I. ;  while,  if  such  series  are 
discontinuous  or  discrete,  they  conform  to  the  order  type  of 
the  integers,  positive,  negative,  or  zero,  and  satisfy,  with  the 
exception  of  Postulate  5,  the  postulates  1-6,  but  also  two  other 
postulates,  namely, 

Postulate  7.  Every  element  of  a  discrete  series  A,  unless  it  he 
the  last,  has  an  immediate  successor,^^  and 

Postulate  8.  Every  element  of  a  discrete  series  A,  unless  it 
be  the  first,  has  an  immediate  predecessor.^* 

All  the  postulates  thus  far  considered  can  be  demonstrated 
to  be  consistent  and  indepe7ident,^^  and  thus  to  furnish  another 
instance  of  that  principle,  namely,  the  theory  of  external  rela- 
tions, which  is  one  of  the  main  contentions  of  Realism  and 
Rationalism. 

But  our  presentation  of  certain  facts  discovered  by  analysis 
with  reference  to  the  nature  of  number,  makes  it  possible  not 
only  to  state  with  precision  ivhat  is  the  continuity,  density,  or 
discontinuity  of  any  series  that  may  have  any  of  these  proper- 
ties, but  also  to  define  with  equal  precision  certain  other  char- 
acteristics, such  as  infinity  and  finitude,  that  different  series 

»'  Op.  cit.,  p.  19.  »*  Ihid.  '°  Op.  cit.,  Chaps.  Il.-V. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      463 

may  possess,  as  well  as  to  specify  the  character  of  the  relations 
between  different  series,  and,  finally,  to  determine  the  status  of 
number  series  in  a  cosmos  that  ipso  facto  contains  all  entities. 

Modern  analysis  would  seem  to  begin,  in  the  investigation  of 
these  problems,  with  the  examination  of  cardinal  numbers,  and, 
as  a  result,  to  define  a  cardinal  number  as  the  class,  N,  of  two 
or  more  classes  that  are  in  the  relation  of  one-one  correspondence 
with  one  another, — one  and  only  one  individual  of  the  one 
class  corresponding  to  one  and  only  one  specific  individual  of 
the  other,  no  matter  what  the  order.  However,  if  there  is  a 
definite  order,  as  in  the  case  of  the  points  of  a  line,  this  one-one 
correspondence  still  holds,  subsisting  between  those  points  which 
make  up  a  proper  part  and  those  which  make  up  the  whole. 
In  this  case  there  are  as  many  points  in  the  proper  part,  defined 
as  that  part  which  is  like  the  whole,  as  there  are  in  the  whole. 
Cardinal  number  is  defined,  then,  in  terms  of  one-one  cor- 
respondence, and  of  "as  many  as,"  but  not  of  "how  many." 

Thus  to  define  cardinal  number  is  to  make  no  distinction 
between  a  -finite  and  an  infinite  cardinal.  This  distinction,  how- 
ever, is  made  by  the  definition,  that,  if  the  one-one  corre- 
spondence is  between  whole  and  proper  part,  the  number  of 
elements  is  infinite.  Finite  is  then  defined  as  that  which  is 
not  infinite,  whereby  one-one  correspondence  of  whole  and 
proper  part  is  precluded.  Thus,  e.g.,  in  respect  to  a  unit  of 
measurement,  a  proper  part  does  not  contain  as  many  individ- 
uals as  does  the  whole,  and  is,  therefore,  finite. 

Whereas,  now,  finitude  and  infinity  subsist  as  a  class  of 
classes  independently  of  the  order  of  the  elements  of  these  classes, 
and  merely  by  virtue  of  a  one-one  correspondence  between  these 
elements,  continuity  holds  only  of  ordered  classes,  although  the 
classes  be  but  segments,  or  sub-classes,  of  the  same  ordered  class, 
e.g.,  of  the  series  of  real  numbers  in  order  of  magnitude.  "With 
as  many  members  in  any  proper  part  of  such  a  series  as  there 
are  members  in  the  whole  to  which  this  part  belongs,  the 
cardinal  number  of  elements  in  both  part  and  whole  is  infinite, 
yet  the  continuity  of  the  series  is  not  identical  with  its  infinity. 
The  continuity  consists,  rather,  in  the  fact  that  the  series  con- 
forms not  only  to  those  postulates  (1-3)  (and  Theorem  I.)  that 
logically    determine    a    series,    but    also    to    the    postulates,    4 


464  REALISM 

(Dedekind's),  and  5  (density),  and,  in  the  case  of  a  linear 
continuum,  6  (linearity).  These  last  postulates  may  be  stated 
in  simple  form  as  meaning  (Postulate  5)  that  between  any  two 
elements  there  is  another  element;  and  (Postulate  6)  that  there 
are  elements  such  that  the  sub-class  of  elements  before  any 
specific  element  has  no  last  term,  and  the  sub-class  after,  no 
first  term — from  which  it  follows  that,  while  the  difference  be- 
tween members  of  certain  pairs  of  terms  of  such  a  series  is  finite, 
the  difference  between  the  members  of  other  pairs  is  not  finite. 

Accordingly  it  results,  in  the  case  of  any  entity,  such  as  time, 
space,  motion,  and  change,  that  is  (1)  a  series,  and  (2)  con- 
tinuous, that,  whereas  the  series  is  ''made  up"  of  elements  that 
are  distinct  (Postulates  1  and  2),  this  distinctness  does  not  mean 
discontinuity,"®  and,  also,  whereas  there  are  finite  differences  be- 
tween certain  elements  and  others,  nevertheless  between  the 
members  of  other  pairs  of  elements  there  are  no  such  differ- 
ences, and  therefore,  in  the  vernacular,  no  gaps  or  sudden 
jumps — in  the  case  of  any  kind  of  change. 

X.   MOTION,   QUALITATIVE   CHANGE,   AND   EVOLUTION 

Our  long  and  seemingly  digressive  discussion  of  numbers 
results,  therefore,  in  conclusions  that  are  of  direct  bearing  on 
specific  cosmological  problems.  For  space,  time,  motion,  and 
qualitative  change  of  many  kinds  are  all  facts  within  the  cosmos. 
Therefore,  through  the  investigation  of  number,  it  can  be  shown 
that  each  of  these  is  a  series,  which,  if  it  is  in  any  instance  either 
continuous,  dense,  or  discrete,  is  this  in  a  very  definite  and 
precise  sense — but  in  a  sense  which,  although  it  presents  em- 
pirical difficulties  to  analysis,  discloses  no  grounds  for  dis- 
crediting analysis  as  such.^'^ 

But  our  discussion  and  seeming  digression  also  has  an  im- 
portance of  its  own.  For  the  number  continuum  is  an  entity 
which,  in  the  cosmos  of  the  realist,  is  found  to  have  a  status 
that  is  quite  independent  of  space,  time,  motion,  and  all  quali- 
tative change.  Indeed  cardinal  and  ordinal  numbers,  integers, 
rational  fractions  and  irrationals,  continuity  and  infinity,  finite- 

'"  Cf.  the  opposed  and  inaccurate  view  of  Bergson  in  Creative  Evolution 
and  elsewhere. 

"'  Contra  Bergaon's  view  again 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      ^65 

aess,  discontinuity,  and  density  are  each  found  to  be  independent 
of  and  logically  prior  to  space,  time,  motion,  and  change  in 
general  in  the  sense,  that  they  are  presupposed  by  these  (latter) 
complexes,  though  the  converse  necessitation  does  not  hold.  Or, 
to  state  this  another  way,  it  is  found  that  specific  propositions 
can  be  asserted  or  postulated  concerning  numbers  and  their 
characteristics,  and  the  implications  of  these  propositions  he 
developed,  ivithout  space  and  time  being  implied.  And  a  similar 
statement  can  be  made  regarding  the  relation  of  every  logically 
prior  science  to  every  logically  subsequent  one.  This  means, 
e.g.,  that  arithmetic  is  logically  independent  of  geometry  and 
of  the  science  of  time,  as  these  in  turn  are  logically  prior  to 
and  independent  of  mechanics,  physics,  and  chemistry.  Such 
an  independence  is  confirmed  by  the  actual  procedures  respec- 
tively of  the  ''pure  mathematician,"  the  geometer,  the  mecha- 
nist, and  the  physicist,  as  each  pursues  his  specific  investiga- 
tions in  independence  of  logically  subsequent  sciences. 

Space,  time,  motion,  acceleration,  and  change  in  general  are 
empirically  discovered,  and  are  then  found  to  be  similar  to  the 
numbers  in  their  most  important  characteristics.  They  "belong 
to"  order-types  that  subsist  among  the  number  series,  they  are 
correlated  with  these  series,  and,  in  general,  are  related  to  the 
number  series  in  many  ways.  Yet  these  relations  are  not  in- 
ternal. They  are,  rather,  external  and  functional, — in  some 
cases,  indeed,  in  the  precise  sense  of  this  term  as  meaning  the 
subsistence  of  a  relation  of  one-one  correspondence  between  two 
series. 

A  similar  statement  can  also  be  made  concerning  the  specific 
instances  (1)  of  the  relation  of  the  rest  and  the  motion  of  a 
material  particle  to  space  and  time;  (2)  of  acceleration  to  mo- 
tion; and  (3)  of  qualitative  change  in  general  to  space  and 
time.  Thus,  e.g.,  both  motion  and  rest  are  discovered  em- 
pirically, and  not  deduced  from  space  and  time.  Yet,  once 
discovered,  they  are  found  to  presuppose,  and  in  certain  respects 
to  be  mnilar  to  both  space  and  time.  These  last  entities,  how- 
ever, do  not  constitute  either  motion  or  rest,  nor  is  the  relation 
between  the  former  two  and  the  latter  in  any  way  "internal." 

Motion,  as  it  occurs  in  the  existential  world,  and  as  also  a 
fact  in  the  ideal  subsistential  world  of  mechanics,  is  the  occu- 


466  *  REALISM 

pation  of  each  point,  of  a  series  of  points,  for  a  particular 
instant,  of  a  series  of  instants.  Each  particular  point  is 
occupied  for  a  specific  instant,  and  not  for  some  other;  at 
instant  a^,  point  h^.  is  occupied;  at  instant  Uy,  point  &„  ;  at 
instant  a^,  point  h^.  This  is  a  relation  of  one-one  correspond- 
ence between  points  and  instants.  The  one-one  relation,  R, 
whereby  a^  R  h^,  but  not  a^  R  by,  generates  the  com- 
plexes flaj/sJ  bx,  ttyR  by,  a^  R  bz-  Motion  itself  is,  then,  the 
series  of  these  complexes,  this  series  being  in  turn  generated  by 
an  asymmetrical  transitive  relation,  Ras  between  these  com- 
plexes as  wholes.  But  the  complex,  ax  R  bx  is  itself  neither 
motion  nor  rest,  as  it  is  so  often  erroneously  claimed  to  be.''® 
Yet  out  of  it  and  similar  complexes  motion  is  logically  generated 
or  organized,  the  secret  of  this  being  that  the  relation,  Ra,,  is 
non-additive,  so  that  a  whole  results  that  has  different  qualities, 
as  a  whole,  from  those  of  the  parts.  It  is  in  this  way  that 
motion  is  made  up  of  ultimate  "elements"  that  are  themselves 
neither  motions  nor  rests,  even  as  extension  of  one  dimension  is 
composed  of  elements  that  are  not  extended,  and  time,  of  instants 
that  are  not  durations. 

Qualitative  physical  change  other  than  motion,  e.g.,  change 
in  electrical  potential,  presupposes  space  and  time  in  quite  the 
same  sense  as  does  motion,  so  that  we  do  not  need  to  consider 
it  in  further  detail.  But,  further,  both  motion  and  qualitative 
change  may  be  either  uniform  or  accelerated.  Motion  and 
change  as  uniform  could,  however,  be  existent  facts  without 
there  being  any  existent  acceleration,  but  the  converse  possi- 
bility does  not  hold.  Rather,  acceleration  presupposes  motion 
and  change,  one  or  both. 

As  has  been  previously  stated,  it  may  be  impossible,  owing 
to  the  relative  grossness  of  empirical  methods  of  measurement, 
etc.,  to  determine  whether  perceptual  time  and  space  and  ex- 
istential motion  and  qualitative  change  are  continuous  in  the 
precise  meaning  of  this  term,  or  are  only  dense,  or  even  dis- 
continuous. But  what  can  be  asserted  and  justified  on  the 
basis  of  an  empiricism  that  accepts  rational  analysis  as  a  means 
of  discovery,  is,  that,  if  either  perceptual  space,  time,  motion, 
acceleration,  or  change  in  general,  including  a  universal  Evo- 

**  For  example,  by  liergson,  op.  oit. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      467 

lution^^^  is  continuous,  or  only  dense,  or  even  discontinuous,  then 
each  such  entity  possesses  one  or  the  other  of  these  character- 
istics in  that  precise  sense  which  is  determined  in  and  through 
the  study  of  number. 

If  any  of  these  entities  is  continuous,  it  is  like  the  series  of 
real  numbers  (in  their  ''usual"  order),  and  will  contain  ele- 
ments that  are  ordered  through  a  one-one  correspondence  with 
the  integers,  the  rational  fractions,  and  the  irrationals  in  order 
of  magnitude.  Accordingly  no  element  will  be  7iext  to  any 
other,  and  between  certain  elements  and  others  there  will  be 
710  finite  difference  or  "distance."  Also  any  "proper  part" 
will  contain  as  many  elements  as  does  the  whole,  so  that  both 
whole  and  part  are  infinite.  However,  since  this  one-one  cor- 
respondence does  not  hold  with  reference  to  finite  (measured) 
constituents,  yet  both  whole  and  proper  part  contain  such  con- 
stituents as  elements,  the  whole  that  is  infinite  in  one  relation- 
ship may  be  finite  in  another. 

But  if  space,  motion,  change,  and  Evolution  are  relational 
complexes  of  the  type  of  the  ordered  series  of  rational  numbers 
alone,  then  are  they  only  dense  in  the  precise  sense  of  this 
technical  term.  Accordingly,  no  element,  be  it  point,  line,  plane, 
or  instant,  is  next  to  any  other,  since  there  is  another  element 
between  any  two  elements,  although  there  are,  also,  finite  dif- 
ferences or  gaps,  small  though  these  be,  from  element  to  element. 
Further,  any  dense  whole  may  be  both  infinite  and  finite,  even 
as  is  the  case  with  any  whole  that  is  continuous. 

Finally,  space,  time,  motion,  change,  and  Evolution  are  dis- 
continuous, if  their  elements  are  related  as  are  the  integers 
alone.  Then  every  element,  except  there  be  a  first  or  last,  has 
two  elements  next  to  it,  one  before,  the  other  after,  and  again 
are  there  finite  differences.  But  also,  since  there  are  as  many 
odd  integers,  and  as  many  even,  as  there  are  odd  and  even, 
infinity  is  quite  possible  in  such  a  series,  side  by  side  with  its 
discontinuity,  and  such  infinity  can  also  cosubsist  with  finitude, 
provided  this  last  means  the  presence,  in  the  series,  of  either 
a  last  element,  and  no  first,  or  a  first  element,  and  no  last,  as 
illustrated  by  all  the  negative  integers,  and  by  all  the  positive 

^''  For  an  analysis  of  these  entities  see  the  writer's  Essay  in  The  New 
Realism. 


468  REALISM 

integers  respectively.  But  if  a  series  has  hoth  a  first  and  a  last 
element,  and  is  discontinuous,  then  it  cannot  be  both  finite  and 
infinite.  For  the  first  element  can  be  put  in  one-one  corre- 
spondence Avith  1  and  the  last  with  n,  and  in  such  a  series  there 
are  not  as  many  odd  (or  even)  integers  as  there  are  hoth  odd 
and  even. 

It  is  evident,  therefore,  that  in  all  those  cases  in  which  a 
unit  of  measurement  is  applicable  to  some  entity  that  permits 
of  measurement  (the  condition  for  this  being,  perhaps,  that 
the  unit  of  measurement  and  the  "thing"  measured  are  of  the 
same  magnitude — as  a  specific  property),  (1)  the  application  of 
such  a  unit  may  result  in  correlating  a  specific  part  of  the  entity 
to  be  measured,  namely,  that  part  which  has  no  predecessor, 
with  the  number  1;  and  (2)  that  the  repeated  application  of 
such  a  unit  may  result  in  correlating  other  specific  parts  (of 
the  entity  to  be  measured)  each  with  the  successors  of  the  num- 
ber 1,  i.e.,  with  the  positive  integers,  so  that  (3)  "in  due  time" 
any  integer,  n,  can  be  reached  in  this  way.  Any  entity  which 
can  be  thus  measured  is  ipso  facto  finite,  and,  also,  if  it  is  cor- 
related only  with  such  discrete  elements  (units),  discontinuous, 
though  it  may  also,  in  relation  to  other  parts,  be  continuous. 
But  it  is  also  evident  that  whether  or  not  one  succeeds  in  cor- 
relating a  specific  part  of  the  entity  to  be  measured,  with  the 
number,  n,  even  though  a  first  part  may  be  correlated  with  1, 
depends,  in  some  instances,  on  the  unit  of  measurement  that  is 
used ;  and  that,  accordingly,  if  the  number  n  is  not  reached, 
that  which  is  to  be  measured  is  endless,  while  if  n  is  reached 
the  measured  entity  has  a  certain  size — that  is  relative,  however, 
to  the  unit  of  measurement  that  is  used. 

It  follows  from  this  that  certain  entities  within  our  cosmos, 
e.g.,  space  as  a  whole,  and  time  as  a  whole,  have  no  size,  and  that 
they  are  endless;  for  no  unit  of  measurement  has  yet  been  found 
whereby  eithei*  of  these  entities  has  been  correlated  with  a  last 
integer,  n,  although,  relative  to  certain  arbitrarily  chosen  units, 
certain  entities,  such  as  physical  and  mental  existents,  are  meas- 
ured, and  have  a  first  and  a  last  element.  But  even  in  this  case, 
what  that  last  integer  may  be  with  which  such  a  last  element 
of  a  measured  entity  is  correlated,  depends  upon,  or  is  relative 
to  the   arbitrarily  selected   unit  of  measurement.     If  this  be 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      469 

small,  the  thing  measured  may  be  very  large,  while,  if  the  unit 
be  large,  the  measured  entity  may  be  small,  indeed,  very  small. 

But  also,  any  entity  which  is  measured,  finite,  and  of  a  specific 
size  on  such  a  basis,  may  *'at  the  same  time"  be  quite  outside 
the  universe  of  discourse  of  size  (and  quantity)  in  respect  to 
constituents  that  cannot  be  correlated  with  the  integers  from 
1  to  71.  Thus,  e.g.,  a  line  that  is  a  specific  length  as  measured, 
is  or  has,  as  also  ''made  up"  of  points,  neither  length  nor  size. 

From  all  this  we  reach  certain  conclusions  that  form  an 
integral  part  of  realistic  cosmology,  such  as  the  conclusion,  that 
the  spatial  and  temporal  universe  (space  and  time)  is  endless 
and  without  size.  Likewise  the  physical  universe  is  as  yet  end- 
less and  "sizeless,"  though  in  due  time,  through  empirical 
methods,  it  may  be  measured,  and  thus  have  an  end,  and,  in 
relation  to  any  arbitrary  unit,  be  of  a  specific  size.  This  would 
be  the  case  whether  such  a  universe  is  "made  up"  ultimately 
of  an  energy,  e.g.,  electricity,  that  is  continuous,  or  of  discrete 
entities,  such  as  electrons,  that  are  discontinuous.  For  a  fmite- 
ness  of  two  ends  is  compatible  with  a  continuity  and  an  infinity, 
although  such  a  finiteness  "side  hy  side"  with  a  discontinuity 
precludes  an  infinity  of  those  elements  that  are  "discontinuous 
with"  one  another. 

Finally,  as  regards  those  strata  of  the  universe  which 
are  "determined"  by  the  relation  of  logical  priority,*'^  one 
must   conclude,   that  such   strata   in   their  logical   order,    e.g., 

number    j^P^^^  (.    motion,  and  qualitative  physical  change,  do 
— I  time   ) 

not  form  a  series  that  is  either  continuous  or  dense,  but  a  series 

that  is  discontinuous;  yet  a  series,  also,  that  has  neither  size  nor 

finiteness,  since  there  is  no  common  unit  of  measurement,  i.e., 

common  quality  that  is  a  magnitude,  except  the  attribute  of 

manifoldness.    Accordingly,  if  numher  as  the  first  stratum  can 

be  correlated  with  the  number  1,  space  and  time  as  the  second 

stratum  with  the  numbers  2  and  3,  motion  with  the  number  4, 

consciousness  with  the  number  n, — at  present, — it  is  implied 

that  there  may  he  other  strata,  n  -j-  1,   n  +  2,  w  +  3,    ieyond 

consciousness   which   have    not   yet    come   within    our   specific 

knowledge. 

*"  See  Chaps.  I.,  II.,  III.,  XIII.,  XLI.,  and  XLIII.,  iv.-x. 


470  REALISM 

XI.   CONSCIOUSNESS  AS  A  DIMENSION  AND  A  VARIABLE 

The  foregoing  discussion  of  space,  time,  number,  order,  and 
the  like,  enables  us  now  to  examine  understandingly  certain 
further  specific  problems,  some  solution  of  which  must  find  its 
place  in  a  cosmology.  These  problems  concern  the  nature  of 
consciousness,'^^  especially  certain  specific  solutions  of  this  prob- 
lem that  have  been  presented  in  recent  philosophical  discussion. 
These  solutions  are  to  the  effect  that  consciousness  is  either 
(1)  a  relation,*^  or  (2)  a  "new  dimension,*^  (or  both),  or, 
perhaps,  a  disembodied  quality,  or  (3)  that  it  does  not  exist 
at  all." 

To  whichever  one  of  these  three  (or  four)  classes  of  entities 
(to  which  may  be  added  "event")  consciousness  may  belong, 
and  however  great  the  lack  of  exactitude  in  current  discussions 
of  such  "theories"  may  be,  still  any  one  of  these  possible  solu- 
tions of  the  problem  of  consciousness  has  the  merit  of  being 
opposed  to  the  view,  that  consciousness  is  in  any  way  a  substance. 
For  that  this  view  must  be  given  up,  is  a  conclusion  that  we 
have  been  forced  to  accept  again  and  again  by  all  sorts  of  con- 
siderations—by all  sorts  of  facts.*^    Accordingly,  consciousness 

"  See  the  volumes,  The  New  Realism,  Essays  by  Holt,  Montague,  and 
Pitkin,  also  Holt,  The  Concept  of  Consciousness,  especially  Chaps.  VI., 
IX.,  and  X.,  and  James,  Radical  Empiricism,  Essay  VIII.  Also  see  the 
following  articles:  F.  J.  E.  VVoodbridge,  "The  Nature  of  Consciousness," 
Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  II.,  1905;  "The  Problem 
of  Consciousness,"  in  Studies  in  Philosophy  and  Psychology  in  The 
Oarman  Memorial  Volume;  "  Consciousness,"  "  The  Sense  Organs,"  and 
"  The  Nervous  System,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientifio  Methods, 
Vol.  VI. ;  "  The  Deception  of  the  Senses,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and 
Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  X.;  Wm.  James,  "Does  Consciousness  Exist?" 
Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  I.,  and  in  Essays  in 
Radical  Empiricism;  W.  P.  Montague,  "  The  Relational  Theory  of  Con- 
sciousness and  its  Realistic  Implications,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and 
Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  II.;  B.  H.  Bode,  "  Tlie  Definition  of  Conscious- 
ness," Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  X.;  R.  F.  A. 
Hoernle,  "  Neo-realistic  Theories  of  Consciousness,"  Proc.  Durham  Phil. 
Soc,  Vol.  XIII.;  G.  E.  Moore,  "The  Subject  Matter  of  Psychology," 
Proc.  Arist.  Soc,  Vol.  X. ;  Perry,  "  Conceptions  and  Misconceptions  of 
Consciousness,"  Psych.  Review,  Vol.  XL,  and  in  Present  Philosophical 
Tendencies,  Chap.  XII. ;  C.  A.  Strong,  "  The  Nature  of  Consciousness." 
Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  IX.,  pp.  533  S.,  561  ff., 
and  589  If. 

*^  E.g.,  by  Woodbridge,  loc.  cit. 

**  E.g.,  Pitkin,  in  The  Neiv  Realism. 

**  J.  B.  Watson  and  the  other  "  behavioriats." 

"  See  Chaps.  I.-llI.,  X.,  XL,  XXVI.,  XXiX.-XXXVIII.,  XL.,  u.,  XLI., 
XXI.,  XLIIL,  i.-ui. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      471 

must  be  either  a  dimension,  a  relation,  a  disembodied  quality, 
or  an  event, — or  two  or  more  of  these  ''at  the  same  time." 
Which  of  these  is  consciousness  ? 

If,  now,  one  theory  that  has  recently  been  advanced  is  correct, 
namely,  the  theory,  that  consciousness  is  a  "new"  dimension, 
then,  unless  this  theory  is  to  present  a  purely  arbitrary  view,  it 
must  conform  to  that  definition  of  a  dimension  which  receives 
at  least  fairly  general  acceptance  in  scientific  circles. 

Such  a  definition  is  obtained  by  considering  such  matters  as 
we  have  just  previously  discussed,  and  is  to  the  effect,  that 
a  dimension  is  a  linear  series*^  (and,  therefore,  more  than  a 
mere  class). 

This  definition  comports  with  that  frequent  usage  of  the  term 
dimension  to  characterize,  e.g.,  space  as  an  entity  that  is  of  one, 
two,  three,  or  even  n  dimensions.  But  it  is  also  a  definition  that 
is  consistent  with  the  result,  which  analysis  obtains,  that  the 
space  to  which  such  a  definition  is  applied,  may  be  continuous, 
or  dense,  or  possibly,  though  questionably,  discontinuous. 

With  this  the  case,  it  is  necessary  to  make  distinct  definitions 
for  each  of  these  three  possible  kinds  of  dimensions,  but  such 
definitions  would  conform  to  those  postulates  *^  by  which  each 
of  these  characteristics  is  logically  determined. 

But  dimensions  may  also  vary,  as  the  examination  of  space 
as  an  example  again  discloses,  as  having  hoth  a  first  and  a  last 
"element,"  a  first,  but  no  last,  and  a  last  but  no  first;  and  also 
as  being  either  finite  or  infinite. 

Alone  common,  therefore,  to  those  usages  in  which  the  term 
dimension  is  employed  {e.g.,  to  space)  is  the  linear  serial  char- 
acter of  that  which  is  dimeiisional.  Other  characteristics  are 
merely  the  differentice  of  the  several  species  of  dimensions. 

With  the  definition  of  a  dimension  which  thus  results,  namely, 
that  a  dimension  is  a  linear  series  that  is  either  dense,  or 
continuous,  and  the  like, — it  follows  that  a  great  many  "things" 
in  this  universe  may  be  dimensional,  and  that  it  would  not  be 
surprising  if  consciousness  were  included  in  this  class — of 
dimensional  entities.  For  a  great  many  entities  are  series. 
Indeed,  that  they  are  a  series,  or  else  entities  that  are  "ele- 

*'  Cf.  Huntington,  op.  cit.,  p.  58. 

*'  See  the  immediately  preceding  discussion  of  this  chapter. 


472  REALISM 

ments"  of  or  correlations  of  series,  and  the  like — and  not  siih- 
stances,  is  one  of  the  most  general  results  of  modern  scientific 
investigation.** 

But  linear  series  are  organized  wholes,  or  relational  complexes, 
that  satisfy  the  postulates,  1,  2,  3,  6,  and  Theorem  I.  They 
therefore  involve  ''elements"  and  certain  specific  types  of  rela- 
tions, namely,  those  that  are  asymmetrical,  transitive,  irreflexive, 
and  connected. 

If  the  relations  that  organize  elements  into  linear  series  or 
dimensions  are  always  of  this  type,*^  then,  although  in  special 
series  there  may  also  be  further  specific  relations,  it  is  due,  in 
some  cases  at  least,  to  the  presence  of  qualitatively  different 
elements,  that  certain  series  are  qualitatively  different  dimen- 
sions. Among  such  qualitatively  different  series  that  we  have 
already  considered  are:  iiine,  whose  elements  are  instanis,  a 
geometrical  line,  whose  elements  are  points,  space  of  w-dimon- 
sions,  whose  elements  are  already  of  n-1  dimensions,  motion, 
whose  elements  are  points — related  in  a  1-1  manner  to  instants. 
Other  and  "new"  series  or  dimensions  which,  however,  we  have 
not  yet  considered  are:  the  class  of  moral  values  in  order  of 
superiority ;  the  events  of  any  causal  chain,  in  order  of  cause 
and  effect;  and,  finally,  and  for  us,  at  this  juncture,  important, 
the  class  of  one's  distinct  sensations,  of  such  particular  kinds  as 
sensations  of  color,  sound,  warmth,  or  pain,  arranged  in  order 
of  intensity. 

There  are  undoubtedly,  then,  many  different  dimensions — 
different  in  that  they  are  qualitatively  distinct — v/hich  is  quite 
possible  although  all  belong  to  the  same  class,  dimension. 

There  are,  therefore,  not  only  dimensions,  which  are  them- 
selves relational  complexes,  but  also  relations  among  or  between 
dimensions.  Thus,  e.g.,  we  have  just  been  led  to  recognize  that 
there  are  relations  of  both  similarity  and  difference  among 
dimensions — a  fact  that  is  not  without  considerable  importance 
for  us.  For  it  allows  us,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  time,  to  discover  a 
dimension  that  is  not  spatial,  and  in  the  case  of  space,  a  dimen- 
sion that  is  not  temporal,  and  therefore  suggests  that  certain 
dimensions,  certain  linear  series,  e.g.,  moral  values,  are  neither 
spatial  nor  temporal,  but  quite  outside  these  two  universes  of 

*' Cf.  Chap.  H.  "Cf.  Huntington,  op.  cit.,  p.  11. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      473 

discourse.  Consciousness,  also,  therefore,  if  it  should  prove  to 
be  a  dimension,  might  be  both  non-spatial  and  non-temporal, 
or  either  one,  and  not  the  other. 

But  there  are  not  only  relations  of  (1)  similarity  and  (2) 
difference  among  dimensions,  but  there  are  also  specific  rela- 
tions of  (3)  correlation,  and  (4)  "multiple  order,"  as  is  illus- 
trated respectively  by  that  correlation  of  space  with  time  which 
is  motion  (or  velocity),  and  by  space  of  more  than  one  dimen- 
sion (multiple  order). 

These  three  cases  are,  now,  to  be  carefully  distinguished  in 
examining   the   question,    whether    consciousness    is    a    "new" 
dimension  or  not;  i.e.,  one  should  distinguish   (1)   the  fact  of 
qualitatively  distinct  linear  series  from    (2)    the  fact  of  cor-l 
related  linear  series,  and  these  two  cases  from  (3)  the  fact  of  1 
multiply  ordered  dimensions  or  series. 

With  this  preparation,  we  may  now  endeavor  to  answer  our 
question:  Is  consciousness,  either  "in  general"  or  in  its  par-  ] 
ticular  instances,  a  dimension,  and,  if  it  is,  what  are  those  dif- 
ferentice  which  distinguish  it  from  other  dimensions,  and  what 
are  its  relations  to  other  dimensions? 

In  answer  to  these  questions  it  may  be  said,  first,  that  con- 
sciousness as  a  generic  term  is  not  a  dimension,  but  only  an 
(objective)  concept  that  is  identical  with  the  fact  of  a  resem- 
blance in  respect  to  the  awareness  that  characterizes  all  those 
particidar  instances  which  we  designate  as  conscious.  Our  ques- 
tions refer,  therefore,  to  particular  entities  that  are  called  con- 
scious, namely,  to  sensations,  memory  images,  emotions,  and  the 
like. 

With  reference,  now,  to  such  particular  conscious  entities,  it 
seems  to  be  an  undoubted  empirical  fact  that  certain  ones  of 
them  do  form  a  series,  and  thus  are  dimension-like.  This  is  the 
case,  as  has  already  been  instanced,  Avith  sensations  of  color, 
light  and  shade,  sound,  warmth,  pressure,  smell,  taste,  and  pain 
in  order  of,  at  least,  intensity,  if  not,  also,  of  extensity.  Dif- 
ferences of  intensity  may  also  characterize  the  different  kinds 
of  images,  both  of  memory  and  of  imagination,  and,  likewise, 
the  emotions;  but  whether  or  not  reasoning  is  so  characterized 
is  very  much  open  to  question. 

There  is  also  no  doubt  that  particular  conscious  processes 


474  REALISM 

as  well  as  certain  manifolds  of  such  processes  are  serial  or 
dimensional  also  in  another  sense,  namely,  that  they  are  cor- 
related with  time — indeed  the  term  conscious  process  itself,  as 
process  is  defined,  connotes  this  correlation.  Finally,  certain 
specific  fields  of  sensations  are  found  empirically  to  form 
multiply  ordered  classes,  as,  e.g.,  sensations  of  sound  as  ordered 
according  to  (1)  pitch,  (2)  intensity,  and  (3)  duration. 

But  these  empirical  matters  have  long  been  accepted  as 
matters  of  fact  in  psychology  and  philosophy,  so  that  the  ques- 
tion. Is  consciousness  a  dimension?  means  something  different 
from  what  such  affirmative  answers  as  the  above  would  seem  to 
imply.  Thus  our  question  would  seem  to  mean,  e.g.,  in  the  field 
of  sensations,  not.  Is  a  specific  manifold  of  sensations  serial  in 
such  respects  as  intensity  and  duration?  nor  even,  Is  one  par- 
ticular sensation  serial  as  having  duration  f  but,  Is  a  particular 
sensation  a  one-dimensional  set,  over  and  above  such  generally 
admitted  dimensionalities?  or,  if  the  qualitative  content  and 
the  aivareness  can  be  distinguished,  Is  either  this  awareness  or 
this  content  a  dimension? 

If,  now,  these  very  specific  inquiries  are  answered  in  the 
affirmative,  it  is  well  to  inquire  further  what  such  answers  imply. 
They  assert  that  a  sensation,  an  awareness,  or  a  sensation- 
content  is  as  such  a  dimensio7i.  But  what  does  this  imply? 
Our  answer  is,  that  it  implies,  seemingly,  that  there  are  elements 
— for,  up  to  the  present  at  least,  no  dimension  or  series  has  been 
discovered  that  is  not  a  complex,  and  that  does  not  as  such  pre- 
suppose elements. 

Can,  now,  such  elements  be  discovered  for  any  particular 
consciousness  as  a  dimension,  and,  if  they  can  be,  what  is  their 
character?  Are  such  elements  in  turn  conscious  elements — 
'' petit es  perceptions" — which,  as  organized  asymmetrically  and 
transitively,  are  a  qualitatively  specific  dimension  that  is  a 
sensation?  //  they  are  (conscious),  then,  however,  is  the  prob- 
lem only  repeated  in  the  form,  Are  such  (conscious)  elements 
themselves  dimensions?  while  if  they  are  not  conscious  elements, 
then  is  this  repetition  of  the  problem  avoided. 

One  might  as  well,  therefore,  accept  "at  its  own  level"  the 
problem.  Is  a  sensation  a  dimension — apart  from  its  duration, 
its  membership  in  an  intensity  series,  and  the  like?  and  not 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM   475 

attempt  to  derive  such  dimensionality  from  the  serial  organiza- 
tion of  "conscious  elements."  And  one  must  also  accept  the 
problem,  Can  elements  be  found  whereby  as  a  dimension  (if 
such  a  sensation  is  found  to  be)  it  conforms  to  the  requirements 
of  that  definition  of  a  dimension  which  is  generally  accepted, 
namely,  that  it  is  a  linear  series? 

Our  answer  to  this  inquiry  reintroduces  principles  that  have 
frequently  appeared,  and  been  frequently  used  in  foregoing  dis- 
cussions. Is  length  one  or  manyf  or.  Is  it  both  one  and  many? 
Yet  how  can  it  be  both?  Still,  if  it  is  both  (by  some  hook  or 
crook),  then  as  one,  is  it  a  dimension?  Yet  is  it  not  admitted 
to  be  a  dimension — not  many,  but  one, — perhaps  indeed  a 
dimension  par  excellence? 

Such  puzzles  would  seem  to  be  solved  by  the  frank  admission 
that  length  is  one  (or  would  some  maintain  that  it  is  qualita- 
tively two?),  and  yet  that  is  also  many — yet  not  many  lengths 
(which  but  repeats  the  problem)  but  many  points — organized 
in  a  very  specific  way — as  we  have  seen.  This  means  that  its 
organized  "manyness"  is  its  oneness,  and  that  its  oneness,  as 
length,  is  identical  with  its  being  a  dimensio7i. 

Dimensionality,  therefore,  does  not  imply  either  a  manifold 
of  elements  that  are  (of  necessity)  themselves  dimensions,  or 
its  own  complexity,  but  only  a  manifold  of  elements  that  are 
(numerically)  distinct  from  itself  and  that  are  organized  by 
very  specific  relations.  This  is,  indeed,  implied  in  the  principle, 
that  the  elements  of  an  n-dimensional  manifold  are  themselves 
n-1  dimensions — in  other  words,  that  "in"  the  elements  of  a 
dimension,  one  dimension  "falls  out." 

Length,  then,  is  a  dimension — one,  and  only  one — although! 
it  is  made  up  of  "elements"  that  are  7iot  dimensions.  But 
length  is  also  a  specific  quality  in  the  universe,  for,  although 
there  are  other  entities  like  it  "to  a  greater  or  less  degree," 
there  are  no  others  quite  like  it.  Yet  it  is  not  a  quality  that 
inheres  in  a  substance  (the  logical  priority  of  space  in  reference 
to  matter  is  sufficient  to  establish  this  fact).  And,  finally,  its 
oneness  is  not  violated  by  the  fact  that  it  can  be  called  both 
length  and  (as  a  member  of  a  class)  a  dimension. 

A  specific  sensation  may,  similarly,  be  regarded  (1)  as  an- 
other   "new"    and    distinct    quality    in    the    universe, — quit« 


4,76  REALISM 

analogous  to  a  specific  length;  (2)  it  may  be  one,  and  yet,  as 
one,  be  "conditioned"  by  the  serial  organization  of  many  ele- 
ments; thus  (3)  it  may  be  a  dimension,  whether  its  elements 
are  dimensions,  or  not,  but  a  dimension  which  in  its  qualitative 
specificity  is  distinct  from  its  elements  (even  as  length  is  from 
points)  and,  (4)  finally,  it  may  be  a  quality  that  does  not  inhere 
in  any  substance. 

But,  if  all  this  is  the  case,  what  are  those  elements  out  of 
which  such  a  specific  dimension  is  made?  First,  in  answer  to 
this  inquiry,  it  has  been  found,  that,  on  pain  of  repeating  the 
problem  as  to  whether  a  sensation  is  a  dimension  or  not,  the 
elements  must  be  different  from  that  wJiole  which  they  7nake 
up.^^  But  also,  as  has  been  found  repeatedly,  if  elements  are 
organized,  i.e.,  are  not  related  addiiively,  then  a  whole  may 
result,  with  properties  very  different  from  its  parts  or  constit- 
uents. The  former  demand  coincides,  therefore,  with  the  latter 
principle. 

To  conform,  now,  to  both  this  "demand"  and  this  "princi- 
ple," it  may  be  said,  that  empirically  any  number  of  different 
kinds  of  elements  (for  consciousness)  are  discoverable — kinds 
that  are  different  both  from  specific  sensation-quality  and  from 
one  another — but  out  of  which,  as  organized  elements,  a  specific 
sensation,  as  belonging  to  the  class  of  awarenesses,  may  arise. 
Such  different  "elements,"  although  all  of  them  are  not  known 
with  accuracy,  are  those  entities  that  are  studied  and  inve8ti-\ 
gated  in  such  sciences  as  neurology,  physiology,  physics,  and! 
chemistry.'^     Yet,  if  not  for  all  sensations,  then,  at  least  for 

'"This  chapter,  iv.,  v.,  and  vi. 

"'That  there  is  an  organization  of  such  non-sensation  elements  ia  not 
invalidated  by  the  objection  that  such  a  statement  or  position  can,  in  last 
analysis,  only  mean  that  the  entities  which  these  sciences  "  treat  of " 
are  themselves  sensations  (or  expressible  in  terms  of  sensations),  so  that, 
ultimately,  what  we  have  is  sensations-organized  give  sensations.  For 
this  objection  is  but  a  special  form  of  or  conclusion  from  the  ego-centric 
predicament,  to  the  effect  (here)  (1)  that,  because  such  "elements"  as 
atoms,  molecules,  colloidal  solutions,  nerve-  and  "  sense-cells,"  nerves, 
ether  waves,  air  waves,  and  the  like,  are  always  in  relation  to  some  kind 
of  knowing,  this  knowing  can  not  be  eliminated  in  any  way;  and  (2)  that, 
related  terms  constitute  or  affect  one  another,  so  that  (3)  atoms,  mole- 
cules, and  the  like,  are  really  sense-constituted  (mental)  entities.  Such 
a  conclusion  we  have  already  found  to  be  based  ( 1 )  on  the  purely 
gratuitous  postulation  of  the  modification  theory  of  relations,  and  (2)  on 
the  ignoring  of  a  method  of  virtual  elimination  of  knoioing  (of  any 
specific  form)  from  the  entity  that  is  known.    Therefore  we  may  say,  that 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      477 

some  specific  sensations,  e.g.,  my  visual  sensation  of  this  specific 
green  (of  this  leaf)  at  this  minute,  these  elements  and  con- 
ditions can  be  specified,  at  the  present  time,  with  a  fair  degree 
of  accuracy. 

But  such  a  specification  shows  that  these  elements  are  organ- 
ized, and  organized  serially.  Therefore,  as  is  the  case  with  the 
serial  organization  of  points  "into"  length,  so  also  if  there  is 
a  serial  organization  of  ether  waves,  waves  of  air,  physico- 
chemical  processes  both  within  the  organism  and  without,  into 
one  whole,  that  whole  which  results  is,  in  the  case  we  are  con- 
sidering, the  sensation. 

All  the  details  of  such  a  serial  organization  are  difficult  to 
determine,  and  are  as  yet  far  from  being  determined.  But 
that  the  organization  is  serial  is  shown  by  the  facts  that  the 
mechanical,  physical,  and  physico-chemical  "elements,"  both 
within  and  without  the  organism,  that  "lie  at  the  basis"  of  any 
specific  sensation  are  correlated  with  (1)  the  time  series,  (2) 
the  space  series,  (3)  are  themselves  a  cause  and  effect  series,. 
and  (4)  involve  any  number  of  specific  correlations  between j 
the  specific  variables  (series)  that  become  the  special  subject- 
matter  of  chemistry,  physics,  and  physiology.  ' 

What  all  the  elements  are,  which,  as  organized  serially,  give 
some  specific  sensation  as  a  unitary  entity,  is  difficult  to  deter- 
mine. Indeed,  it  is  hazardous  to  preclude  certain  possibilities, 
for  which  at  the  present  time  there  is  little  empirical  evidence. 
In  other  words,  the  conditions  for  sensation,  as  well  as  for  other 
kinds  of  coasciousness — indeed  other  kinds  than  those  with 
which  we  are  now  empirically  acquainted, — may  be  much  more 
varied  than  is  at  present  supposed. 

However,  whether  this  be  the  case  or  not,  there  is  one  error 
that  is  to  be  guarded  against  in  this  field,  and  that  is  the  error 
of  assuming  and  dogmatically  asserting  that  the  study,  investi- 
gation, description,  and  statement  of  the  *' conditions,"  "eZe- 
ments,"  organizing  relations  (and  the  like)  of  any  specific  kind 
or  instance  of  consciousness,  sensory  or  other,  does  away  with, 
nullifies,  or  makes  a  non-fact  of  the  whole  that  residts  from 

both  those  entities  that  are  expre&sible  in  terms  of  entities  that  are 
sensed  and  also  those  entities  that  are  not  so  expressible,  e.g.,  masses, 
chemical  valence,  electrolytic  conductivity,  and  the  like,  are,  although 
related  to  consciousness,  not  themselves  conscious  in  character. 


478  REALISM 

the  organized  elements,  i.e.,  the  sensation,  memory  image,  ab- 
stract idea,  and  the  like.  That  there  is  such  a  nullification  is  at 
least  the  tacit,  if  not,  indeed,  the  dogmatic  assumption  of  the 
modern  school  of  hehaviorists. 

Such  an  assumption  is,  however,  as  little  justified  in  the 
case  of  conscious  entities  as  it  is  in  the  case  of  length,  or,  indeed, 
as  it  is  in  the  ease  of  organism,  cell,  molecule,  and  atom — 
entities  which  the  "behaviorist"  repeatedly  "uses"  in  his  de- 
scriptions and  explanations.  Were  the  behaviorist  consistent 
in  his  position  of  displacing  the  whole  hy  its  parts,  then  should 
he  not  stop,  or  rather  hold  his  science  in  abeyance,  until  all 
has  been  worked  out  in  terms  of  some  ultimate  class  of  entities 
of  which  all  else  is  composed?  But  the  behaviorist  is  not  thus 
consistent.  Eather,  he  deals  with  such  entities  as  organisms, 
organs  and  stimuli — as  wholes,  and  not  as  complexes,  and,  there- 
fore, not  with  their  constituent  parts.  Even  so,  also,  is  it  quite 
permissible,  if  not,  indeed,  in  some  cases  necessary,  to  deal  with 
those  qualitatively  distinct  entities  called  sensations,  images, 
ideas,  and  the  like,  at  their  face  value.  Both  procedures  are 
possible  in  some  cases,  but  in  some  cases  not,  as  is  illustrated 
by  the  fact  that  man's  ethical  relationships  are  open  to  sys- 
tematic investigation,  in  the  absence,  at  the  present  time,  of,  e.g., 
any  very  accurate  or  certain  chemico-physics  of  his  nervous 
system.^^ 

We  conclude,  and  also  now  generalize,  that,  although  precise 
and  accurate  knowledge  is  lacking  for  specific  cases,  neverthe- 
less any  specific  sensation  and  any  specific  consciousness  is  a 
qualitatively  distinct  dimension  in  the  universe,  and,  as  such,  a 
unity  in  its  difnensionality,  even  as  is  length,  although  it  "re- 
sults" from  the  organization  of  many  other  qualitatively  dis- 
tinct dimensions.  This  specific  qualitative  distinctness  is  that 
which  is  usually  characterized  as  the  common  attribute  of  those 
facts  that  we  call  conscious,  namely,  as  awareness.  Awareness 
is,  therefore,  the  common  property  of  that  which,  hy  its  presence, 
is  one  class  of  dimensions  within  the  universe. 

What,  next,  is  the  relation  of  this  dimension  to  others?  On 
the  one  hand,  it  is,  as  we  have  seen,  the  "result"  of  the  serial 

"  Cf.  my  review  of  Loeb's  "  The  Mechanistic  Conception  of  Life,"  in 
IScience,  Vol.  XXXVII.,  p.  333  ff. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      479 

organization  of  other,  specific  dimensions.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  can  also,  as  in  other  instances,  (3)  enter  as  a  component 
dimension  into  still  other  w-dimensional  manifolds,  and  (2)  be 
correlated  with  other  dimensions.  Thus  sensations  and  other 
mental  processes  have  duration,  both  by  themselves  and  also  as 
forming  a  series  in  some  "life  history,"  and  so  are  correlated 
with  time.  In  this  last  respect  they  are,  as  themselves  dimen- 
sions, components  of  "higher"  dimensions.  But  they  also,  or, 
rather,  specific  manifolds  of  them,  form  series  in  respect  to  in- 
tensity, cesthetic  value,  and  thus  are  components  of  multiply 
ordered  series. 

Ifj^  now,  the  hypothesis,  that  particular  instances  of  conscious- 
ness are  qualitatively  distinct  dimensions  within  the  universe, 
can  thus  be  worked  out  in  some  detail,  in  a  fairly  satisfactory 
manner,  the  further  question  now  arises,  whether  this  hypothesis 
is  also  compatible  with  other  positions  that  have  been  advanced 
in  this  volume.  For  example,  is  our  present  hypothesis  con- 
sistent with  the  views  (1)  that  an  external  relationship  is  pre- 
supposed as  the  condition  for  there  being  genuine  knowledge; 
(2)  that  there  are  non-existent  efficiencies,  such  as  ethical  ideals, 
and  (3)  that  particular  conscious  entities,  such  as  sensations, 
images,  emotions,  and  reasoning  processes,  appear  and  disappear, 
come  and  go  ? 

The  answer  to  each  of  these  questions  is  "yes,"  Indeed,  in 
a  way,  each  has  already  received  such  an  answer.  Thus  we 
have  found  that  if  any  kind  of  a  process  or  event  is  analyzed, 
it  proves  to  be  serial  in  character,  and  in  this  respect  to  be  a 
dimension.  Motion  and  qualitative  change  are  excellent  exam- 
ples of  this,  as  we  have  previously  seen.'^^  Then  there  is  no 
difficulty  in  identifying  a  conscious  process  and  a  conscious 
dimension,  and  of  thus  conjoining  the  usual  psychological  with 
a  philosophical  point  of  view. 

But  an  answer  to  the  first  question  is  also  ready  at  hand. 
For  it  is  one  of  the  principles  previously  developed  that  a  non- 
additive  relation  (such  as  is  present  in  a  group  of  elements 
organized  as  a  dimension)  results  in  a  (synthetic)  creation  ^*  of 
new  properties,  which  properties  are,  riot  causally,  hut  function- 
ally related  to,  i.e.,  correlated  with,  the  {properties  of  the)  con- 

•■yn.-ix.  of  this  chapter.  "*  E.g.,  this  chapter,  iv.-vi. 


480  REALISM 

stituent  parts.  Such  a  relation  is,  however,  external.  It  is 
exemplified  in  the  instance  of  a  2-dimensional  spatial  manifold 
(a  plane)  in  its  one-one  correlation  with  a  1-dimensional  mani- 
fold (a  line),^^  and  also  in  the  instance  of  a  red-hot  iron  whose 
color,  as  the  iron  cools,  gradually  changes.  Such  a  change  of 
color  is,  now,  a  qualitative  change.  Undoubtedly  it  is  a  change 
that  is  correlated  with  motion — i.e.,  with  the  motion  of  the 
molecules  and  atoms  and,  perhaps,  electrons  that  "make  up" 
the  iron,  as  well  as  with  "ether  waves"  and  the  like.  But,  if 
the  principle  of  creative  synthesis  is  correct,  the  color  is  not 
identical  with  such  motions,  nor,  if  our  solution  of  the  problem 
of  illusory  objects  ^®  is  correct,  is  the  color  subjective,  because 
it  is  not  ide^itical  with  such  motions. 

By  this  last  solution  it  is,  rather,  objective,  though  its  locus 
is  not  the  same  as  is  that  of  motion,  i.e.,  it  is  not  identical  with 
the  "universe  of  discourse"  of  motion.  Accordingly,  the  change 
of  color,  which  change  is  itself  a  series  or  dimension,  is  an  ob- 
jective series  that,  while  it  is  correlated  Avith  another,  or  a 
number  of  other  specific  series  (motions — as  well  as  space),  is 
not  identical  with  these,  much  less  caused  by  them,  and  is  in 
this  sense  external.^'' 

Finally,  our  second  question  can  be  answered  affirmatively. 
For,  on  the  one  hand,  we  have  already  found  evidence  for  ac- 
cepting non-existent  efficiencies,^^  and,  on  the  other  hand,  if  it 
is  efficiencies  of  some  kind  that  must  be  serially  organized  as 
the  "condition"  for  the  "appearance"  of  a  particular  conscious- 
ness as  a  dimension,  then  we  now  have  evidence  of  the  serial 
organization  of  non-existent  efficiencies  in  the  case  of  space. 
For,  if  space  is  the  condition  for  all  that  (physically)  exists,  it 
does  not  itself  exist,  but  only  subsists.  In  a  manner,  therefore, 
that  is  similar  to  the  serial  organization  of  points  to  form 
1-dimension,  and  of  a  manifold  of  one-spatial  dimensions  to  form 
a  2-dimensional  manifold,  etc.,  any  and  all  non-existent  suh- 
sistents  may  be  serially  organized  (as,  e.g.,  are  moral  values), 
and  thus  as  efficiencies  account  for  the  appearance  of  conscious- 
ness, if  consciousness  is  to  be  accounted  for  in  this  way — namely, 

"  Cf.  Huntington,  op.  cit.,  pp.  60-62. 

'"  This  chapter,  i.-iii. 

"  Cf.  Chaps.  1.,  11.,  111.,  and  the  whole  of  Section  IV. 

*'  This  chapter,  i.-vi. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      481 

upon  the  basis  of  some  kind  of  stimulus  (efficiency) — with  ac- 
companying response. 

Two  or  three  further  points  that  are  involved  in  this  "di- 
mensional view"  of  consciousness  now  remain  to  be  discussed. 
One  of  these  points  concerns  the  question,  whether  this  view  is 
reconcilable  with  the  hypothesis,  which  has  also  been  advanced 
in  recent  discussions,  that  consciousness  is  a  relation.^^ 

The  reply  to  this  inquiry  is,  that  one  can  discover  certain 
possibilities  of  such  reconcilement — certain  main  outlines — even 
if  one  cannot  work  out  all  the  details  with  precision  and  ac- 
curacy, after  the  manner  of  certain  sciences,  e.g.,  mechanics. 
One  is  thus  in  much  the  same  position  as  was  Galileo  when  he 
discovered  that,  e.g.,  velocity  was  a  function  of  time  (such  a 
relation  being  the  correlation  of  two  variables) ,  but  was  not  able 
to  discover  all  those  details  which  subsequent  analysis  has  found 
in  the  functional  relation. 

Such  a  reconcilement  is  attainable  again  upon  the  basis  of 
principles  that  have  been  previously  developed.  Thus  it  has 
been  found  that  certain  relations  as  organizing  certain  com- 
plexes are  the  basis  on  which  other  relations  rest.^°  For  example, 
the  relation  of  implication  rests,  in  some  instances,  on  a  twofold 
relation  of  inclusion  between  classes,  (A  <^B,  B  <.  C  implies 
A  <  C).  Also,  if  two  classes  are  each  organized  serially,  then 
do  the  relations  which  so  organize  the  classes,  form  the  basis  for 
the  relation  of  1 — 1  ordinal  correspondence  between  the  two 
classes.  And,  finally,  if  certain  relations  organize  elements  into 
a  unitary  whole,  as,  e.g.,  asymmetrical  and  transitive  relations 
organize  points  into  a  line,  then  is  there  also  a  relation  between 
the  unitary  whole  and  the  organized  elements. 

The  situation  is  not  different  in  the  case  of  consciousness,  if 
consciousness  in  any  particular  instance  is  a  dimension,  and  thus 
a  unitary  whole  that  results  from  the  serial  organization  of 
certain  specific  ''elements."  For  under  these  circumstances 
there  can  be  a  new  relation  (as  we  have  found  that  implication 
is  new)  that  may  be  called  the  "conscious  relation,"  and  there 
most  certainly  is  a  relation  between  this  new  dimension,  con- 
sciousness, on  the  one  hand,  and  both  its  "elements"  and  other 
"things,"  on  the  other  hand,     Bui  whether  the  consciousness 

••  By,  e.g.,  Woodbridge,  loc.  cit.  •"  Chap,  XIIL,  i. 


482  REALISM 

itself  can  justifiahly  be  called  a  relation  is  questionable,  even 
as  would  be  the  case,  if  a  line  were  called  a  relation.  A  line 
is  a  relational  complex,  as  well  as  a  line,  and  it  can  be  a  related 
term  in  other  complexes;  but  it  certainly  does  not  seem  to  be 
a  relation.    Even  so,  then,  with  consciousness  as  a  dimension. 

In  this  respect,  therefore,  the  two  recent  hypotheses  as  to  the 
nature  of  consciousness,  the  one,  that  it  is  a  dimension,  the 
other,  that  it  is  a  relation,  seem  to  be  irreconcilable,  and,  to  the 
writer,  the  advantage  seems  to  lie  with  the  former  hypothesis. 
This  conclusion  is  strengthened  by  the  fact,  also,  that  those  who 
defend  the  second  hypothesis  fail  to  specify  to  what  type  of 
relations  consciousness  (as  a  relation)  belongs, — i.e.,  to  specify 
whether  it  is,  e.g.,  symmetrical,  asymmetrical,  transitive,  in- 
transitive, and  the  like.  This  failure  is,  accordingly,  rather 
damaging,  in  the  light  of  that  detailed  knowledge  of  relations 
which  we  now  have,''^  to  the  contentions  of  those  who  advance 
this  second  hypothesis. 

The  first  hypothesis  seems,  therefore,  to  have  the  advantage. 
For  it  is  an  hypothesis  that  can  be  worked  out  in  fairly  precise 
and  accurate  agreement  with  the  modern  theory  of  dimensions, 
and  comports  accurately,  also,  with  the  empirical  facts,  (1)  that 
perhaps  all  of  the  different  kinds  of  sensation  and  of  images 
form  series  as  regards  intensity  and  extensity  {e.g.,  loudness  of 
tones),  (2)  that  among  sensations  there  are,  as  we  have  seen, 
some  instances  of  midtiply  ordered  series,  e.g.,  tones,  (3)  that 
all  conscious  processes  are  correlated  with  the  dimension,  time, 
and  (4)  that  in  the  field  of  rational  processes,  there  is  a  con- 
formity with  the  system  2.^~  Finally,  such  an  hypothesis 
conforms  to  that  tendency  which  is  one  of  the  dominant  char- 
acteristics of  modern,  exact  science,  namely,  the  tendency,  or 
the  effort  finally  to  formulate  laws  in  the  form  of  equations 
between  variables,  of  the  general  form,  y  =  f{x).  But  a  variable 
is  a  series,  whether  it  also  be  continuous,  dense,  or  discontinuous, 
and  it  is  also  a  dimension,  whether  it  be  linear,  or  multiple. 
Therefore,  if  consciousness  is  a  dimension,  it  is  also  a  variable, 
which  means  that  investigation  should  be  directed  to  ascer- 
taining what  variables  are  specific  functions  of  it,  and  of  what 
variables  it  is  a  specific  function. 

•'  Chape.  II.  and  XXVII.  "  See  Chap.  11. 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      483 

Whether,  now,  philosophical  and  psychological  investigation 
has  as  yet  been  directed,  to  any  great  extent,  at  least,  to  finding 
out  what  the  "place"  of  consciousness  as  such  a  variable  in  the 
universe  is,  may  well  be  doubted.  And  yet,  in  the  absence  of 
the  precise  results  that  might  be  won  by  such  a  procedure,  the 
position  or  hypothesis  that  consciousness  is  a  dimension,  does 
seem  to  solve,  in  a  general  way,  certain  problems  that  other 
hypotheses  fail  to  solve. 

One  such  problem  is  presented  by  the  question,  as  couched 
in  the  naturalistic  terms  of  physics,  chemistry,  and  biology,  or 
in  terms,  namely,  of  cause  and  effect  alone,  as  to  how,  if  any 
specific  consciousness  is  the  final  effect  within  the  hody,  or  within 
the  head,  or,  even  more  precisely,  ivithin  the  cortex  of  the  hrain, 
such  a  consciousness  can  ever  refer  to,  or  "get  out"  to,  an  object 
that  is  remote  from  the  cortex  either  spatially  or  temporally. 
Thus,  to  take  an  example,  if  my  present  sensation  of  a  distant 
star  is  only  the  causal  effect  in  me  of  a  "stream"  of  light  waves 
that  "started  from"  the  star  perhaps  many  hundreds  of  years 
ago,  then  is  not  that  which  I  sense  or  perceive  the  causal  effect 
in  me  (in  my  cortex,  or  brain,  or  head,  or  body)  and  not  the 
star  at  all?  And  does  not  this  compel  us  to  accept  that  which 
is  the  essential  position  or  conclusion  of  Subjectivism,  that  that 
which  I  (directly)  know  is  only  my  own  ideas,  as  the  causal 
effects,  in  me,  of  some  kind  of  external  cause  (either  God,  or 
things-in-themselves,  and  the  like)  ?  Or,  if  this  conclusion  itself 
in  turn  gives  rise  to  too  many  difficulties  and  problems,^^  then 
does  not  the  view  that  consciousness  is  an  end  causal-effect 
force  us  to  conclude  that  it  can  "get  to"  its  object  only  by 
means  of  some  such  medium  as  potential  energy  defined  as  the 
inverse  of  the  "incoming  streams"  of  kinetic  or  active  energy?  ^* 

It  is  quite  clear,  then,  that  if  consciousness  is  regarded  as  such 
a  causal-effect,  such  an  "end-term,"  it  most  certainly  does  seem 
to  be  shut  in,  so  that  we  have  the  problem  as  to  how  it  ever 
can  get  out — to  have  as  its  "content,"  e.g.,  the  spatially  distant 
star,  or  the  temporally  distant  past  or  future  event.  However, 
the  very  statement  of  the  problem  in  these  (causal)  terms  readily 

"  See  Chaps.  XXIX.-XXXII. 

'*  Montague,  in  his  essay,  "  Consciousness  a  Form  of  Energy,"  in  Essays 
in  Honor  of  Wm.  James. 


484  REALISM 

suggests  the  means  of  its  solution,  i.e.,  it  suggests  that  the  way 
to  solve  the  problem  is  to  take  such  a  view  of  the  nature  of 
consciousness,  as  does  not  make  of  it  an  end-effect  in  an  incom- 
ing stream  of  physical  energy.  But  such  a  view  is  the  position 
or  hypothesis  that  consciousness  is  a  "new"  dimension  and  a 
variable.  For,  if  it  is  a  variable,  then,  a  priori,  one  must  grant 
that  it  can  enter  into  the  same  types  of  relationship  to  other 
variables  that  these  enter  into  among  themselves.  And  it  is 
the  possibility  of  such  relationships  that  solves  the  problem  above 
outlined,  as  well  as  other  problems. 

What,  then,  are  some  of  these  types,  or,  rather,  the  principles 
that  are  involved  in  such  types  of  relationships?  In  answer 
to  this  inquiry,  one  has  first  to  say,  that  variables  are  cor- 
related, either  in  a  one-one,  one-many,  or  many-one  manner. 
But  more  important  is  the  principle  that  such  correlation  allows 
of  the  qualitative  discontinuity  of  the  correlated  variables,  as 
well  as  of  the  most  radical  qualitative  differences  between  them. 
Thus,  e.g.,  that  p  =  f{t)  (pressure  a  function  of  temperature) 
does  not  imply  that  pressure  and  temperature  are  identical 
qualitatively;  while,  if  a  "proper  part"  of  a  line  is  correlated 
in  a  one-one  manner  with  a  whole  line  (in  respect,  of  course,  to 
points) ,  then  the  proper  part  may  be  very  small,  and  the  whole 
very  large;  indeed  an  inch  is  in  such  correlation  with  the  dis- 
tance of  a  million  miles.  Further  examples  of  one  or  the  other 
of  these  two  principles,  or  of  both  together,  are  the  correlations 
(1)  between  time  and  space,  (2)  between  the  gradual  change 
of  color,  or  of  temperature,  and  the  motion  of  atoms  and  mole- 
cules, and  (3)  between  the  points  of  all  space  (of  any  number 
of  dimensions)  and  the  points  of  a  line. 

As  applied,  now,  to  the  hypothesis  that  consciousness  is  a 
dimension  and  a  variable,  these  principles  have  an  important 
bearing  on  the  solution  of  the  specific  problem  just  previously 
considered,  as  well  as  other  problems. 

For,  first,  with  it  granted  that  the  "conditions"  for  conscious- 
ness are  both  spatial  and  physical,  then,  if  consciousness  itself 
is  a  new  dimension  that  "arises"  through  the  non-additive 
organization  of  such  conditions,  it  follows,  that  consciousness 
itself  need  not  be  either  spatial  or  physical  in  order  to  be  cor- 
related with  spatial  or  physical  "things,"  as  well  as  with  those 


SOLUTION  OF  THE  COSMOLOGICAL  PROBLEM      485 

eutities  that  are  in  any  way  whatsoever  qualitatively  different 
from  itself,  such  as  those  entities  that  are  neither  physical  nor 
mental  (conscious). 

In  this  respect,  therefore,  consciousness  is  extra-spatial — i.e., 
non-spatial  and  extra-physical,  and,  accordingly,  not  the  kind 
of  entity  that  can  be  spatially  shut  in  within  body,  head,  brain, 
or  cortex.  Clearly,  however,  if  it  is  not  shut  in,  there  is  no 
problem  as  to  how  to  get  it  out — e.g.,  to  the  distant  star.  But, 
if  it  is  not  shut  in,  if  it  is  non-spatial  in  character,  then  it  is 
neither  here  nor  there,  and  yet,  even  as  time  can  be  correlated 
with  space,  without  being  spatial,  so,  also,  can  consciousness  be 
correlated  with  spatial  "things"  without  being  itself  spatial. 
Thus  it  is  that  we  can  understand  how,  e.g.,  the  distant  star  or, 
in  fact,  any  object  that  is  spatially  distant  from  our  bodies, 
should  be  "content"  of  our  consciousness,  without  our  conscious- 
ness spatially  reaching  out  to  the  object  that  is  "content."  The 
consciousness  is  not  "first"  in  our  bodies,  brain,  or  cortex,  then 
to  be  got  to  the  distant  object,  but  is,  rather,  a  "new"  dimension 
that  arises  from  the  very  special  organization  of  "elements" 
of  which  distant  object  and  body  are  each  members.  Yet  it  must 
be  admitted,  if  all  this  account  is  true,  that  why  it  should  be 
some  members  and  not  others  (of  the  organized  series  of  ele- 
ments) that  are  the  specific  content  of  a  specific  consciousness, 
is  a  special  problem  that  is  not  yet  solved. 

However,  an  account  very  similar  to  that  just  given  of  the 
correlation  of  the  variable,  consciousness,  with  physical  and 
spatial  entities,  can  also  be  given  for  its  correlation  with  entities 
that  are  remote  in  time,  either  past  or  future.  For  if  it  is  a 
principle  that  proper  part  is  in  correlation  with  whole  {e.g., 
an  inch  with  a  million  miles  in  respect  to  points),  then  a  par- 
ticular consciousness  "lasting"  but  a  short  time,  can  be  cor- 
related with  a  much  larger  time,  and  thus  reach  into  both  the 
future  and  the  past,  and,  accordingly,  have  as  its  "content" 
an  object  that  itself  is  correlated  with  a  specific  part  of  such 
past  or  future  time.  In  some  such  way  as  this  can  the  fact 
be  accounted  for,  that  particular  complexes  that  now  no  longer 
exist  or  that  do  not  yet  exist,  so  that  they  cannot  "send" 
incoming  streams  of  energy  to  my  brain,  can  nevertheless  be 
"content"  of  my  consciousness. 


486  REALISM 

Such  an  account  of  the  ''ability"  of  consciousness  to  "tran- 
scend" itself  temporally  and  qualitatively  is  undoubtedly  de- 
ficient in  a  great  many  respects.  Yet  it  is  an  account  that 
seems  to  the  writer  to  have  many  advantages  over  that  tradi- 
tional account  which  starts  with  the  tacit  or  explicit  assumption, 
that  consciousness  is  a  substance,  or  an  end  causal-effect  on  an 
ego  or  spirit  that  is  a  sutstance,  and  which  is  so  productive  of 
false  problems  and  of  philosophical  culs-de-sac  and  impasses. 
But  it  is  also  some  such  an  account  as  must  be  made,  if  thd 
hypothesis  that  consciousness  is  a  dimension  is  to  be  anything 
more  than  a  purely  philosophical  speculation.  Such  an  hy- 
pothesis and  such  an  account  seem,  however,  to  lead  in  the 
direction  of  philosophical  progress  and  advance  to  a  much 
greater  extent  than  does  persistent  adherence  to  the  traditional 
point  of  view  in  which  consciousness  is  regarded  as  a  substance, 
or  in  which  it  is  tacitly  assumed  that  problems  are  solved  if 
they  are  ignored. 


CHAPTER  XLIV 

EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  AS  PART  OF 
COSMOLOGY 

It  is  quite  evident  that  in  the  foregoing  presentation  of 
realistic  cosmology  we  have  already  entered  the  domain  of  those 
problems  that  in  Section  II.  of  Part  I.  were  called  epistemological 
and  psychological.  But  why  should  we  not  do  this?  Are  not 
knowing  and  consciousness  undeniable  facts  in  some  sense?  Are 
they  not  within  the  universe,  and,  indeed,  within  the  cosmos  as 
that  universe  in  which  entities  are  related  not  only  in  one,  but 
in  many  ways,  with  the  same  type  of  entity  and  of  relation 
recurring,  perhaps,  many  times?  Finally,  must  not  all  entities 
be  so  related  to  certain  other  entities  of  the  cosmos-universe  as 
to  allow  themselves  to  be  known,  as  unmodified  by  virtue  of 
being  known?  For,  since  in  any  case  it  is  presupposed  tha^ 
some  entities  of  the  universe,  be  these  complex  or  simple,  are 


EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  487 

so  known,  must  it  not  be  granted  that  all  entities  are,  similarly, 
hnowdble,  unless  very  good  grounds  to  the  contrary  can  be 
advanced  ?  Our  answer  to  these  inquiries  has  been  given  many 
times  and  in  many  places/  but  now  all  our  positive  solutions 
to  these  problems  take  their  place  in  a  realistic  cosmology  and 
psychology. 

It  is  epistemological  difficulties  and  problems  that  force  us  to 
the  conclusion  that  consciousness  and  awareness  cannot  be  a 
substance,  and  must  be  either  a  dimension  (variable),  a  relation, 
a  quality,  or  an  event.  These  entities  cannot  be  a  substance, 
except  at  the  cost  of  making  any  genuine  knowledge,  even  of 
themselves,  impossible.^  But  at  least  some  such  knowledge  is 
presupposed  by  each  and  every  epistemology !  Accordingly, 
some  alternative  hypothesis  accounts  not  only  for  the  situation 
that  is  presented  by  this  presupposition,  but  also  for  all  other 
cases  of  genuine  knowing  or  awareness. 

But  there  is  not  alone  genuine  knowing,  but  also  error — of 
many  kinds.  And  yet,  with  the  substance-view  of  consciousness 
invalidated,  the  possibility  of  consciousness  being  a  "container" 
is  invalidated,  so  that  error-objects  can  no  longer  be  regarded 
as  subjective  in  the  sense  that  they  are  contained  in  conscious- 
ness, but  they  also  must  be  accepted  as  objective.  The  only 
residual  subjective  element  in  error  is,  therefore,  the  ** taking" 
of  "something"  to  be  that  which  it  is  not. 

If,  now,  realistic  psychology  and  epistemology  must  take  their 
place  in  realistic  cosmology,  all  the  positive  developments  and 
conclusions,  particularly  of  Chapters  XIII.,  i.,  XXVII.,  XL., 
and  XLL,  must  be  accepted  as  accounts  of  specific  phases  or 
parts  of  the  cosmos,  and  thus  be  included  realiter  in  Chapter 
XLIII.^' 

As  a  fitting  conclusion  or  complement,  therefore,  to  all  these 
preceding  cosmological  accounts,  and  from  the  point  of  view 
that  any  and  all  entities  are  "somewhere"  in  the  cosmos  and 
are  objective,  we  may  now  attempt  a  classification  of  entities 

*  See,  e.g..  Chap.  III.,  and  the  criticism  of  systems  opposed  to  realism. 
Chaps.  XXIX.-XXXVlll. 

'  See  Chap.  III. 

'  For  other  features  of  realistic  epistemology,  see  Chaps.  I.,  II.,  III., 
XII.,  XIV.,  XXI.-XXV.,  XXVI.,  XXVIII.,  and  the  criticism  in  Chaps. 
XXIX.-XXXVII.,  XLII.,  XLV.,  and  XLVI. 


488  REALISM 

whereby  some  of  their  relations  to  one  another,  and  their  quali- 
tative divergence  from  one  another,  shall  be  presented. 

Such  an  attempt  is  directed  to  the  recognition  of  certain 
specific  types  or  kinds  of  entities,  and,  therefore,  to  the  occur- 
rence of  certain  relations,  especially  those  of  similarity  and 
difference  among  individuals,  and  of  the  inclusion  or  exclusion, 
complete  or  partial,  of  the  ''resulting"  classes. 

The  individuals  of  a  class  are  either  absolutely  simple  indi- 
viduals, such  as  points,  or  complexes.  Complex  individuals  con- 
sist, ultimately,  of  "absolute  simples,"  of  which,  seemingly,* 
there  are  a  number  of  different  kinds,  but  they  may  also  be 
complexes  of  complexes.  In  fact,  most  of  the  entities  or 
wholes  within  the  cosmos  are  of  this  type.  But,  in  either  case, 
a  complex  is  a  whole  that  is  organized  by  one  or  more  specific 
relations,  some  of  these  relations  being  independent  of  and 
logically  prior  to  others.  Thus,  among  complexes,  one  can  dis- 
tinguish mere  collections,  classes,  series,  "wholes"  of  correlated 
series,  organic  wholes,  and  the  like,  and  then  ascertain  that 
the  relations  that  organize  certain  of  these  complexes,  as,  e.g., 
similarity  organizes  a  class,  are  independent  of  those  relations 
that  organize  series  and  organic  wholes,  as,  e.g.,  an  asymmetrical 
and  transitive  relation  organizes  a  series. 

The  universe,  now,  is  the  totality  of  all  entities,  whatever 
these  may  be,  as  related  merely  additively.  The  cosmos  may  be 
defined,  accordingly,  as  this  universe  of  entities  as  related  other 
than  merely  additively.  Such  non-additive  relations,  which  sub- 
sist "over  and  above"  mere  additiveness,  are  those  relations 
that  generate  classes,  series,  and  the  like.  But  the  universe- 
cosmos  is  all-inclusive.  There  is,  then,  "place  "  in  it  for  such 
entities  as  (1)  a  perpetuum  mobile,  (2)  "phlogiston,"  the 
hypothetical  substance  that  was  held,  in  the  eighteenth  century, 
to  be  present  in  all  combustible  bodies,  (3)  the  snakes  of  de- 
lirium tremens,  (4)  ghosts,  (5)  centaurs  and  satyrs,  (6)  future 
and  past  happenings  in  distinction  from  present,  (7)  this  table 
on  which  I  am  writing  is  distinction  from  (8)  table  in  general, 
(9)  apparently  converging  rails  and  bent  sticks,  (10)  the  motion 
and  rest  of  material  bodies  in  distinction  from  (11)  space  and 
time  as  conditions.    The  words  that  have  just  been  used  stand 

•  Bee  Chaps.  XXI.,  XXII.,  XXIII.,  XXVI.,  XLIII.,  iv.,  vii.,  viii.,  ix.,  x. 


EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  489 

for  "things"  that  are  entities  in  some  sense,  or  that  at  least 
cannot  be  dismissed  as  mere  nothings,  without  investigation. 

One  traditional  and  short-sighted  way  of  treating  this  problem 
of  classifying  such  entities  as  have  just  been  mentioned,  is  to 
make  some  of  them  '^unreal."  False  hypothetical  entities,  such 
as  "phlogiston,"  normally  and  abnormally  imagined  entities 
such  as  centaurs  and  the  snakes  of  delirium,  and  even,  indeed, 
future  events,  are  often  so  classified.  But  manifestly  even  "un- 
real" things  are  in  some  sense  facts  within  the  universe,  so  that 
it  is  incumbent  on  a  systematic  and  scientific  investigation  to 
determine  the  character  of  the  "unreal,"  A  second  traditional 
method  of  classification  aims  to  do  this.  It  places  all  unreal 
entities  in  the  subject,  or  makes  them  subjective,  in  opposition 
to  other,  real  entities,  as  objective.  Even  space  and  time  and 
all  relations,  as  opposed  to  substance-like  terms,  have  been 
"given"  this  subjective  locus  by  certain  philosophical  systems.^ 
This  solution  of  the  problem  has,  indeed,  become  a  ready-made 
answer  that  is  accepted  without  further  reflection  by  perhaps 
the  majority  of  philosophically  inclined  persons.  By  it,  al- 
though there  is  much  lack  of  clearness  and  precision  in  the 
matter,  the  subjective  is  identified  with  the  mental  or  psychical, 
and  the  objective  with  the  physical,  and  "the  psychical"  is  then 
made  to  contain  all  "unreal"  entities. 

An  analysis  of  this  solution  shows,  however,  that  it  is  really 
derived  by  assuming  the  psychical  to  be  a  sort  of  substance, 
whereby  it  can  be  a  receptacle  or  container.  This  view  of  con- 
sciousness is,  however,  beset  with  so  many  difficulties  in  its  im- 
plications, etc.,  that  it  must  be  given  up,  and  such  an  hypothesis 
accepted  as  makes  of  consciousness  a  dimension  and  allows  all 
entities  to  be  objective  in  the  sense  that  they  are  at  least  not  in 
a  "psychical  container." 

Proceeding,  now,  from  this  point  of  view,  we  find  that  all 
entities  that  come  within  the  field  of  awareness  would  seem  to 
be  similar  in  the  respect,  at  least,  that  they  are  mentionable. 
"Entity"  itself  is  a  means  of  mentioning  them.  But  not  all 
" mentionables"  are  entities.  That  they  are  not,  is  shown  by 
one  or  another  of  the  several  empirical  tests  that  are  at  our 
disposal.  Thus,  some  "mentionables"  are  found  to  be  merely 
"  See  Chaps.  XXIX.  and  XXX. 


490  REALISM 

combinations  of  words,  as,  e.g.,  are  "round  square"  and  "black 
whiteness."  Each  part  of  such  combination-words  may,  per- 
haps, be  employed  in  order  to  mention  entities,  but  the  entities 
thus  indicated,  as,  e.g.,  round  and  square,  exclude  each  other, 
and  subsist  at  different  loci. 

As  entities,  therefore,  we  can  accept  only  such  as  do  not 
involve,  if  they  are  complexes,  characters  that  exclude  and  force 
one  another  into  different  universes  of  discourse,  or  such  as 
furnish  no  occasion  for  exclusion  in  that  they  are  absolutely 
simple.  Let  us  call  whatever  fulfils  these  conditions  a  '^con- 
sistent." All  "consistents,"  then,  are  to  he  accepted  as  entities, 
and  an  entity  is  to  he  defined  as  a  "consistent."  From  this 
definition  it  follows,  that  whatever  appears  to,  or  is  given  as 
content  in,  any  mode  of  awareness,  be  this  perception,  memoiy, 
dream,  illusion,  imagination,  reason,  or  intuition,  is  therewith 
a  "consistent"  and  an  entity.  For  the  fact  of  the  mere  "given- 
ness"  of  the  co-presence  of  several  characteristics  estahlishes 
their  consistency,  and,  therefore,  the  "entity-character"  of  the 
complex.  The  question  of  exclusion  does  not,  of  course,  arise 
concerning  simple  entities,  or,  if  the  apparently  simple  proves 
to  be  complex,  then  its  consistency  is  established  with  its  "given- 
ness."  By  this  test  certain  words  or  symbols  are  found  not  to 
designate  entities  at  all,  "round  square"  being  a  good  example. 
Individual  round  things  and  also  roundness  are  entities,  and  so 
are  square  thiiigs  and  squareness,  but  no  "round  square"  is  ever 
given  in  any  experience. 

Among  entities,  however,  empirical  methods  reveal  two  classes, 
namely,  those  that  exist,  and  those  that  do  not  exist.  The 
former  are  called  existents,  the  latter,  non-existent  siihsistents, 
or  merely  suhsistents.  All  existents  suhsist,  hut  not  all  siih- 
sistents exist.  In  proceeding  here  one  must  rely  wholly  upon 
the  verdict  of  empirical  methods  in  science  and  common  sense 
in  which  innumerable  things,  qualities,  events,  and  relations  are 
accepted  as  existing.  From  such  instances  one  can  derive  a 
partial  definition  of  an  existent,  namely,  that  it  is  an  entity  that 
either  has  heen,  is  now,  or  will  he  "at"  or  "in"  a  particular 
place,  at  a  particular  time,  or  merely  at  a  particular  time,  if 
the  entity  is  not  spatial,  as,  e.g.,  a  conscious  process  is  not.* 
*See  Chap.  XLIII.,  xi. 


EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  491 

"Occupy"  or  "correlated  with"  a  particular  place  and  time, 
or  a  particular  time,  alone,  are  also  terms  that  may  here  be 
used  instead  of  "at"  and  "in."  "Particular  place"  and  "par- 
ticular time,"  are,  however,  relative  matters.  By  themselves 
space  and  time  include  individual  extensions  and  durations,  even 
as  any  one  point  is  that  individual  point  and  not  another.  But 
aside  from  this  individuality  there  are  no  differences  among 
extensions,  except  those  between  one-,  and  two-,  and  three- 
dimensional  spatial  extensions,  and,  also,  durations.  Our  living, 
however,  is  '^earth-centered"  and  twentieth  century  pivoted, 
and  in  relation  to  this  other  spaces  and  times  are  particular  in 
the  sense  in  which  the  term  is  used  above. 

But  to  be  "in"  or  "at,"  or  "to  occupy"  a  "particular" 
space  and  time,  both,  or  only  one,  is  not  enough  to  define  or 
characterize  existents.  For  other  entities,  such  as  dream  objects, 
also  have  this  spatial  and  temporal  particularity.  Therefore 
a  complex  existent  must  have  that  full  quota  of  characteristics, 
or  he  that  full  quota,  which  the  sciences  of  physics,  chemistry, 
biology,  psychology,  and  the  like,  find  it  empirically  to  have. 

Existents,  thus  defined,  are  of  two  kinds,  namely,  physical  and 
mental.  Physical  existents  are  things,  forces,  energies,  qualities 
such  as  solidity  and  elasticity,  relations  such  as  cause  and  effect, 
and  events  such  as  the  falling  of  bodies  and  the  flow  of  electrical 
currents.  Among  such  physical  entities  are  both  those  that  are 
directly  perceived  and  those  that  are  inferred  in  order  causally 
and  functionally  to  explain  those  things,  forces,  etc.,  that  are 
directly  perceived. 

Mental  existents  are,  analogously,  to  be  accepted  essentially  as 
they  are  interpreted  by  empirical  psychology,  namely,  as  proc- 
cesses  or  events  that  occur  at  a  certain  specific  time.  Seemingly 
they  occur  at  a  specific  time  because  that  which  conditions  them 
(yet  does  not  cause  them),  namely,  a  nervous  system  of  a  certain 
degree  of  organization,  and  in  a  certain  specific  condition,  is  at 
that  time.  In  this  respect,  at  least,  mental  events  or  processes 
are  temporally  "located,"  and  are  in  a  temporal  series.  How- 
ever, this  does  not  mean  that  they  themselves  are  limited  tem- 
porally, as  are  their  conditions.  For,  similarly,  an  organism 
as  a  whole  manifests  certain  characteristics,  such  as  the  power 
of  "selective  response,"  reproduction,  and  the  like,  that  are 


492  REALISM 

conditioned  by  physical  and  chemical  forces,  but  that  are  not 
characteristic  of  these  conditions.  So  also  are  there  finite  moral 
beings  only  if  there  are  biological  and  physiological  beings. 
Yet  the  morality  subsists  only  in  the  field  of  the  relationship 
of  such  biological  beings  to  one  another,  and  not  in  the  condi- 
tions. In  general,  the  examination  of  *any  number  of  concrete 
cases  shows  that  the  characteristics  of  the  whole  may  differ 
radically  from  those  of  its  conditions  and  its  parts.  The  non- 
temporal  and  non-spatial  character  of  consciousness  as  such, 
side  by  side  with  the  temporal  and  spatial  character  of  its  con- 
ditions, is  hut  another  instance  of  this  principle.  It  is,  then, 
by  an  indirect  reference  to  the  conditions  that  the  temporal 
(and,  perhaps,  the  spatial)  location  of  specific  conscious  proc- 
esses is  arrived  at.  It  is  for  these  reasons  that  we  shall  classify 
existents  as  of  two  kinds,  namely,  physical  and  psychical,  includ- 
ing under  each  of  these  classes  aZ?  those  suh-classes  that  are 
usually  so  included  in  the  physical  sciences  and  in  psychology. 

Empirical  methods,  experimental,  rationalistic  and  analytical 
in  character,  compel  us,  next,  by  a  process  of  exclusion,  to  accept 
another  great  class  of  entities  for  which  the  name  suhsistent  is 
accepted  by  a  number  of  investigators.'^  These  entities  are, 
on  the  one  hand,  experienced,  and  are  found  not  to  be  self- 
contradictory ;  i.e.,  they  are  "consistents."  Yet,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  are  not  existents;  for  they  are  found  to  lack  those 
qualities,  or  at  least  that  fidl  quota  of  qualities,  including  tem- 
poral and  spatial  localization,  which  psychology  and  physics 
recognize  as  essential  to  objects  that  exist.  Therefore  they  are 
excluded  from  being  psychological  in  character  (as  tradition 
has  so  long  held  them  to  be),  by  the  hypothesis,  now  accepted 
at  this  point  as  established,  that  consciousness  is  not  a  substance 
or  "container."  Examples  of  subsistents  are  the  "perpetual 
motion"  machine  of  pure  mechanics,  the  dreamt  "falling  from 
a  roof, ' '  the  centaurs  and  satyrs  of  the  Greeks,  and  the  substance, 
"phlogiston,"  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

Yet  there  are  differences  among  subsistents — differences  re- 
vealed by  the  mode  of  their  discovery,  even  as  is  the  case  with 
color   and   sound.      Thus   some   subsistents   are   discovered   by 

''  E.g.,  by  Holt,  Marvin,  Perry,  Pitkin,  and  Montague  in  The  Neio 
Realism  and  other  voiumeR. 


EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  493 

reason,  others  by  dreaming,  still  others  by  "waking"  imagina- 
tion. For  example,  it  is  found  by  reasoning,  that  the  transfer 
of  energy  in  the  physical  world  would  take  place  "round  and 
round,"  say,  from  electric  generator  back  to  dynamo  and  to 
fly  wheel,  provided  ever-dissipating  heat  were  not  produced, 
and  also  provided  that  a  "potential  fall,"  analogous  to  the  fall 
of  water  through  a  flume,  were  not  a  necessary  condition  for 
each  and  every  transfer  of  energy.  Exist entially,  however,  ever- 
dissipating  heat  energy  (with  equalization  of  temperature)  and 
"potential  gradients"  are  the  facts.  Yet  "conditions"  that  are 
contrary  to  these  facts  can  be  postulated,  and  reasoned  from, 
and  thus  an  ideal,  perpetuum  mobile,  be  deduced. 

Such  a  subsistent  as  a  "perpetual  motion  machine"  is  both 
spatial  and  temporal,  yet  is  not  correlated  with  a  particular 
space  and  time.  On  the  other  hand,  other  subsistents  are  cor- 
related, not  with  any  but  with  a  particular  space  and  time,  and 
yet  are  only  subsistents  because,  e.g.,  in  the  case  of  dream- 
objects,  they  lack  that  fidl  quota  of  attributes  which  the  physical 
sciences  have  found  to  be  empirically  necessary  for  the  existent 
objects  of  each  special  field  of  investigation. 

Finally,  there  are  still  other  subsistents,  especially  space, 
time,  and  number,  which,  on  the  one  hand,  are  open  to  investi- 
gation by  reason,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  are  found  to  be  the  »« 
conditions  for,  in  one  way  or  another,  those  entities  that  do 
exist.  But,  as  not  being  such  conditions  for  themselves,  they  do 
not  exist,  but  subsist. 

With  this  as  a  preliminary  discussion  and  illustration  of  dif- 
ferences that  subsist  among  some  of  the  entities  of  the  universe, 
that  more  complete  classification  which  rests  upon  these  and 
still  other  differences  (and  similarities)  may  now  be  presented.* 

'  Cf.  with  the  presentation  and  classification  that  follows,  especially  as 
sympathetic  to  the  doctrine  of  "subsistents":  Plato,  Republic,  especially 
Books  v.,  VI.,  and  VII.,  Thecetetus,  Parmemides,  Phcvdo,  and  Cratylus ; 
A.  Meinong,  Oegenstandstheorie,  1904,  especially  the  essay  by  E.  Mally, 
pp.  121-263,  tjber  die  Stcllung  der  Oegenstandstheorie  im  System  der 
Wissenschaften,  1907;  B.  Russell,  "  Meinong's  Theory  of  Complexes  and 
Assertions,"  Mind,  N.  S.,  XIII.,  pp.  204  ff.,  336  flf.,  559  ff.;  "On  the  Rela- 
tions of  Universals  and  Particulars,"  Proc.  Arist.  Soc,  Vol.  XI.,  1911- 
1912;  Problems  of  Philosophy,  pp.  127-157;  Principles  of  Mathematics, 
p.  449  ff.;  R.  B.  Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Chap.  X.;  W.  H. 
Sheldon,  "  The  Metaphysical  Status  of  Universals,"  Phil.  Review.,  Vol. 
XIV.,  1905;  R.  H.  Nunn,  Aims  and  Achievements  of  Scientific  method, 
p.  4tt. 


494 


REALISM 


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3 


EPISTEMOLOGY  AND  PSYCHOLOGY  495 

It  is  to  be  remarked  in  final  comment  on  this  classification, 
that  all  of  the  entities  included  in  it — and  it  is  intended  that 
any  kind  of  "mentionables"  which  can  lay  claim  to  belong  to 
the  universe  as  a  fact  of  some  kind  shall  be  included — are  ob- 
jective to  and  independent  of  the  knowing  consciousness  into 
whose  field,  as  a  specific  dimension  or  variable,  they  enter.  The 
whole  scheme  of  the  classification  is  one  that  is  in  denial  of  the 
historic  principle,  that  any  entity  as  known  is  to  some  degree 
dependent  on,  or  modified  by,  the  knowing.  This  does  not 
deny,  however,  that  that  series  of  relating  consciousnesses  which 
is  an  individual  consciousness,  or  that  that  series  which  in  history 
and  tradition  is  the  development  and  organization  of  many 
individual  consciousnesses  together,  is  not  characterized  by  cer- 
tain specific  attributes  of  its  own.  The  principle  of  our  classi- 
fication would  demand  only  that  such  attributes  and  such  con- 
sciousnesses are  quite  objective  to  the  consciousness  that  knows 
them.  The  classification  also  stands  in  opposition  both  to  the 
monistic  principle,  that  an  underlying  unitary  entity  can  alone 
mediate  the  relations  between  the  various  kinds  of  entities  of 
the  classification,  and  to  the  pragmatic  principle,  that  the  sev- 
eral types  of  entities  are  the  mere  inventions  and  useful  schemes 
of  a  stream  of  human  consciousness  that  has  come  down  through 
the  centuries. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  following  is  a  further  general  bibliography  of  modern  realism: 
E.  B.  Holt,  The  Freudian  Wish,  1916,  The  Concept  of  Consciousness,  1914, 
The  New  Realism  (with  others),  1912;  VV.  T.  Marvin,  First  Book  of  Meta- 
physics, 1912;  R.  B.  Perry,  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  1911,  Moral 
Economy,  1909,  Approach  to  Philosophy,  1907;  B.  Russell,  Principles  of 
Mathematics,  1903,  Philosophical  Essays,  1910,  Problems  of  Philosophy, 
1911,  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy,  1914.  Articles:  Alexander,  "  Sensa- 
tions and  Images,"  Proc.  Arist.  Soc,  Vol.  X.,  1909-1910;  "Program  and 
First  Platform  of  Six  Realists,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific 
Methods,  Vol.  VII.,  1910,  p,  393  flf.;  Dewey,  "Brief  Studio?  in  Realism," 
Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  VIII.,  1911;  Dewey  and 
Spaulding,  "  Discussion,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  VIII.,  pp.  63  ff.,  77  ff.,  566  ff.,  574  ff.;  \V.  Fite,  "Theories  of  Inde- 
pendence," Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  X.,  p.  548  ff.; 
E.  H.  Hollands,  "  The  Externality  of  Relations,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych., 
and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XL,  p.  463  ff.;  I.  Husik,  "Theories  of  Inde- 
pendence," Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  X.,  p.  347  ff. ; 
A.  O.  Lovejoy,  cf.  note  3  of  previous  chapter;  W.  P.  Montague,  "The  New 
Realism  and  the  Old,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  IX.,  p.  39  ff.;  and  "  May  a  Realist  be  a  Pragmatist?"  Jour,  of  Phil, 


496  REALISM 

Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  VI.,  pp.  460  ff.  and  485  fT.;  G.  E. 
Moore,  "  The  Nature  and  Reality  of  Objects  of  Perception,"  Proc.  Aris.  Soc, 
Vol.  VI.,  1905-1906;  and  "The  Refutation  of  Idealism,"  Mind,  N.  S.,  XII., 
1903,  p.  433  ff.;  M.  T.  McClure,  A  Stvdij  of  the  Realistic  Movement  in 
Contemporaneous  Philosophy,  dissertation,  1912;  E.  B.  McGilvary,  "The 
Relation  of  Consciousness  and  Object  in  Sense  Perception,"  Phil.  Review, 
Vol.  XXI.,  1912;  R.  H.  Xunn,  "Are  (Secondary  Qualities  Independent  of 
Perception?"  Proc.  Aris.  Soc,  Vol.  X,  1909-1910;  R.  B.  Perry,  "Realism 
as  a  Polemic  and  Program  of  Reform,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scien- 
tific Methods.,  Vol.  VII.,  pp.  337  ff.  and  365  ff.;  J.  B.  Pratt,  "Professor 
Perry's  Proofs  of  Realism,"  Jonr.  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods 
Vol.  IX.,  pp.  573  ff.;  B.  Russell,  "The  Basis  of  Realism,"  Jour,  of  Phil 
Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  VIII.,  p.  158  ff.;  E.  G.  Spaulding 
"  Postulates  of  a  Self-critical  Epistemology,"  Phil.  Review,  Vol.  XVIII.,  p 
615  ff.;  N.  Kemp  Smith,  "Subjectivism  and  Realism  in  Modern  Phi 
losophy,"  Phil.  Review,  Vol.  XVII.,  Stout,  "  Primary  and  Secondary  Quali- 
ties," Proc.  Aris.  Soc,  Vol.  IV.,  1903-1904;  R.'S.  Woodworth,  "The 
Consciousness  of  Relations,"  Essays  in  Honor  of  Wm.  James,  p.  485  flf. 


CHAPTER  XLV 

THE  REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  VALUES 

As  included  in  the  classification  just  presented,  one  important 
group  of  entities  remains  to  be  discussed,  namely,  the  so-called 
values  or  ivorths.  These  must  now  be  considered  in  order  that 
their  character  and  their  relationship  to  the  other  entities  of 
the  classification  may  be  determined.  In  other  words,  their 
position  in  a  realistic  cosmology  must  be  found  in  order  that 
any  claim  may  be  set  up  that  this  great  and  perhaps  all- 
inclusive  problem  has  been  examined  at  all  exhaustively. 

Several  subordinate  problems  are  very  generally  recognized 
as  falling  under  the  problem  of  values.^  For  example,  What 
is  the  value  among  all  values,  in  other  words,  the  highest  value 
in  relation  to  which  all  others  are  but  species?  Is  it  The  Good, 
or  The  Beautiful,  or  The  True?  Also,  what  is  the  specific  rela- 
tionship of  values  to  other  entities  that  are  not  values  1    Further, 

'  Cf.  Chap,  IX. ;  also  see  the  report  of  the  discussion  on  values  at  the 
thirteenth  meeting  of  the  Am.  Phil.  Assoc,  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and 
Scientific  Methods,  Vol.  XI.,  p.  57  ff.,  by  H.  C.  Brown;  see  also  Perry, 
"  The  Delinilion  of  Value,"  Jour,  of  Phil.,  Psych.,  and  Scientific  Methods, 
Vol.  XL,  p.  141  ff. 


THE  REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  VALUES         497 

are  values  objective,  or  are  they  suhjective  in  the  sense  that 
their  esse  is  their  percipi  or  concipi?  For  example,  is  beauty  in 
an  object  dependent  on  one  who  perceives,  or  who  thinks  an 
object  to  be  beautiful,  or  is  it  not  ? 

Not  all  of  these  questions,  however,  will  be  considered,  nor 
will  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  there  are  values.  For, 
that  there  are  within  the  universe  certain  entities  which  are 
values  or  worths,  is  a  position  that  is  widely  accepted.  Few 
deny  it  in  theory ;  none  can  deny  it  in  practice. 

We  shall  grant,  therefore,  the  factuality  of  values,  and  pro- 
ceed to  a  discussion  of  a  few  important  problems  concerning 
them,  using  for  our  examination  such  important  instances  as 
justice,  beauty,  obligation,  and  pleasure. 

We  shall  first  consider  certain  typical  problems  that  concern 
the  cosmological  status  of  justice.  As  concerns  the  legal  aspects 
of  this  value  one  need  only  remind  himself  that  justice  is 
recognized  as  perhaps  the  dominant  principle  in  the  legal  enact- 
ments of  modern  nations;  while  to  act  justly  toward  and  to 
think  justly  of  our  fellow-men  both  in  those  instances  that  are 
covered  by  law  and  in  those  that  are  not,  is  a  widely  accepted 
rule  of  ethical  (correct  moral)  action.  The  point  to  be  noted, 
then,  is,  that  here,  as  elsewhere,  there  would  seem  to  be  a  dis- 
tinction  between  the  individuals  and  the  state  of  affairs  that 
holds  of  them.  Thus,  in  this  instance,  there  are  just  acts  and 
just  persons,  and  of  these,  mi  that  they  are  similar  in  respect 
to  being  just,  justice  holds.  Indeed,  we  have  here  but  another 
instance  of  an  objective  concept  and  of  the  individuals  of  which 
the  concept  holds, — as,  e.g.,  is  the  case,  also,  with  humanity  and 
individual  human  beings. 

One  of  the  important  questions  that  concerns  at  least  certain 
classes  of  values,  of  which  justice  is  typical,  may  now  be  raised 
in  specific  form.  What  is  the  status  of  that  perfect  justice  which 
none  would  be  so  daring  as  to  claim  is  realized  in  any  human 
society  or  in  the  life  of  any  one  human  being,  or,  indeed,  in 
any  single  human  act,  but  which  nevertheless  is  thought  about, 
and  is  considered  by  at  least  some  philosophers  to  be  implied 
by  imperfectly  just  acts.  In  answer  to  this  question  one  may 
search  for  evidence,  and  inquire,  if,  e.g.,  the  perfect,  the 
geometrical  cizcM^^ceases  to  be  an  entity  because  no  physical 


'49B  REALISM 

otject  ever  attains  its  perfection?  Indeed,  does  not  the  very- 
imperfection  of  such  physical  objects  imply  tlie  perfect,  as  the 
limit  of  the  approximations?  And  would  the  perfect  circle 
cease  to  he,  if  all  physical  objects  were  annihilated  ?  Then  does 
ideal  justice,  as  a  standard  for  men  to  attain  to,  if  possible, 
become  less  of  a  fact,  because  society  and  poor  frail  human 
beings  and  their  concrete  acts  fall  short  of  this  ideal?  Would 
it  cease  to  he,  should  a  cataclysm  hurtle  all  human  beings  forever 
into  non-existence?  And  ivas  it  a  non-fact  in  those  far  reaches 
of  past  time  when  to  living  nature  the  glow  of  dawning  hu- 
manity had  not  yet  come? 

The  ansiver  to  these  inquiries  is  almost  as  old  as  man's  own 
philosophizing,  and  is  one  that  unites  modern  Realism  with 
ancient  Idealism.  It  is,  that  ideals  are  real.  Plato  was  and 
still  remains  the  great  spokesman.^  Eternal  are  justice  and 
goodness  and  truth,  not  because  they  persist  through  all  time, 
but  because  "in  a  heaven  by  themselves"  Xhey  partake  neither 
of  the  nature  of  "things"  that  are  in  time  and  space,  nor,  indeed, 
of  the  nature  of  time  and  space  themselves.  Time-  and  space- 
conditioned  things — "existents"  we  call  them — approximate  to 
the  ideal  in  various  degrees,  but  never  attain  it.  Thus  are  the 
leaf,  the  circle  of  waves  from  the  pebble,  and  the  wheel  that 
man  makes  for  his  use,  all  after  the  model  of  the  perfect  circle, 
yet  are  all  lacking  its  perfection.  So  also  are  there  just-like 
men  and  acts  and  society,  yet  do  all  these  fail  to  attain  the  ideal. 
But  the  ideal  remains, — in  accordance  with  the  principle,  seem- 
ingly, that  the  limit  is  not  a  member  of  the  series  of  which  it  is 
a  limit. 

This  was  the  philosophy  of  Plato — his  Idealism  and  his 
Realism, — and,  also,  is  it  modern  Realism,  with  its  reality  of 
ideals  and  its  ideal  reals.  Justice,  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty 
are  "eternal  verities" — entities  not  subject  to  the  stresses  and 
strains  that  distort  the  particular  and  concrete  time-  and  per- 
haps also  space-conditioned  products  of  natural  processes. 
Indeed,  did  the  act  or  the  person  become  wholly  just,  and  were 
there  only  genuine  knowledge  and  no  error,  still  would  these 
"concretes"   and   "particulars"   be  numerically   distinct  from 

"  In,  e.g.,  Plato's  Republic,  The  Thecetetua,  Parmenidea,  PhcedO)  and 
iJraiylui. 


THE  REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  VALUES         499 

perfect  justice  and  from  complete  truth.  The  perfect  circle  is 
independent  of  and  numerically  distinct  from  the  particular  im- 
perfect instances  in  nature,  but  the  independence  and  the  dis- 
tinctness are  between  the  ideal,  or  principle,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  particular  existents,  on  the  other  hand.  Did  the  latter 
attain  to  the  ideal,  then  would  the  independence  and  distinctness 
still  be  a  fact.  And  the  case  is  not  different  with  justice  and 
the  just  act,  and  with  truth  and  concrete  knowing. 

One  question,  then,  that  contributes  to  the  cosmology  of 
values  is  answered.  Among  values,  as  among  non- values,  there 
are  hoth  existents  and  subsist ents,  with  the  former  subject  to 
time  and  space  conditions,  and  the  latter  not."^ 

But  there  is  a  second  important  question,  the  solution  to 
which  further  extends  our  cosmology.  This  may  be  advan- 
tageously discussed  by  considering  the  nature  of  beauty  in  the 
particular  instance  of  the  beauty  of  color,  of  light  and  shade, 
and  of  outline,  of  the  sea  and  islands  now  before  me.  Old  and 
traditional,  now,  is  the  doctrine,  that  in  the  physical  world  there 
are  ether  waves,  chemical  pigments  and  substances,  reflecting 
surfaces,  lengths,  heights,  distances,  and  form,  hut  that  the  color 
of  an  object  is  subjective,  or  that  its  esse  in  any  particular 
instance  is  its  percipi,  even  as  in  traditional  logic  and  psychology 
the  esse  of  a  universal  is  held  to  be  its  concipi.  It  is  likewise 
with  beauty.  For  difficult  is  it,  indeed,  to  find  physicist  or 
psychologist  who  does  not  insist  that  beauty  in  any  particular 
instance  is  dependent  on  him  who  perceives  and  appreciates,  and 
who  does  not  also  interpret  this  dependence  to  mean,  that  the 
beauty  somehow  resides  in  the  perceiving  and  appreciating  sub- 
ject. For  does  not,  e.g.,  the  color,  according  to  the  traditional 
view,  there  reside?  And  is  not  the  color  identical  with  one  ele- 
ment m  the  beauty  of  the  landscape  ? 

However,  the  traditional  interpretation  confuses  two  things 
that  are  distinct.  "To  be  dependent  on"  is  not  "to  be  identical 
with."  Thus,  e.g.,  physical  motion,  whether  uniform  or 
accelerated,  depends  on  both  time  and  space,  yet  is  not  identical 
with  these,  but  is,  rather,  a  variable  that  is  correlated  with  both 
time  and  space,  and  that  may,  therefore,  be  qualitatively  dif- 
ferent from  and  so  not  causally  related  to  these  entities.*    So, 

'  See  Chap.  XLIV.,  u.  *  See  Chap.  XLIII. 


500       ■  REALISM 

also,  is  that  complex  functioning  of  the  human  organism  which 
is  called  its  "living"  dependent  upon  many  organs,  structures, 
and  specific  processes,  but  is  not  identical  with  any  one  of  these. 
In  both  motion  and  organism  there  is  organization,  by  specific 
relations,  of  those  parts  that  enter  into  the  whole,  while  the 
whole  is  specifically  different,  qualitatively,  from  its  parts,  and 
belongs  to  a  different  realm  of  discourse.  Thus,  e.g.,  the  atom 
differs  from  the  electrons  that  compose  it,  the  molecule  from 
its  constituent  atoms,  the  cell  from  its  molecules  and  colloidal 
particles,  and,  finally,  society  from  the  human  individuals  that 
are  its  units.  Indeed,  no  realm  of  fact,  whether  subsistent  or 
existent,  is  exempt  from  this  principle  of  creative  synthesis,  in 
accordance  with  which  one  or  more  specific  organizing  relations 
so  relate  parts  that  there  are  new  qualities  in  the  resulting 
whole,  and  whole  and  part  belong  to  specifically  different  uni- 
verses of  discourse.^ 

The  realm  of  values  is  no  exception  to  the  validity  or  applica- 
tion of  this  principle.  The  physiological  organism,  either  as  a 
whole,  or  in  respect  to  certain  of  its  parts,  such  as  eye,  optic 
nerve,  and  occipital  lobe,  itself  enters  as  a  part  into  still  other 
"larger"  complexes  that  are  wholes  because  of  the  presence  of 
one  or  more  organizing  relations.  And  this  larger  whole,  like 
other  wholes,  has  characteristics  that  are  different  from  those 
of  its  constituent  parts.  Accordingly,  it  may  well  be,  that,  just 
as  water  is  composed  of  hydrogen  and  oxygen,  yet  is  neither  of 
these  by  themselves,  but  only  as  they  are  related  and  organized 
to  form  a  whole,  so  also  are,  e.g.,  the  color  and  beauty  of  par- 
ticular physical  objects  not  identical  either  with  the  physio- 
logical organism  or  with  any  part  of  it,  nor  with  the  physical 
entities  themselves,  but  are  properties  of  that  whole  which  is  an 
organized  ivhole  of  organism  and  physical  entities. 

This  means,  of  course,  that  color  and  beauty  are  dependent 
in  just  this  specific  way  on  a  perceiving  and  sensitive  organism, 
but  it  does  not  mean  that  they  are  resident  in  the  organism,  or 
that  their  esse  is  their  percipi  by  a  substance-  and  receptacle-like 
consciousness,  as  the  traditional  theory  maintains.  Indeed,  we 
can  go  one  step  further  in  this  argument  concerning  the  typical 
case  of  the  color  and  beauty  of  particular  physical  objects,  and 
•  Cf.  Chap.  XLIII.,  v. 


THE  REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  VALUES         501 

raise  the  question:  Granted  our  principle  of  creative  synthesis, 
that  wholes  have  qualities  which  are  different  from  those  of 
the  constituent  parts,  and  granted  also  the  usual  physical  view, 
that  ether  waves  and  chemical  pigments  are  external  to  and 
independent  of  the  sensitive  organism,  then  may  not  the  color 
and  the  beauty  as  such  be  qualities  of  the  organized  whole,  ether 
waves  and  pigments,  and  so  be  quite  external  to  and  independent 
of  the  organism  1 

This  question  is  difficult  to  answer  with  assurance,  but  an 
affirmative  reply  is  not  weakened  by  the  opposing  argument, 
that  to  the  person  who,  e.g.,  is  color  blind  to  red  and  green, 
these  colors,  are  indistinguishable  and  lack  their  specific  quali- 
tative character.  For  the  facts  of  color  vision  not  only  are 
quite  compatible  with,  but  also  they  tend  to  confirm,  the  hypothe- 
sis just  advanced. 

Color  blindness  is  commonly  held  to  be  due  to  the  lack  of 
a  specific  photo-chemical  process  in  the  retina.  Given  the  three 
normal  photo-chemical,  physiological  processes  in  the  retina  and 
the  other  normal  conditions,  and  there  are  perceptions  of  red 
and  green,  blue  and  yellow,  black  and  white,  but  if  one  of  the 
first  two  processes  is  lacking,  there  is  a  specific  color-blindness. 
In  both  instances,  therefore,  the  color  is  partially  dependent  on 
specific  chemical  processes  in  the  retina.  But,  if  color  is  thus 
conditioned  in  the  eye,  may  it  not  also  be  a  fact  both  outside  and 
independent  of  the  eye  and  the  organism,  when  conditions  similar 
to  those  in  the  eye  are  given?  The  camera,  placed  in  the  proper 
position,  shows  that  the  convergence  of  the  parallel  rails  does 
not  have  its  esse  either  in  the  organism  or  in  consciousness. 
Does  not  color  photography,  then,  reveal  an  analogous  ohjectivity 
for  color — and  for  beauty? 

This  argument  that  at  least  certain  values  are  objective  in 
the  sense  that  they  are  numerically  distinct  from  and  inde- 
pendent of  hoth  a  perceiving  consciousness  and  a  receptive  organ- 
ism is,  perhaps,  a  radical  departure  from  traditional  views,  and 
it  may  frankly  be  granted  to  have  its  weaknesses.  But  if  it  is 
correct,  we  must  conclude,  that  those  elements  which  are 
(Esthetic  idtimates  are,  together  with  the  wholes  that  result  from 
them,  quite  as  objective  as  are  any  of  the  entities  in  a  strictly 
non-value  field.     This  means  that  symmetry  and   proportion, 


502  REALISM 

Hogarthian  "lines  of  beauty,"  color  and  color  combinations, 
simple  ratios  among  fundamental  tones  and  over-tones  and  the 
like,  are  aesthetic  ultimates  that  are  not  dependent  either  upon 
a  changing  and  developing  consciousness,  or  upon  tradition  and 
fashion,  although  their  recognUion  may  be  thus  dependent. 

This  conclusion  receives  support  from  that  accumulation  of 
evidence  which  makes  for  the  correctness  of  a  general  realistic 
position,  namely,  that  position  which  holds  to  the  objectivity 
not  only  of  normal  and  abnormal  existent  objects,  but  also  of 
standards  and  ideals,  and,  indeed,  of  all  those  entities  that  are 
discovered  by  reason.  It  is  a  position,  however,  that  is  not 
exclusive  of  that  ''subjectivity"  of  taste  and  preference  which 
must  be  granted  in  view  of  the  great  diversity  of  tastes,  of 
fashions,  of  "schools,"  and  of  conventions.  There  is  evidence 
to  show  that  the  presence  of  a  sensitive  and  reacting  organism 
is  not  necessary  to  the  existence  either  of  aesthetic  elements  or 
of  aisthetic  complexes.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  organism 
does  enter  into  the  complex  whole  that  exists  when  an  aesthetic 
object  is  perceived  and  appreciated.  It  is  one  participant  in  a 
complex,  even  as  there  are  other  participants.  Vary  it,  and  the 
resulting  properties  of  the  organized  complex  vary,  even  as  the 
perceived  color  varies  from  the  normal  in  the  ease  of  a  color 
blind  eye. 

One  cannot  deny,  therefore,  the  reality  of  the  appeal  of  the 
beauty  of  an  object  to  that  person  with  whom  we  do  not  agree. 
His  organism  and  his  organization  may  not  be  wholly  like  ours. 
So  also  may  there  be  sex,  national,  and  racial  differences,  of 
which  some  are  induced  by  the  development  of  a  tradition  which 
forms  an  environment  to  him  who  is  born  in  it.  Thus  may  we 
account  for  the  fact  that  the  Japanese  do  not  approve  of  Euro- 
pean drawing  and  painting,  and  that  most  of  us  have  to  grow 
to  like  the  ever  new  fashions  and  modes  in  music,  sculpture, 
painting,  decoration,  and  dress.  Or,  it  may  be,  that  the  realm 
of  the  objectively  pleasing  and  beautiful  contains  such  a  wealth 
of  material,  even  as  does  the  realm  of  scientific  entities,  that 
only  a  selective  process  can  be  directed  toward  it,  and  that  the 
basis  for  this  selection  is  laid  down  by  education,  imitation, 
and  tradition.  But  in  either  case,  just  as  there  is  a  range  of 
distribution  of  physiological  organizations,  with  the  most  similar 


THE  REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  VALUES  503 

ones  the  most  frequent,  and  the  deviations  rare,  so  also  will 
there  be  norms  of  taste  and  of  appeal,  with  the  deviations  ex- 
ceptional, but  no  less  real  and  well-grounded  than  the  normal. 

However,  it  is  not  our  purpose  to  present  an  exhaustive  dis- 
cussion of  the  problem  of  values.  Therefore  we  shall  omit  the 
question  as  to  what  the  total  range  of  values  is,  and,  also,  we 
need  not  make  any  final  definition  of  these  entities.  Our  purpose 
will  be  accomplished  if  we  keep  to  that  safe  ground  where  we 
find  certain  specific  values  very  generally  recognized  and  ac- 
cepted. Thus,  without  raising  and  endeavoring  to  answer  the 
question,  whether  there  are  values  wherever  there  are  desires, 
or  interests,  or  tendencies,  we  will  next  consider  the  moral  situa- 
tion as  we  find  this  among  human  beings. 

This  specific  problem  is  selected  because  of  its  bearing  on 
other,  perhaps  greater  problems,  solutions  to  which  must  be 
given  in  order  to  make  our  realistic  philosophy  at  all  complete. 
For  in  this  philosophy  we  must  finally  consider  the  great  prob- 
lems of  teleology  and  theology. 

The  field  of  morals  is  very  generally  admitted  to  coincide 
with  that  realm  in  which  there  are  human  beings  or  person- 
alities as  they  stand  in  various  relationships  not  only  to  one  an- 
other, but  also  to  other  living  creatures,  and  even  to  all  nature 
and  to  the  universe  itself.  In  contrast,  space  and  time,  atoms  and 
molecules,  cells  and  organs,  and  even  all  living  beings  other 
than  man,  would  seem  both  in  their  relationships  to  one  another 
and  to  man  himself  to  belong  to  a  realm  that  is  distinctly  non- 
moral.  Men  may  recognize  that  in  their  relationship  to  some 
of  these  things,  notably  to  "dumb  animals,"  there  is  a  moral 
situation;  but  morality  does  not  seem  to  concern  these  entities 
by  themselves  or  in  their  converse  relationships  to  man.  Here 
there  is  neither  morality  nor  its  opposite. 

The  moral  situation  seems,  therefore,  to  occur  only  under 
specific  conditions.  It  is  a  specifically  differentiated  universe 
of  discourse,  different  from  other  realms,  such  as  the  chemical 
and  the  physical,  but  not  contradicted  by  them.  What,  now,  is 
the  ** topography"  of  this  realm,  and  what  are  the  conditions 
under  which  it  exists  ? 

Certain  principles  previously  ascertained  again  come  to  our 
assistance  in  answering  these  inquiries.    First,  there  is  the  prin- 


504.  REALISM 

eiple  of  creative  synthesis;  parts  form  wholes  which  manifest, 
or  are  one  or  more  qualities  that  are  different  from  those  of  the 
parts.  Secondly,  there  is  the  principle  of  freedom;  new  qualities 
are  a  law  unto  themselves ;  they  act  in  accordance  with  their 
own  nature  and  are  free  to  do  this,  in  that  they  are  specifically 
different  from  the  qualities  of  the  parts.  Finally,  there  is  the 
principle,  that  one  and  the  same  entity  can  stand  in  several 
relations,  and  that  these  relations  are  not  constitutive  of  one 
another.  In  other  words,  an  entity  can  be  a  term  that  retains 
its  identity  while  it  is  a  member  of  a  number  of  relational  com- 
plexes ;  in  one  relation  it  may  act  as  a  unit  and  constituent  that, 
together  with  other  units,  forms  a  larger  whole,  while  in  other 
relations  it  may  itself  be  a  resulting  whole  and  a  complex. 

The  application  of  these  principles  to  the  question  under 
consideration  will  make  these  statements  clearer,  and  will  con- 
nect our  present  discussion  with  the  previous  constructive  de- 
velopment of  our  realistic  cosmologJ^  Again  it  will  be  shown 
that  ethics  is  not  a  phase  of  biology,  even  as  biology  is  not  mere 
chemistry  and  physics,  and  these  are  not  mere  sciences  of  space 
and  time  and  number. 

A  molecule  is  a  complex  of  atoms,  even  as  atoms  are  in  turn 
complexes  of  electrons ;  but  a  molecule  has  properties  not  found 
among  those  of  the  atom,  and  acts  in  accordance  with  these 
properties,  though  compatibly,  also,  with  those  of  its  parts ;  yet 
in  so  acting,  it  acts  as  a  unit.  Thus,  to  illustrate,  molecules  of 
sugar  in  solution  go  as  wholes,  i.e.,  as  units,  through  certain 
membranes;  but  such  molecules  are  related  both  to  their  parts 
and  to  other  molecules ;  in  the  one  relationship  they  are  complex 
wholes,  in  the  other  relationship,  units — substitutable  by  other 
units  (molecules)  that  are  non-electrolytic,  as  the  "laws  of  solu- 
tions" show;  yet  together  with  other  molecules  of  sugar  and  a 
solvent,  sugar  molecules  form  an  aqueous  or  some  other  solution ; 
but  the  molecules  themselves  are  not  a  solution,  nor  do  they 
follow  the  laws  of  solutions.  An  analogous  state  of  affairs  holds 
(1)  of  the  cell  in  its  several  relationships  to  its  parts  and  to 
other  cells;  (2)  of  an  organ,  like  the  heart,  in  its  relationships 
to  its  parts  and  to  other  organs;  and  finally,  (3)  of  the  com- 
plete and  mature  organism  in  its  relationships  both  to  its  various 
organs  and  to  other  organisms. 


THE  REALISTIC  DOCTRINE  OF  VALUES         505 

Man,  as  a  human  organism,  is  no  exception  to  these  principles. 
Complex,  indeed  "infinitely  complex"  though  this  organism  may- 
be, nevertheless,  in  certain  relationships,  it  acts  as  a  unit,  and  is 
a  constituent  of  a  larger  whole.  One  such  whole  is  society — the 
society  of  human  individuals — and  this  whole  possesses  char- 
acteristics that  the  units  do  not  have,  morality  heing  one  such 
characteristic.  If  this  is  to  say,  that  there  would  be  no  ex- 
istential moral  act  or  motive  or  person,  were  there  only  one 
human  being  in  the  world,  then  let  this  be  said.  The  situation 
in  which  morality  thus  occurs  may  be  and  undoubtedly  is  a 
very  specific  situation,  but,  once  it  has  appeared,  then,  as  pre- 
senting something  new,  there  is  freedom  in  respect  to  this  very 
'^newness."  However,  this  is  not  a  freedom  of  the  individual 
in  the  sense  of  his  lawlessness,  nor  in  the  sense  that  it  goes 
counter  to  the  laws,  physiological,  chemical,  physical,  geo- 
metrical, and  mathematical,  of  those  parts  of  which  he  is  a 
resultant  whole.  It  is  the  freedom,  rather,  of  the  whole  to  act 
in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  those  characteristics  which  it 
manifests  as  a  ivliole,  which  particularize  it  as  a  whole,  and 
which  distinguish  it  from  its  own  parts,  from  other  coordinate 
wholes,  and  from  complexes  of  which  it  itself  may  be  a  part. 
The  human  individual  is,  now,  in  quite  this  sense,  free  in  respect 
to  his  peculiar  characteristics  as  a  human  organism,  i.e.,  he  is 
free  in  respect  to  his  mode  of  reaction  to  his  environment,  as 
this  is  physical,  mental,  historical,  existent,  and  subsistent.  The 
"taking  place"  of  some  of  these  modes  of  reaction  is  conscious- 
ness. Such  modes  of  reaction  do  not  contradict  physical  and 
chemical  facts  and  laws,  but  are  more  than  these,  and  in  this 
sense  are  free.  But  it  is  only  when  the  human  individual  reacts 
in  a  very  specific  way,  namely,  when  the  personality  of  other 
individuals,  and  accordingly  their  desires,  motives,  rights,  and 
ideals,  are  in  his  field  of  consciousness,  and  his  in  theirs,  that 
the  moral  situation  subsists  and  exists. 

The  individual  is  thus  free  in  his  cognitive  consciousness, 
but  it  is  society  alone  that  is  free  morally  in  the  sense  above 
defined.  With  but  one  individual  in  the  world,  there  would 
still  be  the  former,  but  not  the  latter  freedom.  But  since  it  is 
a  fact  that  there  are  many  individuals,  there  are  both  kinds  of 
freedom,  yet  only  because,  over  and  above  the  conditions  for 


506  REALISM 

the  existence  of  the  consciousness,  there  are  also  the  specijfic  con- 
ditions for  the  moral  situation. 

This  situation  is,  then,  a  characteristic  of  that  whole,  society, 
which  includes,  let  us  say,  all  human  beings,  and  which  may 
perhaps  be  so  extended  as  to  include  other  organisms,  and  even 
inorganic  nature.  Its  antecedent  basis  is  the  cognitive  (con- 
scious) situation,  but  it  itself  is  not  identical  with  this.  For  the 
moral  situation  arises  only  when,  within  this  broader  relation, 
a  very  specific  cognitive  consciousness  appears,  namely,  that 
which  is  the  recognition  of  personality  as  such.  But,  with  this 
recognition  once  present,  then,  as  constituents  of  this  specific 
consciousness,  there  arises,  further,  the  cognitive  consciousness 
of  respect,  of  reverence,  of  rights,  and  of  ''ought."  This,  there- 
fore, is  the  moral  consciousness, — of  society — conditioned  by  the 
existence  of  society,  self -legislating  and  thus  free,  non-existent 
in  an  individual  by  himself,  but  binding  upon  him  as  a  member 
of  the  complex,  and,  once  arisen,  forming  part  of  his  own 
cognitively  conscious  field. 

With  this  state  of  affairs  holding  of  moral  phenomena  and 
their  antecedents,  and  with  analogous  situations  occurring  else- 
where, there  is  now  revealed  both  the  necessity  of  an  inductive 
procedure  in  studying  each  higher  level  of  realities,  and  the 
impossibility  of  reducing  the  higher  to  the  lower,  as  well  as  of 
deducing  the  former  from  the  latter.  Empirical  entrance  must 
be  made  at  each  level  to  discover  its  characteristics.  But,  once 
discovered  and  analyzed,  the  characteristics  of  any  level  can  in 
many  instances  be  correlated  functionally,  though  not  causally, 
with  those  of  lower  levels,  and  in  every  instance  the  compatibility 
of  higher  with  lower  levels  must  exist  or  subsist.  For,  although 
different,  still,  distinct  levels  are  consistent,  belonging  to  different 
universes  of  discourse,  and  existing  or  subsisting  side  by  side. 
Accordingly  both  the  moral  and  the  cognitive  consciousness  are 
facts  side  by  side  with  the  facts  of  biology,  but  the  laws  of  the 
latter  are  not  those  of  the  former.  Thereby,  however,  the  prac- 
tical necessity  of  discovering  and  analyzing  the  principles  of 
morals  on  their  own  basis  and  level,  and  the  impossibility  of 
deriving  these  from  and  reducing  these  to  the  laws  of  biology, 
chemistry,  physics,  and  mechanics,  is  shown  to  be  due,  not  to  our 
ignorance,  but  to  the  very  structure  of  reality  itself.     It  is  in 


REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY        507 

this  way,  then,  that  our  philosophy  of  moral  values  takes  its 
place  in  the  larger  whole  of  our  realistic  cosmology.^ 


CHAPTER  XLVI 

REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY 

In  our  preceding  discussion  the  conclusions  have  been  reached 
(1)  that  values  both  exist  and  subsist,  as  illustrated  respectively 
by  just  acts  and  by  justice;  (2)  that  values  are  real  parts  of 
the  objective  world,  external  to  and  independent  of  not  only 
their  being  perceived,  conceived,  and  appreciated,  but  also  of 
the  physiological  organism;  and  (3)  that  certain  values,  such 
as  morality,  subsist  and  exist  only  in  certain  situations,  as  char- 
acteristics of  wholes  that  are  complex  in  respect  to  their  parts, 
but  unitary  in  respect  to  other  relationships.  Our  position  here, 
as  elsewhere,  is,  therefore,  one  that  stands  in  radical  opposition 
to  that  relativism  and  evolutionism  which  receives  the  name  of 
Pragmatism,  and  yet  it  is  one  that  denies,  not  the  fact  of  change 

"  The  theory  of  aesthetic  and  moral  values  just  presented  is  one  that 
departs  widely  from  the  positions  that  are  taken  by  most  writers.  A 
brief  general  bibliography  is  herewith  given,  but  without  reference  either 
to  the  agreement  or  the  disagreement  with  the  views  above  presented. 

For  aesthetic  values:  Aristotle,  Poetics;  I.  Babbitt,  The  New  Laokoon, 
1910;  B.  Croce,  Esthetic  as  Science  of  Expression,  trans,  by  Ainslie,  1909; 
Gross,  Einleitung  in  die  Aesthetik ;  Guyau,  Les  Problems  de  EstMtique ; 
Him,  The  Origins  of  Art ;  Kant,  Critique  of  Judgment ;  Lessing,  Laokoon; 
Lipps,  Spatial  ^Esthetics  and  Optical  Illusions;  Vernon  Lee  and  C.  Thomp- 
son, Beauty  and  Ugliness;  H.  R.  Marshall,  JEsthetic  Principles,  1901,  also 
Pain,  Pleasure,  and  /Esthetics;  E.  D.  Puffer,  Psychology  of  Beauty; 
Santayana,  The  Sense  of  Beauty;  Tolstoi,  What  is  Art?  VVoodberry,  The 
Heart  of  Man. 

For  ethical  values:  Am.  Phil.  Assoc,  discussion  at  thirteenth  annual 
meeting,  Phil.  Review,  Vol.  XXIII.,  No.  2;  F.  Brentano,  The  Origin  of 
the  Knowledge  of  Right  and  Wrong,  trans,  by  Hague,  1902;  Dewey  and 
Tufts,  Ethics,  1908;  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics;  Hoffding,  Philosophy 
of  Religion,  Kant,  Critique  of  Practical  Reason  and  Metaphysics  of  Morals; 
Martineau,  Types  of  Ethical  Theory;  G.  E  Moore,  The  Field  of  Ethics; 
Paulsen,  System  of  Ethics,  trans,  by  Thilly;  R.  B.  Perry,  The  Moral 
Economy  and  Present  Philosophical  Tendencies,  Chap.  XIV.;  Rashdall,  The 
Theory  of  Good  and  Evil,  2  vols.,  1907;  Sidgwick,  Methods  of  Ethics; 
Spenser,  Principles  of  Ethics, 


508  REALISM 

and  evolution,  but  only  their  universality.  For  there  is  un- 
deniably an  existential  evolutionary  process,  and  in  this  process 
just  aots,  motives,  and  persons  appear  and  disappear,  as  do  also 
beautiful  "things"  and  qualities.  But  justice  and  beauty  and 
truth  themselves  do  not  change,  but  remain  eternal,  quite  outside 
of  time  and  space. 

There  is,  then,  a  realm  of  values  that  is  not  subject  to  the 
stresses  and  strains  of  this  slowly  evolving  earth  and  this  starry 
universe.  And  such  a  realm  is  itself  organized,  i.e.,  values  stand 
in  definite  relations  to  one  another.  They  may  perhaps  be  well 
described  as  subsisting  in  various  dimensions,  for,  on  the  one 
hand,  they  are  not  reducible  to  one  another,  and,  on  the  other 
hand,  each  would  seem  to  subsist  in  various  degrees.  This  is 
indicated,  perhaps,  by  the  fact  that  in  our  ordinary  discourse 
we  compare,  e.g.,  any  three  things  of  which  beauty  can  be  predi- 
cated as  beautiful,  more  heautiful,  and  most  heautifid;  three 
modes  of  conduct  as  just,  more  just,  and  most  just.  This  means 
that,  in  relation  to  any  two  ''things,"  A  and  B,  that  are  beautiful 
or  just,  there  is  another,  C,  between  them,  which  is  of  such  a 
character  that  the  three  subsist  in  the  order  A,  C,  B ;  then,  also, 
between  A  and  C  there  is  another  degree,  D,  as  there  is  also 
between  C  and  B,  and  so  on.  One  will  readily  recognize  that 
we  have  here  that  which  fulfils  the  logical  requirements  of  a 
dimension  that  is  at  least  a  dense  or  compact  series ;  ^  for  the 
relation  of  "less  beautiful  than"  or  "less  just  than"  is  asym- 
metrical and  transitive. 

The  realm  of  values  may,  perhaps,  be  organized  also  in  other 
ways,  as,  e.g.,  by  relations  of  similarity  and  difference,  which 
generate  classes  in  the  well  known  order  of  genus  and  species. 
But  it  is  not  our  purpose  to  become  involved  in  the  perplexing 
intricacies  of  the  question  as  to  what  such  a  classification  or 
classifications  may  be,  since  such  a  problem  may  better  be  left 
to  a  detailed  treatise  on  values.-  Our  purpose  is,  rather,  at  this 
point  to  consider  existential  values,  and  to  inquire  if  there  is 
anything  contained  in  them  or  in  the  situations  in  which  they 
occur  that  throws  light  upon  the  teleological  problem.^ 

'  Cf.  Chap.  XLIII.,  vir.,  viii.,  ix.;  also  A.  P.  Brogan  in  Proceedings  of 
Am.  Phil.  Assoc,  Phil.  Revieu\  Vol.  XXIV.,  No.  2. 
'  8ee  bibliography  at  end  of  preceding  chapter. 
•  See  Chap.  VII. 


REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY        509 

Such  an  inquiry  leads  at  least  to  results  that  are  positive, 
and  to  a  fairly  precise  specification  of  the  sense  in  which  there 
is  teleology  in  the  existential  process  of  the  universe.  For,  that 
it  is  a  process  in  which  stars  and  planets,  earth  crust  and  earth 
depths,  rocks  and  rills,  plants  and  animals,  nay  even  elements 
and  atoms  participate,  is  a  fact  of  general  scientific  acceptance, 
albeit  science  also  shows  quite  as  decisively  that  there  are  cer- 
tain 'things"  which  are  not  processes,  and  do  not  evolve.  Space 
and  time,  numbers,  logical  principles,  and  even  the  principles  of 
change  themselves  are  examples  of  such  exceptions.  Further, 
it  is  good  realistic  philosophy  to  accept  this  scientific  position 
without  its  further  transformation,*  although  this  does  not  mean 
that  the  implications  of  scientific  results  are  not,  if  possible,  to 
be  discovered,  and  that,  in  many  instances,  to  do  this  is  the 
special  task  of  the  philosopher. 

If,  now,  process  is  change,  then,  whether  it  is  evolution  or 
not  (for  evolution  7nay  imply  progress  toward  a  goal),  it  is  at 
least  direction  in  the  logical  sense  of  this  term.^  For  change, 
whether  it  be  change  of  position  (motion)  or  of  quality,  and 
whether  it  be  continuous,  dense,  or  discontinuous,  both  presup- 
poses and  is  correlated  with  time.  But  time  is  a  series  of 
instants  related  asymmetrically  and  transitively,  and  in  this 
sense  has,  or  is  direction.  Whether,  now,  the  "world 
process"  be  motion  or  qualitative  change,  or  hoth,  and, 
also,  whether  it  be  one  or  many  processes,  it  has  direction 
because  of  its  correlation  with  time.  In  other  words,  the 
process  "goes"  one  way,  and  one  way  only,  and  is,  in  this  sense, 
irreversible. 

However,  not  only  has  the  world  process  direction  in  this 
sense,  but  there  is  also  empirical  evidence  to  show  that  the 
physical  universe  has  or  is  direction  in  still  another  manner. 
There  is  evidence  that  the  physical  universe  is  ' '  running  down. ' ' 
Seemingly  its  end  (do  we  here  get  teleology  if  reAo?  means 
end?)  is  to  become  wholly  "run  down,"  and  then,  no  more 
process!  The  empirical  facts  in  this  connection  are  frequently 
referred  to  in  philosophical  writings  these  days,  and  are  used 
to   support   all   sorts   of   conclusions,    which    oftentimes   they 

*  See  Chaps.  IV.  and  XXVIII. 

*  Cf.  Chaps.  XL,  and  XLIIL,  vii.-ix. 


510  REALISM 

do   not   really    support.^    Here    these    facts   need    only    brief 
mention.^ 

The  greater  number  of  physical  processes  or  energy  trans- 
formations throughout  the  whole  universe  are  exothermic,  i.e., 
they  give  off  heat.  Scientifically  this  means  that,  side  by  side 
with  other  energy  transformations,  as,  e.g.,  that  of  kinetic  energy 
into  electrical  energy,  there  is  always  a  transformation  into  heat 
energy.  But  heat  energy,  like  other  energy  forms,  is  the  product 
of  two  factors,  namely,  an  extensity  and  an  intensity  or  po- 
tential. In  the  case  of  heat  energy  these  factors  are,  respectively, 
specific  heat  and  temperature,  while  in  electricity  they  are  those 
factors  that  are  measured  in  coulombs  and  volts  respectively, 
and  in  a  gas  or  vapor,  e.g.,  steam,  they  are  volume  and  pressure. 
The  latter  case  is  illuminative  of  the  principles  which  we  wish 
to  make  clear. 

The  piston-head  in  the  cylinder  of  a  steam  engine  is  forced 
back  and  forth  only  on  condition  that  there  is  a  difference  of 
potential,  i.e.,  of  pressure  on  its  two  sides,  and  such  pressure 
varies  directly  with  variations  in  the  temperature,  provided  the 
volume  is  constant.    The  pressure  is  a  function  of  the  tempera- ; 
ture.    From  this  and  similar  instances,  of  which  there  are  many,  1 
the  generalization  is  made,  as  identical  in  part  with  "the  seconid, 
law"  of  energy  (the  first  law  being  that  of  conservation),  th^tj 
the  condition  for  the  occurrence  of  an  event  is  a  differeiice  6f\ 
potential  that  is  uncompensated  by  "anything"   else.     Were! 
there  not  such  uncompensated  potential  differences,  then  nothing] 
could  occur.'*    There  would  be  no  events,  no  processes  at  all,  but 
everything  would  be  at  a  standstill — at  least  everything  in  the 
physical  universe. 

But  it  is  to  just  such  a  standstill  that  our  physical  universe  is 
tending.  For  all  other  energy  transformations  are  accom- 
panied by  the  production  of  heat,  and  heat  is  an  energy  that 
cannot  be  confined  within  limits;  it  spreads  out,  and,  as  it  does 
this,  tends  to  become  of  a  uniform  temperature  or  potential, 
which  is  the  very  condition  that  is  inhibitive  of  process  and 
event. 

*  For  example,  Bergson's  use  of  these  facts  in  Creative  Evolution. 
''  The   best  general   presentation   of   those   matters   is   by   Soddy,   Matter 
and  Energy,  in  The  Home  University  Library  yeriea. 
'  iSee  Helm,  Die  Energetik. 


REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY        511' 

The  crucial  fact  here  is  the  impossibility  of  confining  the  heat. 
In  order  to  confine  heat  perfect  non-conductors  would  be  neces- 
sary, but  these  are  not  to  be  found.  Were  they  accessible,  then 
a  means  of  control,  a  means  of  coordinating  the  heat  extensities 
and  the  temperatures,  and  so  of  directing  the  heat  energy,  would 
be  available.  Indeed,  if  a  similar  control  of  other  energies  were 
also  at  hand,  then  would  the  construction  of  a  perpetual  motion 
machine  be  quite  possible.  However,  as  "things"  actually 
stand,  no  such  means  of  control  are  at  our  disposal,  and  the 
unavailability  of  the  greater  part  of  all  energy  is  accepted  as 
a  firmly  established  conclusion  in  the  physical  sciences.  Taken 
together  with  the  correlation  of  all  change  with  time,  this  great 
empirical  fact  of  the  "running  down  of  the  physical  universe" 
is  empirical  evidence  that  it  has  direction^  although  such  a  con- 
elusion  is  weakened  by  recent  discoveries  of  radio-active  sub- 
stances, and,  perhaps  also,  by  the  "theory  of  relativity." 

Shall  we,  now,  identify  this  empirically  established  direction 
with  teleology  ?  If  we  do,  we  should  remind  ourselves,  however, 
that  such  direction  of  itself  implies  no  growth  in  complexity, 
no  higher  organisms  developing  out  of  lower  ones,  7io  purpose 
in  any  usual  sense  of  this  term,  7io  advance  and  no  progress  in 
that  sense  in  which  we  like  to  think  these,  but  only  a  mere 
asymmetry  and  "transitivity"  of  change,  a  swing  ever  forward 
and  never  backward,  an  ever  continued  expenditure  with  no 
recovery."  Indeed,  even  if  we  endeavor  to  interpret  this  direc- 
tional phase  of  change  by  the  concepts,  "means"  and  "end," 
we  get  but  a  paraphrase  of  our  original  facts,  and  are  no  better 
satisfied  than  before.  For  both  means  and  end  are  then  but 
members  of  a  series,  with  the  means  as  earlier  asymmetrically 
related  to  the  end  as  later. 

We  must  conclude,  therefore,  that  the  identification  of  the 
teleology  of  the  existential  process  with  its  temporal  direction 
and  its  "running  down"  is  not  a  very  satisfactory  solution  of 
the  teleological  problem.  Better  perhaps  deny  teleology  alto- 
gether, than  take  the  heart  out  of  it  by  an  explanation  which 
shows  that,  even  if  we  identify  evolution  with  such  phases  of 
change,  there  is  naught  of  advance,  of  progress,  of  betterment, 
in  any  appealing  human  sense. 

"  Cf.  Bergson's  conclusions,  quite  opposed  to  this,  in  Creative  Evolution. 


512  REALISM 

Fortunately,  however,  empirical  facts  forbid  our  making  any- 
such  identification,  or,  better,  limitation.  The  physical  world- 
process  is  direction  in  the  sense  just  presented,  though  its  cor- 
relation with  time  is  a  more  firmly  established  fact  than  is  its 
"running  down."  But  the  world-process  is  also  more  than 
direction  in  either  of  these  two  senses.  For  if  we  identify  change 
with  evolution  we  can  show  empirically  that  all  evolution  is 
marked  by  the  produciion  of  something  new?'^  New  wholes, 
and,  among  these,  values  arise  that  did  not  exist  before ;  progress 
and  betterment  take  place  in  just  this  sense. 

So  far  as  logic  is  concerned,  change  might  be  limited  to  mo- 
tion, and  then  there  might  be  no  qualitative  advance,  no  appear- 
ance of  values,  and  certainly  no  increase  in  values.  But  it  is 
an  empirical  fact,  that  within  the  universe  there  are  qualities 
and  qualitative  changes.  These  changes  are,  frequently,  at 
least,  in  correlation  with  motion,  as  they  are  invariably,  also, 
with  time,  and  perhaps,  also,  with  space ;  hut  they  are  not 
identical  with  motion,  any  more  than  is  that  change  of  motion's 
velocity  which  is  acceleration.  There  are  also  entities  in  the 
universe  that  are  not  change,  and  that  are  qualitatively  different 
from  one  another.  Numbers,  cpace  and  time,  and  other  sub- 
sistents,  as,  e.g.,  subsistent  values,  are  among  such  entities.  The 
physical  universe  would  also  seem  to  contain  entities  that  do 
not  change  or  evolve.  Thus  at  the  present  time  electrons  are 
regarded  as  playing  this  role.  But,  also,  as  we  have  seen,  there 
are  organizing  relations  of  various  type-  and  in  innumerable 
specific  instances.  Accordingly  there  is  an  existential  creative 
synthesis  that  is  also  a  temporal  process  in  which  there  arise 
new  wholes  with  new  properties.  These  properties  undeniably 
have  their  place  in  the  evolutionary  scheme  of  things. 

The  general  principles  that  hold  for  such  a  creative  process 
need  not  be  restated ;  ^^  it  suffices  at  this  point  to  dwell  only 
upon  the  empirical  data  at  our  disposal.  Thus,  when,  in  the 
biological  field,  we  take  the  evidence  at  hand  and  look  backward, 
we  are  convinced  that  those  phenomena  and  qualities  which 
are  presented  by,  e.g.,  the  protozoa,  as  the  lowest  forms  of  life, 
were  lacking  in  those  inorganic  chemico-physical  complexes  that 
existed  before  life  arose.  Similarly  these  protozoa  as  the 
"See  Chap.  XLIII.,  iv.-\x  ''Chap.  XLllL,  ibid. 


REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY        513 

progenitors  of  multicellular  organisms  do  not  present  all  those 
characteristics,  such  as  specific  modes  of  reaction,  of  sensitivity, 
of  conduction  of  stimuli,  of  sex-reproduction,  which  these  higher 
organisms  plainly  manifest.  Also,  as  we  review  the  evolution 
of  civilized  man,  we  find  that,  while  our  savage  ancestors  may 
have  evinced,  e.g.,  the  altruistic  instincts  of  kindness  toward 
and  of  sacrifice  for  the  young,  and  perhaps  for  still  other  mem- 
bers of  the  tribe,  they  nevertheless  did  not  manifest  that 
peculiar  state  of  affairs  which  is  the  moral  consciousness  of 
civilized  man.  Indeed,  if  one  dispute  this,  and  maintain  that 
there  was  a  moral  consciousness  among  early  savage  peoples, 
with  a  development  only  in  degree  and  not  in  kind,  from  them 
to  us,  then  our  point  can  he  made  by  going  still  further  back, 
say,  to  the  period  of  the  ape-like  ancestors  of  man,  or  even  to 
our  invertebrate  progenitors.  Somewhere  a  point  is  reached 
on  one  side  of  which  the  moral  situation  is  lacking,  and  on  the 
other  is  present. 

The  principle  is  not  different  for  every  quality,  characteristic, 
and  situation  (and  situations  are  complex  entities  with  definite 
characteristics)  that  has  appeared  in  the  whole  evolutionary 
process,  with  the  result,  that,  if  this  principle  is  not  accepted,  it 
is  at  the  cost  of  denying  all  discontinuous  appearances  and  neiv 
^'things,"  and  therefore  of  maintaining  that  all  is  one  and 
continuous,  with  differences  only  of  degree,  which,  if  not  ap- 
parent, are  at  least  potential.  Glorious  name,  indeed,  is  this  to 
conjure  with,  and  to  pretend  to  knowledge  where  we  are 
ignorant !  But  inglorious  means  is  it  for  denying  the  facts  of 
experience,  and  the  wonderful  diversity  of  the  qualitative  riches 
of  this  universe. 

For  realism,  however,  all  characteristics,  all  objects,  all  situa- 
tions and  their  qualities,  even  those  that  are  called  illusory  and 
hallucinatory,  are  real  in  some  sense,  for,  clearly,  within  the 
universe  they  must  all  have  their  place.^'  Then  even  more 
clearly  and  more  strongly,  perhaps,  do  the  qualities  and  situa- 
tions and  complexes  that  appear  in  the  great  evolutionary  proc- 
ess of  life  appeal  to  our  acceptance.  Innumerable  such  entities 
there  are,  that  at  one  time  are  lacking,  but  that  at  another  time 
are  present,  having  somehow  and  somewhere  sprung  into  exist- 

"  Chap.  XLHI,,  Hid. 


514  REALISM 

enee  when  tefore  they  did  not  exist.  Yet  they  all  had  their 
antecedents.  For  that  interpretation  of  evolution  which  we  are 
presenting  does  not  in  the  least  deny  agency  or  power,  or 
efficiency,  but,  on  the  contrary,  emphasizes  these  entities.^^  Yet 
it  does  deny  the  non-creativeness  of  that  great  process,  and 
therefore  also  the  perfect  continuity  of  its  career  and  the  eternal 
oldness  and  sameness  of  all  that  exists.  And,  accordingly,  it 
denies  that  evolution  is  mere  direction  and  correlation  either 
with  an  asymmetrical  time  series,  or  with  a  ''running  down," 
or  with  both. 

Evolution  is  creative.  Direct  empirical  evidence  compels  U3 
to  admit  that  there  is  a  newness,  a  creation,  an  ascent  in  situa- 
tions, in  complex  states  of  affairs.  And  some  of  these  situations 
present,  as  their  characteristics,  entities  that  are  values.  Human 
history,  if  one  carefully  surveys  its  long  succession  of  chapters, 
but  especially  if  one  compares  it  with  the  chapters  of  organic 
life  that  antedated  the  human,  is  quite  sufficient  to  convince 
one  of  this. 

The  moral  situation  has  been  selected  for  such  considerations 
both  because  it  is  typical  and  because  it  is  important.  But  a 
detailed  examination  of  the  data  at  hand  shows  that  there  are 
also  many  other  values  that,  although  now  existent,  have  not 
always  existed. 

Here  as  elsewhere  in  the  evolutionary  process,  with  its  ever- 
appearing  new  characteristics  and  qualities,  we  cannot,  there- 
fore, but  conclude  that  there  is  an  efficient  agent  or  power  to 
produce  all  values.  In  other  words,  there  is  a  power  that 
"makes  for"  values,  that  leads  to  them,  or  that  produces  them.^* 
Just  which  of  these  terms  is  best,  must  be  decided  by  analysis. 
But  the  fundamental  fact  remains,  since  there  are  values,  and 
these  values  are  produced  in  the  general  evolutionary  process, 
that  that  which  produces  or  leads  to  them  must  for  that  very 
reason,  if  for  no  other,  itself  he  a  value. 

This  conclusion,  however,  brings  a  new  solution  to  the  teleo- 
logical  problem,  and  leads  us  to  the  very  verge  of  the  theological 
problem,^^  if,  indeed,  we  are  not  already  in  its  midst.    For,  of 

"  See  Chap.  XLIII.,  ii. 

*♦  Cf.  Holl'ding,  Philosophy  of  Religion,  for  a  similar  position. 

"  Chap.  VIII. 


REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY        515 

all  that  we  might  seem  justified  to  call  "ends,"  it  is  values, 
especially  moral  values,  that  would  seem  to  make  the  strongest 
claim  to  be  so  designated.  And  if  a  process  might  seem  to 
deserve  the  term  teleologieal,  for  any  other  reason  than  that  it 
is  direction,  it  is  because  of  its  creative  and  accumulative  power 
to  produce  that  which  conforms  in  some  degree  at  least  to  the 
standards  of  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty.  The  several  facts, 
(1)  that  concrete  situations  among  human  beings  take  on  some 
of  these  value  characters  in  greater  or  less  degree,  (2)  that, 
as  they  do  this,  the  realm  of  perfect  goodness,  beauty,  and  truth 
seem  to  be  ever  more  nearly  approached,  and,  finally,  (3)  that 
there  is  such  an  evolutionary  process  of  advance  and  progress 
as  to  bring  about  this  approach,  are  together  identical  with  the 
teleological  character  of  our  universe. 

Whether,  now,  this  teleology  be  interpreted  as  "immanent" 
or  as  "transcendent"  is,  perhaps,  a  relatively  unimportant 
question.^^  The  former  view  has,  under  the  influence  of  Ob- 
jective Idealism,  become  the  fashion  in  most  modern  philo- 
sophical writing,  although  in  traditional  philosophy  it  has  been 
a  transcendent  teleology  that  has  been  more  frequently  accepted. 
Such  a  teleology  has  usually  been  identified  with  some  such 
position  as  that  the  existential  universe  is  a  mechanism  which, 
in  the  hands  of  an  external  Agent  or  Purposer,  is  the  means  for 
the  accomplishment  of  His  ends.  Clearly  this  position  is  based 
on  an  analogy  ^^  with  the  construction  of  instruments  by  human 
beings,  while  the  "end"  that  is  "aimed  at"  is  interpreted  in 
Strictly  human,  yet  more  or  less  vague  terms — usually  the 
former. 

In  contrast  to  this,  the  position  that  has  just  been  previously 
presented  is  identical  with,  in  its  own  specific  way,  both  a 
transcendent  and  an  immanent  teleology.  It  is  an  immanent 
teleology,  since,  as  regards  that  great  creative  evolutionary 
process,  there  is  no  existential  agent  that  is  external  to  it  as  a 
whole.  Its  earlier  phases  are  external  to  its  later,  and  various 
phases  are  discontinuous  with  one  another,  as  they  must  be  in 
order  to  have  the  process  genuinely  creative,  but  they  are  all 
phases  of  one  total  process. 

But  it  is  also  a  transcendent  teleology.    Justice,  as  we  have 

"  See  Chap.  VIII.  ''  See  Chap.  XX. 


516  REALISM 

found,  subsists  independently  of  just  acts,  just  motives,  and 
just  persons.^**  This  does  not  deny,  however,  the  relatedness 
of  justice  to  these  existents,  but  offers  only  another  instance 
of  the  independence,  accompanying  relatedness,  of  all  subsistents 
on  existents.  Existents,  however,  are  always  those  particular 
instances  which,  under  temporal  and  spatial  conditions,  the  great 
existential  evolutionary  process  creates.  They  therefore  involve 
the  characteristics  that  the  specific  subsistent  processes,  plus 
something  more,  even  as  the  uniform  acceleration  of  a  par- 
ticular moving  particle  (assuming  that  uniform  means  con- 
tinuous) involves  the  order  of  the  number  continuum  and  some- 
thing more,^^  and,  also,  the  motion  of  the  existent  particle  some- 
thing more  than  mere  continuity,  mere  space  and  time,  or  all 
of  these  together.  In  a  similar  way,  space  and  time  are  some- 
thing more  than  number,  although  they  are  each  an  instance  of 
the  same  "order  system." 

In  all  these  instances,  now,  the  "higher"  or  more  fundamental 
may  be  said  to  be  both  immanent  in,  and  also  transcendent  to 
the  "lower"  "level."  And  the  case  is  not  different  with  justice 
and  other  values,  ethical,  aesthetic,  and  cognitive.  These  are  all 
both  transcendent  to  and  immanent  in  their  particular  existential 
instances.  Accordingly,  an  evolutionary  process  that  creates 
these  instances  presents  an  immanent  teleology,  while  that  uni- 
verse which  is  iiiclusive  not  only  of  this  process,  hut  also  of  the 
realm  of  subsistents  presents  a  transcendent  teleology. 

But  a  further  question  now  arises.  Are  the  subsistent  values 
by  themselves,  in  their  relations  to  one  another,  and  in  respect 
to  the  realm  which  they  constitute,  to  be  denied  agency  or 
efficiency?  We  must  answer  "no."  The  existential  process  is 
undeniably  an  efficient  one,  for  it  is  one  that  "produces," 
"causes,"  and  "brings  about."  But  to  limit  efficiency  to  ex- 
istential processes,  even  though  one  does  keep  causation  and  per- 
haps "production''  within  this  field,  is  quite  unjustified.  For 
subsistent  entities  are  such  that  they  make  a  difference  to  the 
other  entities  of  the  universe,  even  though  they  have  no  causal 
effect.  Thus,  e.g.,  the  number  continuum,  space  and  time,  con- 
dition other  entities,  both  simple  and  complex,  and  in  this  sense 
are  active.     So  also  is  the  entire  realm  of  subsistent  values  an 

"  See  the  preceding  chapter.  "  Chap.  XLHI.,  vn.-x. 


REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY        517 

efficient  one, — an  effieieney  which  would  seem  to  be  confirmed 
by  the  fact  that  human  beings  are  actuated  by  ideals  that  have 
never  yet  received  concrete  existential  form.  For  who  would 
be  so  rash  as  to  maintain,  e.g.,  that  any  society  of  men  has 
ever  yet  attained  the  ideal  of  an  organization  in  which  perfect 
justice  is  rendered  to  all?  Yet  who  among  thinking  men  denies 
that  this  ideal  is  something  to  struggle  and  to  strive  for?  And 
upon  whom  does  the  efficiency  of  this  ideal  not  fall  with  com- 
pelling force? 

The  realistic  solution  of  the  theological  problem  can  now  be 
stated.  Negatively,  this  solution  rejects  the  pragmatic  view,  that 
"God"  is  but  a  successful  and  satisfactory  "working  scheme," 
a  racially  subjective  concept  become  traditional  and  so  almost 
immediate  to  our  consciousness,  and  yet  one  that  is,  after  all, 
only  invented  as  an  adaptation  to  a  chaotic  environment.^"  Re- 
jected also  are  the  phenomenalistic  view,  that  God  is  an  object 
of  faith,  but  not  of  cognition,  and  the  objective  idealistic  view, 
that  God  is  a  psychical  being  of  the  nature  of  will  or  of  intellect, 
an  absolute  ego,  etc.,  who  is  relater  of  all  entities,  and  so  the 
fundamental  underlying  reality  of  the  universe.'^  Rejected 
are  perhaps  other  views,  also.  On  the  other  hand,  positively, 
for  realism,  God  is  the  totality  of  values,  both  existent  and  sub- 
sistent,  and  of  those  agencies  and  efficiencies  with  which  these 
values  are  identical.  He  is  also  at  once  the  multiplicity  of  these 
entities  and  the  unity  of  their  organization  in  that  they  are 
related.  This  means  that  God  is  justice  and  truth  and  beauty, 
both  as  these  are  "above"  our  world  and  as  they  are  in  it,  and 
that  He  is  thus  both  transcendent  and  immanent.  Accordingly, 
if  God  is  personality.  He  is  also  more  than  personality  even  as 
the  moral  situation  among  men  is  more  than  personality.  He 
is  love  and  affection  and  goodness,  respect  and  reverence,  as 
these  exist  among  and  in  men,  but  He  is  these  also  as  they  sub- 
sist by  themselves,  and  act  efficiently  upon  men.  In  brief,  God 
is  Value,  the  active,  "living"  principle  of  the  conservation  of 
values  and  of  their  efficiency. 

Yet  God  is  not  all.     There  are  values,  but  not  all  is  value. 

='"  See  Chaps.  IX.,  X.,  XIII.,  ii..  XXXIII 

^'  See  Chaps.  XXIX.,  and  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 


518  REALISM 

For  there  are  also  '^ non-value"  entities.  But,  also,  if  the  uni- 
verse is  that  totality  of  all  entities  which  are  facts  in  some 
sense,  there  is  not  only  the  realm  of  non-values,  such  as  numbers, 
space  and  time,  electrons,  atoms,  masses,  molecules,  and  the  like, 
but  there  is  also  the  realm  of  falsity  and  error,  and,  especially, 
of  evil  and  ugliness,  that  is  directly  opposed  to  the  true,  the 
good,  and  the  beautiful.  This  problem  of  evil  is  not  an  easy 
one,  and  hardly  any  solution  of  it  will  meet  with  wide  accept- 
ance.   Only  a  brief  analysis  of  it  can  be  made  at  this  juncture. 

Philosophical  literature  is  full  of  endeavors  to  argue  evil  out 
of  existence, — indeed,  out  of  reality,  and  it  is  primarily  upon  the 
basis  of  the  positive  evidence  by  which  these  arguments  can  be 
shown  to  fail,  that  our  own  positive  conclusion  is  established. 

One  such  argument  leads  to  that  monistic  and  idealistic  con- 
clusion in  which  all  ^'things"  are  "made"  the  manifestations 
and  mere  appearances  of  one  great  underlying  entity  that  is 
usually  interpreted  as  spiritual  in  character.^-  According  to 
this  position  all  appearances  occur  as  differentiated  into  pairs 
of  terms  that  are  relative  and  not  merely  related  to  each  other.^^ 
Cause  and  effect,  subject  and  predicate,  up  and  down,  good  and 
evil,  are  examples.  The  logical  outcome  of  this  position  is  that 
all  of  these  differences  disappear  in  the  Absolute  One  that  under- 
lies them ;  yet  the  inconsistent  reservation  is  usually  made,  that 
in  the  instance  of  good  and  evil  the  latter  alone  loses  its  identity. 
Thus  it  is  that  the  urgent  attempt  is  made  to  argue  evil  out 
of  existence,  and  out  of  reality.  However,  systems  of  this  type 
have  been  previously  found  "*  to  fail  in  many  respects,  so  that 
we  omit  the  further  examination  of  their  endeavor  to  solve  the 
problem  of  evil. 

Another  argument  concerning  evil  claims,  however,  more  seri- 
ous attention,  namely,  that  argument  which  is  based  on  the 
general  doctrine  of  evolution,  and  which  accordingly  claims  that 
anything  which  is  a  "means  to  an  end"  that  is  itself  good,  or, 
indeed,  that  anything  which  is  even  only  an  incident  in  the  pro- 
duction of  good,  is  a  fortiori  itself  a  good.  This  premise  is  then 
used  to  demonstrate  that  everything,  e.g.,  poverty,  is  either  such 

'""  See  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVIII. 

"  See  Chap.  XXXV. 

*«  Chaps.  XXXIV.-XXXVJIJ, 


REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY        519 

a  mediate  or  such  a  final  good.  For,  it  is  argued,  that,  e.g., 
poverty  is  merely  an  incident  in  that  universal  struggle  for 
existence  which  is  part  of  the  mechanisyn  for  producing  the  fittest 
dnd  the  best  among  human  beings.  Or,  to  take  another  example, 
that  of  ugliness,  this  is  transformed,  if  not  into  beauty,  at  least 
into  a  good  and  a  value.  For,  it  is  asked,  Is  not  ugliness  a 
means  in  that  it  not  only  implies  and  furnishes  a  contrast  with 
its  opposite,  beauty,  but  also  causes  us  to  appreciate  the  latter? 
And  then,  finally,  there  is  injustice.  Superb  role  it  is  held  to 
play — namely,  not  only  that  of  making  its  opposite,  justice, 
logically  possible,  as  "up"  makes  "down,"  but  also  that  of 
being  in  its  practice  the  royal  road  to  its  own  gradual  elimina- 
tion and  the  coming  of  the  opposite  ideal,  justice.  If  this  argu- 
ment holds  for  such  typical  cases,  it  holds  also  for  other  instances, 
with  the  result  that  there  is  nothing  "under  the  sun"  that  is 
not  at  least  a  good  as  a  means  to  some  final  end  which  is  itself 
either  good,  or  true,  or  beautiful. 

The  ways  by  which  this  argument  can  be  refuted  are  found 
both  in  its  own  inherent  weaknesses,  and  in  directly  controvert- 
ing facts.  The  weakness  of  the  argument  lies  in  its  generaliza- 
tion, that,  even  though  ive  cannot  understand  how  specific 
instances  of  seeming  evils  are  really  goods,  nevertheless  we 
must  grant  that  they  are,  and  act  accordingly.  Appeal  is  thus 
made  to  our  ignora^ice,  and  we  are  asked  to  convert  the  proposi- 
tion, that  we  do  not  know  this  or  that  to  be  evil,  into  the 
proposition,  that  we  know  it  not  to  be  an  evil.  But,  clearly,  if 
we  are  ignorant,  then  the  evidence  is  neither  pro  nor  con,  and 
the  position,  that  there  are  some  irreducible  evils,  is  quite  ag 
justified  as  is  the  opposed  more  optimistic  generalization. 

However,  it  is  to  the  acceptance,  not  of  the  mere  seemingness 
of  evil  and  ugliness,  but  of  their  actuality,  that  the  great  ma- 
jority of  good  men  direct  their  practical  activities  for  human 
betterment.  Indeed,  if  the  fighting  of  evil  were  good  merely 
because  of  the  fight,  and  not  because  of  the  evil,  then  would  the 
fight  be  self-defeating.  Practically  and  actually,  however,  men 
fight  evil,  not  for  the  sake  of  the  fight,  but  because  evil  is  evil, 
and  because  they  wish  to  eliminate  it  and  replace  it  with  good. 
Not  the  fight,  therefore,  nor  the  evil,  but  the  fighting  evil  is 
good,  and  this  is  so,  because  evil  is  evil  and  good  is  good. 


520  REALISM 

"We  must  conclude,  that  evil  is  an  entity  that  retains  its  own 
peculiar  character,  and  that  is  not  transformable  into,  nor  reduci- 
ble to,  positive  values.  It  is  an  immediate  and  self-sufficient 
entity  that,  although  it  is  opposed  to,  is  not  in  the  least  dependent 
upon,  good,  although,  of  course,  it  is  related  to  good,  which  is 
quite  possible,  since  relatedness  does  not  imply  dependence,  as 
we  have  repeatedly  discovered. 

The  general  character  of  our  solution  of  the  theological  prob- 
lem, as  this  is  based  on  our  solution  of  the  problem  of  goods 
and  of  evils,  is  sufficiently  indicated  in  these  considerations. 
It  is  a  solution  that  supports  a  theistic,  and  not  a  pantheistic 
position,  and  that  holds  to  the  irreducihle  f actuality  of  evil  and 
of  "powers  for  evil,"  as  well  as  of  good  and  of  "powers  for 
good." 

God  is  "above"  the  world  of  existents,  in  that  He  is  Justice 
and  Goodness  and  Beauty  and  Truth  as  these  subsist  eternally 
is  a  non-temporal  and  non-spatial  realm.  This  is  transcendent 
Theism.  But  He  is  in  the  world  even  as  concrete  particular 
existences  conform  in  a  greater  or  less  degree  to  these  ideals. 
Above  the  world  in  this  sense,  God  is  supernatural,  yet  this 
does  not  mean  that  He  in  any  sense  contradicts  nature.  For 
God  and  nature  are  each  a  different  universe  of  discourse,  a 
different  realm.  But  there  is  also  evil,  both  in  a  subsistent 
realm  and  in  existents,  and  this  can  neither  be  argued  out  of 
its  actuality  nor  reduced  to  anything  else. 

The  religious  consciousness  may  accordingly  be  described  as 
the  persistent  conviction  that  there  are  these  two  powers,  and 
that  each  is  efficient  in  the  realm  of  human  motives  and  acts, 
deeds  and  accomplishments.  Eespect  and  reverence  and  love 
for  values  and  worths  and  for  all  that  either  is  these  or  that 
"makes  for"  them,  form  part  of  the  religious  consciousness. 
But  another  part  also  is  the  hatred  and  detestation  of  all  that 
is  evil  and  ugly  and  false,  and  the  desire  and  will  to  fight  these. 
Such  a  consciousness  is,  however,  clearly  opposed  to  the  passive 
and  inactive  philosophical  position  that  evil  is  but  a  means  to 
an  end,  or  that  it  is  mere  appearance,  so  that  "God's  in  His 
heaven,  all's  right  with  the  world,"  but  it  is,  rather,  the  active, 
militant  attitude  of  hatred  and  of  combativeness.  The  passive 
position  is  blighting,  but  the  active  is  full  of  life.     Yet  evil 


REALISM'S  TELEOLOGY  AND  THEOLOGY        521 

does  not  therewith  become  good — as  a  means  to  stimulating  the 
effort  for  its  own  annihilation.  For  it  is  not  the  evil,  but  the 
hatred  of  evil  that  is  the  stimulus.  Freedom,  too,  is  given  for 
the  fight.  For  that  level  of  existence  at  which  there  is  the 
love  of  good  and  the  hatred  of  evil,  is  one  that  is  the  result 
of  a  creative  process  in  which  new  "things"  appear  that,  as 
new,  are  free  to  follow  their  own  nature. 

Such  a  scheme  of  life  is  one  neither  of  resplendent  optimism 
nor  of  enervating  pessimism.  Evil  is  a  reality,  and  deserves 
only  to  be  fought.  But  the  means  are  given  to  do  this.  For 
there  is  a  Power  for  good  that  works  not  only  side  by  side 
with  man,  but  also  in  him  and  through  him,  flowering  in  that 
freedom  which  is  given  to  his  reason  to  get  at  truth,  to  his 
emotions  to  love  the  beautiful,  the  good,  and  the  true,  and 
detest  the  ugly,  the  evil,  and  the  false,  and  to  his  will  and 
manhood  to  engage  in  the  struggle. 


INDEX 


The  Index  supplements  the  Table  of  Contents,  but  does  not  duplicate 
it:  notes,  as  well  as  subject-matter,  are  indexed.  The  references  are  to 
pages,  f.  signifying  "  and  following  page,"  ff.,  "  and  following  pages." 


Absolute  One,  The ;  see  One,  The  Ab- 
solute. 

Absolute   Will,   337  f. 

Absolutism,  347  ff . ;  in  Phenomenal- 
ism,  225;    in  Pragmatism,   296  ff. 

Absurd,  the,   132  f.;    143  ff. 

Acceleration,  281  ff.;   see  Motion. 

Adaptation,  290  ff. 

Addition,  as  an  operation,  415  ff. 

Affirmation  and  denial,  147  ff. 

Agnostic  Monism,  354  f. 

All-inclusiveness,  of  the  universe, 
432  ff. 

Alternative  hypotheses,  necessity  of 
using,  in  problem  of  error,  377  ff. 

Analogy;  limitations  of,  154;  use  of, 
152  ff. 

Analysis,  141  ff.,  278  ff.;  as  valid, 
27,  896  ff.;  and  "thing"  ana- 
lyzed, 396  ff. ;  fact  of,  as  a  pre- 
supposition, 426  ff.;  faulty,  160  ff.; 
instances  of,  382  ff. ;  view  of,  in 
Phenomenalism,  229  f. 

Analysis  in  situ,  27  ff.,  86  f.,  158  ff., 
208  ff.,  210,  367  ff.,  390;  method 
of,  as  a  presupposition,  427. 

Anaximenes,    81. 

Anselm,  62,  63. 

Antecedence;  logical,  51  ff.,  57;  psy- 
chological, 51  ff. 

Antecedent  and  consequent,  147  ff. 

Anti-iritellectualism,  34,  80  f.,  274  ff.; 
as  a  false  position,  400  ff. 

Antinomies.  35,  160  ff.,  165  ff. 

Anti-substance  doctrine,  the,   273  ff. 

Apodictic,  221  ff. 

Appearance  and  reality,  205  ff. ;  in 
monistic   systems,   346  ff. 

Aquinas,  58,  62  f. 

Aristotle,  13  f.,  62  f.,  101,  108,  116, 
129,  150,  203,  214,  285;  evidence 
of  his  use  of  the  physical  thing 
as  the  model   for  thinking,   30  ff. 

Assumptions,  the  method  of  making, 
390  ff. 

Atoms,  387  f. 

Augustine,  62  f. 

Avenarius,  46. 

Awarene88,478 ;  as  a  dimension,474  ff. 


Bacon,  Roger,   89. 

Baldwin,  M.,  448. 

Bawden,  H.,   285. 

Beautiful,  The,  496  ff. 

Beauty,  60. 

Beck,  J.  S.,  312. 

Behavior,  89  f . 

Behaviorism,  477  f. 

Bergson,  H.,   36,  43,   124,   136,   152, 

170  ff.,    276  ff.,    290,    297  f.,    303, 

342  f.,  464,  466,  511. 
Berkeley,  58,  62,  108,  181,  185,  214, 

233  ff.,  325,  327. 
Biology,  3,  342  ff. 
Bolyai,  J.,  12. 
Bosanquet,  B.,   109. 
Bradley,  F.  H.,  10,  59,  63,  168,  183, 

187,*214,  330. 
Broad,  L.  N.,  218. 
Brogan,  A.  P.,  508. 
Brown,  H.  C,  7,  11  f. 
Burnet,  J.,  166. 

Caird,  E.,  186,  323  f. 

Calculus,  281  ff. 

Calkins,  M.  W.,  186,  324. 

Cassirer,  E.,   175. 

Categories,   13,   17,   107,  222  ff. 

Causation,  55,  182  ff.,  214  f.,  402  ff.; 
as  limited,  292  ff.,  448  ff.;  as  uni- 
versal, 391  ff.;  as  universal,  in 
Naturalism,  260  ff.;  postulate  of, 
216  ff.;  universal,  postulate  of,  as 
self-contradictory,   418  f. 

Causation-philosophies,  9  f. 

Cause,  33,  155  ff. 

Causes,  208  ff.;   Aristotle's  four,  32. 

Change,  62,  280  ff.;  see  Motion;  cor- 
rect analysis  of,  169  f.;  incorrect 
analysis  of,  168  f.;  qualitative, 
analysis  of,  464  ff. 

Chaos.  54  ff.,   331. 

Chemical  entities,  444  ff. 

Classes,  16,  34,  91,  112  ff.,  188  ff.; 
contradictory,  415  ff.;  definition 
of,  193. 

Classification,  nature  of,  15. 

Class  of  classes,  361. 

Coffee,   P.,   as  a   modern    schplaatio 


523 


524 


INDEX 


showing    the     character     of    the 
Aristotelian  tradition,  31. 

Collections,    192  f. 

Compact,  defined,   194. 
Complexes;  relational,  101  ff.,  112  ff., 
178  ff.,      183  ff.,      281  ff.,      293  ff., 
275  ff.,  375  ff.,  421  ff.,  472  ff.;   spe- 
cific, as  organized  wholes,  194  f. 

Comte,  46  f. 

Concepts.  113  f.;  nature  of,  188  ff. 

Connections,  knowledge  of,  145  ff. 

Connotation,   113  f. 

Consciousness;  as  an  end  causal  ef- 
fect, 483  ff. ;  as  a  relation,  481  ff. ; 
as  a  non-spatial,  non-temporal, 
qualitatively  distinct  variable, 
470  ff.,  484  ff. ;  as  a  substance, 
439  ff.;  as  a  substance,  implica- 
tions of  theory  of,  374  ff. ;  as  use- 
ful, 287  f . ;  continuity  of,  in  evo- 
lution, 337  ff. ;  dimensional  and 
relational  theory  of,  bibliography 
of,  470;  problem  of  the  nature  of, 
89  ff. ;  problem  of  the  nature  of, 
solution  in  Phenomenalism,  229  f . ; 
problem  of  the  first  kind  of,  91  ff. ; 
problem  of,  and  problem  of  error, 
438  ff.;  relational  view  of,  42  f.; 
substance  view  of,  as  making 
genuine  knowing  impossible,  42; 
the  religious,  520  f . ;  undeniable 
fact  of,  486  ff. 

Conscious  processes,  classification 
of,  97  f. 

Conservation;  of  energy,  90  f., 
257  ff.,  262  ff.;  of  values,  509  ff.; 
principle  of,  in  general,  257  ff. 

Consistency,  6  ff.,  135;  as  a  presup- 
position, 418  ff.;  as  distinct  from 
implication,  419  ff.;  definition  of, 
421. 

'•  Consistents,"  definition  of,  490. 

Continuity,  57,  161  ff.,  165  ff.;  analy- 
sis of,  451  ff.;  and  experiment, 
462;  definition  of,  194,  461. 

Continuous  series,  examples  of,  462. 

Continuum,  linear,  461. 

Contradiction,  161  ff.,  278  ff.;  Being 
of,  as  a  presupposition,  414  ff.; 
fundamental,  in  Phenomenalism, 
227  ff. ;  fundamental,  in  Pragma- 
tism, 300  ff. ;  in  systems  opposed 
to  Realism,  230  ff. ;  in  Objective 
Idealism,  331  ff.;  in  proof  of  Ab- 
solute One,  357  ff.;  law  of,  106  f., 
136  ff.;  principle  of,  use  of,  285, 
318  ff.;  principle  of,  formal  use 
of,  186  ff.;  self-,  6  ff,,  136  flf. 


Contradictories,    141  ff.,    149  f. 
Contradictory,  The,  17. 
Contradictory  attributes,  their  sub- 
sistence in  different  loci,  375  ff. 
Contradictory  propositions,  136  ff. 
Contradictory  terms,  136  ff. 
Contraries,  149  f.,  161  ff. 
Converse,  115;  of  a  relation,  101. 
Correctness,    formal,    of    reasoning 

process,  119  f. 
Correlation,  171  ff.,  449  f.;  of  series, 

23;    not    identical   with    identity, 

381  f.,  477  ft". 
Correspondence,  290  ff.,  448  f . 
Cosmological  argument,   63. 
Cosmological    problem,    solution   of, 

in  Phenomenalism,  286  f. 
Cosmology,     of     monistic     systems, 

345  ff. ;     of    Subjective    Idealism, 

239. 
Cosmos,    54  ff.,    58  ff.;    the,    437  ff.; 

the,   for   Realism,  443  ff. ;    logical 

origin  of,  for  Objective  Idealism, 

331  ff. 
Costello,  H.  T.,  158. 
Counting,    in    relation    to    number, 

150  f. 
Creative      synthesis,      and      values, 

500  ff. 
Creighton,  J.  E.,  109. 
"Cuts,"  458  ff. 

Darwin,  285  ff. 

Deduction,   16. 

Deism,   58  ff. 

Deity,  The,  .')4  ff.,  58  ff.,  66  f., 
187  ff.,  233  ff.,  328  ff.,  517  ff.;  in 
monistic  systems,  346  ff. ;  in  Nat- 
uralism, 260;  in  Phenomenalism, 
225. 

Democritus,  262. 

Denial,  see  Presupposition. 

Denotation,   113f. 

Density;  analysis  of,  451  ff.;  defi- 
nition of,  194;  postulate  of, 
461. 

Denumerable,  definition  of,  461. 

Descartes,  46,  58,  108,  129,  204,  214, 
264  f. 

Design,   62  ff. 

Determinism,  338. 

De  Vries,  H.,  287. 

Dewey,  J.,  73,  110,  283  ff.,  293,  297. 

Dictum  de  omni  ct  nullo,  116. 

Dimensions;  and  elements,  471  ff.; 
definition  of,  471;  non-spatial  and 
non-temporal,  472  ff. ;  within  the 
universe,  471  ff. 


INDEX 


52^ 


Direction,  logical,  194;  of  processes, 

509  flf. 

Discontinuity,  161  ff.;  analysis  of, 
451  ff.;  definition  of,  194,  *462;  in 
evolution,  513  ff. 

Discourse,  universe  of,  175. 

Discovery,  24,  27;  and  Realism, 
438  ff. 

Disjunction,  141  ff. 

Distance,  145  f. 

Distinctness;  numerical,  498;  of 
truth  and  certainty,  as  a  presup- 
position, 424  f.;  not  identical  with 
discontinuity,  464. 

Distribution,  117. 

Dream-objects,  nature  of,  92  S. 

Driesch,  H.,  343. 

Dynamic  view,  the,  of  modern 
science,  336  ff. 

Efficiencies;  non-causal,  442  ff.,  451; 
non-existential,    479  ff.,    516  ff. 

Ego,  the,  325  ff. ;  as  a  substance, 
33  f . ;  Absolute,  see  Absolute  One. 

Ego-centric  predicament,  219  ff., 
322;  as  solved  in  Phenomenalism, 
228  f . ;  as  solved  in  presupposi- 
tions of  Subjectivism,  240  f . ;  solu- 
tion of,  208'ff.,  212  ff.,  365  ff;  see 
Predicament. 

Electrons,  287  f. 

"Elements";  in  Positivism,  244  ff.; 
psychical,   389  f. 

Elimination,  virtual,  27  ff.,  207  ff. 

Elliott,  H.  S.  R.,   171. 

Emotional  experience,   124  f. 

Emotionalism,  276  ff. 

Empedocles,  51. 

Endlessness,  analysis  of,  451  ff. 

Energy,     262  ff. ;     conservation     of, 

510  ff.;  as  Will,  338  f. 
Entelechy,  343. 

Entities;  of  the  universe,  classifica- 
tion of,  486  ff.,  494 ;  types  of,  ex- 
amples of,  488. 

lipistemological  problem,  203  ff., 
430;  other  problems  as  independ- 
ent of,  53 ;  solution  of,  in  monistic 
systems,  349. 

Epistemology;  its  dominance  in 
modern  philosophy,  25;  science  as 
independent   of,   25. 

Erdmann,  B.,  121. 

Error;  definition  of,  295;  nature  of, 
293  ff. ;  possibility  of,  as  a  pre 
supposition,  429;  the  residual  ele- 
ment in,  376  ff. ;  problem  of,  and 
problem  of  consciousness,  438  ff. ; 


problem  of,  bibliography  of,  439; 
problem  of,  in  Pragmatism, 
290  ff. :  problem  of,  in  Phenom- 
enalism, 228  f. 

Error-objects,  as  part  of  the  cos- 
mos, 378,  433  ff. ;  as  subsistents, 
377. 

Ethical  Idealism,  330  f.,  333  f . 

Ethical  Monism,  341. 

Ethics,  see  Values. 

Ethics;  in  Phenomenalism,  225; 
not  a  branch  of  biology,  450  f . 

Eucken,  R.,  43,  342  f. 

Euclid,  6,  129. 

Evil,  61;  as  an  entity,  518  ff.;  as 
appearance,  339;  problem  of, 
204  ff.,  518  ff. 

Evolution,  90  f.,  Ill,  257  ff.,  262  ff., 
280  ff.,  283  ff.,  305  ff.,  335  ff.,  509 ; 
concept  of,  in  modern  Individual- 
ism, 402  ff. ;  logical  necessity  of, 
as  demonstrable,  186  f .,  285, 
340  f . ;  see  Motion. 

Evolutionism,  degrees  of,  in  Prag- 
matism, 295  ff. 

Excluded  Middle,  law  of,  107. 

Exclusion,  137  ff.,  142  ff.,  375  ff., 
441  ff.:   contradiction  as,  417  ff. 

Existents,  148,  244  ff.,  294f.,  305  f., 
388  ff.;  definition  of,  490;  kinds 
of,  491  ff. 

Ex  nihilo,  Principle  of,  264  f . 

Experience,  73  f . ;  and  experiencing, 
81  ff. 

Explanation,  381  f. 

External  relatedness  of  Jcnotoing 
and  known,  as  a  presupposition, 
428. 

External   relations,   313  ff. 

Fact;  definition  of,  in  Phenomenal- 
ism, 227  f.;  how  given,  123  ff,; 
nature  of,   71  ff. 

Fechner,   59. 

Fichte,  10,  62  f.,  108,  186,  312, 
317  ft'.,  322.  325,  330,  333,  341. 

Finite,  definition  of,  194,  463. 

Finiteness,  analysis  of,  451  ff. 

Force,  origin  of  the  idea  of,  336. 

Fractions;  irrational,  456  ff.;  ra- 
tional, 456  ff. 

Freedom,  56,  333  f.,  521,  505  f.;  defi- 
nition of,  449;  of  new  qualities, 
448  ff. ;  not  identical  with  lawless- 
ness, 392  f.;  of  the  will,  394  f.; 
to  postulate,  7  ff. 

Frost,  E.  P.,  89. 

Functions,   39  f.,    185. 


S26 


INDEX 


Flinctional    relations,    27;    between 

"levels,"   508  f. 
Functional  whole,  definition  of,  195. 

Galileo,  88,  121  f.,  156. 

Gaps,  165  IT. 

Generalization,    126  ff. 

Geometry,  18;  as  illustrating  types 
of  wholes,  196  f. ;  different  sys- 
tems of,  146  f.,  419  ff.;  modern 
method  in,  5  ff. 

Geulinx,   63. 

Good,  Absolute,  347 ;  The,  496  ff. 

Grammar,  99. 

Greek  Philosophy,  46  f . 

Green,  T.  H.,  is'e,  322  f.,  331. 

Haeckel,  262. 

Hegel,    10,    47,    59,    62  f.,    108,    186, 

285  f.,  313,  318  ff.,  322,  328,  330, 

341. 
Helm,  G.,  510. 
Herbart,  60. 

Hibben,  J.  G.,  42,  58,  159,  206. 
Fistorico-pragmatic  proof,  64. 
History,  definition  of,  3  ff. 
Hobbes,  262. 

Hoffding,  H.,  43,  58,  61,  514. 
Holt,  E.  B.,  81,  89,  177,  492. 
Humanism,   298  ff. 
Humanists,  54  ff. 
Hume,    108,   181,   214. 
Huntington,    E.    V.,    12,    175,    455, 

461,   471,   472,   480. 
Husserl,  E.,  12,  103,  107. 
Huxley,  246. 

Idealism,  48  t.,  84,  88 ;  Ethical, 
333  ff.;  Objective,  9,  214  f.,  272; 
Platonic,  308  ff.:  Subjective,  9  f ., 
92  f. 

Idealists,  72  ff. 

Ideals,   11,   151  f.,  309  ff.,  394  f. 

Identity,  The  principle  of,  105  ff. 

Illusions,  problem  of,  solution  of, 
92  ff.,  374  ff. 

Illusory   objects,   93  f. 

Imagination,  126  f.;  in  art,  127  f.; 
in  philosophy,  128;  in  science, 
127  f. 

Immediatism,  276  f . 

Immensity,   49. 

Implication,  7,  10,  18,  86,  99  ff., 
114  ff.,  155  ff.,  196  ff.,  391  ff., 
409  ff. ;  absence  of,  instances  of, 
413  f.;  basis  of  the  relation  of, 
100  ff.;  Being  of,  as  a  presuppo- 
Bition,     412  ff.;      limitations     of, 


422  ff. ;  presehce  of,  and  instances 
of,    413  f. 

Implications,  development  of,  145  ff. 

Implicative  situation,  the,   103  ff. 

Inclusion,  complete,  partial,  or 
negative,  relation  of,   102. 

Inconceivability  of  the  opposite,  8, 
130  ff.,  221,  368. 

Inconceivable  opposites,  examples 
of,  130  f. 

Independence,  182  ff.,  332;  and  re- 
latedness,  20  ff.,  24  ff.,  41  ff.,  76  ff., 
82  f.,  174  ff.,  178  ff.,  207  ff.,  382  ff., 
465  ff. ;  and  relatedness,  instances 
of,  84  ff. 

Individualism,  77  ff.,  402  ff.;  bibli- 
ography of,  403. 

Individuality,  107. 

Individuals,  16  f.,   112  ff.,  445  f. 

Induction,  121  ff.;  necessity  of, 
292  f.,  449. 

Inference,  its  logical  conditions, 
99  ff. 

Infinity,  159  f.;  analysis  of,  451  f.; 
compatible  with  finitude,  164; 
definition  of,   193  f.,  463. 

Influences,  emotional,  8. 

Inheritance,    120  f. 

Instance,  meaning  of,  20. 

Instances,  121  f.,  178  ff. 

Instincts,  337. 

Integers,  456. 

Intellectualism,  80  f . 

Interaction,  267,  272,  290;  limita- 
tions of,  292  f. 

Internal  relations,  formulation  of 
theory  of,  37  ff. 

Introspection,   264. 

Intuition,  124  f.,  277. 

Inverse,  the,  of  a  relation,  101. 

James,  Wm.,  9,  12,  84,  72  f.,  110, 
124,  206,  264,  273  ff.,  283  ff.,  290, 
293,  297  ff.,  302  f. 

Joachim,  H.  H.,  76,  331,  350. 

Jones,  Sir  Henry,  206. 

Justice,  152;  absolute,  498  ff.;  as  a 
non-causal  efficiency,  450  f . 

Kant,  47,  58,  74,  90,  108,  160  if., 
185,  214,  216  ff.,  333. 

Kellogg,  V.  L.,  288. 

Kempe,  A.  B.,   175. 

Knower,  Absolute,  The,  333. 

Knowing;  and  known  object,  as  re- 
lated and  independent,  369  ff. ; 
and  the  system  S,  321 ;  as  a  re- 
lation or  a  dimension,   88  ff.;   as 


INDEX 


527 


a  substance,  88;  as  constitutive, 
223  flf.;  definition  of,  97;  in  de- 
tail and  by  "  lump,"  difference  be- 
tween, 381  ff.;  nature  of,  212  f.; 
subsistent,  as  a  presupposition, 
428;  the  Being  of,  as  a  presuppo- 
sition of  philosophy,  423  ff.; 
structure  of,  in  Phenomenalism, 
220  f. 

Knowing  situation,  the,  28,  81  ff., 
291  f.,  312  ff.,  373  ff.;  analysis  of, 
by  method  of  analysis  in  situ, 
211  ff.,  369  ff.;  and  theory  of  ex- 
ternal relations,  41  f. 

Knowledge;  as  an  organic  system, 
76;  by  specification,  158  f.;  by 
type,  158  f.;  conditions  for,  109; 
extent  of,  381  ff.;  problem  of,  in 
development  of  philosophy,  230  ff. ; 
nature  of,  71  ff.;  origin  of,  79  ff.; 
origin  of,  solution  of  problem  of 
in  Phenomenalism,  227 ;  none 
other  than  empirical  difficulties 
in,  378  ff. 

Lamarck,    285  ff. 

Law,  62  ff. ;  and  laws,  54  ff. 

"Leap,"  the  inductive,   122. 

Leibniz,  47,  58,  62,  90,  108,  129. 

Leucippus,  262. 

Levels,  of  reality,  449  f. 

Life,    512  ff. 

Linearity,  postulate  of,  46 L 

Lobatschewsky,   N.,   6. 

Loci,  logical,  139  f.;  see  Contradic- 
tion and  Exclusion. 

Locke,  46,  71  f.,  108,  181,  185,  204, 
214,  242  f. 

Loeb,  J.,  92,  262,  343,  478. 

Logic,  12  ff.;  as  objective,  15;  dis- 
covery in,  29,  173;  the  constitu- 
tive, of  Kant,  199 ;  the  new  or 
non-Aristotelian,  11,  28  ff.,  36  f., 
156  ff.,  255  f.,  358  ff.;  the  new, 
bibliography  of,  175;  the  new, 
contrast  with  the  old,  173  ff.; 
pragmatic  theory  of,  109  ff.,  199 ; 
principles  of,  as  laws  of  mind, 
106;  types  of,  and  theories  of  re- 
lations, 198  ff. 

Logic,  the  "  old,"  or  traditional,  28, 
101  ff.,  105,  199,  340;  application 
of,  213  ff.;  and  the  new,  con- 
trasted, 366  ff. ;  as  transformed 
into  Hegelian  logic ;  see  Underly- 
ing reality  theory  of  relations, 
proof  of;  character  of,  32  ff., 
155  ff . ;   criticism  of,  35  f . ;    influ- 


ence of,  in  monistic  systems, 
352  ff.;  origin  of,  29  ff.;  use  of, 
279. 

Logical  entities,  objectivity  of,  20. 

Logical  priority;  among  the  sci- 
ences, 465  ff. ;  as  a  presupposition, 
429  ;  instances  of,  386  f . 

I;Ovejoy,  A.  0.,  93,  376,  439,  440. 

Mach,  E.,  27,  46,  246  f. 

Major  term,   117  f. 

Malebranche,  268. 

Manifoldness  of  the  universe,  49  ff. 

Marshall,  H.   R.,   264. 

Marvin,  W.  T.,  128,  206,  402. 

Materialism,  258,  262  f .,  370  f . ;  as  a 
phenomenalistic    philosophy,    263. 

Materialists,  262. 

McCosh,  J.,  408. 

Measurement,  453;  and  numbers, 
468. 

Mechanics,  281  ff.;   see  Motion. 

Mechanism,  in  biology,  342  ff.,  388. 

"  Member  of,"  relation  of,  102. 

Memory,    126. 

"  Mentionables,"  489  ff. 

Middle  term,    116. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  46,  121,  130. 

Miller,  D.,  89. 

Minor  term,  117  f. 

Minuteness,  49. 

Monism,  371  f.,  432  ff.;  logical,  24, 
55;    in    subjective    Idealism,    239. 

Monistic  Vitalism,  343  f. 

Montague,  W.  P.,  483,  492. 

Moods,  of  categorical  syllogism, 
117. 

Moore,  G.  E.,  103. 

Moral  consciousness,  the,  506  f . 

Moral  situation,  the;  its  nature, 
503  ff.,   513  f. 

Motion,  179  ff.,  184  f.,  313,  383  ff. ; 
see  Acceleration,  Analysis,  Corre- 
lation, Continuity,  Density,  Dis- 
continuitv,  Finite.  Infinitv,  Order, 
Series;  analysis  of,  279  S".,  464  ff.; 
analysis  of,  as  evidence  for  exter- 
nal relations,  367  f.;  incorrect 
and  correct  analysis  of,  con- 
trasted, 170  ff.;  modern  and  cor- 
rect analysis  of,  281  ff.;  Zeno's 
analvsis  of,  166  ff. 

Miinsterberg,  H.,  60,  69,  330,  287. 

Mysticism,  277 ;  as  rationally  de- 
fended, 104;  bibliography  of,  407; 
limited  validity  of,  407. 

Naturalism,    9  f .,   47  f.,    214,    370  f.. 


528 


INDEX 


392  f.,  306,  444  f . ;  criticism  of, 
268  ff. ;  as  a  generic  doctrine,  261 ; 
bibliography  of,   259. 

N-dimensions,  473  flf. 

Necessity,  logical,  115. 

Negation,  136  flf. 

Negative,  the,  the  nature  of,  414  flf. 

Neo-realism,  48. 

Neo-realists,  46. 

New  Rationalism,  The,  43. 

Newton,  58. 

Nietzsche,  339. 

Non-additive  wholes,  and  values, 
496  ff. 

Non-epistemological  problems,  in- 
dependence of,  431  f. 

Numbers,  18;  cardinal,  453  ff.; 
analysis  of,  455  ff. ;  irrational, 
458  ff.;  natural,  150  f.,  456;  nega- 
tive, as  realities,  456;  real,  461; 
signed,  415  ff. 

One,  The  Absolute,  321  ff.,  330 ff.; 
as  a  "  mentionable,"  358  f. ;  as 
Oneness,  359  ff. ;  as  a  series, 
359  ff.;  contradictions  in  proof  of, 
357  ff. ;  nature  of,  354  ff. ;  as  sum- 
mum  genus,  356  ff. 

One  and  Many,  446,  475  ff. 

One-one  correspondence,  definition 
of,  466. 

Oneness,  of  the  imiverse,  327. 

One,  The,  not  all-inclusive,  436  f. 

One  Truth,  as  a  system  of  truths, 
as  a  presupposition,  427  f. 

Ontological  argument,  63. 

Ontological  problem,  solution  of,  in 
Monism,  345  ff. ;  solution  of,  in 
Phenomenalism,   226. 

Ontologv,  of  Subjective  Idealism, 
238  f'.' 

Order,  11,  13  ff.;  see  Series,  and 
Logic. 

Organic  systems,  422. 

Organisms,  55,   184  f.,  446  f. 
^Organization,   56  ff.,  246  f.,   446  ff. 

Origin  of  knowledge,  in  monistic 
systems,  352. 

Ostwald,  W.,  47,  262. 

Outcomes,  practical,  275  ff. 

Tan-logism,  9  f.,  330. 

Pantheism,  .59  ff.,  329. 

Panzoism,   34. 

Parallelism,  psycho-physical,  264  ff., 

370. 
Particulars,  11. 
Paulsen,  F.,  89,  152. 


Peirce,  C  S.,   175,  293. 

Perfect,  The,  497  ff. 

Perfect  Being,  63  ff. 

Perfectionism,  in  monistic  systems, 

348. 
Perry,  R.  B.,  81,  285,  492. 
Personality,  the  unity  of,  325  ff. 
Pessimism,  52,  339  ff. 
Phenomenalism,  34,  48  f.,  88,  108  f., 

160  ff.,    214,    298  f.,    308,    311  ff., 

330  f.,  333  ff.,  338;  bibliography 
of,  232;  contrast  with  Subjective 
Idealism,  236  f . ;  criticism  of, 
230  ff. ;     in     Objective     Idealism, 

331  ff. 
Phenomenalists,  72  ff. 
Philosophy;    and    its    environment, 

44  ff. ;  views  as  to  the  nature  of, 
46. 

Physical  entities,  444  ff. 

Physical  Thing,  the;  definition  of, 
29;  influence  of,  as  a  model  for 
thinking,  32  ff.,  213  ff.;  influence 
on  the  philosophy  of  the  tradi- 
tion, 29. 

Pitkin,  W.  B..  89,  492. 

Plato,  13  f.,  60,  90,  152,  203,  255, 
326,  498. 

Pluralism,  358  ff.,  373  f.,  385  ff., 
432  ff.;  in  Subjective  Idealism, 
239;   logical,  24,  43. 

Poincare,  H.,  12,  145.  274,  293. 

Points,   162,   178  ff.;   see  Space. 

Positivism,  9  f .,  47 ;  bibliography 
of,  241;  cosmology  of,  249;  on- 
tology of,  248  f . ;  presuppositions 
and  criticism  of,  251  ff. ;  solution 
of  problems  in,  248  ff. ;  teleology 
in,  249  f . ;  theology  in,  249 ;  valid 
elements  in,  255  ff.;  "values"  in, 
250. 

Positivists,  247. 

Postulates;  as  consistent,  related 
and  independent,  462;  in  geom- 
etry, as  related  and  independent, 
420  ff.;  in  philosophy,  Off.;  for 
Objective  Idealism,  318  ff.;  for 
Positivism,  245  ff.;  for  series, 
455  ff.;  of  Phenomenalism,  210  ff.; 
of  Subjective   Idealism,  233  ff. 

Postulate,  the  freedom  to,  390  ff. 

Postulation;  method  of,  420  ff.; 
method  of  explicit,  6ff. ;  method 
of,  in  philosophy,  203  ff.,  215. 

Pragmatism,  9  f.,  88,  109  ff.,  214, 
370  f.,  392  f.,  396,  398  ff.,  507; 
Absolute,  Royce's  position  of,  18; 
as    a    self-contradictory    system. 


INDEX 


529 


134  flp.;  bibliography  of,  307; 
criticism  of,  301  ff.;  inconsisten- 
cies in,  399  ff. 

Pragmatists,  46,  54  ff.,  72  ff.,  284. 

Predicament;  the  ego-centric,  81  ff., 
206,  315  f.;  solution  of,  365  ff., 
372  ff.;  the  value-centric,  206  ff. 

Premises,  116;  establishment  of, 
144  ff. ;  of  disjunctive  syllogism, 
141  ff.;  of  hypothetical  syllogism, 
147  ff. 

Presupposition  by  denial,  222;  of 
the  principle  of  contradiction, 
140;  instances  of,  in  Individual- 
ism and  Skepticism,  405  ff. ;  proof 
of,  as  a  logical  principle,  1.33  f.; 
psychological  element  in,  134  f.; 
the  test  of,  132  ff.;  use  of,  17, 
19. 

Presupposition  of  premises,  120. 

Presuppositions;  of  systems  opposed 
to  Realism,  26  ff. ;  those  accepted 
by  Realism,  231  f. 

Principles;  as  useful,  288;  of  induc- 
tion, 122 ;  of  proof.  Pragmatism's 
view  of,  297  f. 

Priority,  logical,  86,  409  ff. ;  princi- 
ple of,  384  f. 

Problems;  artificial,  312;  false,  44; 
false,  in  philosophy  and  science, 
397  ff.;  philosophical,  and  history, 
397  ff.;  philosophical,  and  their 
solution,  5;  philosophical,  nature 
of,  396;    real,  312  f. 

Product,  logical,  17. 

Progress,  in  philosophy,  24;  prob- 
lem of,  509  ff. 

Progression,  definition  of  a,  461. 

Proof,  material  principles  of,  200. 

Propositions;  Being  of,  as  a  pre- 
supposition, 409  ff . ;  contradictory, 
415  ff.;  examples  of,  102;  rela- 
tional, 173;  self-contradictory, 
132  f.;  self-contradictory,  exam- 
ples of,  139  f.;  types  of,  112  ff., 
115,    117,   411  f. 

Protoplasm,   282. 

Psychism,  268  ff.,  370;  modern. 
Idealism  as  a,  309  f. 

Psychological  problem,  solution  of, 
in  Subjectivism,  239  f. 

Psychology,  299,  335  f . ;  of  thinking, 
bibliography  of,  95  f . 

Purpose,  55  f . 

Qualitative  difference,  between  know- 
ing and  known  object,  373  f. 
Qualities;       disembodied,      475  ff.; 


physical,    as    subjective,    233  ff.; 
new,  appearance  of,  447  ff. 

Rationalism,  48,  79  f.,  486;  see 
Realism. 

Rationalization,  attack  on,  278  ff. 

Realism,  11  ff.,  23,  25,  43,  84  ff., 
212  ff.,  242  f.,  272  f.,  297  f.,  310, 
316,  406;  and  epistemology,  431; 
and  the  problem  of  error,  374  ff. ; 
and  the  theory  of  external  rela- 
tions, 41  ff. ;  as  a  basic  position, 
9  ff. ;  as  presupposed  by  opposed 
systems,  369  ff.,  408  ff.,  in  logic, 
100  ff.;  in  monistic  systems, 
347  f.;  in  Naturalism,  260  f.;  in 
Phenomenalism,  230  ff.;  in  phi- 
losophizing, 104  ff.;  in  Positivism, 
251  ff.;  in  Pragmatism,  301  ff.;  in 
Subjective  Idealism,  238  ff. ;  The 
New,  bibliography  of,  495  f. 

Reality,  ultimate  nature  of,  for 
Realism,  432  ff. 

Reason,  Freedom  of,  as  a  presuppo- 
sition, 393  ff.,  427. 

Reasoning,  390  ff. ;  by  the  use  of 
words,  95  ff. ;  logical  conditions 
of,   16,  99  ff. 

Reductio  ad  ahsurdum,  132  f,, 
150  ff.,  160  ff. 

Reduction,  of  some  entities  to 
others,  432  ff. 

Reid,  408. 

Relatedness;    see  Independence. 

Relation;  definition  of,  21;  how  it 
relates,  theories  as  to,  176  ff.;  in- 
verse, 191 ;  of  knowing  to  its  ob- 
ject, appearance  and  disappear- 
ance of,  380  f . 

Relations,  14  ff.;  additive,  34  f., 
281  f.;  as  independent,  70  f.,  86, 
384  ff. ;  see  Independence ;  asym- 
metrical, 191;  asymmetrical  and 
transitive,  36,  159,  455  ff.;  see 
Space  and  Time;  Being  of,  as  a 
presupposition,  409  ff.;  causal, 
387  ff.;  dyadic,  191;  external,  in- 
stances of,  382  ff. ;  external,  as 
found  in  knowing  situation, 
212  f.;  external,  theory  of,  proof 
and  criticism  of,  17811'.;  function- 
al, 208  ff.,  291  f.;  internal,  theory 
of,  application  of,  213  ff. ;  internal, 
theory  of,  as  postulated  for  know- 
ing situation,  216  ff.;  intransi- 
tive, 191 ;  modification  theory  of, 
37 ;  modification  theory  of,  evi- 
dence for,  and  proof  of,    182 ff,; 


5S0 


INDEX 


modification  theory  of,  in  Subjec- 
tive Idealism,  236  if. ;  non-addi- 
tive, 163  f.,  281  ff.,  387  f.,  447  ff.; 
non-causal,  387  ff. ;  non-symmetri- 
cal, 191;  non-transitive,  191;  not 
causally  related,  as  a  presupposi- 
tion, 429 ;  of  inclusion  and  exclu- 
sion, 112ff. ;  of  similarity  and 
difference,  112  ff.;  one-many,  192; 
one-one,  192;  symmetrical,  191; 
theories  of,  and  analysis,  426  f . ; 
theories  of,  bibliogra])hy  of, 
181  f.;  theory  of  external,  formu- 
lation of,  38;  theory  of  external, 
evidence  for,  39  ff. ;  theories  of, 
use  of,  in  deriving  philosophical 
systems,  365  ff.;  transitive,  191; 
types  of,  100  ff.,  174  f.,  411  ff.; 
types  of,  in  modern  logic,  157  ff.; 
types  of,  in  traditional  logic,  155; 
types  of,  summary,  190  ff.;  under- 
lying-reality theory  of,  38,  317  ff.; 
underlying-reality  theory  of,  as  a 
postulate,  331  ff.;  underlying- 
reality  theory  of,  criticism  of, 
180  f.,  187  ff.;  underlying-reality 
theory  of,  proof  of,  and  evidence 
for,  185  ff. 

Relativism,  in  Pragmatism,  300. 

Religion,  64  f. 

Religious  consciousness,  the,  69. 

Renaissance,  203  f . 

Responsibility,  394  f. 

Rest,  170ff. 

Rickert,  H.,  69. 

Riemann,  B.,  6. 

Romanticism,  342  ff. 

Royce,  J.,  12  ff.,  62,  135,  175,  183, 
186  f.,  191,  193,  229  f.,  330  f.,  350, 
410. 

Russell,  B.,  12,  27,  37,  103,  136, 
163,  166,  173,  175,  178,  191,  193, 
293,  453. 

Sabatier,  A.,  65. 

Schelling,  10,  318  ff. 

Schiller,  F.  C.  S.,  54,  110,  283,  297  f. 

Schmidt,  K.,  7,  12. 

Schopenhauer,  59,  318  ff.,  339. 

Schulze,  G.  E.,  218,  312. 

Science,  179  ff.,  204  ff.;  as  positiv- 
istic,  256;  influence  of,  in  philos- 
ophy, 257  ff. ;  modern,  logic  of, 
10,  126  ff.      . 

Sciences,  the  natural,  procedure  of, 
274  ff. 

Self,  Absolute,  The;  see  Absolute 
One. 


Self-contradiction,   183,  417  ff. 

Sflf-contradictory,  The,  132  ff. 

Self-evidence,  8  f.,  165  f.,  221,  368; 
the  test  of,  129  ff. 

Self-evident  propositions,  examples 
of,  129. 

Self-refutation,  274. 

Self,  the,  233  ff. ;  as  substance, 
216  ff. ;  the  transcendental, 
220  ff. 

Sensationalism,  79  f.,  276  f . 

Sensations  (and  impressions), 
243  ff. 

Sense  experience,  123  f . 

Series,  10,  18,  56  f.,  156  ff.,  169  ff.; 
correlation  of,  23 ;  definition  of, 
193:  nature  of,  bibliography,  455; 
postulates  for,  455  ff. 

Sharp,  A.  B.,  124. 

Sigwart,  C,  189. 

Similarity,  relation  of,  188  ff. 

Simples,  ^61  ff.,   178  ff. 

Singer,  E.  A.,  89. 

Situation,  the  thinking,  analysis  of, 
114. 

Size,  145  f . ;  of  the  universe,  468. 

Skepticism,  402  ff. 

Smith,  N.  Kemp,  206. 

Soddy,  F.,  510. 

Solipsism,  93. 

Sophists,   78. 

Space,  162;  analysis  of,  279  ff., 
451  ff.;  analysis  of,  modern, 
158  ff.;  see  Analysis,  Continuity, 
Discontinuity,  Density,  Finite,  In- 
finity, Series;  the  world  of,  145  f. 

Spaulciing,  E.  G.,  89,  158,  164,  177, 
230,  280,  467,  478. 

Spencer,  46  f.,   130. 

Spinoza,  10,  46  f.,  59,  63,  108,  214, 
311. 

Standards;  aesthetic,  289;  ethical, 
289. 

States  of  affairs,  11,  25,  84  ff.,  104, 
112  ff.,  318  f.;  as  known  in  dif- 
ferent philosophical  systems,  369. 

Stein,   L.,   9. 

Strata,  of  the  universe,  56. 

Strong,  C.  A.,  268. 

Stuff  and  stuffs,  51  ff. 

'*  Sub-classes,"    458  ff. 

Subjective  Idealism,  inconsistencies 
in,  240  ff.,  243. 

Subsistents,  11  ff.,  50,  98,  148,  294  f, 
305  f.,  377  f.,  394,  444  f.;  and 
causation,  390  f.;  and  existents, 
theory  of,  bibliography  of,  403; 
definition  of,  490)  kinds  of,  491  ff. 


INDEX 


531 


Substance,  33,  155  ff.,  161  f.,  214  f., 
270  fT.,  308  ff.,  435  f.,  439  ff.;  con- 
cept of,  as  applied  to  "  knowing," 
28,  42;  in  monistic  systems,  353  f. 

Substance-philosophies,  9. 

Substance  view,  limitations  of, 
292  f. 

Substratum,  of  the  universe,  328. 

Subtraction,  as  an  operation, 
416  ff. 

Summum  genus,  55  f . 

Syllogism,  the,  119;  as  included  in 
the  new  logic,  36;  categorical, 
102  ff.,  lllff. ;  incorrect,  examples 
of,  117. 

SjTumetry,  21  f. 

Synthesis,  158  ff.;  creative,  479  ff.; 
see  Freedom ;  non-additive,  282  ff. 

System,  meaning  of,  421  ff. 

System,  the  Being  of,  as  a  presup- 
position, 421  ff. 

Systems,  philosophical  and  geo- 
metrical, comparison  of,  5ff. ; 
philosophical,  classification  of, 
9ff. 

System  S,  The,  18. 

Taylor,  A.  E.,  324  f.,  331. 

Teleology,  152  f.,  266  f.;  immanent, 
515  ff.;  immanent,  in  Volunta- 
rism, 338;   transcendent,  515  ff. 

Terms,  Being  of,  as  a  presupposi- 
tion, 409  ff. ;  self-contradictory, 
132  f. 

Thales,  51. 

Theism,  58  ff.,  235  ff.,  320. 

Theological  problem,  solution  of,  in 
monistic  systems,  346  f. 

Thermo-dynamics,  510  ff. 

Things-in-themselves,   217  ff. 

Thinking,   "  Laws  "  of,  222. 

Thorndike,  E.  L.,  26. 

Time,  analysis  of,  451  ff ;  see  Analy- 
sis, Continuity,  Discontinuity, 
Densitv,  Finite,  Infinity,  Series. 

Tradition,  The  Aristotelian,  9  ff., 
24  ff.,  64  f.,  391 ;  character  of,  31, 
326 ;  dominant  concepts  of,  32 ; 
in  logic,   105  ff.;   influence  of,  8  f . 

Transmission,  social,   111. 

Tropisms,  337. 

Truth,  19,  144,  276;  absolute,  74 ff.; 
absolute  standard  of,  in  Pragma- 
tism, 296;  and  certainty,  not  iden- 
tical, 405  ff.;  as  independent  of 
absolutely  true  tests,  presupposi- 
tion of,  420;  as  relative,  74  ff.; 
M  a  satiBfaction  generated  by  be- 


lief,  399  ff. ;  as  a  value,  70  f ., 
207  ff. ;  as  distinct  from  tests  of, 
proofs,    evidence,    and    certainty, 

424  ff. ;  as  distinct  from  success- 
ful working,  as  a  presupposition, 

425  f.;  "copy  theory"  of,  71  ff.; 
definition  of,  423;  "material,"  of 
premises,  119  f.;  nature  of,  71  ff., 
396,  405  f.;  not  identical  with 
usefulness,  398  ff. ;  organic  theory 
of,  76,  350  f.;  Pragmatism's  defi- 
nition of,  276;  pragmatic  theory 
of,  124  f.,  289  ff.;  test  of,  in  mo- 
nistic systems,  351  f. ;  test  of,  lack 
of  any  absolute,  351  f.;  tests  of, 
psychological,  129  ff.;  the  Being 
of,  as  a  presupposition  in  philos- 
ophizing, 423  ff.;  theory  of,  in 
Phenomenalism,  226  f. ;  theory  of, 
in  Positivism,  251;  the  test  of, 
74  f.,  76. 

Truths,  The  system  of,  75  ff. 

Types  of  entities,  manifold  of,  as  a 

presupposition,   429. 
Types   of    knowing,    different,   as   a 

presupposition,  429. 
Typical  cases, 

Ueberweg,  109. 

Underbill,  E.,   124. 

Unities  and  wholes,  197  ff. 

Unity,  180  f.,  197  ff.,  319  f.;  abso- 
lute, 185  ff.,  317  ff.;  metaphysical 
or  transcendent,  as  self-contradic- 
tory, 198. 

Universals,  11,  152. 

Universe,  The;  as  a  machine,  153  f.; 
as  an  organism,  152  ff.;  as  a  sys- 
tem, see  System,  436  ff.;  as  a 
totality,  488  ff.;  the,  examples  of 
kinds  of  entities  it  includes, 
433  ff.;  the  unity  of,  problem  of, 
317  ff. 

Unknown,  as  distinct  from  unknow- 
able, as  a  presupposition,  429. 

"  Unreal  "  entities,  nature  of,  489  f. 

Usefulness,  286  ff.,  290  ff. 

Values,  60  f.,  66ff.,  206;  aesthetic, 
502  f. ;  and  consciousness,  69  ff.; 
as  objective,  501  ff.;  as  qualities 
of  relational  complexes,  499  ff.; 
by  what  conditioned,  68;  defini- 
tion of,  66 ;  conservation  of,  69, 
509  ff. ;  ethical,  394  f . ;  examples 
of,  497  ff. ;  organization  of,  508  ff.; 
problems  of,  solution  of,  in  mo- 
nistic systems,  347;   p.Toblem  of. 


532 


INDEX 


solution  of,  in  Phenomenalism, 
224  f . ;  the  ultimate  standard  of, 
67 ;  theory  of,  bibliography  of, 
507. 

Variables,  179  ff.;  independent, 
382  ff. 

Veblen,  O.,  12. 

Velocity,  39  f . ;   see  Motion. 

Venn,  I.,  121. 

Vitalism,   342  ff.,   388. 

Voluntarism,  9  f. 

Von  Hiigel,  F.,  124. 

Ward,  J.,  264. 

Watson,  J.  B.,  89. 

Watson,  John,  331. 

Whitehead,  A.  N.,  12,  136,  175, 
193. 

Wholes;  causal,  195  f.;  consistent, 
196  f.;  contradictory,  196;  impli- 
cative,   197;    organic,    184  f.;    or- 


ganic, definition  of,  195 ;  organ- 
ized, 361  ff.,  472  ff.;  see  Relations, 
Space  and  Time;  the  experience 
of,  125. 

Will,  Freedom  of,  394  f.;  in  Volun- 
tarism, 335  ff. 

"Will   to  live,"   339  f. 

"  Will  to  power,"  339  f. 

Windelband,  W.,  42,  69. 

Woodbridge,  F.  J.  E.,  89,  481. 

Words  as  symbols,  and  their  mean- 
ings, 96  ff. 

'•'World,"  The,  as  plastic,  llOf. 

World-soul,  328  ff. 

Wundt,   W.,    109. 

Young,  J.  W.,  175. 

Zeno,  166  ff.,  170  ff. 
Zero,   18;   as  a  reality,  456;  defim« 
tion  of,  415  ff. 


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